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Intellectuals and Change

François Bourricaud
Jill Conway
Richard B. Dobson
Nikki R. Keddie
Leszek Kołakowski
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DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Intellectuals and Change

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

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Preface to the Issue "Intellectuals and Change"

THIS ISSUE of *Dædalus* ought to be read in conjunction with the one that immediately precedes it, entitled, appropriately enough, "Intellectuals and Tradition." The two provide an uncommon perspective on the nature of belief in the modern world, and suggest why conventional explanations of the role of intellectuals rarely probe deeply enough into the varieties of intellectual experience.

Leszek Kołakowski, in considering how the belief in the universality of Reason has fared over historical time, is concerned to distinguish between anti-intellectualism, which is a disparagement of Reason itself, and the more limited attacks on *scientism*, which Kołakowski defines as the belief that all meaningful problems may be resolved with scientific methods. While distinctions between the two are sometimes blurred, their separateness ought to be recognized. Kołakowski is particularly concerned to question those beliefs that "raise questions about the cultural continuity of man and the unity of the human species." Marxism, he says, "in its fundamental presuppositions, conceives of socialism as a continuation of the spiritual work of mankind, as the inheritor and not the destroyer of the existing bourgeois culture, in its intellectual, artistic, and technological dimensions." Marxian socialism, Kołakowski writes, was until the Russian Revolution "access to universal culture." This universalism came to be challenged by the growing nationalism of the Soviet state under Stalin, but so accustomed had socialists come to viewing Marxism in its more universal frame that many could not believe what the evidence so plainly told them. The intellectuals of the interwar years, Kołakowski writes, needed to believe that there was still extant "a power representing or embodying traditional longing for cultural universalism whose agent would be the working class." Those intellectuals who were converts to Hitlerism or Stalinism Kołakowski sees as persons fascinated by barbarism, the cult of force, and the cult of authority. None of these were new things. There had been similar conversions for similar reasons at other times in history. Today, Kołakowski writes, "socialism of the Soviet brand is no longer a center of attraction for conversions of this type. It has been replaced by Maoism and the cult of backward countries, the latter, for some intellectuals, being saviors who are showing new ways to humanity." Kołakowski sees these new enthusiasms as having nothing in common with the enthusiasm that once permeated traditional Marxism. He deplores what he sees as their contempt for knowledge, their cult of violence, their spirit of vengeance, their racism. Kołakowski's concluding sentence is an admirable testimony to his own beliefs; he writes: "The idea that mankind should

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'liberate' itself from its intellectual heritage and create a new 'qualitatively different' science or logic is a support for obscurantist despotism."

There is no easy transition from Kołakowski's essay to any of the others in this issue of *Dædalus*. An effort has been made to group the articles by subject, bringing together the two that treat intellectuals in the Arab world and the Middle East, the two that deal with intellectuals in early modern Spain and in Latin America in the twentieth century, and concluding with the long article on intellectuals in the United States and the Soviet Union, together with two commentaries that have been solicited on this fairly controversial subject.

Menahem Milson, after briefly considering the *'ulama'*, the Islamic religious scholars of the premodern period, reflects on what has happened to the Arab intellectual since Europe's presence, starting with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, became more consequential. The idea of Muslim superiority, once unquestioned, was significantly threatened in the second half of the nineteenth century. European power, exerting itself through a superior military technology and state organization, made Islamic practices seem anachronistic and insufficient. Although certain members of the *'ulama'* and of the governing classes urged modernization on the Muslim states as a way of recovering their position, by the end of the century the *'ulama'* had lost their place as an uncontested intellectual elite in the Arab world and had been replaced by a Westernized intelligentsia, less inclined to dwell on its Islamic identity and more disposed to emphasize its Arab character. This movement, Milson explains, was intimately related to the rise of Arab nationalism.

The Arab intellectual felt great ambivalence toward Western culture; even when committed to modernization as a way of restoring lost power and national pride, he recognized that such a commitment involved a certain loss of self-esteem. In continually emphasizing what the West had borrowed from Islam, particularly in certain scientific fields, there was an implicit concern to minimize Islam's indebtedness to the West and to reiterate a loyalty to traditional Islamic culture. The failures of European civilization were much commented on by Arab intellectuals. They tended to see Western civilization as essentially materialistic, and contrasted it with the spiritual qualities that were said to inhere in Arab civilization. Milson considers also "the crisis of the educated," the deep-seated feelings of alienation that commonly appeared among Arab intellectuals. Whether the estrangement was caused by a sense of isolation from other family members who had not become equally Westernized, or by a separation from the masses, it was exacerbated, the author says, by yet another factor: the intellectuals were politically peripheral. They were divorced from all major power, whether in the area of planning or of implementing change. Once heavily involved in the independence movements, they were no longer useful to the military men who came to lead so many of the Arab

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states. They are not even used by the new authorities as the legitimators of their power. As Milson explains: "The military officers can address the masses directly, using the same ideological formulations which were originally produced by the intellectuals." The intellectuals, having once provided the ideology, are now marginal men.

Nikki Keddie, in analyzing the role of intellectuals in the modern Middle East, starts by considering the conditions that had been common until the later Middle Ages. While a first tentative effort at Westernization was made early in the eighteenth century, this movement never became important. Napoleon is credited with persuading many nineteenth-century Muslims that their survival depended on changes in their military technology, and that this demanded educational reform. The movement for change took many forms; Keddie's interest is to show how the situation developed in Egypt, and also in Istanbul, the center of the Ottoman world. An earlier belief in constitutionalism and parliamentary institutions as the Western models most worthy of emulation gave way in time to a greater emphasis on the importance of nationalism. The successes of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were crucial in conveying this message. Arab nationalism—an invention of the twentieth century—was soon blended with socialism in various parts of the Middle East. Agreeing that the Arab intellectuals have become a marginal class politically, Keddie argues that their alienation and frustrations ought not to be overemphasized. As she explains: "They hold major positions on newspapers, and have influence as writers and professors. The secular authorities rarely heed them, but this is hardly a situation unique to the Arab world." Keddie believes that "intellectuals in the Arab countries have a more difficult task than their peers elsewhere," and one of her principal concerns is to indicate why this is the case.

Juan Linz, in reflecting on intellectual roles in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain, is in fact considering the plight of intellectuals in a post-Reformation Catholic world still dominated by religion. Most Spanish intellectuals, Linz explains, were prepared to accept the established political order; this did not in any significant way affect their creativity. While there was consensus on a "fairly well-delineated range of beliefs, values, and ideologies," this proved to be no impediment to innovation in other spheres. There was, in short, no fundamental conflict between authority and the intellectuals. While the Spanish achievements during the period were not uniformly distinguished—the showing in philosophy, science, and music, for example, was considerably less remarkable than that demonstrated in literature and the arts—the reasons for such variations in accomplishment are by no means obvious.

Linz, insisting that Spanish society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was neither feudal nor bourgeois, sets out to establish the social composition of the intellectual class. While one out of four intellectuals was a university teacher in the sixteenth century, the number similarly

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engaged in the seventeenth century proved to be miniscule. The rise of Madrid—a city without a university—as the cultural center of the nation was only one of several factors that help to explain this change. Just as important, perhaps, was the extent to which both state and church, in their complex bureaucracies, provided men with the income, experience, and leisure that made possible an intellectual life. Many of the leading intellectuals were of course clerics. Linz estimates that in the sixteenth century some 40 per cent of the intellectual elite were members of the clergy; the number declined somewhat in the seventeenth century.

Linz writes also of the political roles of intellectuals, reminding us that such a characterization would have been meaningless to Spaniards of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Linz pays particular attention to the debates that took place over many years concerning the rights of the Spanish crown to conquer America and reflecting on the status of the Indians that were found there. The Spanish kings encouraged this debate, seeking to legitimate their own policies through the support of intellectuals. According to Linz, the situation became very different in the seventeenth century. The debate was no longer so much about goals as about means; questions relating to administration and economics became the chief concern of intellectuals. Linz writes: "A changing society in crisis, which does not encourage criticism of its ultimate values, which feels no guilt for its actions, seems to be particularly favorable to the emergence of empirical social science analysis and reformism." He asks whether there may not be an analogy between the Spanish experience and that of post-Napoleonic France, post-Bismarckian Germany, and post-depression United States.

François Bourricaud, recognizing the difficulties of writing about Latin America as a whole, precisely because the social and economic differences between states are so substantial, still sees the necessity of making certain kinds of generalizations. He suggests that nineteenth-century Latin American provincialism, tempered by a certain reliance on a few major external centers, in Europe or the United States, came to an end sometime in the 1920's. That decade—and not the nineteenth-century decade of independence—is for Bourricaud the critical watershed, after which time questions of dependence and identity become dominant. The intellectuals' concern, he explains, was not so much to raise questions about the critical function of intelligence as to provoke debate about what the social mission of those who styled themselves intellectuals ought to be. Bourricaud, questioning the conventional portrayal of the Latin American intellectual as "a guerrilla-obsessed, revolution-loving romantic," or "a lover of the past, forever hostile to technical progress and the modern organization of industrial societies," prefers to see them as petit bourgeois, who are at one and the same time political radicals, cultural conservatives, anti-imperialists, authoritarian and elitist. Conservatism, Bourricaud tells us, is weak as a political ideology but has a strong position in Latin American culture.

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"Activism" of one kind or other is clearly the *summum bonum* of intellectual life.

Bourricaud draws attention to what he calls "pulpit idealism" or Arielism, which, while condemning industrial society, especially of the Anglo-Saxon variety, constantly emphasizes the virtues of youth and finds its principal support in the student movements of the first decades of the twentieth century. He distinguishes between this Arielism and intellectual movements that took root in the years after World War II. It was then that an earlier populist trend that had emphasized the necessity of industrialization, agrarian reform, and a diminished dependence on imperialism became more generalized. There was a growth of interest in the social sciences in the universities and a proliferation of governmental programs and agencies charged with economic development. The intellectual's role, in short, was to change the world. Bourricaud writes: "It is no longer a matter of writing, or speaking from the heights of a pulpit, or even of participating in the organization—by education or indoctrination—of the popular masses. There is only one duty left: to make the revolution!" Bourricaud adds: "I am well aware that in Spanish the word *revolución* is extremely ambiguous, since it equally designates the most commonplace military coup d'état and the most decisive social transformation." Bourricaud considers the events that have in more recent years dampened the enthusiasm of those who once had such high hopes for development; he reflects on the growing anomie among Latin American intellectuals and their fascination with violence, guerrilla warfare, and urban terrorism. The developers, through their experiences, have indeed become more radical, but they seem no less separated from the masses and the popular culture that they continue to extol.

In considering the role of intellectuals in the United States and the Soviet Union, S. M. Lipset and Richard Dobson ask whether these societies are not becoming increasingly dependent on their intellectuals precisely at a time when these intellectuals are becoming more openly critical of the political and social order they are expected to extol. Reflecting on the situation in the United States, Lipset and Dobson show how long-standing is the adversary role of intellectuals in America. They agree with others that for almost the whole of the twentieth century the "political weight of American intellectuals has been on the progressive, liberal, and leftist side." While they would not deny the substantial differences between the intellectual climate of the 1960's and that of the 1930's, the authors choose to emphasize the consistency of the general leftist orientations of intellectuals both inside and outside universities. As for the Soviet Union, the authors' chief concern is to explore what they call "the widespread diffusion of opposition tendencies among Soviet intellectuals." Again, while not wishing to exaggerate the character of this "adversary role," Lipset and Dobson speak of the "rebirth" of a critical intelligentsia since the death

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of Stalin. They suggest that "the guiding role of the Communist party of the Soviet Union is being challenged by a new intelligentsia—not the stratum of white-collar workers hailed by Stalin in the thirties as the creation and servant of the party—but by a conscious, amorphously organized group of intellectuals who dare to speak their minds and engage in independent activity in support of their ideals."

Lipset and Dobson seek to explain how the social structures of two such very different societies have contributed to the formation of a critical intelligentsia. The institutionalized reward structure for scientific and scholarly work is held to contribute to the formation of such a class. More important, however, is that scholarship imposes a demand for a certain freedom from outside interference, and, in itself, helps to breed independence. While this is true of the scientist and scholar, who ought to be seen as "knowledge-producers," it is not equally true for writers and artists. Lipset and Dobson consider the role of patronage and markets in leading such people to become participants in the so-called "adversary" class. They are careful to distinguish between the substantially different conditions that prevail in the United States and the Soviet Union for men and women engaged in these pursuits. Their conclusion, however, is that "the Soviet 'adversary culture' gains strength from and unites intellectuals in the academic world and those in the arts."

Lipset and Dobson argue that the growing influence of "intellectuals and the university community on the body politic of many nations is not a function simply of increased numbers, of the vital services provided, or even of increased general social prestige." Rather, they say, the influence is tied to intellectuals' capacity to exert greater authority over other elites—in government, the churches, business establishments, the mass media. The authors reflect on how the intellectuals have influenced the churches in the West and how the Communist party's ideology in the Soviet Union—at least in its cruder dogmatic forms—has been challenged by the development of science. While accepting the fact that the links between the intellectual community and the political elite are significantly weaker in the Soviet Union than in most Western countries, the authors seek to emphasize the gravity of the problem in all the societies that they have examined. Since post-industrial society depends on trained intelligence and on research and innovation, Lipset and Dobson see the greatest significance in the fact that the political leaders appear to be "at odds with their intellectuals."

Jill Conway, in considering these views on the character of the American intellectual, asks whether the principal theses can be supported by historical evidence. She raises the fundamental question whether an activist society whose intellectual tradition is essentially pragmatic is capable of producing an adversary culture. She is not certain that it can even conceive of one. Radical criticism, she argues, has not been paramount in the uni-

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versities; indeed, the research that has been conducted there has proved exceedingly useful both to government and business, and has in fact been dependent on both for its financial support. The fundamental criticism of the society that Lipset and Dobson think to be so manifest seems quite obscure to one who looks at these phenomena from across the Canadian border.

Martin Malia, examining the arguments from another perspective, asks whether it is not important "to point out certain historical and social factors which could limit or diminish the recent impact of critical intellectuals in both East and West." Believing that the differences between national traditions and social and political patterns are critical in determining the character and role of any intellectual class, Malia dwells on what he sees as the substantial differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this respect, the capacity of the American system to withstand criticism and "co-opt" the critic is contrasted with the Soviet situation where there is, in Malia's words, "a national heritage that combines the most exalted kind of critical ideals with a virtually complete lack of institutional means for implementing them." The number of active dissenters in the Soviet Union is obviously very small, Malia writes, and while there can be no accurate knowledge of their precise number, their activities are scarcely known to the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people. Also, their protest is almost always in literary terms; the principal critics are poets and novelists, and not, as in the West, social scientists. Malia finds no great threat to the Soviet system in such an intellectual opposition.

This issue of *Dædalus* is the second that has been recently published on intellectuals. A debt is owed Professor S. N. Eisenstadt of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for his help with this volume. Many of the essays presented here were first discussed at a conference on Intellectuals and Tradition convened in Jerusalem in March 1971 under the auspices of the Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation as part of its program on the Dynamics of Cultures. Our thanks are due to the Foundation for making early drafts of these papers available to us.

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LESZEK KOŁAKOWSKI

Intellectuals Against Intellect

THE WHOLE of the spiritual and technological culture of our world is based on the belief in the *universality of Reason* in the *double meaning* of the word. The universality of Reason may mean, first, that the same rules of bivalent logic and the same rules of empirical verification are applicable to all questions that may occur to the human mind. Second, it may mean that the value of knowledge is determined *entirely* by the correct application of these rules, independent of its ethnic, social, religious, or psychological origin, and that all human beings are able, in principle, to think according to the same rules. This means that in all questions where the use of reason is possible, communication, discussion, and dialogue are also possible.

The belief in the universality of Reason in both senses came to articulation over centuries, slowly and not without difficulties. We find the full expression of this belief in the developed bourgeois culture of the seventeenth century. However, it must be noticed that the first form of the belief in the universality of Reason does not logically follow from the second; that is, one may, without contradiction, accept the second while rejecting the first. Criticism of the universality of Reason is sometimes directed toward the first and sometimes toward the second meaning, and the attacks are so differentiated in results and motivations that it is doubtful that we could give them a common historical meaning.

Criticism of the universality of Reason in the first sense, that is, criticism of the universal applicability of the rules of *positive* thinking, was associated with the defense of religious faith against rationalist and skeptical erosion. But its social sense is far from being always the same. Criticism of reason may be a defense of an establishment with ideological claims that must protect itself from rational skepticism. Criticism of reason may be a weapon of the oppressed and uneducated classes to whom the instruments of rational discussion are inaccessible; intellectual rigors, logic, and education itself, monopolized as they are by the privileged orders, often appear to these classes as a perfidious device of the devil. That is why they oppose their own spiritual poverty as a mark of superiority to the existing social order.

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Every establishment protects itself against criticism, but not all need anti-intellectual ideologies for this purpose. Any criticism of the establishment is criticism of a certain consecrated tradition, but not all of them undermine the tradition of universalist rationalism. In the history of Christianity we find many examples of aggressive antirationalism that appears now as a tool of the conservative resistance of the ruling apparatus against the critique of intellectuals, now as a weapon of the unlettered exploited classes that assail the sanctified order together with its cultural and intellectual superstructure. Christianity has defined itself as opposed to secular and rationalist culture; it appeared as a movement of unenlightened people who have sanctified their own ignorance as the hallmark of a higher enlightenment whose origin is divine. At the same time, however, Christianity defined itself, in opposition to Jewish particularism, as a movement with universalist claims. This first ideological variant of Christianity, as articulated in Paul's letters, contained simultaneously vehement assaults against pagan intellectual culture and the belief in the basic unity of the human species—a position that was intended to serve and did effectively serve as an instrument of reconciliation with pagan culture. The history of Christianity considered from this standpoint is ambiguous: it marks a radical discontinuity with the foregoing culture while it maintains a belief in the unity of human nature sanctified in God, a belief that favors the acceptance of reason as a universal tool. That is why the assimilation of Greek culture started early and why the open hostility to reason, common to writers who represented "the plebeian side" of the Christian tradition, coexisted almost from the beginning with efforts of adaptation by those who looked to pagan culture as a natural preparation for the supernatural revolution, and who sought to adjust Christian ideas to the needs and level of the enlightened privileged classes.

This ambiguity—this belief in the basic discontinuity of human culture, interrupted in a miraculous way in the Resurrection of Christ, together with a belief in the basic goodness of human nature, involving a partial acceptance of pagan culture—is deeply rooted in Christianity. The whole of its history confirms this ambiguity. The moment a new urban culture arises, there is an unavoidable consequence: the emancipation of intellectuals. The Christian establishment begins by defending its anti-intellectual superiority over the new secular wisdom, but eventually it assimilates this wisdom, doing so with extraordinary ability, and making it an instrument of its own. In the eleventh-century controversy between dialecticians and antidialecticians we notice a situation that may never reappear with such sharpness of outline. Peter Damiani wrote in a small treatise, *De perfectione monachorum,* that monks who study secular science are like men who flee from an honest wife to a harlot. In the treatise *De sancta simplicitate scientiae inflanti anteponenda,* he observed that the devil was the first teacher of grammar since he taught our progenitors to

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inflect the word "God" in plural (*eritis sicut Dei*). His was an extremely well-aimed intuition. Four centuries later, from the end of the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth centuries, grammarians were in the vanguard of the critical attack against tradition through their philological analysis of the Bible. The period from Antonio de Lebrixa and Erasmus to Spinoza and Richard Simon was one of the most important in the ideological corrosion of Christianity, whatever were the motivations of those who wrote in the way they did.

The open anti-intellectualism, protecting tradition against rational criticism, considerably weakened once Christianity succeeded in absorbing and assimilating in its own way the philosophical inheritance of antiquity, including the logical abilities that gave Christianity a weapon of its own. When the Thomist principle, holding that truth of faith is *supra non contra rationem*, prevailed within the Church, and the powers of logic were at the service of Orthodoxy as well as its critics, militant irrationalism was more often a weapon of the plebeian movements that fell on godless reason as an ally of social privilege. It was natural that in a situation where education was a privilege and rational philosophy and theology were used in ideological protection of that privilege, that reforming and revolutionary movements of the oppressed classes took the form of attacks against reason. Intellectuals who articulated this anti-intellectualism usually did not oppose Reason to Unreason, but contrasted the perverted human reason to the living faith of the regenerated. Savonarola was certain that any country gammer knew more than Plato and Aristotle since she knew what was most important and was inaccessible to pagan wisdom—she knew the Savior. Luther wrote that whoever tried to apply human logic to the Holy Trinity would unavoidably stop believing in it. Peter Gonesius, an ideologist of early Polish antitrinitarianism, stated that whoever deals with dialectics is the brother of the Turk.

The attacks of the Reformation on the value of Reason were in most cases limited; what mattered was not just any kind of intellectual activity but the scholastic techniques of validating faith with rational efforts, that is, the use of reason in religious questions. Criticism of the intellect that tries to inquire into divine secrets and that imagines it can really understand or justify the truth of faith was a consequence of a basic mistrust during the Reformation of human nature and human natural forces. This criticism was related to the idea of a democratic Church, a Church liberated from the distinction between an educated clergy and an ignorant crowd of believers who require a human mediator in their communication with God; in matters of faith all people are equally ignorant, or—what is the same—equally capable. To trust scholastic reason means to feed human pride; as such, this trust not only fails to support the believer in his faith, but actually perverts it. The simpletons' faith, that is indifferent to the subtle distinctions of theologians, and insensitive to the growing mass of

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arguments and counterarguments, resists temptation better than scholastic wisdom that holds up to ridicule the divine mysteries while trying to support them with its syllogisms.

To be sure, criticism of the universal applicability of reason is not a feature specific only to the Reformation. All variants of Christianity (except late deist doctrines that do not belong to any Orthodoxy) assumed that there were at least some elements of faith which could not be known except by revelation. Philosophers, however, differed widely about what in religion might be accessible to reason—from those who believed, as Anselm did, that almost everything in religion may have a rational validation, to those who rejected any rational justification in this domain. Christian mystic-pantheists, such as Meister Eckhart, or simple pantheists, such as Nicholas Cusanus, denied that there was any value in Aristotelian logic outside the finite world and argued that thinking about divine reality cannot be submitted to the principle of contradiction. Fourteenth-century nominalists rejected all attempts to turn faith into knowledge and so did their inheritors—the founders of the sixteenth-century Reformation. All later efforts to protect faith against rationalist criticism—from Pascal to Cardinal Newman—articulated different kinds of limitation in the universal applicability of scientific rules of thinking; philosophers who undertook these efforts tried to show that Reason was passing beyond its valid limits whenever it wanted to decide about questions properly reserved for the order of faith.

This kind of criticism of reason cannot properly be called anti-intellectualism. It is not criticism of the intellect but rather criticism of *scientism,* that is, criticism of the belief that all meaningful problems may be resolved with scientific methods, that their susceptibility to such solution properly defines the meaningfulness of problems, and that we must not profess any convictions which fail to keep this condition. In this century, criticism of the universality of Reason so conceived is a constant topic of philosophy and appears outside specifically religious thinking—in intuitionist philosophy, in *Lebensphilosophie* as a whole, and in existential meditation as well (especially in Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel). The idea that analytical reason and the rigors produced by the sciences are inapplicable in the reflection about God, about human existence (in the peculiar existential meaning of the word existence), about Being as a whole transgressing the sum of particular beings, does not belong to the anti-intellectual but rather to the antiscientist tradition. Otherwise, everything in the history of culture that is not strictly in line with positivist scientism would be included under the rubric anti-intellectualism.

Criticism of the universal claims of analytical reason may be, and used to be, based upon rational arguments. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn between the criticism of the universal aspirations of analytical reason and the properly anti-intellectual criticism based on the idea that in questions

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where rational discussion and controversy are possible, final decisions depend on social, ethnic, religious, or psychological commitment, and that the object of conflicts is not truth in the current meaning but the function, value, or origin of ideas.

It is one thing to maintain that meditation on those aspects of existence which escape discursive thinking may be justified and fruitful; it is another to claim that in most important social, religious, or philosophical questions there are rights and wrongs founded not on arguments but on origin or function, and that a right of this kind may be imposed as a truth of a higher grade regardless of whether common ways of arguing are possible. In the first sense criticism of the universality of Reason is not necessarily dangerous to the culture, since it neither questions the possibility of dialogue nor denies the value of normal ways of arguing in domains accessible to scientific inquiry. Criticism of the universality of Reason in the second sense is dangerous. This second universalism assumes that all people participate in the same "rational nature," to speak in Aristotelian-scholastic language, or, to speak in a modernized way, that basic structures of thinking are qualities of the human species (without prejudging the origin of this identity), and that we are therefore allowed to believe in the continuity and universality of human spiritual culture that makes understanding possible and the ideas of criticism and tolerance rational. If the universalism of Reason in that version is undermined, fanaticism, intolerance, and refusal of discussion inevitably follow.

Certainly the distinction between these two kinds of attack against reason was not clearly articulated for a long time in the history of Christianity. At the time of the Reformation both kinds of criticism existed, interwoven in such a way that only analysis by a historian can separate them. Actually, the Reformers often criticized not only the attempts to apply logic and reason to questions reserved for faith, but the pagan culture as a whole. Precisely because it was pagan, they denied its intellectual and moral achievements; these derived from pagan, or "natural," sources and were not of divine inspiration. On this point the controversy between Erasmus and Luther is important. Dispute about the virtues of pagans—that is, about whether the moral values of the pre-Christian world were real values though they emanated from human natural forces (as Erasmus claimed)—was part of a larger dispute, which in philosophy was centered on the value of pagan philosophical thought and logic. Attitudes differed widely on this point. The extremists of the Reformation assumed that a pagan simply as pagan could not be right and that in stating this no further inquiry was needed, not unlike the statement that the demon is a liar by definition and therefore lies even when he tells the truth. Simplifying, we may say that the idea of the limited validity of reason, especially the rules that eliminated religious questions from the competence of analytical reason, were arising from the bourgeois culture within modern Christianity while

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plebeian variants of Christianity were rather anti-intellectual in the proper sense, that is, they rejected cultural continuity and all criteria—intellectual or moral—that could claim universal validity and would be independent of the opposition between paganism and Christianity.

The question of whether there are criteria for intellectual work that are universally valid for all societies and all historical epochs is far from being obsolete; on the contrary, we are witnessing its growing vitality in this century. When Hugo Grotius, one of the outstanding minds of Christian bourgeois culture, wrote that there was a Christian theology, but no Christian surgery, Christian geometry, or Christian political science, he was articulating a problem that would revive in our own century in almost exactly the same form. The oppositions "pagan-Christian," not unlike "Jewish-Aryan," "bourgeois-proletarian," or "black-white," if they are taken to cover the culture as a whole, and especially its intellectual values, serve to raise questions about the cultural continuity of man and the unity of the human species. The belief that these or similar oppositions are valid anywhere (needless to say, some are valid in certain domains of culture) is one of the greatest dangers for humanity.

To be sure, the opposition between proletarian and bourgeois culture, or rather between the culture of exploited classes and the exploiters, is not absent in early variants of socialism. There is a striking similarity between the mental structure found in the nineteenth-century anarchist movement, in particular in Mikhail Bakunin and his followers, and that of various plebeian Christian movements. Bakunin is not free from a certain inconsistency on this point. However, his idea of the "revolt of life against science," his attacks on universities as bulwarks of elitism, his faith in the *Lumpenproletariat* as the leading force of revolution—all this forms a consistent whole. The Polish anarchist Jan Wacław Machajski (who wrote principally in Russian) was even more radical in this respect than Bakunin. He claimed that the Marxian idea of socialism was a product of particular interests among the intelligentsia who aimed to take the place of the existing privileged classes and to preserve untouched the system of inequality and exploitation. It was for this reason that the egalitarian society had to begin by expropriating the capital of the intelligentsia, that capital being knowledge. Knowledge, accessible only to the privileged minority, would be a weapon in the struggle for privilege. One may find even stronger formulations of this idea in other, less known anarchist writers. Dislike for intellectuals and for science is present also in other elements of the nineteenth-century workers movement, especially among the Proudhonists.

Georges Sorel, at the beginning of the twentieth century, formulated in the clearest way the objections that the plebeian movement—the movement of the working class—needed to have to oppose the tradition of intellectualism and rationalism and intellectuals as such. They may be summarized briefly as follows:

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First, intellectualism is unable to rise above the worship of utilitarian values; it shatters in a natural way traditional tribal solidarity, favoring the efficient and rational productive organization. Only within irrational tribal communities do the supreme human values flourish: devotion, heroism, contempt for immediate gain. Intellectualism views society through theories of social contract, variously formulated, and it is precisely for this reason that human dignity and spontaneous solidarity find no place among its views.

Second, reason is a natural ally of determinist doctrines. It aims to grasp the world as a system essentially determined in its evolution by natural laws, thereby weakening human belief in the strength of will and the possibility of true creativity.

Third, intellectualism and reason itself are natural allies of social reform against the idea of revolution. Partial changes and gradual reforms can be justified, foreseen, planned, and organized in a rational way, but the Apocalypse of the global revolution cannot look for support to rationalist doctrines and rational justification. It needs a myth, the only force capable of organizing the energy of the proletariat necessary for the struggle. One of the most important tasks of the proletariat is not to be blinded by the values of rationalist bourgeois culture—it must seek to escape the fate of Germans who sought learning from the conquered Romans and let themselves be dominated by their culture instead of overcoming it; it must escape the fate of the Reformation that in a similar way destroyed its own energy in assimilating the values of humanism.

Fourth, the values of intellectualism belong not only to the privileged classes but are themselves put at the service of the privileged, who assume that the highest human values are precisely those which can be shared only by a privileged elite. Hence, they sanctify inequality and oppression as necessary conditions for the flourishing of culture.

There are in Sorel's attacks some well-taken points that ought not to be disregarded. It is not only that the sets of values he opposed to each other have been contradictory throughout the history of culture. We cannot be certain whether they are not permanently contradictory, and whether a culture is possible that would be dominated entirely by this type of intellectualism Sorel fought against—a culture that would be scientistic and utilitarian in all respects. It is incontestable that intellectualism and the worship of reason are natural foes of the belief in the value of tradition; the link is obvious, it is confirmed historically, and is logically clear. But it is also incontestable that we can scarcely imagine how certain essential values, indispensable for society, can effectively survive without some form of cult to surround the tradition. It is obvious that, although the rationalist doctrine does not itself necessarily imply determinist belief, the psychological and historical link between the two is too strong to be considered unimportant. Rationalist ideologies are not simply affirmations of rea-

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son as a distinguishing mark of the human species; they have an inherent underlying belief in the unlimited capacity of reason to assimilate the world, a belief that in principle everything can be submitted to rational interpretation. Therefore, rationalist ideologies have a natural tendency to maintain that the world in all of its aspects is in principle predictable, and they are hostile to the idea of creativity (in the Bergsonian sense). Determinism is natural to rationalism. On the other hand, it may be a discouraging doctrine for those who wish to believe in the value of human initiative, irrespective of whether or not certain alleged historical laws guarantee its success. It is true that determinism was a part of Marxism in its evolutionist version, dominating in the period of the Second International, and that many Marxist theorists of that time (George Plekhanov, Karl Kautsky, Antonio Labriola) tried to show that historical determinism did not contradict the need for individual engagement; on the contrary, that it furnished the strongest reason for such engagement, giving the fighters a certitude that history was on their side (or, at least that they were on the side of history). In this respect, however, Antonio Gramsci's idea seems to be more accurate—that belief in the historical laws which guarantee victory to the struggling proletariat is rather the expression of the fact that the proletariat is still a class incapable of independent initiative and requires comfort in doctrines that promise victory than that it is an explicit appeal to struggle.

Whatever is correct in Sorel or in those anarchists with similar ideas can only be turned against the most expansionist version of intellectualism, against any ideology that assumes the reduction of all values to those accepted in the tradition of utilitarianism and the reduction of all admissible human convictions to those that fulfill conditions imposed by scientistic theories. But Sorel's appeals for a complete break with bourgeois culture—one of the reasons for the rather disgraceful success of his writings among Italian fascists—are by no means defensible by arguments which speak in favor of the value of tradition and of nonutilitarian virtues. That human reason must capitulate before certain questions that mankind cannot be rid of; that rational means do not allow for legitimizing the hopes that are needed for humanity; that universal determinism is an ideology as any other—these facts offer no justification for breaking the theme of cultural continuity. Sorel is only an example of the aberration to which intellectuals succumb when they succeed in persuading themselves that solidarity with the oppressed classes requires that they admire, not heal, what has been the great misfortune of these classes, their inability to participate in the development of spiritual culture.

It is incontestable that the position of intellectuals is a form of privilege, and that those who see their ideal in the absolute equality of mankind in every respect must demand the destruction of culture. If equality in every respect is the highest value, then the most important task of society is to

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press all people down to the level of its least enlightened parts. It resembles the ideal of certain eighteenth-century totalitarian utopias, the exact opposite of the doctrine Marx called scientific socialism. Marx sought to abolish privilege resulting from command over the means of production and to abolish also the privilege of education insofar as this was a consequence of the privilege of ownership; his purpose was to provide access to culture for everybody. That is why the cult of, and the striving for, knowledge were characteristic traits of the labor movement at the time that it was under the strong influence of Marxian theory. Movements which propagated equality in all respects as their principal ideal aimed at a very different end; their purpose was to liquidate rather than to spread culture and knowledge. Even if we believed in Trotsky's prophecy that in a socialist world everybody would be able to achieve the spiritual level of Aristotle, Goethe, and Marx, we would assume that to achieve this ideal the unenlightened strata of the population would have to rise first to the level of its present elites, and, then, that cultural differences would exist for a long time, the abolished inequalities in ownership notwithstanding. This obviously contradicts the ideals of anarchism and all those other socialist utopias that have had envy rather than a striving for justice as their underlying motivation and that put forward as their aim the pulling down of the whole of mankind to the level of its most ignorant strata, thereby glorifying illiteracy as a proper road to the liberation of humanity.

This kind of mentality appears to be spreading in our culture. It has always depended on the obviously reasonable observation that spiritual culture is linked to material privilege. Indeed, throughout human history inequality and exploitation have been the source of cultural progress or—what is much the same—the condition of culture was the free time that a minority enjoyed because it was denied to the majority.

Certain formulations of Marx suggest that he believed in the particular class character of the culture as a whole. It is certain, however, that Marxism, in its fundamental presuppositions, conceives of socialism as a continuation of the spiritual work of mankind, as the inheritor and not the destroyer of the existing bourgeois culture, in its intellectual, artistic, and technological dimensions. To the overwhelming majority of intellectuals in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of this century access to Marxian socialism was access to universal culture. Socialism presented itself as a carrier of spiritual universalism, and so did Marxism, conceived as the ideological and theoretical articulation of socialism. To the intellectuals of the Second International (with a few exceptions), being a socialist or being committed to the cause of the working class did not mean being an advocate of an essentially different culture which broke the spiritual continuity of humanity and which had different rules of thinking and different moral values. On the contrary, it was a proletariat which—conforming to Marx's idea—had to be the spiritual inheritor of everything

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that the privileged classes had created, that they had kept as their privilege, and that they were no longer capable of preserving. There was no question of an essentially different "proletarian culture" opposed as a whole to the "bourgeois culture" and to bourgeois values.

In this respect the Russian Left of the Second International also shared this essential belief in the continuity of culture. It is confirmed by the clearly unsympathetic attitude of both Lenin and Trotsky toward the theory and practice of Soviet "Proletcult." That belief assumed that the proletariat in power, instead of assimilating and enriching the achievements of the existing culture, would create from nothing, by virtue of its peculiar mission, an essentially different culture of its own in which all previous institutional forms of social life as well as all earlier criteria of intellectual and artistic valuation would lose their validity. Proletcult was a barren formation; it remained as a historical curiosity without leaving any value that would be worthy of notice. However, its liquidation came less as the result of the triumph of the traditional socialist idea of cultural universalism and more as the result of the growing nationalist character of the new Soviet state. This state, rather than serving as the carrier of universalism, became a continuation of Great-Russian chauvinism. As such, Soviet culture admitted the principle of selective cultural continuity while virtually limiting that continuity to specific Russian features that began to be proclaimed as the supreme incorporation of the new socialist culture. Specifically socialist canons of art appeared to be, in the Stalinist period, dogmatization of the petit bourgeois tastes of the new privileged class, which cut itself off almost completely from the bourgeois tradition of the West.

This fact, so obvious today, was by no means so clear during the prewar years. That is why many Western intellectuals—especially during the years of the Great Depression and the fascist threat—still motivated by traditional ideas of universalism, supported Marxism and socialism, and saw the Soviet Union as its principal carrier. The need to believe in the existence of a movement representing this universalism was of such extraordinary strength that it blinded even the most outstanding minds to facts that —it seems now—ought to have been apparent to the most superficial observer. From the present perspective the reaction of many Western intellectuals to the Moscow trials, for example, seems unbelievable. These clumsy, fantastic spectacles, full of contradictions, where stupidity, cruelty, and lies seemed to cry for the vengeance of heaven, gained the support or sympathy of people like Romain Rolland, Henri Barbusse, Bertolt Brecht, and Leon Feuchtwanger. It is impossible today to read without horror the panegyric of Sidney and Beatrice Webb—brilliant and incorruptible beyond doubt—who, in the days of the most ferocious Stalinist terror, glorified the democratic Soviet regime and proclaimed its superiority over the British democracy. This blindness, unbelievable as it seems today, emanated from a desire to believe that there was still on earth a power representing or embodying

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traditional longing for cultural universalism whose agent would be the working class. These were unforgivable and fantastic mistakes, but anti-intellectualism was not necessarily involved in the attitude.

Of a quite different character were the conversions of intellectuals to Hitlerism or Stalinism, which were conscious conversions to barbarism, known and accepted as such. In fact, there were virtually no other kinds of conversions to Hitlerism, since it had no such phraseological veil inherited from universalist tradition as Stalinism used to exploit. Moreover, Stalinism also attracted some people as an embodiment of Marxist universalism, and tempted others as a march of the "splendid Asiatics" called to destroy decaying European civilization. There remains something enigmatic in the problem of conversions of the latter kind, not unlike the problem of active Hitlerites in intellectual circles. Our generation, which has seen the fall of men of such caliber as Knut Hamsun or Gerhart Hauptmann, which reads texts of Martin Heidegger putting his metaphysics at the service of fanatical criminals, during the life of which Nobel prize winner Philipp Lenard wrote his famous racist *German Physics*—this generation cannot be satisfied with the simple (and true) statement that every system and every movement finds intellectuals to serve it. It seems, as it were, that in many intellectuals there is something like "Naphta's component" (from *The Enchanted Mountain*): an independent intelligence impeded by its own independence and looking for an authority originating in other, nonintellectual sources. The fascination by barbarity, the cult of force, and the cult of authority are not new inventions among intellectuals. We observe similar cases in the history of early conversions to Christianity among Roman intellectuals; they acceded to the new faith aware of its primitivism and accepted it as such, feeling that they voluntarily submitted to a supreme authority, ashamed, so to speak, of their own human wisdom and ready to renounce it on behalf of "the madness of faith." The period of the Reformation and Counter Reformation furnish examples of similar attitudes. When studying the religious history of the seventeenth century, for instance, I was struck by the fact that an obscure French prophetess, a complete ignorant, Antoinette Bourignon, was suddenly acknowledged as an incorporation of the supreme divine wisdom. She was thought to be a spiritual authority, and acknowledged as such by men from the highest intellectual elite of Europe, including Johannes Komensky, Jan Swammerdam, and Pierre Poiret. The attitude of Florentine humanists toward Savonarola was similar. We may explain conversions of this type, in psychoanalytic terms, as a vengeance of id upon the excessively developed ego or, in social terms, as a result of the alienation that almost every intellectual experiences and that forces him to look for community other than the elitist République des Lettres, giving him the sense of confidence, spiritual security, and authority that is lacking in intellectual work. Whatever the explanation, one may be sure that any religious or social movement representing the most aggressive anti-intellectualism will

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find the enthusiastic support of a certain number of intellectuals brought up in Western bourgeois civilization who ostentatiously discard its values to humble themselves before the splendor of a sound barbarism.

Socialism of the Soviet brand is no longer a center of attraction for conversions of this type. It has been replaced by Maoism and the cult of backward countries, the latter, for some intellectuals, being saviors who are showing new ways to humanity. It seems almost incredible that the cult of primitivism combined with the belief in the revival of mankind through its least developed segments should commonly appear under the label of Marxism. I do not maintain that there is only a single "genuine" Marxism and that the others are "distorted" or "falsified"; on the contrary, I think that there are several incompatible versions or varieties of Marxism that can lay claim to continuing in certain respects the Marxian tradition. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that certain elements of the Marxian vision of the world were formulated so clearly and belong so obviously to the very core of the doctrine that it is impossible to discard them and to maintain the pretense of being Marxist. The idea of Marx that the industrial proletariat of highly developed countries should be the vehicles for socialist transformations is one such central theme. One may believe that social developments in this century do not permit this hope to be maintained; but if this is so, then one must admit that Marxism is a doctrine inapplicable to the modern world and that it has nothing to offer us. It is a pure verbal game to give the name of Marxism to a statement that mankind will be liberated from oppression, exploitation, and misery thanks to masses of illiterate peasants from the most backward parts of the world. Marxism without the industrial proletariat is like Christianity without God, and though even that phenomenon exists nowadays, there is no reason to consider it as anything but a play on words.

Let us leave aside the unimportant problem of denominational labels. I maintain that contemporary conversions of intellectuals to Maoist or similar faiths cannot be interpreted simply as an act of solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, and that it is not to be compared with the assent that intellectuals, once upon a time, gave to traditional Marxism. The latter was access to a movement that seemed to represent the continuity of culture, a respect for knowledge, and a regard for intellectual values. The contemporary enthusiasm of intellectuals for peasant and *Lumpenproletarian* movements or for movements inspired by the ideology of national minorities is an enthusiasm for that which in these movements is reactionary and hostile to culture—for their contempt of knowledge, for the cult of violence, for the spirit of vengeance, for racism. Racism is still racism even when it is the racism of a discriminated minority, as is the case of certain forms of the American black movement. It is one thing to take the side of discriminated elements of mankind in their efforts to overcome misery and humiliation; it is another thing to support every form of barbarism and

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violence provided that these are carried out by the discriminated strata, and to proclaim as "progressive" every movement that claims to be an "enemy of the bourgeoisie." (Did not the fascist movements also often draw their energy from the revolt of the discriminated *Lumpenproletariat* and use antibourgeois phraseology?) It is one thing to criticize Western democracies because of exploitation of poor countries or because of their inefficiency in coping with the misery of the third world; it is another thing to make of this criticism the pretext for admiring the most obscure dictatorships, provided only that they threaten the white world with destruction. It is one thing to fight for equal rights in education and another to kneel before black racists who stigmatize the existing intellectual tradition as "irrelevant white knowledge" (as stated in the proclamation of the Black Students Union), and to see a mark of particular supremacy in the cultural backwardness of the black population. Certainly, one cannot completely exclude the possibility that contemporary admirers of barbarism represent a real tendency in the historical process and that all the technological and spiritual achievements of modern times will be destroyed in an unprecedented cataclysm, compared to which the fall of the Roman Empire will seem a trivial stumble, and that the surviving part of mankind will, for centuries, be thrown into primitivism and misery. Such apocalyptic visions excite the childish imaginations of certain intellectuals, but they have little to do with the idea of helping oppressed and suffering humanity.

We have now, in the light of twentieth-century ethnological inquiry, good reason to presume that basic patterns of thinking are invariable throughout the history of the human species, and that they are independent of the vicissitudes of human civilizations. It is irrelevant in this context, important though it might be from a philosophical standpoint, how this universality may be explained: by genetic circumstances (it may be argued, for example, that basic rules of probabilistic thinking simply articulate the way the conditional reflexes are produced and extinguished); by the nature of language; by divine will; or by the structure of transcendental rationality. However, even if these basic patterns are common to people of all cultures and all ages, the same cannot be said about the *awareness* of this universality. From the fact that we share the same logic, it does not automatically follow that we know we do. On the contrary, the awareness of such a community is the product of a particular culture and perhaps only a particular perspective of that culture.

This awareness of universality being visible only from a particular perspective makes it difficult to separate the universal and the particular in our own consciousness, since to grasp our participation in universal patterns we are bound, perhaps, to belong to one particular civilization. Probably we would not be able to discover what is universally human in ourselves had we not lost, in general, belief in the superiority and exclusive value of our culture (though it is still ours). We imagine today that we are able to

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absorb specific values of all ages and all civilizations, that we can be at the same time Japanese of the twelfth century, Aztecs of the fifteenth century, ancient Greeks, Polynesians, and cave dwellers of Altamira. But this openness, this flexibility or ability to absorb, is a product of that unique civilization which produced a sort of indifference to its own specific values. Our universalism is another name for our indifference, for lack of belief in *any* specific cultural values. In cultures which did not articulate the universality of patterns of thinking (even if people actually were following them), the feeling of belonging to one's own culture could be much more total and all-embracing than it is for us. We usually make a distinction between the order of cognition and the order of values, between what is *true* (justified with the help of universal rules of deductive and probabilistic logic) and what is *valid* (what cannot be justified without appeal to tradition). However, this distinction cannot remove all doubts about what elements in our culture belong to what domain. This belief in the universality of certain cultural patterns (including patterns of thinking) runs against the need for "total commitment" or for "global belonging" to one particular culture or subculture or to a militant group (provided that the ideologies of a universally human cause are usually expressed also in groups with particular vested interests). Total commitment is difficult if we remain aware that we share with our enemies some basic values, even intellectual ones. The feeling of total commitment allows us to claim that what seems wrong from the standpoint of alleged universal criteria of thinking may be right or may turn out to be a higher truth from the perspective of supreme values. Strongly militant groups—be they religious or political, be they a threatened establishment or a revolutionary movement—often produce this tendency to deny any kind of universality. If all groups that need an ideology stressing such a denial find intellectuals responding to this demand, it may be partly explained by the peculiar social position of intellectuals themselves. In other words, it may be argued that intellectuals not only happen to express anti-intellectual tendencies arising in different milieus, but that their own situation produces this tendency as well. Precisely because social functions of intellectuals include the acceptance of universally valid patterns of thinking as obligatory norms, intellectuals are unable to constitute a group giving to its members that feeling of total commitment, or the sense of belonging that many religious and political groups are able to supply. Briefly, what is usually called the alienation of intellectuals, their often described feeling of being uprooted, of not belonging, may produce ideological needs which are expressed in joining and articulating anti-intellectual tendencies in existing movements.

This feeling of not belonging may be extremely strong and is produced not only by the peculiar situation of intellectuals, but also by all circumstances that make life in contemporary societies more and more dependent on rationally organized technological and administrative systems, which

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destroy all remnants of the tribal community and all village-like communication. The longing for global commitment and the desire to withdraw from a society where the communication is being carried out more and more through these intermediary systems are among the dominating motives of many philosophical, religious, political, and social phenomena in our culture. An individual may try to satisfy this need in different ways: in political participation, in mysticism, in drugs. (I do not suggest that all these kinds of commitments have the same social meaning or the same value, only that similar individual motivations may work in all of them.) Drugs may be a way of breaking the cultural continuity on an individual level, a desperate attempt to return to the lost union with the world, but the ideology of drugs may express some socially determined requirements for such a break. (One can hear American revolutionaries explaining that the American establishment is fighting against drugs for political reasons, because drugs enable people to get rid of the internalized values of the establishment, inoculated in education; the values and the ideas of the establishment are so deeply rooted and internalized that except for drugs there is apparently no other way of liberating oneself from them.)

Intellectuals are by no means called to govern the world. Their most important function is to maintain and to convey the accumulated stock of human spiritual culture as common stock; in other words, their work is meaningful only in terms of the assumption that despite all struggles and conflicts the human species participates in essentially the same intellectual structure, and that all the world's conflicts do not destroy the continuity and unity of human intellectual effort. The idea of the universality of Reason implies that the concept of *Truth* is different from the concept of *validity* as applied to values, institutions, mythologies, morals. It does not imply that the normative criteria of validity in other domains (in the realm of myth, among others) must not be employed, but it forbids *replacing* the criteria of truth by them. It forbids, briefly, replacing thinking by commitment. To violate this interdiction means what may properly be called the betrayal of intellectuals. The idea that mankind should "liberate" itself from its intellectual heritage and create a new "qualitatively different" science or logic is a support for obscurantist despotism.

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MENAHEM MILSON

Medieval and Modern Intellectual Traditions in the Arab World

I

In medieval times the most important factor affecting the nature of intellectual traditions in the area now known as the Arab World was Islam. It should be noted therefore that the term "Arab World" used in the title of this essay reflects the modern situation which is discussed in part II.

The Supremacy of Religious Knowledge

Our discussion of intellectuals in Arab countries in the modern period must include some consideration of the intellectual elite in these countries in premodern times. The religious scholars, the *'ulama'*, comprised that elite. *'Ulama'* is an Arabic word meaning "scholars" or, more precisely, "those possessed of knowledge" (in Arabic, *'ilm*). The term *'ulama'*, however, came to signify quite early in the Muslim era "those possessed of *religious* knowledge," and it is in this sense that the term will be used throughout this paper.

Consideration of the *'ulama'*, their intellectual traditions and their social position, will afford us one necessary perspective for viewing the situation of the modern intelligentsia which has taken their place as the generally recognized intellectual elite in Arab countries. The inclusion of the *'ulama'* in our purview is all the more important, since the *'ulama'* retained their established position until the end of the nineteenth century.

The intellectual tradition of *'ulama'* was multi-faceted, comprising methods of study and interpretation, rules of validation and refutation, criteria of excellence, and needless to say, a canon of sacred texts, which were believed to be the source of all religious knowledge. The *'ulama'* maintained special educational institutions—*madrasas*—for the transmission and further development of their intellectual traditions. To be sure, nonreligious sciences were also known and pursued in the Muslim world. Muslim writers in the Middle Ages distinguished between religious and nonrelig-

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ious sciences. Sometimes the dichotomy was presented as religious or traditional, in contradistinction from philosophical, rational, or foreign.[1]

Because of the general religious bent of Islamic civilization, religious knowledge was given preference over other types of knowledge. As a covenantal religion, Islam's most important manifestation is the Sacred Law (the *shari'a*), which in theory is all-embracing. Consequently, jurisprudence (*fiqh*) occupies a central position among the religious sciences.

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, one of the most authoritative Muslim scholars, draws up the order of priority of the various sciences; his views are very instructive for the discussion at hand.[2] Having established a broad division between praiseworthy or commendable knowledge and blameworthy or reprehensible knowledge, he proceeds to distinguish—within the category of praiseworthy knowledge—between various types of knowledge according to their inherent value. Of the highest value is religious knowledge (and especially knowledge of the religious law), for it constitutes a personal obligation[3]: every Muslim is required to acquire that religious knowledge which is relevant to the occasion.[4]

Next in order of value comes knowledge which is considered a collective or communal obligation[5]—that is, there should be a sufficient number of persons with this type of knowledge to meet the needs of society. Included in this category are medicine and mathematics. It is noteworthy that Ghazali gives as the reason for the "communal obligation" to possess mathematical knowledge the fact that it is needed to implement the requirements of religious law in certain matters, such as division of estates and bequests and other business transactions.

Third in order of value is that knowledge which, though praiseworthy, is not included in the obligatory category, and is thus supererogatory. According to Ghazali that class includes "penetrating deeply into the subtle points of mathematics and the innermost truths of medicine and the like, *which can be dispensed with;* nevertheless, this [kind of knowledge] has the benefit of adding to the capacity in the required matter."[6]

The order of value seems clear: the nonreligious sciences are considered necessary only as *applied* sciences and derive their value from advancing the objectives of religious law. The value of pure or basic research is subsumed under applied science, which is itself subservient to religion. This order of priority, expressed by Ghazali as theological doctrine, had concrete social consequences; it was reflected in the predominance of the *'ulama'* as the uncontested intellectual elite in Islamic society. The centrality of religious knowledge (with jurisprudence as its axis) is demonstrated by the fact that many Muslim scholars who were creative in the nonreligious sciences also engaged in the religious sciences and often held prominent positions as *'ulama'*.

This is true mostly with respect to scholars in the "Arabian" sciences, because these sciences, though nonreligious, were nevertheless considered

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indigenous and were incorporated in the intellectual traditions of the *'ulama'*.[7] Still more remarkable is the fact that this was occasionally the case with scholars of the "rational-foreign" sciences.[8]

The inferior status of the nonreligious, "foreign" heritage—a phenomenon which was correlated with the supremacy of the *'ulama'* tradition—resulted in the decline of the "philosophical" or "rational" sciences.[9]

Scholars and Princes

A popularly held notion is that in Islam church and state are one. Insofar as this phrase means that the only truly Islamic political community is the *umma*, the community of believers, it is true. However, using the Western terms "church" and "state" one may be misled into thinking that the ruling institution and the religious institution are intermixed or are one and the same, and that is far from true.

Some historical studies point out that the *'ulama'* quite consciously and deliberately kept apart from the political institution.[10] This process of separation began quite early in Islamic history, probably immediately after the period of the Righteous Caliphs—the first four successors of the Prophet Muhammad (632-661). Following these caliphs, political power and the religious intellectual elite parted ways. At first this separation was not quite conscious and for a while some religious scholars did not give up hope of influencing the strictly political spheres of life. However, later on, in the Abbasid period, this separation became clear and the religious scholars recognized the situation and even preferred it. The religious scholars realized that by remaining detached from the actual exercise of political power, they retained prestige without becoming contaminated by the faults of the princes and therefore could better cultivate their intellectual traditions. A tacit concordat seems to have evolved between the *'ulama'* and the princes. Certain spheres of influence were left in the hands of the religious scholars, such as the regulation of all matters relating to personal status, moral behavior, and education. Other more strictly political matters were left to the princes: foreign policy, taxation, jurisdiction over criminal affairs. These matters were not considered under the jurisdiction of the *'ulama'*, even though theoretically the *'ulama'* as representatives of the Holy Law, the *shari'a*, should have a say over every aspect of life.

This type of concordat made it possible for the rulers, on the one hand, and the *'ulama'*, on the other, to cooperate for many centuries. A symbiotic relationship evolved between the two institutions, cooperating but distinct. The *'ulama'* legitimized the power of the Muslim rulers, who, for their part, recognized the supremacy of the Sacred Law.

In return, the *'ulama'* were allowed to exercise their influence in certain spheres and were also materially rewarded by having positions as judges in the courts and by receiving a share in various religious endow-

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ments. The *'ulama'* carefully tried to avoid direct involvement in politics and, as a result, a very strong tradition emerged in the Muslim world: the idea that worldly politics (in Arabic, *siyasa*) is essentially corrupt and contaminated by too many mundane considerations; hence scholars should be on guard against being tainted by excessive contact with the sultans. Related to this notion is another, the image of political power which evolved in Muslim tradition: namely, that such power rests basically on one sanction, military force. This notion is clear in the writings of al-Ghazali and of later writers[11] and may have persisted into the modern period. Still another concept which forms part of the tradition of the *'ulama'* is their self-image. The *'ulama'* are the guides of society. A saying which expresses this idea, and is ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad, is that "the *'ulama'* are the successors of the prophets." Another saying states, "Nothing is mightier than religious knowledge: kings have jurisdiction over people but the *'ulama'* have jurisdiction over kings." Notwithstanding the actual division of power between rulers and religious scholars, and the fact that the direct influence of the *'ulama'* was confined to well-defined spheres, the *'ulama'* viewed themselves as the guides of society, since their authority emanated from a higher source than that from which political power was derived, that is, the authority of the Holy Law.

The intellectual traditions of the *'ulama'* were enriched and expanded by additional cultural materials which, although of different origins and of another nature, were nevertheless adopted by the *'ulama'* and modified to accord with their traditions. This extension not only gave variety to their intellectual tradition, but also strengthened their social position, since it provided additional maneuverability and more opportunities for influence. The extension was in two directions. The *'ulama'* adopted and adapted within their own cultural framework another tradition—originally quite alien: namely, the literature about the education, etiquette, and ethics of the scribes at the Sassanid Court of Persia. In the early days of the Abbasids, during the reign of al-Mansur (745-775), the alien nature of that tradition was keenly felt, but within a few generations, religious scholars had absorbed and adapted many elements of this Sassanian court literature. This is clearly reflected in the writings of a religious scholar such as Ibn-Qutayba (d. 889), who manages to integrate this alien implant with Arab-Islamic tradition.[12]

This early association between religious scholarship and the education of the court scribe was of great importance, since thus, most of the persons trained in the tradition of the *'ulama'* were also conversant with the scribal arts and hence capable of filling positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy. We notice here a contradiction between the ideological position of the *'ulama'* on the one hand and the pressures of reality on the other. Although there was a very strong tradition that scholars should avoid excessive involvement in the ruling institution, throughout the Middle Ages one can find *'ulama'*

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occupying administrative positions in the service of Muslim rulers.[13] Later, in the Ottoman period, we find that many high positions in the administration (not exclusively in the juridical system) were still filled by persons trained in the *madrasas*.

In another direction, *'ulama'* tradition was extended to embrace the mystical tradition of the Sufis. Although these two strands in Islamic thought—the juristic and the mystical—represent two distinct types of religious approach, yet in reality they were not separate. This association, too, took place relatively early. The best-known representative of the integration of the two traditions is the aforementioned Ghazali (d. 1111), but this attitude of bridging the gap between the mystical and the juristic has its origins earlier in the history of Islamic thought. The great masters of Islamic mysticism—Junayd, Abu Talib al-Makki, Sulami,[14] to mention only a few—all insisted on the need to observe the Sacred Law and not to separate the mystical from the juridical. It is certainly no mere coincidence that the founders of the great Sufi orders (mystical brotherhoods) were also prominent teachers of jurisprudence. The founder of the Suhrawardi order, Abu al-Najib al-Suhrawardi (d. 1168), was a teacher of Shafi'i law. The founder of the Qadiri order, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), was an authority of the Hanbalite school of jurisprudence.

Withdrawal from worldly affairs is of course very important to the mystical outlook, and the association between the mystical tradition and that of the *'ulama'* may have reinforced a tendency already inherent in Islamic religious thought: namely, withdrawal from politics. On the other hand, Sufism exerted exceptional appeal upon the minds of the laity, and large numbers from all walks of life (including members of the ruling classes) joined the Sufi orders as "lay members." Consequently, Sufism reestablished some kind of community between rulers and ruled. Hence, the accommodation of Sufism by the *'ulama'* increased their influence over the masses.

In summary, the *'ulama'* had a very strong position as the representatives of the Sacred Law in a society dedicated to the realization of that law on earth. Their influence and status were greatly enhanced by the fact that their tradition included education for scribal offices (as previously stated, originating in foreign sources), so that they could supply administrative personnel. By incorporating the mystical approach into their religious outlook, they improved their capability to reach the uneducated laity and exerted strong moral influence upon them. Thus, even though they gave up the idea of directing the policies of the state, they were in a highly strategic position: placed, so to speak, between princes and masses, they served as intermediaries between the two groups. They were willing to legitimize the sultans and keep the masses docile, and did so, as long as the sultans allowed them to exercise that authority which they considered essential for maintaining the important elements of religious law and preserving the essentials of their way of life.

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II

The following discussion deals with modern intellectual traditions in the Arab World, mainly as they are reflected in literature.

The Social Bases of Modern Arab Intellectual Tradition

Although modern Arab intellectuals are highly heterogeneous as a group in various aspects, such as religious origin, educational background, and political affiliation, they nevertheless seem to share some characteristic attitudes with regard to their society and to modern civilization. The present discussion is concerned with these common attitudes, which can be abstracted from their works. To be sure, the broader subject of Arab intellectuals in modern times also involves a study of (1) the various types of modern Arab intellectuals (namely, reformist *'ulama'*, Western educated Muslims, and Christian Arabs)[15] and (2) the specific circumstances in the various Arab countries which differ in regard to the pace of modernization. However, this certainly goes beyond the scope and purpose of the present essay, which is intended to deal with the major issues concerning Arab intellectuals in general.

The emergence of the modern Arab intellectual tradition came in response to the challenge posed by Western civilization to the Arabs (as well as to Muslim peoples in general). This challenge was a function of the military and political superiority displayed by European powers in relation to Muslim states and particularly to the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt strikingly signaled that superiority, thus beginning a process of intervention and conquest called the Impact of the West.

In order to fully gauge the significance of that impact as perceived by Muslims, we must recapitulate the ideal collective self-image held by Muslims. This ideal self-image is based on the notion that God promised the Muslims victory and superior status in relation to other religious communities in this world. Islam was validated at the beginning of its history by means of the victory that Allah vouchsafed to the Prophet Muhammad's army at the Battle of Badr in 624, and that validation was repeatedly confirmed in a series of victories and conquests in the course of the first Islamic century. This story of success has become part of Islamic religious consciousness. The idea of Muslim superiority was particularly undermined in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire suffered various military setbacks at the hands of the Russians, and when Muslim countries in the Middle East fell under the domination of European Christian powers: Tunisia in 1881 under French rule and Egypt in 1882 under British rule. These events had an extremely unsettling effect upon the minds of Muslims; from the Muslim point of view, it seemed as though

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history had been deflected from its preordained course. In response, Arab-Muslim intellectuals asked certain questions and proposed some answers concerning the situation of their society in the modern world, thus laying the foundation of what we may call—to borrow a term from Edward Shils—the "original tradition" of modern Arab intellectuals. The realization of inferiority in power vis-à-vis Europe (or the West, or the Christian powers—as the other camp is variously defined) is the formative experience underlying the original tradition of modern Arab intellectuals.

The immediate aspect of the Western challenge was military and political; however, its cultural aspect soon became apparent as well, and has had more pervasive and lasting effects. Although Arab countries are no longer subjugated to European colonial powers, the sense of being in an inferior position persists. The continuation of that experience, which gave rise to the original tradition of modern Arab intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century, may account for the fact that some of the central themes of that tradition persist in contemporary intellectual production.

To Muslim modernizers in the nineteenth century—of the ruling class and of the intellectual elite alike—it seemed that Europe possessed the secret of power. Hence, in order to regain lost power and glory, Muslim states had to emulate the European powers in military technology and methods of state administration. Muslim rulers, intent on effecting these modernization plans, set out to build Western-trained personnel, capable of carrying out such reforms. Thus, military and administrative reform prompted the emergence of a new educated elite.

Among those in the nineteenth century who called for modernization and contributed to the formation of the original tradition of modern Arab intellectuals, we find both members of the *'ulama'* and members of the governing classes. An outstanding example of the first type is the Egyptian scholar and writer Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (d. 1873).[16] Of the second type one should note the Tunisian statesman Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (d. 1889).[17] Still faithful to the Islamic world-view, both Tahtawi and Khayr al-Din hoped that the *'ulama'* would continue to play an important role as an intellectual elite, and they tried to convince them of the need for modernization.

In contradistinction from the attitudes which became predominant toward the end of the nineteenth century, the writings of Tahtawi and Khayr al-Din do not reflect that mixture of acute envy, hostility, and suspicion of the West which becomes a salient feature in the writings of modernizing intellectuals later in the nineteenth century. This is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that Tahtawi's and Khayr al-Din's attitudes toward European civilization were formed before the experience of European intervention and occupation in the 1870's and 1880's, which exacerbated suspicion of and hostility toward Europe.

Before we proceed to describe the characteristic features of the tradition

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of modern Arab intellectuals, we must underline a fundamental fact, namely, that the *'ulama'* as a group lost their position as an uncontested intellectual elite in the Arab world. When viewed in retrospect, the *'ulama'*s loss of status appears to have been inevitable. However, throughout the nineteenth century this was not yet evident. The *'ulama'* were involved in the "original tradition" of modern Arab intellectuals in two ways: (1) some *'ulama'* (notably, Tahtawi and Muhammad 'Abduh) played a leading role in laying the foundations of that tradition; (2) the early modernizing intellectuals addressed themselves to two groups—rulers and *'ulama'*. They attached particular importance to the attitudes of the *'ulama'* in view of their position as spiritual leaders of society; they hoped that the *'ulama'* would modernize themselves and thus lead their society to modernization. This hope, however, was not realized; the *'ulama'*, as a group, were unable to modernize. There was a radical difference between the moral and intellectual assumptions underlying modern civilization and the *'ulama'*s belief system. But except for a few bold spirits, such as Tahtawi and 'Abduh, the *'ulama'* responded to the challenge of modernity by withdrawing into a defensive conservatism. In the meantime, another type of educated class evolved: the Westernized intelligentsia.[18]

The modern intelligentsia is different from the *'ulama'* also in its collective self-identity. In contrast with the *'ulama'*, who represent Islamic consciousness, the modern intelligentsia views itself as Arab. This is related, of course, to the rise of Arab nationalism which came to replace the former Islamic collective identity. The emergence and growth of Arab nationalism and the various ways in which it replaced the earlier Islamic identity is beyond the scope of this essay. However, it should be briefly noted that this change from Islamic to Arab identity which took place among educated Arabs in the Middle East was facilitated by the well-known close association between Arabism and Islam, an association harking back to the very origins of the Islamic religion in Arabia.[19]

It should be noted that some intellectuals in the Arab countries have propagated ideologies upholding nationalist identities other than Arab: in Egypt, Egyptian nationalism and in Syria and Lebanon, Syrian nationalism. In both cases, an attempt was made to relate the particularist nationalist ideology to a national myth antedating the Islamic era. These ideologies had little popular appeal and were swept aside by the tide of pan-Arab nationalism. These particularist views, conflicting with the prevalent current of opinion, have been submerged but not totally eliminated; they constitute "small traditions" which may yet resurge. Small groups of intellectuals still continue to favor "particularist" cultural identity, although this position is not publicly acceptable.

The transition from Islamic to Arab identity was not immediate and the early modernizing intellectuals such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and 'Abduh still speak in the name of an Islamic resurgence and Islamic unity,

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but later on this changed. One of the factors inducing this change was the influence of the European notion of collective identity based on non-religious grounds. Secular nationalism was obviously "modern," and the modernizing intellectuals, by definition, preferred all that seemed modern. There were political developments, extraneous to the preferences of Arab intellectuals, which also prompted this change. The adoption by the Young Turks of a modern nonreligious concept of Ottomanism, in substitution for the traditional concept of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic state, weakened the Islamic bond. This process culminated in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a secular Turkish national state.

Related to the change from Islamic to Arab identity is the coalescence of Arab Muslims and Christians in the original intellectual tradition of modern Arabs. The tendency to coalesce was mutual, though more intense on the Christian side. Arabic-speaking Christians in the Middle East lived as members of minority communities which were tolerated, but could never aspire to a position of full citizenship in an Islamic state. Under the influence of modern ideas, educated young Christian Arabs aspired to break the confines of minority status and participate in the experience of society at large, in order to gain more economic and political opportunities. They saw the way to coalescence with their Muslim neighbors in their common denominator: the Arabic language and its literary heritage. Since modernity involved a decline in the influence of religion, it was now easier for educated Arabic-speaking Christians to relegate their confessional identity to a secondary place and emphasize those linguistic and literary elements which facilitated cooperation and unity with the Muslim majority. On the side of the majority group, modernizing Muslims, also influenced by modernity and European currents of thought, lost many of their more strictly theological beliefs, while retaining a strong attachment to Islam as a form of collective identity and a symbol of national pride.

They continued to cherish the historical glory of Islam: the military achievements of the Arab tribes, the accomplishments of the great Islamic empires, and the flourishing medieval civilization. Arab nationalism was able to encompass these traditionally Islamic elements, and thus to satisfy emotional needs of the Muslims while creating common ground between Muslims and their Christian neighbors. It supplied a nationalist formula apparently modern rather than medieval.

For modernizing Muslim intellectuals, this change was relatively easy because the heroes of Arab nationalism are also Islamic heroes: the Prophet Muhammad, the Caliph 'Umar, the great general Salah al-Din (of Kurdish ethnic origin). Christian intellectuals must also cherish the glory of Islam and admire its great past if they want to be truly identified with Arab nationalism. On this point we should quote Michel Aflaq, the chief ideologue of the Ba'th party. Aflaq, himself a Christian, says, "The Ba'th party is a national movement which addresses itself to all Arabs irrespective of re-

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ligion, and it respects freedom of religious belief. However, it sees in Islam a national aspect which has had a very significant role in shaping Arab history and Arab nationalism, and it believes that this aspect has a very strong connection with the spiritual heritage of the Arabs and the components of their genius."[20] He states that "Islam is an Arab movement which meant the revival and fulfilment of Arabism."[21] According to Aflaq, "The life of the Prophet Muhammad represents the Arab spirit in its true sense."[22]

Muslim intellectuals, while striving to modernize, nevertheless have a sense of allegiance to their Islamic heritage, and they feel keenly the need to maintain it in order to retain their identity and self-esteem. In contrast, Christian intellectuals incline to advance much further in the direction of modernization without excessive regard for a heritage to which they feel no inner allegiance, as it is not truly their own. The following lines by Hisham Sharabi succinctly describe the situation of Christian Arab intellectuals in this respect:

> It was impossible for the Christian Arab not to wish for a way to Westernize society. Theoretically there could be no limit to what the Arabs might borrow from the West. To the Christians, the Islamic reformists' limitations on borrowing could not be valid. Nevertheless, Christian intellectuals had to be especially aware of these limitations and reservations, and they always tried to see the West with Muslim eyes in order to determine these limits. These conditions determined the scope of the Christian intellectual contribution.[23]

Christian Arabs realize that they must pay homage to the Islamic heritage if they wish to remain within the fold of Arab nationalism. They are thus under certain constraints which they can hardly overcome.

Heritage Versus Modernization

Having opted for modernization, which in fact means borrowing from the West, Arab intellectuals had to face serious ideological and psychological conflicts. In order to withstand the West, the Arabs must learn from the West. To be on the receiving end in the process of borrowing is to be somehow inferior. Thus modernization—desired by the Arabs to help them in restoring their lost power and national pride—also had the effect of undermining self-esteem. Further exacerbating the ambivalence toward Western culture was the lurking fear that cultural borrowing might result in the loss of national identity. Modern intellectuals had to look back to the glorious past for pride and reassurance. True, history was the story of not only achievement but also decline. The causes of decline, however, were identified and isolated. The responsibility for the decline was attributed to a non-Arab group, the Turks, who, even when they had been converted to Islam, were not truly imbued with its spirit. In addition, religious accretions of foreign origin (Jewish, Christian, or Persian) were also deemed to be a detrimental factor, since they were held to have distorted pristine (Arab)

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Islam. Specifically, these foreign accretions are described as the source of fatalism, which in turn led to lethargy and stagnation. This particular approach to the interpretation of Islamic history has become characteristic of the modern intellectual tradition.

Contemporary Arab writers bestow great praise upon their medieval ancestors, who cultivated the heritage of Greek philosophy and science and, in transmitting it to Europe, enabled that continent to achieve the Renaissance. This notion, already found in the works of early modernizing writers such as 'Abduh and Afghani, has percolated to school textbooks and to journalistic writing and is, in a way, accepted as "common knowledge" among Arabs today. Interestingly enough, although the glorification of medieval Arab science has assumed such ideological importance, there seems to have been no great interest in the actual study of this subject in modern Arab universities. The notion that European science is derived from medieval Arab science is intended to legitimize and facilitate cultural borrowing, for it implies that (1) Arabs borrow from Europe what they had previously given to it (hence, no inferiority is involved), and (2) the borrowed science cannot be alien in principle (hence, there can be no danger of losing cultural identity). We may wonder whether modern Arab scientists actually accept this notion or whether they feel that, ideology aside, the modern science in which they are engaged is Western-based and has very little to do with the medieval science of their ancestors.

Emphasis on the importance of science was a central theme in the original tradition of the modernizing Arab intellectuals, for science seemed to be the key to the acquisition of military and political power. The modernizing intellectuals stressed that Islam is the religion of reason and science. To uphold this view, modernizing intellectuals and reformers such as Afghani and 'Abduh quoted various sayings of the Prophet in praise of science and knowledge: "Seek knowledge (*'ilm*) even if it be in China," or "The search for knowledge is a personal obligation incumbent upon every Muslim." Such sayings occur originally in contexts which make it clear that the knowledge intended is religious. The modernizing intellectuals use these sayings with the intention of making science more readily acceptable to their Muslim society and demonstrating that Islam favors science. This practice seems to serve the double purpose of the modernist: (1) legitimization of reform, and (2) apologia for Islam.

Using these traditional sayings in praise of knowledge or science (as *'ilm* may be variably translated), the modernists glossed over the essential difference between modern science and traditional knowledge. This ambiguity serves ideological purposes, but does not help bring about the change in values necessary for a scientific approach. When we read of the need to acquire science in the writings of many modern Arab intellectuals, we cannot help feeling that they think of science as they would of some commodity, rather than as the internalization of new attitudes and values.

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Partly as a result of this attitude toward science, as an instrument that can be acquired and then put to use in order to regain strength and greatness, the modern Arab intellectuals, who have adopted some of the traditions of Europe, were not so successful in adopting others (those concerning method and discipline in particular).[24] In addition to the factor of attitude toward science, there is a social factor that may also account for this failure to adopt certain primary components of Western intellectual tradition. The outside intellectual control on scholarly production in Arabic is minimal: European scholars cannot read works written in that language in their field of specialization. Whereas the Arab readers, who are the primary consumers of this intellectual production, cannot usually compare what is written in Arabic with parallel products in European languages.

We have already mentioned the particular approach to Islamic history characteristic of modern Arab intellectual tradition. We should refer here to one specific theory, forwarded by some Arab writers, which illustrates the ideological orientation of this type of historical thought. According to this theory, European civilization borrowed from the Arabs not only in the Middle Ages, but even earlier, in ancient times, and Arab civilization actually precedes that of Greek and Hebrew antiquity. This argument is based upon another, that the Aramaeans and Phoenicians were in fact Arabs, and so, since the Greek script is derived from the Phoenician script, it follows that Greek civilization is derived from and based upon Arab civilization.[25]

In innumerable writings, modern Arab intellectuals stress the need to preserve and revive their heritage. This frequently means the literary heritage, but in other instances we cannot be sure whether the heritage to which the writer refers is the literary or the scientific one. We should also note that the writers who call for preservation of the heritage hardly ever specify which elements within this heritage are viable in a modern situation. Though they constantly refer to the spirit of Arabism inherent in the heritage, they do not explain the nature of that spirit. The heritage is described in general terms as a source of national pride and self-esteem. It must be cherished because, so the argument goes, no nation separated from its historical origins and its national heritage can survive. The following quotation from Professor Nasir al-Din al-Asad may well represent this extremely popular theme: "The heritage of every nation is [the embodiment of] its spirit, its characteristic qualities and its history; and any nation abandoning its heritage kills its own spirit . . . It is not true that the adoption of modern civilization requires the destruction of the heritage . . . on the contrary, in truth, the nation's progress comes into being from its inner self and emerges from its heritage."[26]

Few Arab writers declare outright that modern civilization is totally different from their traditional indigenous culture and that one should be completely oriented toward modernity without nostalgia for a past which is

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no longer relevant. This was the attitude of Salama Musa (d. 1958), the Egyptian Coptic writer and social critic. The same view is held by Ghali Shukri, a contemporary literary critic, also of Coptic origin. The Lebanese poet and literary critic Adonis also calls for critical examination of the heritage, and proposes that if the latter constitutes an impediment to modernization it should be relinquished. Adonis states that "the infantile attachment of modern Arab intellectuals to the belief that the heritage is infallible may be the cause for the failure of modernizing efforts in the past fifty years."[27]

It is probably no mere coincidence that both the Egyptian writers who so boldly advocate the need to modernize without being held back by attachment to the heritage and the Lebanese writer who speaks in a similar tone are not members of the Sunni ("orthodox") Muslim majority group, but belong to religious minorities: the Egyptians are Copts and Adonis comes from a Shi'ite family. Therefore they do not share the general loyalty to the great tradition of Islam. Their views encounter fierce opposition on the part of nationalist intellectuals who represent the predominant ideology. Those who have not shown allegiance to the heritage are accused by nationalist writers of mental enslavement to Western culture.[28]

The inner conflict between the attraction exerted by Western culture and loyalty to the traditional heritage is clearly expressed by a modern Arab intellectual as follows:

> The task of the revolutionary intellectual with respect to universal currents of thought is difficult and complicated, because he should harmonize between national faith and his humanistic inclination. He is, on the one hand, compelled to be conservative with regard to his ethical and historical values and, on the other, he must satisfy his desire to develop his backward society.[29]

Thus the dichotomy of heritage versus modernization presents a bipolar syndrome of agonizing ambivalences and conflicts.

The cultural attraction of the West seems to nourish an idea current in the writing of modernizing Arab intellectuals: namely, that Western powers wanted not merely to conquer the Eastern lands physically, but also culturally, and even religiously. Even if such an accusation could be leveled at French colonialism, it hardly applies to the British variety. In any case, this kind of motive does not seem central in the considerations of modern colonizing powers in the Middle East. This accusation could reflect the consciousness of modernizing Arab intellectuals that they have in fact been conquered culturally. The Arab intellectuals, strongly attracted to Western culture, now project this situation, thus attributing what is in fact the result of a cultural process to the evil intentions of the colonizing powers.

A concept taken from European history, namely the idea of *renaissance* (in Arabic, *nahda*), offered reassurance and hope to the Arab intellectuals. Having studied European history, they became fascinated by the experience

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of the Renaissance: revival of the scientific tradition of antiquity brought Europe out of the Dark Ages and made possible its great achievements of culture and power. Arab modernists hoped that their countries could effect a similar *renaissance* and regain power and grandeur. This theme is very powerful in the early formative period of the original intellectual tradition, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In more recent writings the term *nahda* is not in great favor. Since Arab intellectuals used the word with such high hopes at the turn of the century, and no great renascence followed to bring the desired effects, the use of the word now would be a reminder of failure. Some modern intellectuals in recent years speak of the *renaissance* as beginning not, as was previously thought, at the end of the nineteenth century, but actually later under the revolutionary regimes, the earlier stages being only preparatory.

Western culture has proved highly attractive for many modern Arab intellectuals, and their acquaintance with it led to deep dissatisfaction with and sometimes even repulsion for their own indigenous civilization. This is reflected particularly in novels, some of them autobiographical or partly autobiographical. An example is the autobiographical work of the Egyptian writer, Tawfiq al-Hakim, *Zahrat al-'Umr*. The book consists of letters written to a French friend, in which he constantly speaks with admiration about European culture and expresses his dissatisfaction with the Egyptian environment and the culture of Egypt. The following passage from one of the letters reflects the author's cultural preference: "I am afraid that my love for European music results from the fact that it is primarily an intellectual structure, whereas our oriental music which is based on sensual pleasure and physical impression does not interest me at all."[30]

The modernizing intellectuals who have become acquainted with Europe are faced with another problem: they realize that European culture, which is supposed to be a model for emulation, itself suffers from various faults and that they should determine which elements are good and which are bad. However, it is difficult for them to discern and select. An Arab professor, discussing the crisis of Arab intellectuals, refers to "the lack of self-confidence [on the part of the Arab intellectual] in his capacity to distinguish between that which is beneficial and good and that which is damaging and destructive among world currents of thought."[31]

In another autobiographical novel, *'Usfur min al-Sharq* (A Bird from the East) by Tawfiq al-Hakim, the young protagonist, an Egyptian student in Paris, has conversations with a Russian expatriate. The time is shortly after World War I, and the young Egyptian hears sharp criticism of European civilization. His Russian friend tells him that the pure source of spiritual culture is the East and that to the East the young Egyptian should return. The Egyptian, however, knows well that this image of the East is false. He thinks, "There is no longer a pure source there . . . The beautiful and noble clothes of the East are today a strange mixture of European attire

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which causes laughter, like the appearance of monkeys who snatch the clothes of tourists of all sorts, put them on and climb a tree, imitating the gestures of the owners." He concludes his thought, "The East no longer exists today. It is a jungle on whose trees there are monkeys putting on Western clothes—without method, order, understanding, or perception."[32]

Imported modern technology cannot alleviate the feeling of the Arab intellectual that "he lives under the shadow of a backward civilization."[33] The progress achieved in the industrial and technological spheres only widens the gap between the external material conditions in which he finds himself and the inner aspect of mental attitudes which has not adequately changed.[34]

A very interesting feature of the original tradition of Arab intellectuals is that while attracted to Western civilization and desiring to emulate it, they still pejoratively characterize European civilization as materialistic, and praise Arab civilization as spiritual. They ascribe the colonialist tendencies of European culture to materialistic ambitions, which are of course blameworthy. We should note, however, that there are also intellectuals in Arab countries who try to stress the common elements in the intellectual traditions of Europe and of Islam and see in these elements a basis for a new humanistic Arab culture that would eliminate the tension between indigenous and foreign cultures. This is especially the attitude of the Egyptian writer and thinker, Taha Husayn.[35] But this seems to have remained a minority attitude, because of the nationalistic tendencies so important in the intellectual tradition of modern Arabs.

The Crisis of the Educated

For some fifteen years now, Arab intellectuals have been writing and speaking about "the crisis of the educated" (*azmat al-muthaqqafin*).[36] The sense of crisis is not limited to Arab intellectuals living under conservative or "reactionary" regimes, but is also acutely felt in the progressive or revolutionary Arab states. In fact, the phrase *azmat al-muthaqqafin* has been made current by, and in reference to, Egyptian intellectuals. On the face of it, there is a consensus between the Egyptian intelligentsia and the political leaders in regard to the great national goals. However, although the progressive regimes subscribe to the ideas of nationalism and social reform propagated originally by the intellectuals, there is, nevertheless, an intense tension between the two groups. One may wonder what is the source of the malaise of the Egyptian intelligentsia. In view of the ostensible consensus in ideology between rulers and intellectuals in Egypt, one tends to conclude that the crisis may have its roots in the very nature of the modern Arab intellectual elite.

The major factor responsible for the deep malaise of Arab intellectuals seems to be their alienation. Alienation is, of course, a phenomenon char-

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acteristic of intellectuals everywhere. But the alienation of Arab intellectuals goes beyond that of the learned man who feels separated from the uncultivated masses. The modernizing Arab intellectual, having adopted Western education and Western values, cuts himself off from his family background and the experiences of his own childhood. The resultant alienation is very acute. Occasionally the Western-educated young man discovers that the cultural gap makes it difficult for him to communicate with his wife or fiancée. Egyptian literary works amply illustrate this experience.[37]

To be sure, the experience of alienation extends beyond the family circle; the modern Arab intellectual is estranged from the masses. His estrangement is often aggravated by disdain toward their backwardness and imperviousness to change. The result is a conflict between the ideological outlook of the modernizing intellectual and his immediate feelings toward the people. A short novel by the Egyptian writer Yahya Haqqi tells the story of a young Egyptian doctor returning home upon completion of his studies in England. The young hero loves his country, but he feels that, "The more his love for Egypt grew, the more he became exasperated with the Egyptians."[38] This kind of paradox is not unique to Arab intellectuals; it is familiar in other modernizing societies and revolutionary movements.

Yahya Haqqi's story illuminates yet another important issue, namely, the question of the terms upon which the modernizing intellectual is reaccepted in his society. In the story, the young doctor is infuriated by the superstitious beliefs of the people. His offensive outburst against customary beliefs is met with violent opposition. He still hopes to prove the superiority of his modern scientific techniques over the customary (superstitious) way by effecting a dramatic success in the treatment of his first patient. Unfortunately, the first attempt ends in failure. The young doctor is about to lose his self-confidence, having previously lost the confidence of the people. He then realizes that "there is no science without faith." He makes his peace, at least outwardly, with the customary beliefs. In this way he regains the confidence of the people; he now resumes the treatment of his first patient, this time with success. The happy end of the story is that the doctor continues to practice medicine in his native neighborhood, "relying on Allah as well as on his science and his hands, so Allah blessed his science and his hands."[39]

The story may be taken as an object lesson for modernizers: new techniques can be successfully introduced, if they are not presented as opposed to traditional beliefs. Conversely, it also reveals that although the Western-educated professional may be accepted by the people on a practical basis, yet his world-view remains alien and incomprehensible.

True, the modern intellectuals speak and write Arabic, that is to say, they formulate their ideological positions in a language which is read by the people. The question is how much of this intellectual production is really understood by people who are but slightly Westernized, if at all.

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Understanding is difficult to measure quantitatively. But we may suppose that the masses who read papers and listen to the radio understand best and adopt most readily those elements which appear familiar to them linguistically as well as conceptually. In other words, the audiences actually do not transform their ideas to the modern, partially Westernized outlook of the Arab intellectuals; rather, they pick from this intellectual production published in Arabic those sections which include, or seem to resemble, traditional phrases and formulations. Those phrases are the ones which appeal most to the emotions and consciousness of the masses.

Consequently, although there is linguistic contact between the Westernized intelligentsia and the people, that contact is very tenuous. The more sensitive intellectuals are certainly aware of this gap. Ghali Shukri, for example, complains that modern Arab writers, who are themselves educated in the West or have adopted modern culture, write for people who still live in a culture which is four centuries behind. This may be something of an exaggeration; nevertheless, it may point to a very real situation.

The alienation of the intellectuals is accentuated by yet another factor: their political peripherality. They accuse the politicians of having removed the intellectuals from the realm of planning as well as that of implementation.[40] The political ineffectuality of the intellectuals in Egypt—as well as in other Arab countries—is due in part to the relatively minor international significance of the Arab academic and scientific community.

The fact that Arab governments, when they need scientific aid, can, and indeed have to, rely on foreign sources means that they depend only slightly on the indigenous academic community for these concrete purposes. This certainly deprives the intellectuals of an important leverage for political influence. The preoccupation of the Arab intellectual with ideological questions at the expense of technology and science seems to have undermined the position of the Arab academic and intellectual community as a whole.

In the thirties and forties the intellectuals led the struggle for independence by means of the written and spoken word. They were in the forefront of the movements which called for complete independence and social reform; many of them were active in political parties and parliament. But once the revolutionary regimes were established by military men, these intellectuals seemed left out. Paradoxically enough, the intense involvement of the modern Arab intellectuals with political ideology may have contributed to their political peripherality, once the ideology which they had created triumphed.

Under colonialist or imperialist rule the intellectuals acted as social critics. But now that they live in national "revolutionary" and independent Arab states, they find it somewhat difficult to act vigorously as social critics, for that would mean, in many cases, to criticize a government which shares, at least formally, the same ideology that they do. And that criticism would

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appear to be an act of disloyalty or even treason, especially since the Arab world still views itself as in the midst of a struggle against external enemies. So that Arab intellectual is handicapped as a critic within his own society.

It should be noted, however, that some Egyptian writers expressed their misgiving about various aspects of life under the revolutionary regime through fiction.[41] They have occasionally also resorted to allegory in order to express their criticism of the social and political conditions in Egypt. Since the death of Nasser, Egyptian intellectuals have begun to feel somewhat freer to criticize the conditions in their country.

Unlike traditional *'ulama'* in medieval Islam, the modern Arab intellectuals are not indispensable as legitimizers of political power. The military officers can address the masses directly, using the same ideological formulations which were originally produced by the intellectuals. The officers may be able to use them even more effectively than the intellectuals themselves, since they have greater cultural affinity with the masses.

To be sure, there are intellectuals in Egypt who continue to carry out the task of explaining to the public the policies of the government in reference to the accepted ideological formulas and to reinterpret ideology in the light of political contingencies. However, the range of this process is limited by the positions of the regime and by attitudes which have come to be accepted as unquestionable national dogma. It seems that the ideological views of the intellectuals are accepted within certain limits: the masses respond to them inasmuch as they understand them, and the rulers use them to the extent that these views suit them politically. In other words: Arab society has accepted the solutions of the intellectuals on its own terms.

To qualify our observation on the decline in the significance of modern Arab intellectuals as legitimizers of political power, we should call attention to the fact that modern Arab governments, unlike traditional Muslim rulers, need also some measure of external legitimization. By virtue of their Western education and the resulting affinity with foreign attitudes, modern Arab intellectuals have assumed the role of obtaining external legitimization for their governments.

Being relegated to a state of political peripherality would not have been a distressing experience to traditional *'ulama'*, since such a situation does not clash with their world-view. In contrast, the modern intellectuals, having adopted the Western notion of nation-state, wish to influence the direction of the nation through their association in the ruling institutions. However, they now find themselves relegated to a marginal role in politics, far removed from their hoped-for role as the "vanguard of leadership."

References

1. See L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 101-124.

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2. See Ghazali, *Ihya 'ulum al-Din,* I (Cairo: 'Isa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1957), pp. 14-18.

3. Arabic: *fard 'ayn.*

4. Ghazali says, "The meaning of the word knowledge (*'ilm*) in the saying of the Prophet Muhammad, 'Every Muslim is under obligation to seek knowledge,' is knowledge of the practice which is patently obligatory for Muslims." Ghazali, *Ihya 'ulum al-Din,* I, 16.

5. Arabic: *fard kifaya.*

6. Ghazali, *Ihya 'ulum al-Din,* I, 17.

7. The prevalence of this phenomenon in Islamic civilzation makes it useless to list examples. However, two outstanding cases will be mentioned here by way of illustration. Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), the famous Andalusian poet and writer, best known for his book on love, also wrote on jurisprudence. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), the historian and philosopher of history, served most of his life in religious offices: as *qadi* (judge), teacher of jurisprudence, and head of a Sufi convent.

8. Ibn Rushd (Averroës, d. 1198), "the Commentator of Aristotle," held for a number of years the religious office of *qadi.*

9. See G. E. von Grunebaum, "Muslim World View and Muslim Science," in *Islam,* 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1961), pp. 111-126. Especially pertinent to our point are his following observations:

   "No matter how important the contribution Muslim scholars were able to make to the natural sciences, and no matter how great the interest with which, at certain periods, the leading classes and the government itself followed and supported their researches, those sciences (and their technological application) had no root in the fundamental needs and aspirations of their civilization . . . This is why the pursuit of the natural sciences as that of philosophy tended to become located in relatively small and esoteric circles and why but few of their representatives would escape an occasional uneasiness with regard to the moral implications of their endeavors—a mood which not infrequently did result in some kind of an apology for their work. It is not so much the constant struggle which their representatives found themselves involved in against the apprehensive skepticism of the orthodox which in the end smothered the progress of their work; rather, it was the fact, which became more and more obvious, that their researches had nothing to give to their community, which this community could accept as an essential enrichment of their lives." (p. 114)

10. See H. A. R. Gibb, "An Interpretation of Islamic History," in his *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 10-14; and cf. Gibb, "Government and Islam under the Early Abbasids: The Political Collapse of Islam," *L'Elaboration de l'Islam,* Colloque de Strasbourg, June 1959 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1961), pp. 115-127.

11. See H. A. R. Gibb, "Constitutional Organization," in M. Khadduri and H. J. Liebesny, eds., *Law in the Middle East* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1955), pp. 19, 23.

12. The blending of Arab-Islamic tradition and that of the Persian court scribes is demonstrated in his book, *'Uyun al-Akhbar.*

13. In illustration of this point two examples are noteworthy. Ibn Hubayra (d. 1165), a scholar of the Hanbalite school who wrote books in the religious sciences, distinguished himself as a powerful vizier in Baghdad. Al-Qadi al-Fadil (d. 1200), educated as a religious scholar, served as the vizier of Salah al-Din.

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14. Junayd (d. 910), Abu Talib al-Makki (d. 996), Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sulami (d. 1021).

15. See a discussion along these lines: H. Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970).

16. See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 68-82.

17. See L. Carl Brown, *The Surest Path: The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth-Century Muslim Statesman* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); see also Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 83-94.

18. A special term signifies the new intelligentsia, *muthaqqafun*. The word *muthaqqaf*, which is in itself a neologism, means "an educated person" but it is used to signify exclusively "a person with modern education."

19. W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 94.

20. Michel 'Aflaq, *Fi Sabil al-Ba'th*, 3d printing (Beirut, 1963), p. 89.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

23. H. Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West*, p. 60.

24. See von Grunebaum's pertinent observation: "It should be added here that the results of Western research are more easily transferable than its methods, and that the Western research mentality, as one of the most singular characteristics of our culture, can only very gradually be instilled into the thoughts and the feelings of the impatient young nationalists of the Near East." *Modern Islam*, p. 266.

25. See 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, *Al-thaqafa al-'arabiyya asbaq min thaqafat al-yunan wa-l-'ibriyyin* (Arab culture is earlier than that of the Greek and the Hebrews) (n.p., n.d.), p. 29 *et passim*.

26. Nasir al-Din al-Asad, "Al-turath wa-l-mujtama' al-jadid" (Heritage and modern society), *Al-Adab*, 13 (Beirut, March 1965), 26.

27. Adonis, "Al-ra'is jamal 'abd al-nasir wa-l-thaqafa," *Al-Adab*, 16 (Beirut, June 1968), 5.

28. 'A'isha 'Abd al-Rahman (Bint al-Shati), *Qiyam Jadida li-l-Adab al-'Arabi* (Cario, 1970), p. 174.

29. Abu al-Qasim Sa'dallah, "Azmat al-muthaqqaf al-thawri fi al-watan al-'arabi" (The crisis of the revolutionary intellectual in the Arab homeland), *Al-Adab*, 14 (Beirut, April 1966), 4.

30. Tawfiq al-Hakim, *Zahrat al-'Umr*, 2d printing (Cairo, 1944), p. 166.

31. Abu al-Qasim Sa'dallah, "Azmat al-muthaqqaf al-thawri fi al-watan al-'arabi," p. 4.

32. Tawfiq al-Hakim, *'Usfur min al-Sharq* (Cairo, 1938), pp. 229-231.

33. Ghali Shukri, *Shi'runa al-hadith ila ayna* (Cairo, 1968), p. 18.

34. See *ibid.*, p. 19.

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35. On Taha Husayn, see Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, pp. 324-340.

36. On the meaning of the term *muthaqqaf*, see note 18 above.

37. For example, *Adib* by Taha Husayn, *'Usfur min al-Sharq* and *Zahrat al-'Umr* by Tawfiq al-Hakim, and *Qindil Umm Hashim* by Yahya Haqqi.

38. Yahya Haqqi, *Qindil Umm Hashim* (Cairo, n.d.) (*Iqra'* Series, no. 18), p. 34.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

40. See Adonis, "Al-ra'is jamal 'abd al-nasir wa-l-thaqafa," p. 4.

41. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the novel *Miramar* (published in 1967) by Najib Mahfuz. The villain in this story is a high-ranking official in an Egyptian nationalized company who is also an important member of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's only political party.

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Intellectuals in the Modern Middle East: A Brief Historical Consideration

INTELLECTUAL LIFE in the Middle East, influenced by Islam, has a long and varied history. There has been a rich intellectual life in the Muslim world, especially in its first few centuries and again in the last two.

Traditional Islamic Intellectuals

The first centuries of Islam saw the development of an increasingly complex and differentiated class of intellectuals. Much of the earliest intellectual effort was devoted to the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad. A definitive Qur'anic text had to be established; it needed to be interpreted for believers; Muhammad's life, sayings, and practices needed to be recounted. The early rise of sectarian movements guaranteed that intellectual effort would be made in establishing their defenses. The Shi'a, or partisans of Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law 'Ali and his descendants, devoted their efforts to proving the intellectual as well as religious superiority of their particular claims; the Kharijites or "seceders," who rejected both the Shi'ites and the Umayyad caliphs, did the same.

The Islamic world, influenced by Hellenistic thought coming in from the conquered Near East, necessarily became more sophisticated in its intellectual endeavor. Hellenistic influence first appeared in theology, where Hellenistic logic was used to defend the rationality of Islam against the rationalist claims of Christianity and of other religions. The Mu'tazilites, the first theologians of Islam, argued for the unity and justice of God. In doing so, they set up a theory of natural law and of rational good and evil which competed with Christian theology on its own ground. The Mu'tazilites believed in a created rather than eternal Qur'an; in this they were going against the dominant Muslim opinion. Popular orthodoxy soon reasserted itself despite the protection given Mu'tazilite doctrine by the early 'Abbasid caliphs. After this, Greek logic was used by theologians in a more conservative way. They argued for the omnipotence and inscrutability of God, whose ways are not subject to earthly concepts of

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justice, and who creates good and evil by His own will, rather than following rationally knowable good and evil.

Just as theology became more conservative after its early intellectual flowering, so also did law, the central science of Islam. In the first Islamic period, law adopted, though sometimes in altered form, a good deal from prior local law and custom, and also from the necessities of the day. As time went on, however, a need was felt to Islamicize legal practices. Nearly all of them came to be traced back to Muhammad himself. This was done through the medium of *hadiths* or Traditions—sayings attributed to Muhammad via a chain of authorities whose names were cited to validate a Tradition. Intellectual effort by jurists came to be limited to analogy from the Qur'an or Traditions. Once all the usual cases had been decided by the Qur'an, Tradition, analogy, or consensus of the jurists, the legal codes were virtually frozen in the four orthodox schools of law. Nevertheless, more probably remained open to the judgment of jurisconsults as expressed in *fatwas* (judgments) than recent Oriental scholars have admitted. In any case, the intellectual activities of the leading jurists continued to provide leadership to the community, and legal scholars played the central role in the traditional Islamic educational system. Law continued to expand and to adapt itself to new conditions; this was accomplished through the medium of opinions or *fatwas* granted by judicial leaders in answer to new or difficult questions, and through administrative rulings outside the *shari'a* (Islamic law).

The first centuries of Islam witnessed significant economic and social expansion characterized by the growth of cities, the development of trade, the increased importance of the commercial bourgeoisie, and the extension of agriculture. There was a corresponding intellectual ferment, in part at least the consequence of these new economic and social needs. Science and mathematics developed beyond the level they had achieved with the Greeks and the Romans; these served the needs and the curiosity of the expanding society; the same was true in the fields of medicine and philosophy. In all these areas a debt was owed to the Greeks, and to a lesser extent to the Persians and the Indians. In all fields there were also new achievements.

The early 'Abbasid period (beginning A.D. 749) saw a series of officially sponsored translations from the Greek and the Persian which greatly expanded the intellectual horizons of the educated classes. The cultivated man came to be educated in the *Adab* "culture"; he had access to refined poetry, prose literature (often dealing with morality), and the rudiments of science. Intellectual experimentation and free thought were possible. The widespread sectarian movements gave ideological content to revolts among the discontented masses. Greek philosophy became known to some of the intellectual elite.

The Muslim philosophers, the most sophisticated intellectuals of their

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time, took over the neo-Platonic and neo-Aristotelian theories of Hellenistic times and adapted them to the Islamic environment, and, in addition, made original contributions of their own to philosophy. In the relatively free tenth century A.D., there were a variety of philosophies based on different Greek schools, extending to a radical rejection of religion in a few known cases. The Shi'ites in this period also made use of Greek philosophy in their religious theories, and the influence of Greek thought permeated beyond strictly philosophical circles.

In the eleventh century economic and social changes occurred that ended the first expansive state of Islamic society and culture. The invasion of Turkish nomads into the eastern part of the Middle East and of Arab Bedouins into North Africa brought major changes in economic life. There was a trend toward greater nomadism and a decline in agricultural production and trade. Deforestation and salinization of irrigated soil preceded this agricultural decline and made agricultural recovery to former levels exceedingly difficult. The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century only accelerated trends that had been operating since the eleventh century. A form of military feudalism based largely on nomadic tribes took over where formerly there had been relatively centralized states. Many of the urban centers declined. These economic, social, and political changes were accompanied by major cultural changes. As the age of feudalism had been the age of religion in the European West, and the age of commerce the age of free thought, so it was in the Muslim East, except that there the time periods were reversed, with tribal feudalism coming second. In the eleventh century religious orthodoxy began to take over the entire educational system. Even civil servants who had formerly received a partly secular education came increasingly to be educated in religious schools. Religious orthodoxy displaced free thought, and philosophy became more suspect than it had ever been. Even the less radical philosophers were suspect; they were subject to abuse and penalities at the hands of the orthodox. The philosophers developed a sort of protective coloration. They expanded on their earlier argument that philosophical thought was designed only for a restricted elite, and that a literalist and unquestioning orthodoxy was best for the masses. Philosophy was declared to be consistent with the Qur'an when the Qur'an was interpreted according to reason, but such rationalist allegorical interpretations were to be available only to the philosophers. Not even theologians were to indulge in such interpretation; for them to do so would confuse the masses and make them question the faith that had kept them orderly and obedient in this world through fear of punishment in the next.

This theory entered Western Europe along with Averröes' philosophy and came to be known as the theory of the "double truth." In fact, as others have pointed out, there was only one truth, the rational truth known to the philosophers. The masses were given a distorted version of reality,

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together with a mythology about physical heaven and hell and God's human attributes, making religion comprehensible to them in terms accessible to them and thereby leading them to behave in accord with the religious law.

Orthodox theologians considered that theology was only for the educated and should be kept from the masses as it would only confuse them. The famous theologian al-Ghazali (d. 1111) wrote a treatise on the need of keeping theology from the masses. The Islamic mystics, or Sufis, similarly restricted their higher truths to the initiated, as did many of the Shi'is. It was the philosophers, however, who worked the theory out most elaborately. Their ideas deserve attention because in some degree they persist into the modern Muslim world. Following certain hints in the Greek philosophers, the Muslim philosophers, faced with a religious orthodoxy of a kind the Greeks had never known, created a series of defenses that found their most classic expression in certain of the writings of Avicenna and Averröes. Insisting that their Greek-based philosophy was enjoined on them by the Qur'an, they offered a few appropriately interpreted verses to support their view. They also adopted the idea that humanity was divided into a small elite capable of understanding philosophy and a large mass who could not be exposed to it, lest it upset their literalist faith. They insisted that philosophy was intended only for a restricted intellectual elite, and that the rest of mankind might properly be moved with parables and rhetoric that served a useful social purpose.

The notion that society is divided into a mass and an elite permeates the Islamic world of the later Middle Ages, and leaves a great residue among modern Islamic intellectuals and politicians. In class terms no less than in intellectual terms, medieval Muslim authors saw their society as divided into two great classes, the large mass and the small elite. The words used for the mass and elite classes—*'amma* and *khassa*—are the same as those used by the philosophers and others to describe the intellectual elite and the common mass.[1]

In late medieval times, apart from the small class of innovating intellectuals—the philosophers and the few innovating theologians such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Taimiyya—the religious scholars and jurists, or *ulama*, and the chief governmental scribes and advisers were the closest thing to an intellectual class. The later *ulama* operated within an Islamic tradition that held innovation (*bid'a*) to be a sin. They made strenuous efforts to show that they were *not* being original. Their position was precisely opposite to the one taken by most intellectuals in modern times. This emphasis on preserving the past was not peculiar to the Middle East, though the weight of the Qur'an, of religious Traditions supposedly emanating from the mouth of Muhammad, and of religiously based law—the all-encompassing *shari'a*—may have made Islam especially resistant to innovation. The belief that the Qur'an was the literal word of God, and hence infallible, and the

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quasi-infallibility of at least the "strong" (that is, well-attested) Traditions from the mouth of Muhammad gave intellectual endeavor within the Muslim world a very special cast. Almost to the present, innovation has had to be represented as interpretation of the Qur'an and Traditions. Inevitably, new ideas came out in highly traditional forms.

A partial exception to the relative rigidity and traditionalism of late Islam is found in Twelver Shi'ism—the state religion of Iran after 1501. Not only did Twelver Shi'ism incorporate a rationalist Mu'tazilite theology, but Iran maintained a live Avicennan philosophical tradition uninterrupted into the nineteenth century, with a number of original philosophical minds developing this tradition within the Shi'i framework. In the western Islamic world, by contrast, the philosophical tradition was persecuted out of existence, though it seems to have existed underground for some time after Averröes, to reappear, as Muhsin Mahdi has shown, in the social thought of the last great original thinker of the traditional Muslim West, the fourteenth-century Ibn Khaldun.[2] In Iran, even religious thought was touched by rationalist philosophy, and religious innovation was justified by the theory that in the absence of the "Hidden Imam," the twelfth in the line of 'Ali, the leading religious thinkers, or *mujtahids*, could exercise individual endeavor, or *ijtihad*, to solve questions of law or religion. Their solutions were merely probable, so that the same question might be solved differently by a different *mujtahid*.

The practical difference in rates of innovation between Iran and the lands to the west were in fact not as great as this theoretical difference might imply. Iran, more nomadic and less economically developed than the Ottoman Empire, did not have any great social impetus for intellectual innovation. Even the Ottoman Empire at its height did not witness intellectual adventuresomeness comparable to what had been present in the first centuries of Islam. Most of the empire's economic, social, and scientific needs were answered within a framework of adapted Islamic traditions, though there were some fundamental innovations in the realm of law and government.

The First Modern Intellectuals

The Ottoman Empire, following on its first great military defeats by the West, recorded in the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699, experienced in the early eighteenth century a brief period of incipient Westernization. A few Western books were translated into, and printed in, Ottoman Turkish and some Ottomans became conscious of the need to adopt Western military methods. The chief intellectual of the period, and the one responsible for most of the printed translations, was a converted European Unitarian, Ibrahim Müteferrika.[3] After his death and the resumption of conflicts with Europe, a reaction against the nascent Westernization set in. The reaction

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pointed up what was to be a recurrent problem in the intellectual life of the Middle East—the psychological difficulty of responding positively to a West seen to be an attacker and the abode of infidels.

The real break with the past did not occur until the beginning of the nineteenth century; it was Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 that started the process. The first major innovations occurred on the governmental level; they had to do largely with military reform. It was soon discovered that military change necessitated at least partial educational change, and this was responsible for opening the intellectual dikes.

Nineteenth-century Muslims, in reconsidering traditional modes of thought, had the choice of setting up parallel systems with scant reference to traditional ways, or trying to reinterpret the old, employing modern ideas that necessitated new interpretations of traditional writings. Both methods were in fact employed. The first innovators—rulers and governmental men—were largely concerned with self-strengthening. Their reforms were practical; they had scant concern for Islamic justifications. Muhammad 'Ali, the ruler of early nineteenth-century Egypt, established numerous new schools and a translation bureau without ever trying to justify them as Islamic. Rifa'ah at-Tahtawi, the Egyptian Muslim *shaikh* who accompanied the students Muhammad 'Ali sent to Paris to oversee their religious behavior, was a pioneer in advocating Western ideas and practices. He did not devote much time to reconciling what he advocated with the Qur'an. Tahtawi was fortunate enough to write at a time when Western imperialism was not yet making serious incursions into his native Egypt. He did not face the dilemma that wracked so many later Muslim intellectuals—how to advocate modernization without encouraging servility to the West and discouraging confidence in one's own cultural resources. Tahtawi became an ardent advocate of Westernization; he had none of the apologetic tone so common with so many of his successors.

Sultan Selim III, who came to the Ottoman throne in 1789, introduced a "New order" (*Nizam-i jedid*) in the army and elsewhere, but conceived of his acts as any traditional Ottoman reforming sultan might have done. He showed little concern with justifying his reforms by Qur'anic precedents. The reforming Sultan Mahmud II, whose modernization program included the destruction of the traditional janissary corps in 1826, asked his *ulama* to secure justifications from the Qur'an and Traditions for his military policies, but this was a minor concern for him. After his death the centralizing and modernizing ministers Reşid, Ali, and Fuad Paşas took the lead in introducing Western reforms in the bureaucracy, in the judiciary, and in the schools. These ministers generally tried to introduce reforms without reference to the Qur'an and Traditions; ironically, it was against these ministers that Ottoman reformists spoke up in defense of certain elements of tradition.

The first generation of Ottoman intellectuals appeared in the 1860's.

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Among the so-called new or Young Ottomans, the most prominent was the writer, Namik Kemal. Writing for and editing newspapers, first in Istanbul, then from their Paris exile, these men set forth a program of reform that placed constitutionalism at its center. Reforming ministers had no great interest in such a program. Opposed to a regime that had already made significant moves to Westernize and centralize the government, the Young Ottomans were very different from the reformers in most Middle Eastern countries, who were still arguing against traditional and reactionary regimes. The Young Ottomans had their own idealized modern version of Islam and of traditional Ottoman society. Namik Kemal argued that the separation of powers had existed in the old Ottoman state; the *ulama* had been the judiciary; the janissaries (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a large urban militia) had existed as a countervailing force. The regime of Ali and Fuad was criticized for its blind imitation of the West and for its overcentralization of power. The proposed remedy was primarily a constitution and a parliament. Under Kemal and others the opposition press became a force for the first time. Kemal is generally given credit for popularizing such terms as *watan* (fatherland), *hurriet* (liberty), and *millet* (nation)—Arabic words nationalized in Turkish, but taking on new meanings in the Arab world after the Turkish innovations.

If modern Egypt's intellectual life may be said to have started with Tahtawi, who welcomed nearly every Western innovation, it continued in a new way with the young oppositionists of the 1870's. The principal figure was Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani. His peripatetic life led him to influence many countries in the Muslim world, but his most important work was done in Egypt, where he lived from 1870 till the time he was exiled in 1879.[4] In Egypt, as in the Ottoman capital, the first innovators borrowed from the West without trying to justify their borrowings intellectually. As in Turkey, it was a group of opponents of the government—in this case the government of the spendthrift Khedive Isma'il—that constituted the first body of independent intellectuals that that society had seen. Though there is no evidence of direct influence either way, Afghani, like Namik Kemal, saw much of the ideal society as having existed in the Islamic past. He called on Muslims to cast off their apathy and to build societies as strong as those that had existed in early Islam. Working to find Islamic precedents for the reforms he advocated, Afghani's real concern was to find arguments that would mobilize the masses so that they would defend their country's independence against the now encroaching West. Where, as in Egypt, the West appeared both as an enemy to be feared and as a model to be emulated, a strong ambivalence toward the West developed. There was a keen desire not to admit open borrowing.

In this situation, Jamal ad-Din was an ideal leader for young and aware Egyptians and also for Syrians in Egypt. His circle included young men who were to figure among Egypt's most prominent intellectuals and most

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important politicians. Jamal ad-Din was born and raised in Iran in a Shi'ite family, but from the time of his expulsion from Afghanistan by its new ruler in 1868 until his death in 1897, he claimed to be from Afghanistan, except when he lived in Iran in the late 1880's and early 1890's. He probably put forth this claim to make himself appear as a born Sunni and thus to be acceptable in the Sunni lands to which he traveled. From the time he first appeared on the historical scene, on his only trip to Afghanistan in the 1860's, he figured as one who hated the British. He resented their encroachment on Eastern and Muslim lands—most particularly India—where he had lived as an adolescent at the time of the Indian mutiny. In Afghanistan he showed the same desire to strengthen Muslim lands against foreign aggression. After his expulsion from Afghanistan, Afghani went briefly to Egypt and then to Istanbul. Here, in a speech on crafts delivered in the manner of the medieval Muslim philosophers, whom he had learned of in Shi'i circles and who had come to have great influence on him, he referred to prophecy as a craft on almost the same level as philosophy. He drew comparisons between philosophers and prophets, and the talk aroused considerable anger among the religious conservatives. It was at their prodding that the government deported Afghani in 1871.

He went to Egypt, where a leading government official arranged a stipend for him. In his eight years there Afghani offended the religious conservatives, but he was more circumspect than he had been in Istanbul and managed to get into less trouble. Among his young disciples were many who were to become important intellectuals—including, especially, his closest disciple, Muhammad 'Abduh, later the grand mufti of Egypt and a major religious reformer; also, journalists like James Sanua and Adib Ishaq and political men like Abdullah Nadim and Sa'd Zaghlul (prominent in later years as a nationalist leader). Just as the circle of Young Ottomans who lived precariously in exile made up the nucleus of the first independent group of Turkish intellectuals, so Afghani's Egyptian circle can be regarded as the first independent intellectual group in that country.

Afghani taught his disciples to use rational arguments to confront the outmoded policies and religious forces of the opposition. Much of his teaching consisted of oral commentaries on Muslim philosophers, virtually untaught in Egypt and in other western Sunni lands. Just as the philosophers had used reason in their approach to the traditional religious texts, Afghani taught his pupils to do the same, though his purpose was to give a more modern meaning to those texts. Afghani also adopted from the philosophers their division of humanity into an elite, capable of taking in the whole rationalist truth, and a mass, who had to be dealt with in quite different terms, in a style more rhetorical. Afghani may be regarded as the first man in the Islamic world to recognize the importance of the mass media—newspapers, public speeches, and leaflets were all crucial for him. He pushed his followers in Egypt to publish newspapers; these became

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a kind of opposition press, limited only by the dangers incurred in criticizing the government of Isma'il and the encroachments of foreigners. Afghani was one of the first to detect in the ready-made structure of Freemasonry in Egypt the possibility of creating a political secret society. He converted one of the masonic lodges to which he belonged into a secret political group with ties to the heir apparent to the khedivate, Taufiq. When Taufiq assumed power after the British and French had brought about the deposition of his father Isma'il in 1879, Afghani expected greater influence for himself and for his followers. He was sorely disappointed. Continuing to make fiery speeches against the foreigners, he was deported by Taufiq, whose power depended on foreign support. Afghani's followers, however, went on to become important men in Colonel Ahmad 'Arabi's revolutionary government in 1882; men like 'Abduh and Sa'd Zaghlul had important later careers.

Afghani's group, like the Young Ottomans, illustrates the close ties between intellectual life and politics in the modern Middle East. Nearly all the men who can be pointed to as intellectuals also have a political role. While this may be thought to reflect the myopia of the scholar who refuses to dignify as intellectuals those among the *ulama* who were doing the same old thing in the same old way, the prejudice has some basis in fact. Only the man who is capable of looking at the traditions of his society with a critical, though not necessarily jaundiced, eye can be properly called an intellectual. Because the *ulama* were not all blindly bound to a traditional mode of thought, more study needs to be made of their leading men and writers. In Egypt and Iran, and probably in the rest of the Middle East as well (which has not been studied with this question in mind), many of the leading *ulama* sent their sons to foreign universities and gave them the modern training that served as their entrée into lucrative and powerful positions.

Recent studies on the *ulama* and Sufi orders support the above observation, and also show the traditional and continued use of education in religious sciences for entrée into the *ulama* class by sons of the peasants and other relatively poor groups. Entry into the *ulama* has been shown to be the chief traditional vehicle of social mobility, but now that the more powerful and lucrative posts lie outside the *ulama* class, the religious higher schools tend to be patronized by the poorer classes, while the *ulama* may regard continuation of *ulama* status for the family as something for the third son to take up, but not the first or second.[5] Original writing by the traditionalist *ulama* is rare, although not so rare as Western concentration on the modernizers would make it seem.

A modernist member of the *ulama* class who had great intellectual influence was Afghani's chief disciple, Muhammad 'Abduh. Giving up on political activity after he left Afghani in 1885, 'Abduh became the founder of the school of Islamic modernism. Returning to a quasi-Mu'tazilite in-

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terpretation of Islam, he tried to prove that modern science and other modern principles were encompassed in the Qur'an. In his practical activity, he sought to modernize Egyptian law and education. His own chief disciple, Rashid Rida, persisted in believing that all the principles necessary for modern life were to be found in a return to the truly understood principles of the Qur'an and of the earliest Muslims. As time went on he became increasingly conservative, expressing admiration for the puritanical Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia. His influence dwindled even before his death in 1935. The highly political and revolutionary principles of Afghani were used by his most immediate descendants in directions that became increasingly reformist and in time conservative. A theory of religiously-based change which seemed revolutionary in the 1870's appeared outdated or even reactionary in the 1930's.

This is not to say that all such thought became conservative. In the hands of the Islamic reformist Qasim Amin, Islamic modernism was used to justify the emancipation of women, a growing cause among many progressive thinkers of the twentieth century. There were others of 'Abduh's school who similarly used Islamic reformism to justify modernizing change.

The Ideas and Expression of Modern Intellectuals

Modernization in its earlier phases encouraged the development of a relatively independent intellectual class, though that class was often stifled by censorship like that of the more traditional despots, as, for instance, under Sultan Abdülhamid II. In the early phases of modernization, Western thought inevitably came to influence educated Middle Easterners; modernization created new groups amenable to Western ideas. New military and technical schools, translation bureaus, and Western-model schools on all levels, in addition to education abroad, helped to create a growing class of modern or semimodern intellectuals. No longer were the *ulama* class and the government the only channels of entry for talented and educated men, though expanded government operations meant that many intellectuals were in fact in the government. There were also jobs for the educated in law, medicine, and, increasingly, in business enterprises and in other new professions. The writer, found primarily in newspapers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, could increasingly move to the novel, the short story, the modern poem, play, or essay. Much of this writing was directly political, but in times of repression writers could use fiction to express critical attitudes in the way that had been done in Russia in the nineteenth century.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century there was a belief in modern constitutions and parliament as the key to achieving the status of the West. Particularly after the Russo-Japanese war, when the only constitutional state in Asia defeated the one European great power that

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had no constitution, there was a growth of interest in parliaments and constitutions. The revival of the Ottoman constitution in 1908, the Persian constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, and the Arab parliamentary regimes of the period between the world wars all attest to this faith. In the period since World War II there has been increasing disillusionment with parliamentary regimes. These are seen as representative of a limited ruling class of landlords and the rich. Nationalism and socialism have appeared as the new panaceas. Nationalism was a much later development in the Middle East than is generally realized; pan-Arab nationalism is an even more recent development. Its post-World War II triumph could not have been predicted with confidence before 1939.

Middle Eastern intellectuals, seeing the weakness and inefficiency of their own traditional regimes, turned to nationalism after the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1909. Arab intellectuals developed into separatists only after the succeeding Young Turk government discriminated in favor of the Turks and against the Arabs. The exact nature of Arab separatism varied over time and place. The Arab nationalists who opposed the Ottoman Empire generally wanted a single large Arab Asian state; Egypt was rarely considered a candidate for membership in this state until World War II. Local Lebanese, Syrian, and Egyptian nationalist movements flourished in the interwar years; so, also, did nationalist theories put forth by intellectuals. Only since the creation of the state of Israel has pan-Arabism become the dominant trend among both intellectuals and the masses.

After the death of constitutionalism as a panacea, increasing emphasis was put on nationalism by both intellectuals and governments. In Turkey, the key figure was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who created a new nation out of Anatolian Turkey, and whose military success was followed by major reforms. His success attracted intellectuals as much as others; intellectuals were harnessed into supporting Anatolian-Turkish nationalism, which had scarcely existed before Atatürk took power. The dominant form of Turkish nationalism before this had been pan-Turanianism, which aimed at annexing Russia's Turkish territories. Atatürk even found intellectuals to back his laudable campaign for Anatolian nationalism with a less intellectually honest, but perhaps necessary, campaign to prove that earlier peoples in Anatolia, notably the Hittites, had in fact been Turks. The original language of mankind was said to be a form of Turkish (which could make the Turks relatives of any desired people). Turkish intellectuals since World War II have not been pressured into supporting theories of this sort.

Egyptian nationalism became a major intellectual trend early in the twentieth century, with the romantic Mustafa Kamil and the liberal constitutionalist Ahmad Lutfi as-Sayyid. After World War I the nationalist movement was led by the chief of the leading nationalist Wafd party, Sa'd Zaghlul. Egyptian nationalism was at first quite separate from Arab nationalism, and until approximately World War II the word "Arab" had

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the meaning of "Bedouin" in Egypt. Mustafa Kamil's nationalism was pro-Ottoman, but after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire nationalism tended to be limited to Egypt and to be anti-British in its emphasis. In the interwar period Egyptian liberals developed the Pharaonic view of Egyptian civilization, emphasizing the continuity of Egypt from Pharaonic times to the present. The great intellectual Taha Husain, in *The Future of Culture in Egypt,* argued that Egypt was a Western, Mediterranean civilization, with no ties to the East.

This liberal view of nationalism was part of a secularism characteristic of many Egyptian intellectuals, particularly in the 1920's. This secularism sometimes went beyond the bounds tolerated by a still powerful religious establishment and public opinion. Taha Husain's early book on pre-Islamic poetry, which claimed that much of it had been forged by later Islamic authors for their own ends, created such a furor that it had to be withdrawn and revised. A book by 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, suggesting that Islam was not concerned with politics and that Muhammad had not headed a state, caused a similar outcry. Despite such setbacks, reformist and secularist writing continued, though many more gestures were made in the direction of Muslim orthodoxy.

Broadly speaking, these nationalist intellectuals represented a new bourgeoisie. They were largely a landed, professional, and commercial rather than industrial bourgeoisie, who owed much of their position to new types of trade with the West. The Egyptian bourgeoisie in the early twentieth century was optimistic about the possibilities of liberal nationalism, and this optimism was reflected in the chief contributions of its liberal intellectuals. As constitutionalism was shown to be a farce in practice, and as the demands of the lower classes came increasingly to the fore, the higher bourgeoisie and certain of the liberal intellectuals became increasingly conservative, irrationalist, and pessimistic. Taha Husain changed from optimistic radicalism to emotional conservatism. With certain of the other intellectuals the change was even more marked.[6] At the same time the lower classes and the petty bourgeoisie were beginning to find their organized intellectual expression in the Muslim Brotherhood, which expressed both their frustrations and their utopian aspirations in those religious terms that were most familiar to them.

Arab nationalism began, as Sylvia Haim has demonstrated, only in the early twentieth century.[7] It received its major impetus from the Turkish nationalism of the Young Turk government and from World War I, which influenced the Arab revolt and the Arab separation from the Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism's chief ideologist was Sati' al-Husri, whose many books were dedicated to promoting nationalism and pan-Arabism. Other nationalists wrote suggesting that all ancient Near Eastern empires were Arab achievements. Intellectuals became increasingly caught up in the pan-Arab cause, and in place of the many nationalisms, local as well as pan-

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Arab, we find a single pan-Arab nationalism taking over both the masses and the intellectuals in the post-World War II period. The virtual unanimity of Arabs, intellectuals and masses, on the Arab-Israeli question helped forge a consensus and a dislike of heresy among Arabs that was in certain ways reminiscent of the orthodoxy of the premodern period. Arab intellectuals, having for a brief period differed, were partially returned to the mold of unanimity. This unanimity, however, ought not to be exaggerated; even on the Arab-Israeli question, a variety of practical and impractical approaches exist about what ought to be done, and these may even outweigh the unanimous feeling that something must be done.

In the "progressive" countries—Iraq and Syria—as well as in those that have had more recent revolutions, Arab socialism is the dominant ideology of intellectuals. The same is true of Egypt, where the form of socialism is somewhat different. In Iraq and Syria, where communism was known earlier, the Ba'th party, which originated during World War II, has been the chief representative of socialist thought; it has helped provide an ideology for Egypt as well, though this is not always admitted. The Ba'th's original ideology, expressed by its first leader Michel Aflaq, combined a moderate socialism with a strong nationalism. This blend suggested a downgrading of the idea of class struggle and an emphasis on national unity and integration. With the rise to power of more leftist factions of the Ba'th, Marxism and the class struggle have taken a more prominent place in Ba'thist thought. Certain thinkers have tried to integrate not only Arabism but also Islam with socialism. As Islam had once been portrayed as being constitutional, democratic, and scientific, so now it is claimed to be socialist.

Socialism made its first appearance in Egypt after World War I with intellectuals like the Coptic Christian Salama Musa and organizations like the small and divided Communist party. Only since World War II, however, has socialism come to the fore as a major force. The discrediting of the constitutional regime and of the monarchy, particularly during the first Palestine war, led to a revolutionary situation that came to a head in 1952. Since 1961 socialism has been the order of the day, though it is generally proclaimed to be of a special kind—Arab socialism—which retains a utopian, nationalist, and even Islamic tinge. Arab socialism is held to avoid class struggle and the sacrifice of the current generation to future ones, though in practice these things turn out to be less easy to achieve than is suggested by theory.

The continued emphasis on Islam in the Arab countries, considerably more vocal than anything characteristic of Turkey or Iran, is not only to be explained by the fact that the Arabs were the first Muslims and therefore feel an identification with Islam in an almost nationalist way; the Turks felt almost as much identification with Islam. This defensiveness about Islam and use of Islam in modernization is also caused by the fact that the

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Arabs, unlike the Turks and Iranians, were colonized by Europeans, and had to emphasize their ideological distinction from European Christianity and secularism as part of their anti-imperialistic ideology.

In Turkey, the intellectuals' position has been different because of Turkey's noncolonial background and also because the Turks were about a generation ahead of the Arabs in modernization and development. The variety of intellectual trends common to the Turks before 1922 is roughly comparable to what the Arabs experienced in their own liberal interwar period. Just as the Arab intellectuals at that time wondered whether to support pan-Arabism or separatism, with Egypt as an entity returning to the Pharoahs, and Lebanon as a unit going back to the Phoenicians, so Turkish intellectuals before 1920 argued whether Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, or pan-Turkism ought to be the dominant trend for them. Just as the Arab new regimes claiming a mass appeal have clamped down on intellectuals, limiting the variety of permissible solutions, so Turkish intellectuals under Kemal Atatürk were drawn to the Anatolian-Turkish nationalism discussed earlier, which had the pragmatic value of limiting the strivings of Turks to territory they controlled or regained after World War I. The major difference between the Anatolian nationalism that became official Turkish policy and the Arab nationalism of the post-World War II period is that the former was based on a realism that did not require the Turks to annex new territory, which the pan-Turanianism of certain Turkish intellectuals would have done, and which the ideology of pan-Arabism requires. The defeat of Israel imposes obligations that are beyond the capability of Arab governments; these obligations only lead to increased frustration.

Kemal Atatürk encouraged ideas with less intellectual plausibility than pan-Arabism, but these were positions that permitted pragmatic accomplishments; pan-Arabism and belief in the ultimate defeat and dismemberment of the Jewish state have as yet led to no comparable pragmatic accomplishments. Turkey, having never been a colony or a mandated territory, finds few psychological obstacles to taking over Western thought systems in their entirety; Arabs, having suffered from colonialism in various forms, and seeing Israel as the final chapter of Western colonialism in their territory, find it more difficult to take over unchanged thought systems from the colonial West. The Arabs identify more strongly with Islam than do the Turks, but it must be realized that this was not always the case, and that a non-Muslim Turk is seen by many Turks as an impossibility, whereas non-Muslim Arabs abound.[8] The archaicizing nature of much Arab thought probably has more to do with the Arabs' hostile attitude toward the West than with stronger traditional identification with Islam. Both the Arab countries and Turkey have vacillated between intellectual conformity and greater intellectual freedom.

Important in the development of Arab thought has been the special role of the Arab Christians. Sent to foreign or local missionary schools before

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their Muslim compatriots, they were the first to develop a Westernized viewpoint. They tended also to be secularist and to be scientifically oriented in their publications. They did not have to confront the humiliation of their people in quite the same way as did the Muslims. They pioneered in setting up newspapers and other modern institutions in Arab countries. Despite these early secularizing tendencies, Christian writers and politicians recently have identified themselves with the Islamic past and have shown a reverence for Muhammad. Even Arab Christians, then, recognize a tie between Islam and Arab nationalism, and few have tried to divorce the two. Lebanon, however, remains different from the other Arab countries with their large Muslim majorities.

Arab intellectuals today are frustrated not only by the problems faced by their countries, but by their marginal importance in the Arab world. Most recent regimes are either traditional monarchies or military revolutionary states; neither has turned much to intellectuals for help; neither has feared intellectuals sufficiently to devote great attention to them. The military regimes have usually worked out their ideologies with little help from the intellectuals, who have joined the movements rather than initiated the ideologies. The modern intellectuals are unlike the traditional *ulama* who had a clear role in society, recognized by government and masses alike. The frustrations and the alienation of the intellectuals ought not, however, to be overemphasized. They hold major positions on newspapers, and have influence as writers and professors. The secular authorities rarely heed them, but this is hardly a situation unique to the Arab world.

The intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were in a position to claim credit for an influence on society, for helping to transform the social order. In the traditional class structure the *ulama* operated as a buffer between the masses and the secular rulers and as the maintainers of the status quo. Attacks on the status quo and the old class system came largely from the new intellectuals, who tended to express the interests of the new middle classes and professional groups. New theories were brought to the Middle East by intellectuals in the first instance and were later taken up by other groups in society. Constitutionalism, democracy, higher status for women, nationalism, socialism—these were all causes first advocated by intellectuals and then supported by broader strata of the society. Even the military rulers of the Arab countries were influenced by the new climate of opinion that owes so much to the pioneering of intellectuals. Nationalism has been the most important meeting ground for intellectuals and new rulers; nationalism is a twentieth-century phenomenon in the Middle East, which spread with great rapidity after being initially espoused by a small group of intellectuals. Socialism, as an idea, spread even more rapidly; its first advocates were small numbers of intellectuals, of whom Salama Musa of Egypt ought to be singled out.

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The intellectuals were pioneers in communicating new political theories and in making them palatable by insisting that they were Islamic (or Arab, Turkish, or Persian) in origin. The new middle class tended to take up the theories of nationalism, while the petty bourgeoisie of the bazaars and the lower classes looked more for a new interpretation of Islam such as the one offered by the Muslim Brotherhood. Such individuals and groups saw all the difficulties of modern times as stemming from a turning away from traditional Islam. Traditional Islam still motivates the lower classes, though sometimes in unlikely combinations with socialism and nationalism. The demand for intellectual conformity in most of the Arab world and in Iran now affects all classes, though it is felt to be particularly galling by the intellectual class.

Iran, like Turkey, has alternated between periods of intellectual conformity and periods of freedom. The rhythm, however, has not been the same. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a strong censorship existed in both Iran and Turkey. Iran was in a relatively backward social and intellectual state; the intellectuals who were the analogues of the Young Ottomans, who first published newspapers abroad and smuggled them into the country, appeared later, in the 1870's to 1890's. Iran achieved its first constitution in 1906-1907 through a revolution that made a free press possible. A great variety of antiautocratic, constitutional, and modernizing newspapers developed, along with others that took quite opposite views. After a period of intellectual freedom in the first years after World War I, Reza Shah, who copied Kemal Atatürk in many ways, began to suppress independent liberal thought and encouraged a form of official nationalism that had its roots in the Achemenid and Sassanian past. This type of nationalism, based on pre-Islamic emphases but without the conservative official bias, had been favored by advanced Iranian intellectuals since the late nineteenth century, when Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani published his anti-Arab, anti-Islamic, and radical Iranian nationalist works. He, however, had looked back to Mazdak, the fifth century A.D. religious rebel and communist, for inspiration, and not to the rulers of early Iran. Similarly, the radical nationalist Democratic party of the early constitutional period that continued through World War I had taken the legendary blacksmith and warrior Kaveh as its hero. Kaveh had saved Iran in the distant past. Reza Shah and his son, the present Shah, prefer to look to the ancient monarchy. The nationalist intellectual Ahmad Kasravi, who tried to free Persian of Arabic words and to reject Shi'ism as a harmful alien importation, was assassinated in 1946 by a member of the Fida'iyyan-i Islam, a fundamentalist organization with appeal similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. As in much of the Middle East, religious orthodoxy has become a class phenomenon, adhered to by many of the lower classes and by the petty bourgeoisie, but not by the intellectuals or upper bourgeoisie.

In Iran the brief periods of intellectual freedom and free political

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life that followed the two great wars of the twentieth century each time have culminated in an absolutist monarchy that imposed strict censorship and worked to keep intellectual expression under firm control. In Iran, as in the Arab countries and Turkey, censorship has led intellectuals to seek the ambiguous spheres of fiction and poetry rather than to risk open political dissent. The literature of modern Iran, like that of the Arabs and that of modern Turkey (excellent, but still undiscovered in the West), deserves greater study by those who wish to learn what intellectuals are in fact thinking. In Iran today there is far more oppositional thought among intellectuals than appears on the surface, or impresses itself on the outsider bedazzled by the sometimes real and sometimes public relations achievements of the Shah.

Everywhere in the Middle East, as in much of the rest of the world, nationalist loyalties have largely taken the place of religious loyalties among the educated classes. The appeal of secular nationalism as opposed to nationalistically tinged religion has been much more limited among the masses. The continued strength of religious fundamentalism among the people is shown by the popularity of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt until its suppression, or the expression of religious loyalties among Turkish peasants in their electoral behavior when Kemal Atatürk's Republican Peoples' party ceased to have a political monopoly. Arab nationalists have associated their nationalism with an appeal to Islam, which in its beginnings was a religion of the Arabs. The Turkish and Persian nationalists have generally made no such connection, and, especially since World War II, have been faced by opposition movements among the *ulama* and/or the common people.

Intellectuals in the modern Middle East have introduced a wide variety of new ideas to their countries—liberalism, parliamentarianism, nationalism, and socialism in all their permutations. Since the late nineteenth century, as circles of mutually reinforcing individuals, they have often formed "schools" favoring particular trends. The modern intellectuals have broken decisively with the Islamic past, most particularly in Turkey and Iran, where religion is generally considered, in the tradition of the philosophers, to be good for keeping the masses orderly, but not suitable in its rules and dogmas for the well educated. Only in a few periods have intellectuals been free to express all their thoughts openly in print.

The fluctuation between periods of censorship and periods of freedom has moved more frequently toward intellectual controls than to intellectual freedom. One can only hope that the current situation in Iran and most of the Arab countries will give way to one where intellectuals will feel greater possibilities of openly discussing important affairs. Privileged Westerners should realize, however, that intellectual freedom often seems a distant luxury to rulers who seek to modernize and improve living standards rapidly. The intellectual must often suffer when these goals preclude

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intellectual freedom, and it is all too easy to condemn all interference with intellectual freedom without recognizing the forces that make such interference attractive to new regimes.

The bravado of much of the nationalist appeal often masks a profound frustration and uncertainty about the national virtues that are so loudly proclaimed. In the Arab countries in particular, the twentieth century has been a time of serious defeats, for which a certain consolation is sought in ideology. Arab intellectuals, and often their Persian and Turkish counterparts, have taken refuge in the glorification of the distant past, which serves as a balm for the pains of the present. The Golden Age of Muhammad and the first four caliphs is constantly celebrated by Arab intellectuals, as are the achievements of the early 'Abbasid caliphate and the final outcome of the Crusades. Later years are seen as a deviation from the Arab essence—they may be discarded. Recently, socialism has been added to the nationalist ideology, but not always with great clarity of purpose.

Intellectuals in the Arab countries have a more difficult task than their peers elsewhere, and we should not be surprised that many of them choose exile, silence, or cunning as ways to overcome their predicament. Hope for a changed climate among Arab intellectuals depends largely on whether their countries achieve either solutions or new attitudes to their major domestic and foreign policy problems. So long as Arabs, with partial justification, consider themselves to be ill-used by the West and Israel, so long will the restrictions on intellectual freedom and the frustrations of daily life lead certain intellectuals and publicists to romanticize about the past and the present. Others will choose to express their realistic views in literature and art, where freedom is the greatest.

There has been, since the six-day war, the development of more radical thought concerning what is wrong with the Arab world. The rise of socialist ideologies and the opposition to neo-imperialism has cut into the intellectual gap between the elite and the masses, which was already undermined by mass nationalism. If the Arab masses, the leading intellectuals, and the governments can unite around practical socialist programs, there will be hope for a more rapid economic, social, and cultural development in the future.[9]

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Intellectual Roles in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Spain

AFTER UNIFICATION under the Catholic Kings in 1474, the conquest of Granada in 1492, and the incorporation of Navarre in 1512, Spain became one of the first large European monarchical states.[1] This political modernity, however, was not accompanied by other processes of modernization, most specifically a flourishing national capitalism. Spain could have been one of the first national monarchies had it not become enmeshed soon after unification in a two-fronted imperial adventure. The grandson and heir of the Catholic Kings, who became Charles I of Spain in 1516, was, when elected emperor in 1519, confronted by both the Lutheran challenge and the Turkish threat in Vienna and the Mediterranean.[2] In those same years navigators and conquistadores were creating a transoceanic empire that would soon extend to the Philippines and incorporate most of America. The meaning and purpose of empire in Europe and overseas, and specific policy questions such as the treatment of the Indians, would engage intellectuals in fierce disputes and important political roles. Politically Spain experienced basic changes in the two centuries of Habsburg rule: it moved from a rising power with a new sense of mission, optimism, and dignity, to a period of frustrating and costly struggles inherited from that moment of zenith, ending in defeat, crisis, and decline.

Religion occupies a central role at the time of the Reformation and Counter Reformation in Spain; it is impossible to find more than isolated cases of secularized intellectuals such as those in eighteenth-century France.[3] The medieval coexistence and conflicts among Christians, Muslims, and Jews created unique problems, problems that have led Américo Castro to interpret Spanish culture and society almost exclusively from that perspective.[4] Centuries of a crusading tradition left a mark; the forced conversion of large populations and their resistance to assimilation created unique problems to which the Inquisition was one response; concern for *limpieza de sangre* (clean blood, that is, no descent from Jews or Moors) and conflict between old and new Christians had profound implications for society and culture. This unique religious constellation led to a pre-Reformation religious reform that had close ties with Erasmianism and helps explain

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the failure of the Protestant Reformation in Spain and the role of its intellectuals in the Catholic Reformation (or Counter Reformation).[5] In fact, it is impossible to separate religious and intellectual roles, not only because clerics, monks, and even inquisitors played important roles in cultural and intellectual life, but also because lay intellectuals were deeply involved in religious questions and political-legal or economic problems are debated in religious-moral terms. Without the religious context—the confrontation with the Muslim and particularly the Jewish heritage, the missionary task in the New World, and the defense of Catholicism against the Protestant heresy—Spanish culture would make little sense. In this essay, therefore, I will be dealing with religious intellectuals, post-Reformation Catholic intellectuals living in a religious society rather than a secularized world.

Culturally Spain was often the crossroads of the main currents of the time: the Renaissance and humanism blend and conflict with a variety of medieval heritages; Erasmianism and scholasticism, innovation and continuity, face each other and often fuse.[6] Cultural life is at the center of the transition from the Renaissance to the post-Renaissance, or baroque, era. The Counter Reformation had a strong Spanish component, at least in the sixteenth century. The Jesuit order, its agent, was founded by a Spaniard, although it was not always in favor in Spain. The Jesuits and their system of education contributed a new type of religious-intellectual role, quite different from that of medieval monks. Spanish mystics and saints play an important role until Frenchmen assume intellectual and organizational innovative roles in the seventeenth century.

Within this unique historical, political, religious, and cultural context, Spain offered men of ideas—the creators or manipulators—a large number of roles, some old with a new content, others emerging at the time.

Intellectuals as Guardians and Innovators, Not Deviants

A theme will soon emerge as central for the two centuries under consideration, one quite different from any during the last two and a half centuries: intellectuals identified with an order, religious or political. This identification as guardians of a tradition did not imply subservience, lack of innovation, or even criticism of that tradition, particularly in the first half of the sixteenth century. Men responding to a new situation (the Reformation, the conflict between emperor and Pope, the discovery and colonization of America) gave creative formulations in literature and the arts to its ideals, criticizing imperfections in the social order, while defending it against its enemies. Obviously the emphasis on one or another role varies in different men and over the two centuries, but the majority of the men we will be discussing do not present the disjunction between society and culture to which we are so accustomed in our time. Some might argue that this situation was ultimately in conflict with the most genuine role of the

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intellectual, with real breakthrough and innovation, and in the last analysis was the result of constraint, of a closed society, of conscious or unconscious self-censorship of which we have only an insufficient record.[7] This might be true in some areas of intellectual endeavor (scriptural criticism, certain expressions of religious sentiment, for example) and in certain periods (such as the last years of the Erasmians).[8] With the exception of Bartolomé de Las Casas, who became a bishop, was listened to in the highest circles, and was not persecuted or silenced in his lifetime, few leading minds questioned the legitimacy of authority to the point that we could call them radical intellectuals. A few, who were not central figures, went as far as real heresy to die at the hands of the Inquisition, and many more encountered suspicion or persecution (accused by fellow intellectuals, not always lesser minds). A few preferred to live abroad, like Luis Vives, or exile, like Juan de Valdes, but one cannot speak of an intellectual emigration (and certainly powers hostile to Spain would have welcomed real dissidents). How is it possible to account for this combination of "basic" conformity and "real" creativity—a creativity based on issues concerned with central values? The answers are not easy and are certainly subject to controversy.

I would stress that a culture whose boundaries are fundamentally religious (even when politically supported) leaves a wide area for cultural creativity, perhaps because a book religion and a tradition based on it cannot be expanded or stretched too far by the intellectuals to limit creativity outside of its particular content. Despite similarities between the Spain of those centuries—in fact of Catholic and much of Protestant Europe—and contemporary totalitarian societies (a point stressed by Barrington Moore in his analysis of Calvinist Geneva),[9] the fact that those societies were based on religious rather than political-secular values makes such comparisons risky when attempting to study the life of intellectuals in them. The duality,[10] paradoxically, often protects those who question other authorities on the basis of arguments derived from the religious sphere. Las Casas' criticism of colonization, of the authority of kings to engage in the conquest of America, was possible because he appeared moved by evangelical zeal. As long as a man identifies with the religious community he can go far in his criticism of the powerful and of society, or of intellectual tradition and its authorities.

Innovation within an order is perceived as less disruptive and irresponsible than a situation where there is no established public allegiance to some basic consensus. Those concerned with the role of intellectuals in "closed" societies today should consider the possibility of conclusions other than the inevitable destructive conflict between power and intellectuals. Why not consensus on a fairly well-delineated range of beliefs, values, and ideologies, and creativity within the area defined by those boundaries? One basic difference from contemporary closed societies is that the Span-

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iards of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had few if any models of a freer society.

Another explanation for this widespread cultural consensus—one that does not speak in terms of repression or fear—might be that Spaniards did not turn their attention to certain problems or push their questions beyond a certain point as the result of latent self-censorship. Such an interpretation is offered by many who admire the works of Spanish intellectuals, without either ignoring or stressing their limitations or the gaps in their contribution to Western civilization. There are variations in this approach, ranging from a comparison of the sum total of the intellectual effort in those two centuries (a balance in which the plus in art and literature would be contrasted with a minus in philosophy and science) to a comparison of the work of men pursuing similar intellectual problems or forms of aesthetic creation, accounting for the differences in the boundaries set to the travels of their mind by their different basic commitments and the pressures of the societies supporting them. It would be a tempting but hazardous task, for example, to compare Shakespeare with the almost contemporary Spanish theater in those terms. The comparison between Spanish, Italian, and English science would appear as a more fruitful example, but would have to await much more scholarly work on the history of Spanish science. Certainly such research would be central to a test of Robert K. Merton's theory of Puritanism and science as well as the theories of his critics. The risks of such an approach become evident when we realize that scholars have discovered important Spanish contributions which had previously been attributed to other countries, or had been independently arrived at almost simultaneously in Spain, or had been diffused from Spain. The case of the contributions of Spanish moralist-economists to the understanding of the European and particularly Spanish inflation caused by the American treasury is a good example. Those who refer only to Bodin, Botero, Serra, Davanzati, Sully, Montchrestien, and Montaigne ignore, as Pierre Vilar has stressed,[11] the contribution of the Spaniards Martín de Azpilcueta, Tomás del Mercado, Luis Ortiz, Martín González de Cellorigo, Pedro Fernández de Navarrete, and Diego de Saavedra Fajardo. The same seems to be true in some other scientific fields. A social history of science should distinguish the issue of intellectual discovery from that of institutionalization of scientific endeavors, diffusion, continuity in efforts, and practical application and use of technology before accounting for the gap between Spain and other countries at the onset of the industrial and scientific age. The issue might then shift into an analysis of the direction of the total effort of the society, given its ideological and political commitments and its use of economic resources, and the values of the society in determining them, rather than the role of the individual intellectual. It would turn the question away from queries about the impact of society on intellectuals, scholars, and scientists, themselves, into queries on the re-

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sponse of political, social, and economic institutions to their work. Modern scholarly histories of Spanish universities and science from a comparative perspective would be important in this context.

Chronological comparative tables of developments in different realms, such as those of Pierre Chaunu,[12] clearly show that the Spanish contribution was outstanding in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries in literature and the arts and some forms of religious thought and expression, but not fully comparable in philosophy and probably less so in science and music. Even when gaps in scholarship may account for some of the differences in visibility, there can be little doubt that few of the great philosophers, scientists, and musicians who shaped European civilization from then on were Spaniards. Even if it were only a question of the diffusion and reception of the work in some of those fields by Spaniards making simultaneous and independent discoveries, the question would remain: what barriers—cultural and sociological—would account for the lack of diffusion, visibility, institutionalization? On the other hand, there is little record of persecution or censorship of efforts in those fields in Spain in indices of the Inquisition, records of trials by the Suprema, or even the limited information on university life.[13] In fact, there is some evidence (for example, on the toleration of Copernican teaching) of less inquisitorial concern with new scientific ideas than in Italy. The course of intellectual life was apparently shaped more by positive than negative sanctions, by incentives rather than by proscription or even prescription. Selective, permissive tolerance, with largely invisible but effective boundaries, channeled the efforts of intellectuals—or, as the defenders of Spanish culture would argue, there was deliberate and free choice of certain alternatives even when others were possible.

Spain in the post-Renaissance and Counter Reformation period offers an example of intellectual life characterized by integration into the society—shaping society and being shaped by it—rather than in conflict with it. Some periods of the Middle Ages, the era of Louis XIV, Germany in certain decades of the nineteenth century, and prolonged periods in non-Western civilizations were perhaps similar in combining creativity and the absence of crisis—a period when intellectuals were often influential, highly respected (ignoring their economic complaints), integrated without necessarily being subservient to the powers of the society, even critical of specific aspects of the social order without questioning its basic assumptions. How this became possible is an interesting question, one that should include, however, the question of the cost of such a pattern to the society and long-term intellectual development. Such a perspective certainly would make sense in studying German idealism and culture at the turn of the nineteenth century, or academic and scientific life in imperial Germany until close to World War I. Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz has noted: "We had no religious wars in the sixteenth century but we had them in the twentieth."[14]

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An important aspect of the heritage of those two centuries is the conflict in Spain over the interpretation of its cultural achievements in view of the fact that the successful nations of Europe followed a different path and that regardless of the value of their heritage, Spaniards could not continue their unique culture in a creative way into the eighteenth century (except, perhaps, in the arts, with Goya). Glorious achievement and decadence are inextricably linked and are a source of permanent ambivalence for nineteenth-century intellectuals. The polemic of the two Spains[15] —defined more or less narrowly and projected into the past—is the key to post-Enlightenment Spanish culture and, together with economic and social problems, to the deep divisions underlying instability and civil wars. We may surmise that this problem of relating a glorious past to later mainstreams of a Western civilization imposed on all by its political, military, technological, and economic success also plagues other intellectuals in non-Western societies, particularly Islam.

The basic Catholic consensus in the Spanish culture, particularly of the seventeenth but even of the sixteenth century, turns out as central to Spanish intellectual and political debate in the twentieth century, when secularization of the culture has moved very far. We cannot resist quoting a historic speech of Prime Minister Manuel Azaña in defending article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic outlawing the Jesuits and forbidding the religious orders to engage in education. Even this great secularizer feels pride in the Spanish Catholic culture, to the point of suggesting that perhaps Catholicism owes more to Spain than Spain to Catholicism, and he argues that the nation was Catholic because its culture was Catholic while "Spain has stopped being Catholic," whatever the number of believers, because then (1931) its creative culture was not Catholic. Few texts reveal better the complex identification between religion, culture, and nationality that those creative centuries have left as a heritage for intellectuals and politician-intellectuals.

> I cannot admit, honorable gentlemen, this to be called a religious problem. The authentic religious problem cannot go beyond the limits of the personal conscience, because it is in the personal conscience that the question on the mystery of our destiny is formulated and answered. This is a political problem, of the constitution of the State, and it is just now when this problem loses even a resemblance to religion, to religiosity. Unlike the old state that took upon itself the tutelage of consciences and provided a means to push the souls, even against their will, on the way to their salvation, our State excludes all otherworldly concern and any care about faithfulness, and withdraws from the church that famous secular arm that rendered it so many and large services. The question is nothing but to organize the Spanish state on the basis of the premises that I have just established. *In order to affirm that Spain is no longer Catholic we have the same reasons, I mean reasons of the same nature, as to affirm that Spain was Catholic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.* It would be a useless argument to examine now what Spain owes to Catholicism, which is the favorite subject of the apologetic historians; I rather think that it is Catholicism which

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is in debt to Spain, because a religion doesn't live in the written texts of the concilia or in the folios of its theologians, but in the spirit and the actions of the people who embrace it, and the Spanish genius spread all over the moral expanses of Catholicism, as its political genius spread all over the world in the enterprises we all know. Spain, in the apogee of her genius, when Spain was a creative and inventive people, she created a Catholicism to her own image and resemblance, in which shine above all the traits of Spain's character, certainly very different from the Catholicism of other large Catholic powers; so different, for example, from French Catholicism. Then there was a Spanish Catholicism for the same psychological reasons that created a Spanish novel, a Spanish painting, a Spanish theater, and a Spanish morality in which the penetration of the religious faith is so visible. And this is so true that there is still by chance the Society of Jesus, a Spanish creation, the work of a great example of our race, and that proves to what extent the genius of the Spanish people has affected the direction of the historic and political government of the Church of Rome. But now, honorable gentlemen, the situation is just the opposite.

Therefore I have the same reasons to say that Spain is no longer Catholic as to say the opposite of the old Spain. Spain was Catholic in the sixteenth century in spite of the fact that there were many very important dissidents, some of whom are the glory of Castilian literature, and Spain has stopped being Catholic despite the fact that there are millions of believing Catholics in Spain. And could the Spanish state, could any state in the world in its organization and thought be dissociated, divorced, turning its back, hostile to the general sense of civilization, of the present situation of its people? No, honorable gentlemen.[16]

A Profile of Intellectual Production

A quantitative or qualitative analysis of the total intellectual contribution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is outside the scope of this essay, but a few facts can provide a profile of intellectual life. To form a collective portrait of intellectuals I have compiled a biographical file on 321 authors writing between 1500 and 1700. To add to the data on this "elite" we have the index of the *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova* of Nicolás Antonio, the seventeenth-century Spanish bibliographer-scholar, which classifies authors and works published between 1500 and 1584. The statistics composing this profile of intellectual life are presented in table 1.

Our quantitative analysis revealed, to an extent we did not expect, a shift at the turn of the century from the scholarly—be it scientific, humanistic, or theological-philosophical—to the expressive literary artistic culture. Many factors must account for such a dramatic change, among them the decline of the universities and the drop in enrollment (as stressed by Richard Kagan[17]) in the less professional and practical disciplines. Our data confirm Kagan's in that the shift was not only away from an incipient scientific culture—mathematics, natural history, and medicine—but also simultaneously away from theology, scholastic philosophy, and even the classical humanities. Our rough quantification even shows the shift from a legal-philosophical-theological analysis of power to a more secular treatment of

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Table 1. Classification of "elite" authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by main area of endeavor; classification of "mass" authors and/or works listed under comparable subject headings in Nicolás Antonio's *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova* (in percentages).

Field	*Elite authors*						*Nicolás Antonio's mass authors, 1500–1584*	
	Sixteenth century		*Seventeenth century*		*Both centuries*			
Theology	4.9		0.9		3.4		30.6	
Philosophy	1.5	6.4	—	0.9	0.9	4.3	2.5	33.1
Classical humanities	10.2		2.6		7.5		7.5	
Legal thought	9.3		—		5.9		8.7	
Political thought	13.7		15.5		14.2			
Economics	2.9	16.6	2.5	18.0	2.5	16.7	1.7	1.7
Natural science	2.4		—		1.6		1.2	
Medicine, science	7.3		0.8		5.0		4.5	
Mathematics	3.4	13.1	—	0.9	2.2	8.9	3.3	9.0
Morals	1.5		0.9		1.2		7.5	
Mystic	2.9		2.5		2.8		—	
Ascetic	4.4		0.9		3.1		—	
Religious, devotional	3.4	12.2	0.9	5.2	2.5	9.6	—	7.5
History	13.6		5.2		15.9		15.4	
History of Indies	7.8		0.9		0.5		—	
History of saints and religious orders	—	21.4	—	6.1	—	16.4	7.8	23.2
Poetry	18.0		25.9		21.0		6.5	
Theater	7.3		28.5		15.0		1.1	
Religious theater	0.5		0.9		0.6		1.2	
Novel	3.9		10.3		6.2		—	
Rogues novels	1.0		8.6		3.7		—	
Social description	2.4		4.3		3.1		—	
Literary theory	1.5	34.6	1.7	80.2	1.6	51.2	—	8.8
Total number of authors	205		116		321		10,807	

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.

those subjects by the lay baroque writers, as pointed out by José Antonio Maravall.[18] The basic religious and philosophical ideas were not too different from those formulated by theologians and philosophers in the sixteenth century, but the form of expression changed. The strange symbiosis between writers and their public, particularly in the theater, shows how the hard-won consensus, the consumption society created by inflation, the treason or defeat of the bourgeoisie, and the mixture of court, aristocratic, and bureaucratic culture with the populism of the old Christians gave priority to living ideas rather than searching for them.

The contrast between the aesthetic creativity of the seventeenth century and the relative barrenness from then until the late nineteenth century leads conservative, nativist critics to perceive cultural decadence as

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the result of an effort to link with traditions of intellectual effort that had become neglected and that therefore appear foreign. However, our data suggest that the break had taken place much earlier and that the explosion of aesthetic creativity in the seventeenth century hid the decadence already affecting other forms of intellectual life. The apparent lack of correspondence between cultural glory and political power and wealth that we felt existed in the Spain of the seventeenth century is, in view of these data, partly spurious.

The Societal Context

It is not easy to describe briefly the social structure of Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Social and economic historians have accumulated much information,[19] and literary historians and essayists have offered their quite contradictory interpretations. Obviously, the social structures of the different kingdoms and even of different parts of the Crown of Castile were quite heterogeneous. In addition, a great number of economic, social, and even cultural changes took place between the reign of the Catholic Kings and the death of the last Habsburg. We can only list some basic characteristics and then explore how they affected the recruitment of the intellectual elite broadly understood and particular sectors of it.

The first question that arises is the degree to which society was feudal or bourgeois. Using those terms in a somewhat strict sense—that is, rejecting the Marxist expansion of the concept feudal and linking the term bourgeois to certain forms of economic organization, at least of incipient capitalism—I would argue that the dominant structures of Spain were neither feudal nor bourgeois; both are, however, important components of the social structure.

The Reconquista of a large part of the area north of Toledo was accompanied by settlement by free peasants. The large-scale participation of the population in the struggle against the infidel gave to many, in some provinces the overwhelming majority of the population, the status of nobility: *hijodalgos*. This status did not imply wealth or a seigneurial relation over anyone. Most cities were under royal rather than noble or ecclesiastical lords. The Southern Reconquista, carried out by the military orders and by a nobility that was granted authority over an Islamic population, created a quite different social structure.[20] The cities of Castile, on the basis of wool production, the textile industry, and trade with northern Europe, were at some point becoming bourgeois centers, but a number of economic and political changes soon weakened that development.[21] The important role of the church, particularly the religious orders, and of the *letrados*[22]—lawyers trained at the universities—created strata close to the center of power that only in part overlapped with the nobility, or at least

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with the titled nobility. The special role of the formerly Muslim population in many of the manual and artisan activities, and in some sections in agriculture, introduced a cultural-ethnic stratification that might in part, particularly after the notion of purity of blood becomes institutionalized, be considered a caste structure. A large Jewish minority[23] in business, the administration of kings and lords, and certain professions such as medicine constituted a pariah people, in Max Weber's terms, powerful in many respects, but increasingly perceived as alien and hated by the little people. The end of the Reconquista in 1492, after over a century of conflicts, antisemitic riots, and perhaps a populist element in the royal policy, left the Jewish population with a choice between conversion and expulsion. The fact that a large number, particularly the more secularized privileged segment, opted for a more or less sincere conversion created a new group: the *conversos* or *cristianos nuevos*. This group was increasingly the object of discrimination and suspicion. In Spain we are confronted with a plural society, subject to a giant political-religious-cultural effort of integration or, perhaps better, homogenization.

It is within this context that we must analyze the men whom we might call intellectuals. The fact that most of them entered their roles through the university and/or the church, which only to a point required noble status, allowed for some social mobility,[24] even though the mass of peasants were far from having equality of opportunity to become literate. Legally the church and the convents were open to men of all classes and the universities had colleges for those of limited means,[25] but throughout this period they discriminated increasingly in favor of those of privileged background, even violating their statutes, although the servants of wealthy students often had an opportunity to obtain an education. Most of those in intellectual activities probably came from the lesser nobility, the *hidalgos*, a numerous class in Spain, or, to a lesser extent, from an incipient office and merchant bourgeoisie.

One disability must have weighed seriously for the new Christians in precluding entry into many professional and intellectual pursuits: that of the requirement of *limpieza de sangre* in cathedral chapters, for officers of the Inquisition, for many benefices, in the most distinguished colleges at the universities, and, after some resistance, in the religious orders, even among the Jesuits who opposed it strongly and did not accept it outside of Spain.[26] (The successor of Saint Ignatius came from a *converso* family.) Even so, a number of outstanding figures in letters and scholarship had known Jewish ancestors, something that their personal enemies did not fail to note, and others probably "passed" by obtaining false genealogical backgrounds.[27]

Américo Castro suggested that the intellectual elite in the sixteenth century had ties with a *converso* milieu. Our data (see table 2), obviously incomplete since they cannot take into account those "passing" successfully and the many for which biographical data are scant, do not show such a

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Table 2. New Christian background or suspicion of it in elite intellectuals (in percentages).

Background	*Sixteenth century*	*Seventeenth century*	*Both centuries*
Converso or crypto-Jew	—	1.7	0.6
Of *converso* family	4.4	2.6	3.7
Accused of *converso* background with high probability of being so	1.5	—	0.9
Accused of *converso* background, probably unjustly	1.5	3.5	2.2
Modern scholars have reasonable suspicions of *converso* background	3.4	—	2.2
Modern scholars provide circumstantial evidence on *converso* background	1.0	1.7	1.2
Total number	205	116	321

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.

high proportion as his, though they show a larger number in the sixteenth (9 per cent) than in the seventeenth century (4 per cent). However, the "probably unjustly accused" more than doubled from one century to the next, perhaps reflecting the heightened concern with *limpieza de sangre*. These figures are the more surprising considering the fact that an estimated 250,000 *conversos* lived untouched by the Inquisition after the expulsion among the 7.4 million inhabitants calculated for 1541 (that is, 3.3 per cent of the population)[28] and the fact that the Jewish population was of an urban character and disproportionately engaged in intellectual callings.

The caste element that the distinction between *cristianos viejos* and *nuevos* introduced must have had important psychic consequences, regardless of the Jewish cultural heritage that they may have received and reworked within a Christian framework (for instance, in an Erasmian Christianity or a mystical "Protestantism") or in literary forms that expressed alienation.[29] Paradoxically, the distinction between old and new Christians created a sense of equality among old Christians, even commoners, reflected in literature and often noted by foreign observers. In fact, the emphasis on the *limpieza de sangre* had at its roots the hostility of upward mobile strata toward an aristocracy that often had intermarried with wealthy Jews, toward all economically or professionally privileged strata, and therefore encountered the resistance of parts of the elite.

The aristocracy of birth, from the poorest *hidalgo* to the *grandees* of Spain, retained its status privileges, enhanced its wealth and power (particularly in the period of decadence), maintained a style of life, even without means, by indebtedness, and reinforced its self-esteem through a complex process of rejection of incipient bourgeois values and ways of life. Economic decline, inflation, depopulation of the countryside, and consumption rather than saving made Spain less bourgeois than other European

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societies of the time. The situation profoundly affected its culture, its literature, and its market for the theater and the arts.[30]

The importance of a nonaristocratic clergy and of the professions, particularly lawyers and nonaristocratic servants of the state, does not allow us to consider Spain a feudal society even when feudal values and structures were evident. In a sense we are dealing with intellectuals in neither fully traditional nor modern society—an agrarian society, which is neither feudal nor bourgeois nor peasant-egalitarian, but one in which religion, religious-racial prejudice, monarchical authority, and even education introduce elements of egalitarianism and achievement. The economic dependence of the intellectual, scholar, and writer on officeholding in the bureaucracy or the church did not affect his self-esteem nor that granted to him by his contemporaries of all classes. In addition, the imperial assertion of Spain's power had very early established the dignity of intellectual work in the vernacular rather than Latin, doing away with any distinction between scholars and writers.[31]

In a period in which noble family background was widespread in all elites—often falsely claimed, if for no other reasons than to escape taxes—in which the population of entire regions claimed noble status, we cannot be sure that biographers always recorded it. Our data therefore must underestimate the noble background, but they are nevertheless indicative. The titled nobility, from princes and dukes to *señores*, was not heavily represented among intellectuals (between 4 and 5 per cent), even when those of noble background or *hidalgos* constituted at least 19 per cent more. Proportions of intellectuals from the titled nobility, the *hidalgos*, and those of noble background without specification, as well as those donning the crosses of one of the military orders (requiring proof of nobility), increased markedly among those born after 1575. (Those with some information on noble background were 21 per cent before that date and 27 per cent afterwards.) The number of *caballeros* of the military orders increases from 5 per cent to 19 per cent. Considering an average of one noble for every ten inhabitants in the population,[32] this proportion, while high, does not seem so remarkable. Intellectual positions were far from dependent upon noble birth.

Birthplace and Travel

The birthplace of intellectuals, particularly the elite among them (see tables 3 and 4),[33] tells us much about the milieus favorable to cultural creativity. It is certainly not the marginal and poor Spain of the northern seaboard—where the use of vernaculars like Galician and Basque must have been an obstacle—nor large parts of the poorer interior, from which academics and men of letters came. Most of them came from urban centers, particularly the rich emporium of the Atlantic trade: Seville, the other

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large Andalusian cities, the old imperial city of Toledo (in the sixteenth century), some of the bourgeois cities of Old Castile, and, increasingly, Madrid, capital of the empire. One-third of the intellectual elite was born in the seven largest cities of Castile. Maps of economic activity[34] and intellectual activity show striking resemblances.

The participants in the Council of Trent (1545-1563)[35] allow us to compare a top religious-scholarly elite with sixteenth-century elite intellectuals in general. The Basque areas, Navarre, and Old Castile are represented disproportionately, while the south, so rich in literary intellectual life, is underrepresented. The areas that today constitute the core area of Spanish Catholicism are overrepresented. Perhaps the more recent conquest, a different style of life, and a less intellectualized religiosity account for the north-south differences.

An outstanding characteristic of these intellectuals is geographic mobility (see table 5), a reflection of the imperial character of Spain. In the sixteenth century, up to 64 per cent had traveled outside of Castile or Aragon, a figure reduced in the seventeenth century to 35.5 per cent. One of every ten had even crossed the Atlantic. Italy, partly dominated by Spain, seat of the Pope, center of humanistic learning, location of Bologna and Naples, two of the universities open to Spaniards after 1558, and on the route to the Habsburg north, was visited by more than one-third in the sixteenth century and over one in four in the seventeenth century. Flanders, the fatal inheritance of the Habsburgs, was seen by almost one in ten as a result of its frequent wars. In the sixteenth century, France and specifically the Sorbonne attract many visitors, as does England after the British marriage of Philip II. One of the most surprising facts is the considerable intellectual exchange between Castile-Aragon and Portugal in the sixteenth century and the cessation of those contacts in the seventeenth century, despite the union of the crowns until 1640, perhaps an indication of increasing cultural nationalism in the neighboring country soon to become independent. The retrenchment of Spain, the increased cultural isolationism, is reflected in the decreasing contacts of intellectuals within foreign countries, with the exception of those such as Naples, Sicily, and Flanders, and to a lesser degree the Habsburg domains, tied to the empire.

Among motives for foreign travel or sojourn (see table 6), study and teaching were important in the sixteenth century but nearly disappeared in the seventeenth, reflecting the change from the internationalism of Renaissance Europe to the growing national and religious boundaries of later days. Charles V, in his constant travels, was often accompanied by men of letters, but the later Habsburgs stayed in Spain; correspondingly travels as diplomats became more important for a minority of intellectuals. The great debates of the Counter Reformation offered another opportunity for international contacts. Only one reason for travel did not decline: war. More Spaniards go abroad to fight in the seventeenth century than in the

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Table 3. Birthplace of elite and mass intellectuals, region's per cent of total population, ratio between figures, birthplace of Spanish participants in Council of Trent (in percentages).

Region	Elite			Mass[a] (1500–1584) (B)	Per cent of total population (C)	Ratios		Participants in Council of Trent
	Sixteenth century	Seventeenth century	Both centuries (A)			Elite (A/C)	Mass (B/C)	
Madrid, city	4.4	25.0	12.0	5.9	1.8	6.68	3.28	2.3
Castilla la Nueva, including Madrid province	15.0	14.0	15.0	16.0	14.2	1.05	1.26	8.6
Sevilla	9.3	7.8	8.7	7.6	6.4	1.36	1.34	2.3
Cadiz, Huelva	—	—	—	1.0	—	—	—	—
Cordoba	4.4	2.6	3.7	3.0	2.6	1.42	1.11	2.3
Jaen	0.5	1.7	0.9	2.2	3.1	1.29	1.71	3.1
Granada	2.9	1.7	2.5	3.0	2.7	1.26	1.30	1.6
Malaga, Almeria	0.5	1.7	0.9	1.6	—	—	—	—
Andalucia	17.6	15.5	16.7	18.4	14.8	1.11	1.21	7.0
Castilla la Vieja (Santander, Burgos, Logroño, Soria)	2.0	5.2	3.1	5.6	7.5	.41	.75	18.7
(Avila, Valladolid, Segovia, Palencia)	8.8	6.0	7.8	9.0	10.6	.73	.85	14.0
Salamanca	2.9	0.8	2.2	2.6	3.6	.61	.72	5.5
Leon, Zamora	4.3	1.7	3.4	2.3	5.2	.66	.44	7.0
Extremadura	4.4	0.8	3.1	4.2	6.3	.49	.67	3.1
Asturias	1.0	1.7	1.3	0.3	1.9	.68	.16	—
Galicia	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.2	7.0	.09	.17	0.8
Basque country	1.0	0.9	0.9	2.0	2.2	.41	.91	3.9
Navarra	1.9	0.9	1.5	2.2	1.6	.94	1.37	4.7
Murcia	1.5	1.7	1.5	0.7	1.6	.94	.44	—
Albacete	—	0.9	0.3	0.5	—[b]	—	—	—
Aragon	4.4	2.6	3.7	11.4	4.5	.83	2.54	9.4
Cataluña	2.4	3.4	2.8	6.6	5.0	.56	1.32	3.1
Baleares	—	—	—	1.3	1.5	—	.88	2.3
Valencia	6.3	4.3	5.6	7.7	5.0	1.12	1.54	7.0
Crown of Aragon	13.1	10.3	12.1	27.0	16.0	.76	1.69	21.8
Spanish America	2.4	2.6	2.5	3.4[c]	—	—	—	—
Portugal	2.9	2.6	2.8	—[d]	—	—	—	—
Other foreign countries	0.5	—	0.3	—	—	—	—	—
Without information	16.1	10.1	14.0	—	—	—	—	—
Total number	205	116	321	2,586	8,120,337	—	—	128

SOURCE: The data on population are from Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *La sociedad española en el siglo XVII* (Madrid: Instituto Balmes de Sociologia, CSIC, 1963), pp. 101–157. The censuses and estimates for the different kingdoms and provinces are of uneven quality and are from somewhat different dates; the best ones are for the kingdom of Castile from the census ordered by Philip II at the end of his reign. The figures are for the date closest to 1600. The sixteenth century is generally a period of population increase, while the seventeenth century represents a drop. There are obviously important regional differences in the demographic trends from region to region and city to city which we could not take into account—for example, the rapid rise of Madrid at the end of the sixteenth century and the decline of Toledo around 1600 and of Seville at mid-seventeenth century (see graph III, p. 155). The data for eighteen regions or provinces within Castile around 1591 have been taken from

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Felipe Ruiz Martín, "La población española al comienzo de los tiempos modernos," in *El tránsito de la edad media al renacimiento en la historia de España, Cuadernos de Historia*, I (Madrid: Instituto Jerónimo Zurita, CSIC, 1967), pp. 189–202, second of the appended tables. The lack of correspondence between the present provincial division and the historical provinces has forced us to combine data for those born in different provinces to calculate the ratios and a margin of error exists in the case of those born in the rural areas or small towns due to boundary changes between regions. Another source of error is the nonallocation of those of the elite whose birthplace we ignore, for we include them in calculating the percentages.

The data on the participants in the Council of Trent (1545–1563) refer to 128 of 163 participants, for whom we have birthplace and certitude of their participation. Spaniards constituted the largest group, after the Italians, and played a prominent role (of fourteen theologians sent by the pope, eleven were Spaniards). Data from C. Gutiérrez, S.J., *Españoles en Trento* (Valladolid: Instituto Jerónimo Zurita, CSIC, 1951), pp. lxix-lxx, 1050–1053.

[a] Nicolás Antonio, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*; see table 1 and Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.

[b] The province of Albacete was not a separate unit; it was divided among different regions.

[c] Based on all those listed in the Peninsula and overseas: 2,679.

[d] Nicolás Antonio lists Portugal and its authors born overseas, which represent 26.7 per cent of his total listing of 3,604 authors by birthplace.

Table 4. Type and size of birthplace of elite intellectuals.

Region	*Sixteenth century (per cent)*	*Seventeenth century (per cent)*	*Population*		*Per cent of total population*	
			1530	*1594*	*1530*	*1594*
Madrid	4.4	25.0	4,060	37,500[e]	0.05	0.40[e]
Castilian cities:						
over 20,000 in 1530[a]	22.4	17.2	192,290	253,455	2.60	3.00
	26.8	42.2				
10,000 to 19,999 in 1530[b]	4.9	2.6	101,360	138,630	1.30	1.60
3,000 to 9,999 in 1530[c]	4.9	1.7	87,700	128,830	1.20	1.50
	36.7	46.5			5.15	6.50
not included above, now provincial capitals	9.8	11.2				
Cities of the crown of Aragon and Navarre[d] now provincial capitals	4.9	2.6				
All present Spain: small towns and important villages	17.1	15.8				
small villages	11.2	7.8				
America, Portugal, foreign countries	5.8	5.2				
No information	14.5	11.2				
Total number	205	116	7,414,000	8,485,000		

SOURCE: Ramón Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros: La vida económica en Castilla (1516–1556)* (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1955), I, 60; see also Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.

[a] Includes Seville, Toledo, Valladolid, Jaen, Cordoba, Medina del Campo. Only Medina del Campo drops below 20,000 at the end of the century. This group does not include the cities of the kingdom of Granada; Granada city had a population of between 18,000 and 50,000 in the seventeenth century. The population for Seville used here is 19,000, but turn-of-the-century estimates go as high as 150,000, including transients, to drop again in the mid-seventeenth century to 65,000.

[b] Includes Segovia, Salamanca, Baeza, and Ubeda (which at the end of the century have over 20,000), and Murcia, Alcazar de San Juan, and Medina de Rioseco.

[c] Includes Burgos, Avila, Alcala, Toro, Palencia, Talavera, and Ciudad Rodrigo (all over 10,000 at the end of the century), and Zamora, Guadalajara, Soria, Santiago, Orenso, Vigo, Tuy, and La Coruña.

[d] Includes Barcelona, with about 50,000, Zaragoza, with between 25,000 and 30,000, and Valencia, with approximately 50,000, in the seventeenth century.

[e] Maximum estimate for Madrid in the seventeenth century is 165,000 or 1.8 per cent of the total population.

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Table 5. Travels of elite intellectuals (in percentages).

Place visited	*Sixteenth century*		*Seventeenth century*		*Both centuries*	
America	13.2		7.8		11.2	
Naples and Sicily	7.8		8.6		8.1	
Rome	12.7		5.2		10.0	
Rest of Italy	16.1		4.3		11.8	
Italy unspecified	6.3		7.8		6.9	
Total Italy		42.9		25.9		36.8
Flanders	9.8		9.5		9.7	
Germany, Austria	8.8		5.2		7.5	
France	13.7		7.6		11.5	
England	5.4		0.9		3.7	
Muslim countries	7.3		4.3		6.2	
Portugal	10.2		3.5		7.8	
Other countries	1.0		—		0.6	
Those having visited places outside the Peninsula	63.7		35.5		47.1	
Total number	205		116		321	

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.

sixteenth. Some 11 per cent of the intellectual elite had seen action somewhere outside the peninsula, a factor not to be neglected when we try to understand the heightened national and imperial consciousness in their work.

Universities and Intellectuals

One might consider intellectuals as those men trained at the thirty-three universities of the realm—eighteen of them founded in Castile alone between 1475 and 1620—or at foreign universities before the prohibition by Philip II in 1559.[36]

The outstanding work of Richard Kagan[37] on Spanish universities based on matriculation records allows us to describe the university attendance in the period. Kagan estimated 20,000 students annually in the late sixteenth century, which would be 3.7 per cent of the fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old males, and 6.3 per cent of those seventeen years old, a figure that would have to be raised slightly if taking into account students being educated by the Jesuits in arts and grammar at the university level. This proportion would be higher than that for England and probably the highest in Europe at that time. In fact, such proportions were not exceeded in modern nations until the late nineteenth century and in many countries until a few decades ago. Kagan estimates, in view of the large proportion of students of noble (particularly *hidalgo*) origin and the proportion of that class in the population, that perhaps one-quarter or one-third of Castile's

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Table 6. Motives for foreign travel of elite intellectuals (in percentages).

Motive	*Sixteenth century*	*Seventeenth century*	*Both centuries*
Study	15.0	1.8	7.1
Teaching	7.8	—	5.0
Council of Trent	6.3	—	4.0
Business of religious orders	6.3	0.9	4.4
Diplomacy	3.9	5.2	4.4
Travel with			
kings	6.4	—	4.0
nobles	3.4	6.0	4.4
ecclesiastics	2.4	0.9	1.8
family	1.9	1.7	1.9
Ecclesiastical position	2.9	0.9	2.2
War			
Italy	5.4	6.9	5.9
Flanders	2.9	5.2	3.6
Armada Invincible and British pirates	1.0	0.9	1.0
France	2.4	0.9	1.8
Turks and Africa	5.4	4.3	5.0
America	2.5	2.6	2.5
Germany	1.5	2.6	1.9
Portugal	2.4	—	1.6
Total in any war[a]	13.2	8.6	11.2
Exile	2.9	1.7	2.5
Adventure	0.5	1.7	0.9
Total number	205	116	321

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.
[a] The same individual, obviously, can have participated in different campaigns.

young noblemen may have received some form of university or university-level education. Most of the students were of urban background, from the north and center of the peninsula, areas with the highest *hidalgo* concentration. With the exception of Alcalá, Salamanca, and Valladolid, Castile's universities drew the vast majority of their students from the diocese or province in which they were located. The three mentioned were in many ways the "imperial" universities of the Habsburgs; their graduates enjoyed a majority of places and in many offices a virtual monopoly.

Within the three imperial universities the graduates of the six Colegios Mayores started to dominate the chairs and crown and clerical offices. Between 1566 and 1700 over half of the members of the Councils of Castile and the Indies, and nearly 40 per cent of the Castilian bishops during the seventeenth century, were graduates of the Colegios. Since these students were a privileged minority, others must have been discouraged from studying. Two additional factors accounting for the sharp drop in university enrollment are the increase in the sale of offices by the crown under the

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late Philips and the revival of aristocratic ideals with the great wars of the 1630's and 1640's and the policies of Olivares. In addition the religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, offered in the seventeenth century an alternative to university education.[38] It is probable that these circumstances, together with population losses, economic decline, mounting taxation, fiscal chaos, atrophy of urban economic activities that reduced professional opportunities for lawyers, and the displacement of private teaching by the orders, account for the fall in the number of students. By 1660, Alcalá, Salamanca, and Valladolid attracted fewer than half the number of students they had had a century before, a downward trend that continued into the eighteenth century. Kagan's time series for Castile's universities by faculty therefore offer another clue to the fluctuations of cultural life and the onset of Spanish decadence. It would seem that, with some delay, the curves of academic life and cultural creativity, considered in terms of the number of outstanding figures born at different times, reflect the economic and subsequent political crises of Spain.

Obviously many of those who obtained their *bachiller, licenciado,* or even doctorate entered pursuits that did not involve the use of knowledge and ideas. Some became conquistadores or adventurers, but most were probably professionals: lawyers, doctors, civil servants, and ecclesiastics. The functions of the universities were listed in a royal privilege of 1659: "they have been since their foundation, seminaries of eminent men of letters, the source of the highest dignitaries of the Church, and for the administration of justice in our royal name and with your representation on our tribunals and councils."[39] Therefore, not all those with academic degrees can be considered intellectuals, even in a broad sense of the term.[40] The rosters of faculty, graduates, and students of the leading universities should allow us to answer two complementary questions: how many of the men that shaped Spanish culture and society were connected with universities and how many of those who sat in their classrooms contributed more or less creatively to shape that culture? Our data allow some tentative answers to the first of these questions (see tables 7 and 8).

Six out of ten of the elite intellectuals of these two centuries attended at least sometime, often without obtaining a degree, some university. However, that proportion changes markedly from 48 per cent in the sixteenth century to 28.5 per cent in the seventeenth. This shift reflects the change from a humanistic renaissance and scholarly academic-scientific culture to a more literary and expressive one, from the Renaissance (or late medieval) to the baroque. It also corresponds well with the conclusions of Kagan on the decline in enrollment over the period. The universities attended and the courses of study followed also tell us much about the intellectual milieu. Among those born before 1576, 11 per cent attended foreign schools, compared to 3 per cent afterwards. Undoubtedly, the prohibition of Philip II in 1559, together with other factors, had some impact. Within

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Table 7. Universities attended by elite intellectuals (in percentages).

University	*Born before 1525*	*Born 1525–1575*	*Sixteenth century*[a]	*Seventeenth century*	*Both centuries*
Salamanca	37.0	19.8	26.8	12.1	21.5
Alcalá	19.0	16.2	15.1	12.1	14.0
Valladolid	2.4	2.3	2.4	3.1	2.8
"Imperial Universities"	58.4	38.3	44.4	27.6	28.3
Sevilla	3.7	4.6	3.4	3.5	3.4
Granada	2.4	5.8	3.4	1.7	2.8
Osuna and Baeza	—	3.5	1.1	1.7	1.6
Other Castilian universities	1.2	3.5	2.4	0.9	1.9
Catalan and Aragonese universities	3.7	9.3	5.8	1.7	4.4
Valencia	1.2	3.5	2.4	0.9	1.9
Foreign universities	19.9	5.8	11.2	2.6	8.1
No record of university education	29.8	36.0	37.0	53.5	43.0
Total number	81	86	205	116	321

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.
[a] Includes those sixteenth-century intellectuals for whom there is no record of birth date.

Spain, 38 per cent attended one of the three universities Kagan has called imperial—Salamanca, Alcalá, and Valladolid—often more than one of them. In the sixteenth century Salamanca was attended by 27 per cent, a figure reduced to 12 per cent in the seventeenth, while Alcalá, closer to the court, retained much of its attraction (15 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively). The figures for the elite clearly reflect the drop in enrollment after the peak in the 1580's and the decline of the universities as centers of learning—and even, as we will see in the case of Francisco de Quevedo, reaction against

Table 8. University studies of elite intellectuals (in percentages).

Field	*Born before 1525*	*Born 1525–1575*	*Sixteenth century*	*Seventeenth century*	*Both centuries*
Humanities	30.1	18.6	21.8	17.3	19.3
Theology	15.8	17.4	17.1	9.5	14.3
Civil law	12.1	10.5	17.1	18.1	20.2
Canon law	7.3	3.5	7.3	8.6	7.7
Medicine	8.6	10.5	9.8	3.4	7.5
University studies with no information on discipline	6.2	15.2	9.3	6.1	8.5
Total number	81	86	205	116	321

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.

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the university-educated and exaltation of the men of action and the aristocracy against the *noblesse de robe*. These trends occur even when the proportion born in university towns remains stable at around one-fourth. There are indications that some must have preferred a Jesuit college education to the disorderly universities (the proportion triples from one to the other century, but is still low). The Andalusian universities did not train a large proportion of the intellectuals but those proportions remained almost unchanged, in contrast to those of the kingdom of Aragon, which without exception came to play a much smaller role.

Kagan also documents how the enrollments in different faculties show a steady shift, beginning in the middle years of the sixteenth century, away from the study of arts and theology to the study of law, particularly canon law, gateway to both clerical and secular careers. In Alcalá the number of law students equaled that of theology by 1550, and by the opening of the seventeenth century, jurists outnumbered theologians almost two to one, a ratio that doubled before the century was out. At Salamanca and Valladolid the theology faculty fared even worse. As Kagan says: "In this light the old, popular assertion that a one-sided, conservative preoccupation with theology thwarted educational and scientific progress in Spain and her universities is not borne out . . . the almost exclusive pursuit of law and office-holding careers would be a more credible answer." Our data on the intellectual elite are fully congruent with his findings.

The Occupations of Intellectuals

The occupations of intellectuals (see table 9) provide us with many insights into their way of life, their social contacts, and their experiences. Obviously many made their living with activities very directly related to their written work, but others had to engage in a great variety of activities to assure it.

The most intellectual of all occupations, university teaching, was practiced by one out of every four intellectuals in the sixteenth century, the age of splendor of the universities, but it becomes almost insignificant in the seventeenth century. Certainly there were still professors at the universities of the realm, but few of the cultural elite, as we have defined them, were occupying the chairs. Private teaching had already been an important activity in the 1500's, but it became more important in the next century relative to university teaching, a fact probably not unrelated to the shift of the cultural center to Madrid, a city without a university. The masters holding chairs, particularly at Salamanca and Alcalá, were often not only creative intellectuals but were also called on to act in other roles: to be advisers to the crown and its councils, the church, and the Inquisition; to settle controversial issues—moral and legal questions such as the conquest of America and the treatment of the Indians—and to answer questions of heresy

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Table 9. Main occupations of elite intellectuals (in percentages).

Occupation	*Sixteenth century*		*Seventeenth century*		*Both centuries*	
University teaching	25.9		1.7		17.1	
Private teaching, including religious colleges	8.3		4.3		6.8	
Total academic		34.2		6.0		23.9
Chronicler	6.8		6.0		6.5	
Archaeologist, artist	1.5		0.9		1.2	
Actor	2.9		0.9		2.2	
Income from writing	1.5		—		0.9	
Continuous support by maecenas	1.0		1.7		1.2	
Censor	.5		3.5		1.6	
Total "intellectual"		14.2		13.0		13.6
Ecclesiastical office	19.5		17.2		18.2	
Religious order	19.0		9.5		15.6	
Preacher	4.9		2.6		4.0	
Inquisitorial office	3.9		6.9		5.0	
At service of church without being cleric	1.5		1.7		1.5	
Total religious		48.8		37.9		44.7
Rentier	2.4		6.0		3.7	
Medicine	8.3		1.7		5.9	
Law	2.0		4.3		2.8	
Notary	2.4		0.9		1.9	
Total free professions		12.7		6.9		10.6
Court positions	16.1		12.9		14.9	
At the service of the nobility	8.8		14.7		12.0	
Total court service		24.9		27.6		26.9
Government office:						
Executive	6.8		12.1		8.6	
Finance	5.4		6.0		5.6	
Judiciary	4.9		3.5		4.4	
Diplomacy	1.5		3.5		3.1	
Other public employment	2.4		4.3		3.1	
Total public office		21.0		29.4		23.9
Military:						
Officer	7.8		10.3		8.6	
Service as officer	3.4		3.4		3.4	
Soldier	5.4		2.6		4.4	
Total military		16.6		16.3		16.4
Business, commerce	1.5		—		0.9	
Printer	0.5		0.9		0.6	
Artisan	1.5		—		0.9	
Total "bourgeois"		3.5		0.9		2.4
No information on occupation	7.3		19.0		11.6	
Total number	205		116		321	
Average number of positions for those with information	2.1		1.7		1.9	

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay. The biographies are far from adequate on the activities of intellectuals. Multiple activities were frequent and we have considered all of them, rather than attempt to identify one main occupation and secondary ones, or take into account the time spent in each.

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and occasionally technical problems. There was movement from the universities into important offices; for example, a humanist professor at Alcalá —Juan de Vergara—became secretary to the archbishop of Toledo and canon of the cathedral. This practice became so frequent in the seventeenth century that faculty turnover contributed to the crisis of the university. Sometimes professors were influential writers and poets as well as academic experts, as in the case of Fray Luis de León. Professors often became bishops and church dignitaries. Theologians were often heads of powerful religious orders or held office in them; some of them participated as experts in the Council of Trent. In contrast to modern times, the university influenced public affairs not only through its members, but also as an institution expressing its opinion corporatively, though the practice was probably less common in Spain than at the Sorbonne or Louvain. Although the Inquisition may have shifted the function of thought control from the universities to censorship and the expurgation of books by that organization, it also, however, turned to well-known men, highly respected (then, and some even today) for their learning and creative contributions.

In addition to teaching, a variety of activities associated with cultural life, from royal or city historian to theater censor or actor, provided a living to another 14 per cent. Few are reported as living from the product of their published works, nor did private fortune support many of them. Support was less from individual patrons or even positions in the entourage of the nobility, than in court or public offices and, probably most often, through ecclesiastical benefices demanding little attention and often held in absentia. The church, particularly in the sixteenth century, was the support of close to half of the intellectual elite, mainly through the religious orders. After they lose importance for cultural life in the seventeenth century, church offices still provide support to close to two in ten.

Positions in that unique bureaucracy, the Inquisition, became increasingly important, assuring its members at least a tax exemption. The free professions, particularly medicine, were relatively important, but could not compare in either period with public office as a source of income. The administration of the state, the Indies, and the municipalities, and the diplomatic service, provided many intellectuals not only with social status and an income, but also with interesting experiences to use in their work, particularly that of the seventeenth-century political and economic thinkers. From governors of provinces, members of the highest councils of the realm, to modest tax collector positions—such as the one Cervantes held—the public sector provided the economic base for creative work and leisure. Obviously we cannot determine how many of the 21 per cent in the sixteenth and 29 per cent in the seventeenth century holding such positions won them by learning, professional capacity, and dedicated effort and how many held such positions more on account of their noble status or local family prestige. However, the two columns of a bureaucratic

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empire—state and church—as opposed to a market for intellectual products such as the university, were the supporters of the creators of ideas. Obviously this dual support did not encourage overly critical ideas about those institutions, criticism such as could be encouraged by autonomous corporate institutions such as universities, or a market for books supporting their authors. The surprising fact is the freedom of mind of many of these men in view of their social position. The military involvements of Spain in that period account for the large number who either as officers or soldiers spent years of their life in the army or navy of the king. Bourgeois occupations such as merchant, banker, or artisan were full-time occupations and did not allow the leisure to think and write that benefices of the church and offices in the bureaucracy provided. Few of the elite made a living in the incipient bourgeois society, and the number decreases from one century to the next.

The Religious as Intellectuals

Priests and members of religious orders, some without university education, were often intellectually active outside religious roles. Many of them taught, others wrote, preached, and advised the powerful as confessors, often without limiting themselves to religious activities. Much of profane literature was written by clerics, though one must distinguish carefully between those who obtained only minor orders to be eligible for ecclesiastical benefits as a source of income and those who were priests. The boundaries between laymen and clerics in those centuries were much less precise.

Antonio Domínguez Ortiz[41] has described the extremely complex structure of ecclesiastical society, the secular and regular clergy, the offices, the financial bases, the relation to different aspects of the social structure and public life. For the end of the sixteenth century he reports a figure of 29,745 secular and 32,698 regular clergy in Castile. An estimate that seems plausible for the late seventeenth century is 150,000 clerical persons, including nuns, which would be about 2 per cent of the population and 5 per cent of the active population.[42] In 1630 in Castile and Leon there were 343 high church offices, 928 canons, and 585 *raciones* in the cathedrals; adding those of the kingdom of Aragon, a reasonable estimate for Spain is 2,500. A variety of other "benefices" could raise the figure to some 3,650.[43] There is no doubt that many intellectuals held such positions, but from the figures it is also clear that only a small proportion of those holding them must have been creative intellectuals. We have no figures for the number of convents in the seventeenth century, but in the eighteenth century 2,104 male convents are reported to have existed. Some of them in the sixteenth century had been centers of learning, like San Esteban of Salamanca, and many served local schools. Quite a few men of all walks of

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life, among them some famous writers (such as Lope de Vega), in their advanced age became priests or entered cloisters.

In many ways clerics, particularly those of the secular clergy, were less differentiated and isolated from the lay world and its worldliness than they are today: their dealings with women and children, their attachment to the household of powerful aristocrats, their political offices as viceroys and governors, and their positions in the court assured them a much closer contact with the whole society, a contact that allowed them to share and understand the problems of laymen, from love and politics to the emerging capitalist market and monetary system. Those men approached their tasks from a religious perspective, and at the same time they brought to the religious sphere the problems of the world and their direct knowledge of them. It is not an accident that some of the most interesting contributions to economic analysis at the time were the work of clerics, moralists who as preachers and confessors could observe directly in a place such as Seville the consequences of the arrival of specie from the Indies.[44] The authors of religious-educational plays—the *autos sacramentales*—and of plays with deep religious-philosophical meaning were also authors of profane comedies and dramas.[45] There were undoubtedly, after the Reformation, pressures to limit certain intellectual activities of religious significance to those specifically trained (particularly after the translation of the Scriptures into the vernacular was forbidden and their commentary increasingly suspect), but even so the literature written by laymen has a deep religious component. The fear of the *iluminados* and lay mysticism, of the excesses of conventicula outside the control of the church, of an intimate religiosity neglecting or rejecting the sacramental and public manifestations, of the impact of Erasmian devotion weakening the role of religious functionaries and threatening the monopoly of religious virtuosi controlled by church institutions[46]—all put a limit to lay devotional literature and scriptural scholarship, but not to the more aesthetic manifestations, poetry and theater. For a better understanding of the religious life it would be interesting to know how many religious officeholders were also intellectuals in one sense or another; for a sociological study of intellectuals it would be interesting to know how many were linked with the church.

Our data allow some tentative answers to the second of these questions (see table 10). While in the Middle Ages to be an intellectual was almost identical with clerical status, the Renaissance brought with it the secular intellectual in the royal and noble courts and in the universities, who, with the invention of printing, increasingly wrote for the market or an audience. Four out of ten among the intellectual elite were clerics, almost equally divided among the secular and the regular clergy. Obviously many of those men had received orders late, sometimes as widowers. There are significant differences between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the number of members of the regular clergy (23 per cent as opposed to 13 per cent)

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Table 10. Membership in religious orders of elite and mass intellectuals (in percentages).

	Elite			*Mass (1500–1584)*[a]	
Religious order	*Sixteenth century*	*Seventeenth century*	*Both centuries*	*Per cent of authors*	*Per cent of members of order*
Benedictine	—	—	—	2.7	4.8
Cister	—	—	—	2.8	4.2
Dominican	5.4	0.9	3.6	11.2	16.5
Franciscan	5.9	1.7	4.3	16.1	23.8
Carmel	1.5	—	0.9	4.8	7.2
Capuchine	—	—	—	0.6	0.9
St. Augustin	2.4	—	1.5	6.1	9.0
St. Hieronymus	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.3
Jesuit	5.4	4.3	5.0	14.9	21.9
Merced	—	0.9	0.3	5.4	7.9
Other orders	1.5	4.3	2.5	2.7	3.9
Total members of religious orders	45.4	32.8	40.7	67.9	100.0
Secular clergy	22.0	18.1	20.5	11.6	—
Minor orders	1.0	1.7	1.2	—	—
No record of clerical status	54.0	64.5	59.0	20.5	—
Total number	205	116	321	3,604	2,449

SOURCE: See Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.
[a] Nicolás Antonio, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*; see table 1 and Note on Quantitative Data at end of essay.

and even a slight drop in the secular clergy (from 23 per cent to 20 per cent). Undoubtedly the decline in the humanistic and academic fields and the decrease in the number of university trained intellectuals had something to do with this change. Significantly, Spain, without an internal war of religion, political secularization, or even a lessening religious emphasis in its culture (except in the type of religiously oriented culture), undergoes a process of secularization of its intellectual elite. However, among the "mass intellectuals"—those classified by Nicolás Antonio—the proportion of members of religious orders is appreciably larger than among the elite (68 per cent as opposed to 41 per cent). Among the regulars we see the decay of the mendicant orders, particularly the Dominicans, but also the Carmelites who had brought mysticism to its height. The Jesuits contribute in the seventeenth century one-third of the regulars with distinguished contributions (one of every twenty intellectuals). Their share among the elite was disproportionately large. A finding of interest for a sociological study of culture is the considerable parallelism between the number of authors from different orders among the "mass" (including "second raters") and their contribution to the small minority of outstanding writers, our "elite."

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The Religious Role of Intellectuals

Within the church the following intellectual roles existed: professors of theology, scholastic philosophy, moral theology, scripture, and canon law, mainly at Salamanca and Alcalá. Many of those teaching were also members of religious orders. It should be remembered that only in the nineteenth century were ecclesiastical studies separate from the university. In addition, there were the centers of education and learning of the religious orders, of increasing importance in the seventeenth century. The famous preachers, especially at the court, who often also wrote, were another type using and diffusing ideas.

A special category of "religious intellectual" not found in later centuries are the ascetics and mystics, whose writings are an important part of literature and who had a wide impact in shaping the ideas and values of the time as they were reflected in more profane literary expressions such as poetry and the theater. Their role was particularly fraught with ambiguities and dangers as religious virtuosi without institutional charisma either of office or education, rebelling as divinely inspired reformers against the *Veralltäglichung* of the religious orders. Despite the deep suspicions of authorities and "qualified" religious experts and moments of persecution,[47] these men and women and their writings were soon recognized and their early sanctification legitimized their endeavors. The fact that such a style of religious creativity has little importance after 1700 indicates the deep discontinuity in Spanish culture and the uniqueness of the preceding period. The continuity that many scholars have noted between the medieval or pre-Reformation and the Catholic Reformation or baroque (or Counter Reformation) mystics, despite the apparent discontinuities in the cultural policies of the Inquisition at the time of the ascent to the throne of Philip II,[48] is one of the strong arguments for the basic unity of Spanish cultural life in those centuries. Obviously the question can be asked: Is it legitimate to stretch the term intellectual as far as to include mystics like Saint Theresa or Saint John of the Cross? Certainly for men like Quevedo—whose role probably would fit any narrower definition—such an approach (separating different types of creativity) would make no sense. To understand the impact of ideas on society, its central institutions and its elites, that approach would not suffice either.

The church, however, not only molded culture and society through its teachers, scholars, preachers, and mystics, creating and diffusing ideas, it also proscribed, deleted, and punished "heretical ideas" (see table 11). In the broad sense of the term "intellectual," part of the role of the inquisitors was intellectual: to judge the compatibility of new ideas with a dogmatic religious-philosophical heritage, subjecting to their control the works of the elite, including those of men close to power and even high church digni-

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Table 11. The Inquisition and elite intellectuals (in percentages).

Inclusion in the Spanish *Indices Librorum Prohibitorum*	Seventeenth century	Eighteenth century	Both centuries
Opera omnia or several works forbidden	3.9	—	2.5
One work forbidden	4.4	1.8	3.4
Chapters, parts, or paragraphs expurgated	5.8	5.2	5.6
Some lines or quotations expurgated	3.9	1.8	3.1
Special cases	1.0	—	0.6
Total authors included	19.0	8.6	15.2
Actions other than inclusion in the indices	**Seventeenth century**	**Eighteenth century**	**Both centuries**
Interrogated but not prosecuted	1.0	—	0.6
Denounced but absolved	1.5	—	0.9
Prosecuted or jailed but finally absolved	3.9	0.9	2.8
Minor sentence	—	1.7	0.6
Major sentence (over 5 years) or burned in effigy	1.0	1.7	1.2
Exiled out of fear of the Inquisition	1.5	0.9	1.2
Total authors affected	8.9	5.2	7.3
Collaborators with the Inquisition[a]	1.9	0.9	1.6
Total number	205	116	321

SOURCE: The information on the inclusion in the indices has been obtained by checking the names of the elite authors against the indices of the Inquisitors: Fernando de Valdés (1559), Gaspar de Quiroga (1583), Bernardo de Sandoval y Rojas (1612), Antonio de Sotomayor (1667), and Agustín Rubín de Cevallos (1790). The indices of Antonio Zapata (1632), Diego Sarmiento de Valladares and Vidal Marín (1707), and Francisco Pérez de Prado (1747) could not be consulted. The index of 1790 reproduces the index of 1747 with additions up to 1789. The omission of the indices of 1632, 1707, and 1747 should not affect our findings too much, since later indices carried over the works included earlier, even when some works might have been dropped in the meantime. Some of the sixteenth-century authors were included only in the seventeenth and a few in the eighteenth centuries. Therefore the figures do not refer to authors affected in their lifetime, nor do they take into account that some works were included in only one index or only temporarily until they could be studied more thoroughly. The data on personal persecution and collaboration with the Inquisition have been gathered from the biographical sources listed in the Note on Quantitative Data at the end of the essay. The information on this aspect might not be complete.

[a] The majority of these also had difficulties with the Inquisition on account of their own works.

taries.[49] The pattern of censorship that generally did not condemn all the works of an author, nor whole books, but that "expurgated" them, deleting paragraphs or sometimes even isolated sentences, required an intellectual effort. So, for example, in Cervantes' *Quijote* only one sentence was found objectionable.[50] The indices of forbidden books, the deletions in different editions, and the records of the trials of the Inquisition are basic sources for the study of intellectuals and their relation to society. The impact of the Inquisition as an institution, the social control climate supporting and reinforced by it—through the appeal to denunciation of the *edictos de la fe*, what Unamuno has called the "immanent inquisition," the conscious or unconscious self-censorship on intellectuals and scientists—will continue to be debated.

The summary conclusion of Otis Green offers a balanced judgment:

It would be possible to draw, for Spain, an imposing picture of official leniency, and to balance this with a sobering account of the "immanent inquisition" which not only might, but sometimes suddenly did, introduce into a writer's life a

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period of terror (usually relieved by absolution). Yet this much can be asserted with assurance: the Spain of the sixteenth century was not created by the Inquisition; it developed, used, and abused the Inquisition as a means of strengthening, and later defending, its cherished way of life.[51]

However, our data on the changing emphasis within the religious culture from the first half of the sixteenth century to the second half and, even more, during the seventeenth century, suggest that social controls might have contributed to a shift from an intellectual-scholastic or intimate-mystical focus to a more literary-aesthetic-public style, very congruent with the age of the baroque.

The record of the overt activity of the inquisitors is complex: works included in the Roman Index of Paul IV were not included in the Spanish; some works were allowed in Latin but not in vulgar languages (because certain ideas were dangerous for the masses but not for the elite); there was tolerance of political thought (like that of Juan de Mariana and Francisco Suárez) considered sufficiently dangerous in other European countries to be burned; they were not overly concerned with some types of criticism of rulers; and they were far from puritan (as the treatment of *La Celestina* shows) despite the appeals of some intellectuals against light and useless literature. Of over a hundred picaresque novels, a risqué genre, only two were permanently forbidden and four expurgated.[52] Obviously political considerations, personal animosities, guilt by association, the personalities of the grand inquisitors, and the *converso* family background of the author enter into the particular cases; but, not without some ambivalences and shifts in emphasis, there is an undeniable consistency and logic in this thought control institution. Certainly the boundaries between the censorship and the creative activities of intellectuals in those centuries were far from neat, the same men sometimes playing the two roles. Unfortunately, we have no clear record of their motivations and feelings in doing so. However, we should remember that censorship, evaluation of thought from some fixed standards, need not always be the task of hacks, second-rate minds, as it became in the eighteenth-century Inquisition and is probably generally true in our time. A high degree of consensus on an orthodoxy, relatively clear standards to define it, an idea of order that excludes an absolutization of the idea of intellectual freedom, these are probably the conditions for a censorial function by creative intellectuals. From that perspective the inquisitor role can be an almost legitimate intellectual role and our implicit assumption of the equation of censorship with anti-intellectualism turns out to reflect a unique historical situation.[53]

Political Roles of Intellectuals

For the contemporary reader the political roles of intellectuals are probably more interesting than the religious roles, even though such an

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analytical distinction would make little sense to most men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even less to Spaniards of those centuries. Even when Charles V and his advisers were involved in a bitter feud and war with Pope Clement VII, the issue was perceived and argued in religious terms: the proper role of a Pope and the need to call a church council to face the Lutheran heresy and to unite the Christians against the Turkish menace. The occupation and plundering of Rome by mutinous imperial troops is interpreted both by a humanist imperial secretary, Alfonso de Valdés,[54] and a popular poet as the just punishment by God of the Pope and the Roman Church for their deeds. The distinction of the charisma of the office from the person of the incumbent, which allows so much criticism (direct or indirect in literary forms) of rulers, including the Pope, allows for a defense of that act by the Erasmists. High officials and theologians who were consulted about the unprinted but widely circulating *Diálogo de las cosas ocurridas en Roma* (1527), objected mostly to particular sentences, not to the spirit. However, what is important about this work is its religious-political character as an important document by an intellectual in the service of the emperor. Political theory in those centuries is also moral-religious theory. The separation of political from religious and moral thought and the secularization of politics that was initiated with the Renaissance in many European countries did not go far in Spain.

Within this general framework intellectuals responded to a variety of problems, often in bitter conflict with each other. They played a number of roles. The uncommitted humanist[55] was politically concerned and sometimes influential, but unwilling to attach himself to any ruler in a permanent way or to intervene directly in the great debates. Erasmus, avoiding partisanship in disputes and policy decisions, despite his connection with emperor, Popes, rulers, and other more committed humanists and theologians, is the model for that role. Among Spaniards, Luis Vives, who lived principally abroad in Bruges, fits this role.

The committed humanist was active as a political adviser, writer of official statements, and propagandist of the position of his ruler. He maintained contact with his more apolitical peers, encouraged learning and scholarship, fought more or less overtly the more traditionalist or scholastic clerics and monks, and hoped for an irenic solution to the religious conflict. A few Spaniards looked with understanding on the Reformation but ultimately supported the Catholic position of the emperor and turned against the reformers. The more Erasmian or more Italian background of their humanism shades into their positions, as the contrast between an Alfonso de Valdés and a Ginés de Sepúlveda[56] would show. It is these men who formulate the new and at the same time old imperial ideas of Charles V, against the appeals of many members of the Castilian Cortes to center his attention on the national kingdom. They combined ideas of a Christian peace under the leadership of the emperor to face the Turkish threat with

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calling a council to reform the church and if necessary stand up to the Pope, who was overly interested in his Italian power politics. International politics among emerging modern states, particularly in relation to France, is justified by them in ideological terms that combine a variety of historical and intellectual heritages.

Max Weber has summarized the sociology of the humanists and the monumental work of Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne*, in an excellent documentation of his conclusions for the Spanish case.

> The sociology of the Humanists, particularly the transformation of a feudal and clerical education into a courtly culture based on the largesse of patrons, is not without inherent interest . . . The ambivalent attitude of the Humanists toward the Reformation was primarily caused by ideological factors. Insofar as Humanists placed themselves in the service of building the churches of either the Reformation or the Counter-Reformation, they played an extremely important, though not decisive, role in organizing church schools and in developing doctrine. But insofar as they became the carriers of particular religiosity (actually a whole series of particular types of faith), they remained without permanent influence. In keeping with their entire pattern of life, these Humanist groups of the classically educated were altogether antipathetic to the masses and to the religious demagogy of priests and preachers; on the whole they remained Erastian or irenic in temper, for which reason alone they were condemned to suffer progressive loss of influence.[57]

More specific is the role of those asked to debate basic policy alternatives in theological-moral-philosophical terms and to contribute more or less directly in transforming their positions into policies and legislation. The legitimation of Castilian rights over the New World and the legislation about the rights of the conquistadores and the Indians in the new domains of the crown is a classic example of such a role. A man like the Dominican professor Francisco de Vitoria of the University of Salamanca, considered one of the founding fathers of international law, represents this type well.[58]

The two preceding roles are, to use Theodor Geiger's expression,[59] legitimizers and rationalizers (a better English translation would be institutionalizers) of power, but are far from mindless servants without independent judgment and influence, and are genuinely concerned about the uses and abuses of power. They are not, however, moral prophets standing up in protest against power, any power, in the name of higher principles or ideals. Obviously this type is not frequent, and has little place in Spanish intellectual life once basic choices have been made in the reign of Charles V and Philip II has fully committed himself to a Spanish policy and world-view within the framework of the Counter Reformation. The "prophetic Christian," like Father Las Casas,[60] not without an element of megalomania, lack of realism, even intolerance or rigidity, incarnates this position. It is not an accident that this author of memoranda, distorted history, self-apologias, should have been less scholarly and academically learned than his antagonists: Ginés de Sepúlveda or the moralists and legal advisers

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shaping the compromise legislation of the Indies. Weber's notion of the prophet[61] would lead us to expect him to be less the pure intellectual.

The prophetic-moral critic, legitimized by a religious mission, is quite different from another type of critical intellectual, found in the seventeenth century and closer to some of our contemporary writers. These men do not question the ultimate values of society, nor even the specific policies, but rather satirize in literary forms, particularly dreams or pamphlets, rulers and their abuses: the *validos*—the universal ministers, favorites of the king—who usurp (due to the weakness or laziness of the monarchs) their power. Some of the works of Quevedo,[62] which cost him considerable persecution, fall into this category. This political role of intellectuals is again closer to that of modern lay intellectuals than to that of the religiously inspired moralists who contributed potentially radical political theories.

Another manifestation of intellectual concern with politics, or more specifically policy, is the type called at the time *arbitristas*,[63] those who offered panaceas to problems, particularly the financial problems of an indebted monarchy. There were some frauds among them, but they provided the beginnings of economic science and practical suggestions for the reform of government. The works of Martín González de Cellorigo[64] and Pedro Fernández de Navarrete[65] are good examples. Again this type of thinking is most frequent between 1600 and 1626 and reflects an increasing awareness of crisis, even decadence. After 1640, with the Catalan and Portuguese rebellions, the character of this literature changes from a search for remedies to a mood of defiance or *laudatio temporis acti*.[66]

Just as in the religious intellectual effort we found aesthetic creators diffusing the basic values of society for the masses in their poetry and in the theater, we find playwrights exulting a distinct concept of monarchical authority, glorifying the giant efforts of the nation in its wars. Many of the plays of Lope de Vega and Calderón perform this function. The defense and restitution through poetic justice of a political-moral order—in contrast to the work of Shakespeare which was more concerned with human passions—limits the tragic elements in politics.[67]

Finally, we may note how the embattled position of Spain stimulates a continuous tradition of defense of its culture and values: first with the assertion of the Castilian language against Latin, and later the defense against foreign criticism that was partly based on the dissidents or prophetic critics who were received with enthusiasm abroad. This line of nationalist intellectual response to the external world[68] becomes increasingly important as a feeling of decline, defeat, and exhaustion from trying to meet the great commitments of a superpower with limited resources set in. In the eighteenth century this defensive role was central and was a continuous strain in Spanish culture, increasingly combined with an awareness of the need to assimilate important elements from other cultures to overcome decay and backwardness.

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Debates on the Conquest of the Indies and the Status of the Indians

Few issues exemplify better the role of intellectuals in politics than the disputes about the rights of the Spanish crown to conquer America and the status of the Indians. Those disputes have been symbolized in the works of Las Casas, Ginés de Sepúlveda, and Francisco de Vitoria, but as Lewis Hanke has shown,[69] many theologians, legal scholars, and historians both in Spain and overseas participated, and their positions were echoed in the actions of administrators, bishops and clergymen, and even common Spaniards. It is impossible to summarize even the main outlines of the arguments used by all the parties to the dispute or the impact of their positions on declarations of principle, legislation, policies, and ultimately social reality. It is impossible to do so not only because of the complexity of the issues, but also because of the bitterness of the disputes between contemporary scholars, who generally took sides for or against one of the protagonists, and the difficulty of learning and evaluating the realities of Spanish rule. Ultimately modern scholars attempting to analyze the role of those learned and passionate men of the past face the question: How different would Spanish rule have been without the agitated polemics and inquests in the universities and royal councils; how much did different positions influence the legislation; and, finally, how far did that legislation get implemented overseas? On all those questions we find a variety of often contradictory responses by respectable scholars.

However, a few facts stand out and deserve to be noted in a study of the role of intellectuals in the Spanish empire. First, the rulers allowed and even encouraged discussion of their rights, duties, policies, and laws, in a search for legitimacy, information, and policies. As Weber stressed, like all others who enjoy advantages over their fellows, men in power want to see their position as "legitimate" and their advantages as "deserved," and to interpret the subordination of the many as the "just fate" of those upon whom it falls. It was up to the intellectuals of the time to find, largely through scholastic debate and the collective decision of learned men, convincing arguments within the theological and humanistic cultural traditions of the time, and it was up to the legal experts to translate those claims into normative declarations. Normally the legitimizing effort is directed more toward the subjects than toward satisfying the conscience of rulers, but the difficulty in making those claims understandable to the natives, and the fact that the conquistadores to a large extent did not feel a need for legitimacy when their rewards were so immediate and tangible, gives those disputes their unique quality. The considerable freedom granted to those debating the issues suggests that this legitimizing function of intellectuals cannot be performed—even for the ruler himself—without it.

Second, the controversy exemplifies the difficulties in linking disputes

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by intellectuals about ultimate values, principles, and laws with social realities—and the subsequent distortion of reality. The nature of the Indians, their psychology, and their customs are described (even by those who were in close contact with them) in terms of the positions taken, and we find little reference to the varieties of Indian civilization, customs, peoples, or situations in the conquest. Examples were chosen and generalized to fit intellectual arguments. In contrast, an administrator like Antonio de Mendoza, the first viceroy of New Spain, recommended in a memorial to his successor:

> Treat the Indians like any other people, and do not make special rules and regulations for them. There are few persons in these parts who are not motivated, in their opinion of the Indians, by some interest, whether temporal or spiritual, or by some passion or ambition, good or bad.[70]

Whatever conclusion we reach about the impact of the ideas of theologians and moralists on the laws, basic policy declarations, and specific experiments to implement certain ideas, the striking gap between them and the reality of the colonization is undeniable. The feedback of resistance to the implementation of values enjoying authoritative sanction in the further elaboration of laws and policies and even more their implementation should warn us against overestimating the role of intellectuals in shaping social reality. The difficulty of answering the question how things would have been without their presence, their justification, their criticism, their solutions, is a persistent problem in the study of the role of men of ideas in any society.

Third, the range, variety, and complexity of positions of men sharing largely a common culture, often using the same authorities and concepts in their arguments, often linked with the same or similar institutions, illustrates how difficult it is to derive ideas from a sociocultural context, how many of the same cultural materials can be used for opposite purposes, and how even a limited freedom of intellectuals rather than strict hierarchical subordination makes consensus among them difficult. The main antagonists never convinced each other. The fourteen judges called to Valladolid in 1550-1551 never reached a clear decision; they scattered after the final meeting, exhausted and confused, and for years afterward the Council of the Indies struggled to get them to give their opinions in writing. As late as 1557, Melchor Cano, one of the most influential among them, was still being asked to submit his answer. Indirectly, however, the dispute had a great impact.[71] Sepúlveda's books and apologies[72] on his doctrine of the Indians as slaves by nature and his justification of Spanish rule were never allowed to be published and did not appear until the end of the eighteenth century; the work that was the immediate cause of the Valladolid dispute did not reach print until 1892 and his earlier works were suppressed. On the other hand, Las Casas was able to publish in 1552 a galaxy of provocative treatises including the *Very Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies*,

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a strong indictment of Spanish rule, that circulated freely until it was withdrawn first in Peru and when his papers were collected in 1571 and kept closely watched by the chief historian of the Indies. The *Destrucción* was forbidden by the Inquisition in 1659 as offensive to the Spanish nation.[73] The general ordinance of 1573 by Philip II incorporated some of the ideas emerging from the dispute. The word "conquest" was to be substituted by "pacification" and no license was given to enslave the captives if war was necessary. The idea that the Indians were slaves by nature, childlike creatures, was rejected; they were to be accepted as men capable of becoming Christians and incorporated into Spanish civilization with legal rights. In some respects those developments exemplify something we find often in the role of intellectuals: their tendency to take extreme positions when asked for advice by rulers, the difficulty of formulating a consensus among intellectuals after their arguments are aired, the lack of resolution of the issues, the silencing or ignoring of some opinions, the partial incorporation, without explicit reference to them, of some of the ideas debated into policies, an ebbing of interest, and, finally, the renewed interest centuries later from the perspective of other times, leading to a reliving of old battles among another generation of intellectuals.

Fourth, the debates and arguments provide evidence of a proposition that Marx formulated for revolutions and that might be extended to political-intellectual conflicts. New issues and new situations are discussed in a language using concepts and categories of the past, even when their meaning is likely to be different. The title of a work by Lewis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*,[74] reveals how new answers were sought not on the basis of new concepts, which emerge only slowly, but by debating the meaning of natural slavery and by arguing that new facts do not fit the old concept. This might be characteristic only of a traditional society, but we suspect that it is a more general pattern, particularly when dealing with questions of legitimacy, morality, and law.

Fifth, there is also a shift, that would be interesting to document chronologically, from debates about questions of principle to more descriptive and factual efforts—writings that today would be considered anthropological, even efforts to reconstruct with a political purpose the preconquest history. Francisco de Toledo, a wise lawgiver, energetic administrator, and the greatest ruler Spain ever sent to Peru (1569-1582), conscious of the "books of the fanatic and virulent bishop of Chiapa [Las Casas] [that] served as the spearhead of the attack on Spanish rule in America," attempted to counteract that influence. He inspired the composition of a treatise against the bishop's ideas, arranged for the "true history" of Peru's past by Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, and embarked upon an investigation of the justice of Inca rule by collecting the so-called *Informaciones*. These were a formal inquiry into the ancient history of the Incas, their conquests, the institution of the Curacas, and religious beliefs and customs, particu-

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larly sacrifices. Information was taken down, by the means of interpreters, from two hundred Indians at eleven different points during an inspection of the realm between November 1570 and March 1572. Those inquiries have been published and their nature and value are debated by scholars, since their conclusion was foregone: "Your majesty is the legitimate ruler of this kingdom and the Incas are tyrannical usurpers"—an interesting example of the use of "facts" collected to answer the questions of intellectuals. That did not end the arguments, even in Peru. The effort to obtain a correct history led to the Indian history of Sarmiento de Gamboa, which was read to the principal and most able descendants of the Incas and to the surviving colleagues of Pizarro who, under oath, were called to tell the truth and make the necessary corrections. After their approval it was sent to the king of Spain, but was not published until 1906.[75]

One of the most fascinating roles in these debates of theologians and lawyers, religious men and humanists, against the background of king, royal officials, and conqueror colons, is the one assumed by Bartolemé de Las Casas, that of the prophet in the sociological sense of the term. The contradictory portraits of the man by his followers and his critics—for example, Ramón Menéndez Pidal in a recent biography—can be harmonized if we look at his role and personality in this light. Las Casas, through his many published and unpublished writings, through his constant pleading before the authorities and at councils of experts including some of the most learned men of his time, through his polemics with scholars like Sepúlveda, through the influence of his thought on many writers of his time, through his echo abroad and to our day, can certainly be considered an intellectual. However, neither his training (he probably did not have a bachelor's degree) nor his late scholarly reading made him an equal to those learned advisers. Prophecy in the context of sixteenth-century and overseas colonial society could not be addressed to the masses; it had to be directed to the elite and it had to take intellectual forms. Menéndez Pidal[76] makes the mistake of analyzing the scholarly efforts, the arguments, the historical writings of Las Casas by applying to them the standards that might be valid to judge the works of a legist or a historian. The impact and the audience that this bitter, even intolerant, critic could find can be understood only in terms of his prophetic role. The critique of his role as a bishop, of his lack of interest in missionizing day-by-day to the Indians, in learning their languages, and in living among them, makes sense only if we cast him in the role of the exemplary prophet rather than that of the ethical prophet—again to use Weberian terminology.

> We shall understand "prophet" to mean a purely individual bearer of charisma, who by virtue of his mission proclaims a religious doctrine or divine commandment . . . the personal call is the decisive element distinguishing the prophet from the priest . . . It is characteristic of the prophets that they do not receive their mission from any human agency, but seize it, as it were . . . the afore-

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mentioned assumption of power, came about as a consequence of divine revelation for religious purposes . . . The philosophical ethicist and the social reformer are not prophets in our sense of the word, no matter how closely they seem to resemble prophets . . . [they] lack that vital emotional *preaching* which is distinctive of prophecy, regardless of whether it is disseminated in the spoken word, the pamphlet, or any type of literary composition . . . The enterprise of the prophet is closer to that of the popular leader (*demagogos*) or political publicist than to that of the teacher.[77]

There are obviously many aspects of Weber's description that are missing in the role created for himself by Las Casas, but there is an affinity between him and the "titans of the holy curse" when he threatens the royal advisers and the king with doubts about their salvation, when in his *Confesonario* as a bishop he denies the sacraments to those unwilling to restitute and give up their exploitation, when in 1542 he prophesies God's punishment and destruction of Spain, when he writes "and for those sins, from what I read in the Holy Scripture, God shall punish with terrible punishments and perhaps totally destroy all of Spain." His demagogic sermons from the beginning of his career, his demonstrative acts as a bishop, particularly his excommunications, his passionate accounts of Spanish cruelty, his one-sided view of the qualities of the Indians, his denial of the right of conquest even with royal authority, his confidence in God's protection, all fit into this prophetic role. His testament summarizes well this self-image that carried such conviction that while he was often hated and seen as a fool he was not dismissed by the powerful, nor silenced by the Inquisition. He was listened to and given opportunities to carry through his more or less utopian (in the circumstances of the New World) experiments; he was sometimes ignored, but not perceived as mentally abnormal or a "Quijote," as Bataillon noted, criticizing the hostile view of Menéndez Pidal.[76]

Las Casas' position is found in letters, in memorials to the Council of the Indies, and in his *History of the Indies*. Menéndez Pidal, commenting on these texts, without any sympathy, notes the imitation of the style of Isaiah, and points out that some of his ecclesiastical admirers of the time likened him to the prophet Elias. He concludes by stressing Las Casas' megalomania and split personality and by complaining bitterly that he does not prophesy like Isaiah a "restoration in justice." Like the prophets of Israel described by Weber, Las Casas included himself among the sinful. For many younger monks he was "the candle that set everything on fire," as one of his contemporaries wrote warning the authorities.[79]

Undoubtedly this prophetic intellectual, who did not even attempt to create a community of followers outside the institutions of the church, or a political movement, or dissidence, generally using the language of the scholastic and the legist and trying to work through the institutions, is the best evidence of the limits that an existing social order based on tradition and self-interest and with the support of other intellectuals can place on its most passionate critics. Scholars still debate how much his strident voice

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contributed to shaping policies and laws and arousing the public conscience, as compared to those arguing and working for reform from more moderate premises.

Decadence and Providentialism

The seventeenth century sees a change in the role of intellectuals in their relation to politics and society. The great debates about the ultimate goals of the polity, the imperial role in Europe and America, and the legitimacy of power had been resolved. We no longer find humanists reinterpreting Roman and medieval ideas as advisers of the emperor, nor theologians, moralists, and lawyers arguing about the mission of Spain when confronted with the prophetic critique of a Las Casas. Other roles and human types appear, as the country faces new and different problems. There is no question about goals, but great concern about means; administration, finances, monetary policy, and economics become the concern of intellectuals. Occasionally some of the most intelligent spontaneously offer their advice, suggesting an end to the imperial drive that overtaxes the resources of the country and consolidation of the empire, but for pragmatic reasons rather than doubts of its legitimacy. Two of the most interesting political thinkers and critics of the seventeenth century had considerable diplomatic experience: Quevedo in Italy and Saavedra Fajardo as negotiator of the Peace of Westphalia.

In contrast to Charles V, who traveled constantly over his European domains, the later Habsburgs stayed in Spain and increasingly in Madrid, partly due to financial difficulties that limited the travels of the court. This inward shift is reflected in the data presented above on the travel of the intellectual elite in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The foreign world with which Spain is at war most of the time is perceived as hostile and the success of writings critical of Spanish society, its colonization, its Inquisition, its persecution of the Jews, leads to a new type of literature: the defense of Spain. This self-affirmation is not the pride of a new power, of a new language equal to the classical languages, of its contribution to humanistic learning, but the defense of a mission questioned by others, of a culture considered stagnating or intolerant, of a Catholicism asserting itself against the consolidated Protestant Reformation. The extreme form of this defensive reaction is a feeling of being God's chosen nation, the elected people, a messianism that overcomes all the doubts that the economic decadence, corruption of government, and military defeats might create. The baroque rhetoric of priests, monks, and preachers substitutes for the rigorous theological debates of previous generations and the intimate creativity of the mystics. The period of political decadence initiated around 1600, fully evident with the rebellions of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640 and the Peace of Westphalia in 1659, slowly turns also into one of cultural de-

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cadence. The years from after the death of Calderón in 1681 until 1730 when the eighteenth-century renewal began (though some of the political and economic changes of the new Bourbon dynasty had been instituted earlier) are a low point in Spanish culture.

Quevedo is a fascinating type of intellectual: poet, novelist, political philosopher, satirist, apologist of the monarchy and Catholicism, influential diplomat and politician, persecuted and imprisoned for his criticism of the king's favorite, defender of Spanish culture and foreign policy, but also conscious of the twilight of Spanish power. Witty, sarcastic, moralist and opportunist, "in his personal life a deviant who did not wish to be a deviant," with some exaggeration it has been said that all by himself he played the role which is played by the press of the political opposition. His satire was literary as well as social and political; it varied with the ups and downs of the author's needs and aspirations. At the same time, in his serious political treatise, *Política de Dios y Govierno de Christo*,[80] he sought to apply the principles of ethics to politics, attacking the idea of a reason of state as a satanic invention of which Pilate is a prime example. He is not the academic or clerical expert—in theological or legal matters—at the service of the state, but the layman, diplomat, politician, moral critic of the foibles of the society, hard, brisk, and often brutal in his style.

Juan Marichal[81] has noted how Quevedo, despite the fact that he was the son of the queen's secretary and had aspirations to a bureaucratic career, identifies with the more dynamic segment of the aristocracy—the Duke of Osuna—and in his writings turns against the *noblesse de robe*, against the university educated, the "negotiators," with their *civilidades* (courteous formulas), in favor of the men of action. As Quevedo wrote: "Monarchies maintain themselves with the customs on which they were built. They always have been acquired by captains, always corrupted by *bachilleres* . . . armies, not universities gain them and defend them . . . The battles give kingdoms, the letters, degrees and caps." And in another place: "Rome [in its rise] did not use doctors, nor books, but soldiers and lances. Everything was impetus, nothing studied. After Cicero and . . . Caesar introduced words and discourses [decadence began]."[82] It is probably no accident that he should have been an advocate of the apostle Santiago—Saint Jacques, so closely associated with the Reconquista, patron saint of Spain against those favoring the mystical doctoress Saint Theresa. The military defeat of Spain arouses the hostility of an intellectual against a government run largely by graduates, using summas rather than aphorisms, theologians rather than men of experience and cunning.

Quevedo's darts are often directed against the powerful, their vices and abuses of power, but without questioning the legitimacy of the monarchy, the monarch, or the ultimate values of the society. Far from him is the prophetic wrath of Las Casas that indicts a whole society. In contrast to the Erasmians who were questioned or persecuted by the Inquisition for the

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religious implications of their scholarly activities, he was the victim of political persecution, being exiled and made a prisoner of the state. The duality of king and *valido*, universal prime minister and king's favorite, in an age of crisis, allows a successful writer with some independent means to play the role of an independent intellectual who calls attention to the woes of the state without however questioning the legitimate authority of the king—something that would have been more difficult when the kings also governed. Divided authority, semi- or illegitimate authority, even in a highly consensual society, allows the emergence of the critical intellectual. Persecution in this case does not threaten the honor of the person, as the suspicion of heresy did, but after the fall of the *valido* becomes a source of pride. Ultimately the bitter experiences of politics, intellectual feuds, influence and defeat, and ups and downs of fortune lead to the philosophical attitude toward life that we find in many of Quevedo's works.

The first page of the *Panegírico a la Majestad del Rey nuestro Señor Don Felipe IV en la caída del Conde Dugue* (1643) praises the monarch after the years in which his light reached us weakly until the day he "subjected to him alone all the citizens" saying:

> It cannot be noted against you that you have elected ministers who have been an obstacle to you. Your majesty should consider that Christ not only selected twelve disciples, of which Peter denied him, Thomas doubted him, Judas sold him; but he himself told them: "I elected you, and not you me" . . . Who shall wonder that in the one [selection] your Majesty made in the desire of the whole common good there should be among the selected some neglectful, etc. so that it is convenient that you deserve to be such a great king, that you should be it alone.[83]

The praise followed by hopes for the future does not prevent him from expressing his despair in a private letter to a friend (1645):

> The worst news keeps coming in from everywhere, and the worst of all is that everyone expected that kind of news. I cannot be sure, dear Don Francisco, whether things are breaking up or have finally broken up. God knows! There are many things that, though they seem to exist and to have been, are now mere nothing, a word or an image.[84]

Only six years before a priest, mathematician, and jurist, Francisco Mateu, wrote in an *Antipronóstico a las victorias que se pronostica el reino de Francia:*

> As long as Spain administers justice with equity, favors the ecclesiastical estate maintaining its immunities, obedient to the Roman Pontifex, furthering the Holy Tribunal of the Inquisition, diffusing the faith . . . and would keep it with the customary purity . . . I say and reaffirm myself that it shall triumph not only of France but of as many enemies shall oppose it.[85]

Mateu is not alone; others like Pellicer, Jauregui, Céspedes y Meneses, Quiñones de Benavente, in their works and pamphlets, reassure the nation.[86]

The reactions of despair and its opposite, foolhardy providentialism of

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a chosen people, were the literary expressions of the crisis. Another response was the pragmatic one of administrative and economic reformers, who with rare exceptions did not question the goals of the nation but attempted to propose more rational means to achieve them. New kinds of intellectuals were at the point of appearing, but they were without a well-defined role, without an organized and theoretically elaborate body of knowledge on which to base their advice despite important theoretical insights, without a defined social position; these new intellectuals and economists were the fiscal and administrative reformers. Writers were concerned with problems: the depopulation of the country from 8.4 million in 1591-1594 to 7.5 million in 1713 (as a result of wars, migration to America, expulsion of the *moriscos* —converted Moors—pests, and the large number of celibate priests and monks), the unfavorable balance of trade and decay of industry, the copper money inflation, the drop in productive population particularly in the countryside, the dominance of consumption values in the ruling classes, administrative corruption and inefficiency, and economic inequality of classes and regions. Some of these writings make real contributions to understanding the economic and social mechanisms that produced the seventeenth-century European, and particularly Spanish, inflation and economic decadence. A changing society in crisis, which does not encourage criticism of its ultimate values, which feels no guilt for its actions, seems to be particularly favorable to the emergence of empirical social science analysis and reformism. (There might be here an analogy with post-Napoleonic bourgeois France, post-Bismarckian Germany, post-depression United States.)

This concern with more pragmatic problems, even when often the solutions proposed are unrealistic, coincides with a certain weariness with the load of empire. So, for example, Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola (d. 1631), canon of Zaragoza, who negotiated to bring Galileo to Spain, writes in an officially sponsored history, *Conquista de las Islas Malucas* (1609), on the Philippines:

> People said that the Monarchy, spread far and wide and separated by so many seas and climates, can scarcely be held together, nor is human providence able to bind into a unit . . . provinces which Nature set so wide apart . . . ; that these reasons are not sophistic, but born of experience . . . ; and that the most suitable action would be for the king to increase his strength in Europe.[87]

But the response of Philip to these people, the ministers of finance, was that all efforts should continue, as Otis H. Green summarizes the account of Argensola:

> The history proclaims the king's zeal to maintain inviolate the faithfulness of his subjects in the Indies . . . (and the) determination to introduce into all corners of the earth "our vigilance," ever at the service of this mythical empire, so that in the end it might triumph. The natives of the Spice Islands are exposed to the heresies of the Dutch and the abominations of Islam; the "cause of the Faith" does not permit the abandonment of that Asiatic outpost. Even though in

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the enterprise of preaching the Gospel there are intermixed at times "the avarice and the excesses of our captains and soldiers," such excesses do not render the cause less just; nor can the Spanish nation listen to "reasons of state."[88]

On their public record, Spanish intellectuals did not question the attitude reflected in this text. When three and a half centuries later another empire found itself confronted with overexertion and the option to abandon an outpost in the struggle for an ideology, politicians responded like Philip II but intellectuals took a completely different stance. A counterideology of a religious character (if we accept the notion of Counter Reformation) probably gave the historical process a meaning acceptable to many intellectuals that a secular counterideology might not be able to provide.

A Note on Quantitative Data

To provide a collective portrait of intellectuals I have compiled a biographical file on 321 authors writing between 1500 and 1700, which will be expanded and improved in future research. In the absence of a standard national biography, such as the one used by Theodor Geiger in his research on Danish intellectuals, I have based my selection of names on several criteria. First, I considered those receiving more than passing mention in three leading histories of literature: Angel Valbuena Prat, *Historia de la literatura española*, 4 vols. (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1968); Juan Hurtado and Angel González Palencia, *Historia de la literatura española*, 2 vols. (Madrid: SAETA, 1940); and Guillermo Díaz-Plaja, ed., *Historia general de las literaturas hispánicas*, 6 vols. (Barcelona: Barana, 1953). As histories of literature their references to philosophy, theology, political thought, science, and so forth are limited. To compensate I included the authors mentioned in the works of José María Maravall, *Carlos V y el pensamiento político del renacimiento* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1960) and *La philosophie politique espagnole au XVIIe siècle dans ses rapports avec l'esprit de la Contre-Réforme* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955); in the monograph by Luciano Pereña Vicente, *La universidad de Salamanca forja del pensamiento político español en el siglo XVI*, in *Acta Salamanticensia, Historia de la Universidad*, vol. I, 2 (1954), which includes most of the theologians, philosophers, and jurists; in Alain Guy, *Les philosophes espagnoles d'hier et l'aujourd'hui* (Toulouse: Privat, 1956); in Gregorio Marañón, "La literatura científica en los siglos XVI y XVII," in Díaz-Plaja, ed., *Historia general de las literaturas hispánicas*, III, 933-966, with special reference to the medical literature; and in Julio Rey Pastor, *Los matemáticos españoles del siglo XVI* (n.p.: Biblioteca Scientia, n.d., about 1914), for the history of mathematics. In future work I intend to take into account some of the recent research in the history of Spanish science, unfortunately inaccessible now. The Catalan language literature, of limited importance in this period, was likely to be under-

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represented with histories of literature centered on writings in Castilian and I therefore included those authors receiving more than passing mention in: Jorge Rubió Balaguer, "Literatura Catalana," in Díaz-Plaja, ed., *Historia general de las literaturas hispánicas*, III, 729-930; Joan Ruiz i Calonja, *Historia de la literatura catalana* (Barcelona: Teide, 1954); and the introduction by Martín de Riquer, *Resumen de literatura catalana* (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1947). The biographies of the authors so listed were taken principally from Félix Torres Amat, *Memorias para ayudar a formar un diccionario crítico de escritores catalanes y dar alguna idea de la antigua y moderna literatura de Cataluña* (Barcelona: Verdaguer, 1826). The biographies of Valencian authors were completed with the classic work of Vicente Ximeno, *Escritores del Reyno de Valencia* (Valencia: Estevan Dolz, 1749). If anything, my data give a somewhat disproportionate weight to the authors in Catalan. The biographical data for all the authors so listed were completed from a great variety of sources, particularly the *Diccionario de Literatura Española*, edited under the direction of Germán Bleiberg and Julián Marías for the Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1949, and the *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana*, edited by Espasa Calpe (the Spanish National Encyclopedia), Barcelona, 1905. The work of Nicolás Antonio, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova sive Hispanorum Scriptorum qui ab anno MD. addMDCLXXXIV floruere notitia*, reprinted in two volumes in Madrid by Joachimi de Ibarra in 1788, was an indispensable source. In addition, I consulted a spate of bio-bibliographic lexica on the illustrious sons of various provinces, most published around the turn of the century. On the Jesuit authors, Petri Ribadeneirae, S.J., *Bibliotheca Scriptorum Societas Iesu* (Antverpiae, 1643) was useful.

Certainly a further search through monographic sources would supply missing information, and it is reasonable to assume that on many characteristics the figure would be higher, but I do not feel that the general trends would be modified. The percentages should be read with this relative lack of information, particularly on lesser figures, in mind.

I divided the elite intellectuals into those born in or before 1575, whose productive years would fall mainly into the sixteenth century, and those born after that date, whose writings would fall into the reigns of the last three Habsburgs (1598-1700). The authors whose birthdates were unknown were classified into one or the other century on the basis of the date of their first published work. It might have been interesting to use 1556—the date of the abdication of Charles V and ascent to the throne of Philip II—as another dividing line, but this would have further complicated the tables. My analysis of data on the first generation suggests that what I say about the sixteenth century is particularly true for the first half.

The excellent indices of the monumental work of the seventeenth-century scholar Nicolás Antonio, giving place of birth, membership in religious orders, and sex for 3,604 authors—925 native of Portugal and its possessions

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and 93 of the Castilian Americas, leaving 2,586 born in the area of present day Spain plus some parts of today's France—have contributed data on persons outside my small elite. I call those persons, for brevity's sake, "mass" intellectuals. In addition, his index of twenty-three main subjects of works, a list of some 10,807 entries, has allowed me to characterize in general terms the intellectual production of the men writing between 1500 and 1584 whose work was considered worthy of notice by one of their most learned and informed contemporaries. The data of Nicolás Antonio permit some interesting comparisons between "elite" and "mass" intellectuals (without taking those terms too seriously).

I want to thank my wife Rocío Terán de Linz for her collaboration and Pedro González Blasco for research assistance.

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1. Basic sources on the political, social, and economic history of the period are: Juan Reglá, *Historia social y económica de España, Imperio, Aristocracia, Absolutismo*, Vol. III of the *Historia social y económica de España y América*, ed. Jaime Vicens Vives (Barcelona: Teide, 1957); J. H. Elliot, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964); John Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965-1969). For a critical review of the rich literature on the economic and social structure, specifically that with a quantitative emphasis, see Juan J. Linz, "Five Centuries of Spanish History: Quantification and Comparison," in Val Lorwin and Jacob M. Price, eds., *The Dimensions of the Past: Materials, Problems and Opportunities for Quantitative Work in History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). For the sixteenth century see also Ramón Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros: La vida económica en Castilla (1516-1556)*, vol. I of a three volume work, 2d rev. ed. (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1955).

2. On the political, economic, social, and cultural structures of southern Europe at the time see the beautiful book by Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'epoque de Philippe II*, 2 vols., rev. ed. of work first published in 1949 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966).

3. There is no work on religious ideas, movements, and practices in Spain comparable to the great work of Henri Bremond, *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France depuis la fin des guerres de religion jusqu' à nos jours*, 9 vols. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967) (first ed., 1923). However, Luis Sala Salust, "La espiritualidad española en la primera mitad del siglo XVI," *Cuadernos de Historia, Anexos de la revista Hispania*, 1 (Madrid, 1967), 169-187, provides a brief overview of the variety of spiritual currents in Spanish Christianity in the first half of the sixteenth century, with a good critical bibliography.

4. Américo Castro, *The Structure of Spanish History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) and *De la edad conflictiva: El drama de la honra en España y en su literatura* (Madrid: Taurus, 1961). See also his *Aspectos del vivir hispánico: Espiritualismo, mesianismo, actitud personal en los siglos XIV al XVI* (Santiago: Cruz del Sur, 1949); *Cervantes y los casticismos españoles* (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1966); and *Hacia Cervantes*, 3d rev. ed. (Madrid: Taurus, 1967). Castro's work

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has aroused bitter polemics, particularly Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, *España. Un enigma histórico,* 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Ed. Sudamericana, 1956) and "Las cañas se han tornado lanzas," *Cuadernos de Historia de España,* 27 (1958), 43-66.

The outstanding modern scholarly work on the Jews in society is Julio Caro Baroja, *Los judíos en la España moderna y contemporánea,* 3 vols. (Madrid: Arion, 1961). On the "purity of blood" statutes and the bitter controversies surrounding their introduction, see Albert A. Sicroff, *Les controverses des statuts de "pureté de sang" en Espagne du XVe au XVIIe siècle* (Paris: Didier, 1960).

5. Unfortunately we cannot go into the question to what extent Spanish cultural development was a continuation of the pre-Protestant reform of the church initiated by Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros or a reaction to the Reformation, an antimovement, a counterreformation. Much of the argument hinges on the reading of the work of Marcel Bataillon on the Erasmianists and the degree to which the period 1530-1540 and the change of generations coinciding with it is considered a breaking point. A comparison between the Spanish and the Italian counterreformation in this respect, and between Spanish and French Catholicism in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, would also be rewarding. For an introduction to the problem, the lectures of H. Outram Evennet, *The Spirit of the Counter-Reformation* (Cambridge, Eng.: The University Press, 1968), with a postscript by John Bossy on the concept of counterreformation, are an interesting point of departure.

   For a review of the problems and positions on the place of Spanish history in the context of European historical periodizations, see Quintín Aldea, "Límites y valoración del tránsito de la Edad Media a la Moderna," *Cuadernos de Historia, Anexos de la revista Hispania,* 1 (Madrid, 1967), 1-36, with special reference to the ideas of Ortega y Gasset, Américo Castro, and Sánchez Albornoz.

6. The monumental work by Otis H. Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition: The Castilian Mind in Literature from El Cid to Calderón,* 4 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965) rejects the narrow perspective of the literary historian and includes philosophical and political thought, even scientific developments, in an effort to understand Spanish culture in its uniqueness as well as in the context of the great streams of European civilization. See the review by Manuel Durán, "Otis H. Green and Spanish Culture: 'Spain and the Western Tradition,'" *Hispania,* 50 (December 1967), 1012-1018.

7. The "censura inmanente" of which Unamuno wrote in *En torno al casticismo* (Madrid, 1916), p. 185. For a discussion of some of these problems see Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965). For a moderately conservative Spanish view see Miguel de la Pinta Llorente, *La Inquisición española y los problemas de la cultura y de la intolerancia* (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1953). See also Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* IV, 163-164, and Castro, *The Structure of Spanish History,* pp. 636-637, on the Mariana comment on the trial of Fray Luis de León.

8. Marcel Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne. Recherches sur l'histoire spirituelle du XVIe siècle* (Paris: E. Droz, 1937). There is an expanded Spanish translation published by the Fondo de Cultura Económica in Mexico.

9. Barrington Moore, "Totalitarian Elements in Pre-Industrial Societies," *Political Power and Social Theory* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), pp. 30-88.

10. This aspect has been central to Weber's analysis of Western civilization in his *Economy and Society,* ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968). While there are strong tendencies toward what Weber calls Caesaro-

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papism in Spain, there are in this period a number of situations in which segments of the church, like some religious orders, or the Inquisition, acted very independently and even against the wishes of the sovereign.

11. "Los primitivos españoles del pensamiento económico: 'Cuantitativismo' y 'Bullonismo,'" in *Crecimiento y desarrollo. Economía e Historia: Reflexiones sobre el caso español* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1964).

12. Pierre Chaunu, *La civilisation de l'Europe classique* (Paris: Arthaud, 1966), pp. 530-567.

13. See Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition;* Pinta Llorente, *La Inquisición española;* Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne.* For example, the teaching of Copernicus at Salamanca in 1561, Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* III, 234, and Irving A. Leonard, *Books of the Brave: Being an Account of Books and Men in the Spanish Conquest and Settlement of the Sixteenth Century New World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), esp. chap. 7, "Light Literature and the Law."

14. Sánchez Albornoz, *España. Un enigma histórico,* II, 562.

15. Ramón Menéndez Pidal, *The Spaniards in Their History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), pp. 102-143; Franz Niedermayer, "Zwei Spanien? Ein Beitrag zum Gespräch über spanische Geschichtsauffassung," *Saeculum,* 3 (1952), 444-476.

16. "Política religiosa: El artículo 26 de la Constitución," speech in the legislature on October 13, 1931, in Manuel Azaña, *Obras Completas,* ed. Juan Marichal (Mexico: Oasis, 1966), II, 51-52. Emphasis added.

17. Richard Kagan, "Universities in Castile, 1500-1700," *Past and Present,* 49 (November 1970) and his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "Education and the State in Habsburg Spain," Cambridge University, 1968.

18. José Antonio Maravall, *La philosophie politique espagnole au XVIIe siècle dans ses rapports avec l'esprit de la Contre-Réforme,* trans. Louis Cazes and Pierre Mesnard (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955). See pp. 30-31 on the change in social background and intellectual style of the political writers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

19. The most important scholarly study of Spanish society in the seventeenth century is Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *La sociedad española en el siglo XVII,* vol. I (Madrid: Instituto Balmes de Sociología, CSIC, 1963). For the sixteenth century, Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros* is an excellent study of the social structure.

20. Edward E. Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 50-61.

21. See the works of Ramón Carande, Earl Hamilton, Pierre Vilar, among others. The essay by Pierre Vilar, "El tiempo del Quijote," in *Crecimiento y Desarrollo,* originally published as "Le temps du Quichote," *Europe* (January 1956), pp. 3-16, summarizes well those developments and their intellectual reflection.

22. See José Antonio Maravall, "Los 'Hombres de Saber' o letrados y la formación de su conciencia estamental," *Estudios de historia del pensamiento español* (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1967), pp. 347-380, for the early development of their status consciousness; Bartolomé Bennassar, *Valladolid au siècle d'or. Une ville de Castille et sa campagne au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Mouton, 1967), pp. 357-373, esp. 365-372; and José Antonio Escudero, *Los secretarios de Estado y del despacho, 1474-1724,* 4 vols. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1969).

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23. See Caro Baroja, *Los judíos en la España moderna,* I, 182-189, for the various estimates of the Jewish population at the end of the fifteenth century and the number of expelled and converted. His estimate is 160,000 expelled, 240,000 new converts, of which 50,000 were tried by the Inquisition in the first half-century of its activities.

24. See the map on page 80 of Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *La sociedad española en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid: Instituto Balmes de Sociología, CSIC, 1955), with the proportion of nobles in relation to the total population in 1797.

25. See, for example, some of the Constitutions of the Colleges of the University of Alcalá, quoted by José de Rújula y de Ochotorena, Marqués de Ciadoncha, *Indice de los colegiales del Mayor de San Ildefonso y Menores de Alcalá* (Madrid: Instituto Jerónimo Zurita, CSIC, 1946), pp. viii-ix, xvi.

26. Sicroff, *Les controverses des statuts de "pureté de sang,"* pp. 270-290.

27. See Castro, works cited in note 4; Caro Baroja, *Los judíos en la España moderna;* Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne.*

28. For estimates of the Jewish population and the *conversos* remaining after the expulsion see Caro Baroja, *Los judíos en la Espagña moderna,* pp. 182-189, and his concluding estimate, p. 189. The ratio to population is based on the figure given for Spain by Carande, *Carlos V y sus banqueros,* I, 67.

29. On the affinities between a new Christian background and illuminism and Erasmianism, see Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne.*

30. Vilar, "El tiempo del Quijote," pp. 444-448; Bennassar, *Valladolid au siècle d'or,* chaps. V to VIII.

31. See Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* II, 11-16, on Nebrija, father of Spanish philology and author of the *Gramática de la lengua castellana* (1492), the first grammar of the romance language written with all the rigor of the new philology.

32. This estimate is based on Domínguez Ortiz, *La sociedad española en el siglo XVII,* p. 169. This work constitutes the best study of the role of the nobility in Spanish society of the seventeenth century.

33. We have used the information on the place of birth rather than where a person spent his formative years, or the main place of residence, because that information was available more frequently than any other. However, the data on places lived show for both centuries, but particularly the seventeenth, the attraction of the capital, with 31.2 per cent and 53.5 per cent, respectively, having spent time in Madrid. The number having lived in Seville is also slightly higher than for those born there. Unfortunately, the information on the place of death is so incomplete that we could not, as we intended, use this information to study more precisely the internal migrations or the "brain drain" from the periphery to the center. In addition, a number of writers must have retired in their old age to their ancestral homes or quieter places than the court, a fact that would limit the validity of the indicator.

34. See José Gentil da Silva, *En Espagne, Développement économique, subsistance, déclin,* avec représentation graphique des information par Jacques Bertin (Paris: Mouton, 1965), maps in appendix and tables pp. 82ff.

35. The data are from C. Gutiérrez, S. J., *Españoles en Trento* (Valladolid: Instituto Jerónimo Zurita, CSIC, 1951); see map on p. lxviii.

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36. On November 22, 1559, Philip II issued an order to all Spaniards studying or teaching abroad to return within four months, the only exceptions being those at particular colleges in Bologna, Rome, Naples, and Coimbra. In the future, no Spaniards were to be allowed abroad to study except at those colleges.

37. Kagan, "Universities in Castille." The figures quoted here are revised estimates that Professor Kagan was kind enough to communicate to me.

38. See Alberto Jiménez, *Ocaso y restauración. Ensayo sobre la universidad española moderna* (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 1948), pp. 26-28, on the reaction of the universities to the creation of the Colegio Imperial in Madrid in the first years of the seventeenth century. See also José Simón Díaz, *Historia del Colegio Imperial de Madrid* (Madrid, 1952).

39. A *Real Cédula* of April 8, 1659, quoted by José de Rújula y de Ochotorena, *Indice de los colegiales*, p. vii. In 1766 the Marquis of Alventos, in his history of the college of San Bartolomé in Salamanca, summarized the achievements of the students of the six Colegios Mayores (four in Salamanca, one in Valladolid, and another in Alcalá). Summarizing the count in thirty-four groups given by José de Rújula y de Ochotorena, *ibid.*, p. xii, we can classify the 6,093 colegiales into the following groups:

Saints, venerables, and persons of special virtue	156	2.6 per cent
Ecclesiastical dignitaries	2,173	35.7
High executive government officials	1,398	22.6
High judicial officials	1,553	25.6
Titles and nobles	612	10.0
Writers and teachers of princes	228	3.8
	6,093	100.3 per cent

Some of those in the "nonintellectual" categories, such as those in the clerical group, the forty-five participants in general church councils, could be considered intellectuals. Even so, the proportion is low. Nicolás Antonio lists only 118 writers who were graduates of the Colegios, confirming that those elite colleges served more to train civil and church officials than intellectuals.

40. The indexes of students and professors in those centuries published for a number of universities and colleges would allow an analysis of this type. These listings have been used to determine if leading writers attended the universities, if they received degrees, and the type of courses in which they matriculated. An indication of the prestige attached to university education is that sometimes it can be proved that claims were not quite true; so, for example, Lope de Vega attended Alcalá, but apparently did not receive a degree. Américo Castro and Hugo A. Rennert, *Vida de Lope de Vega (1562-1635)* (Salamanca: Anaya, 1968), pp. 24-26.

41. For a sociological-historical study of the church see Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *La sociedad española en el siglo XVII*, vol. II, *El estamento eclesiástico* (Madrid: Instituto Balmes de Sociología, CSIC, 1970).

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

44. This point is emphasized by Pierre Vilar in his essay, "Los primitivos españoles del pensamiento económico," pp. 183-184.

45. See, for example, Angel Valbuena Prat, *El teatro español en su Siglo de Oro* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1969).

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46. Max Weber has emphasized this problem in *Economy and Society,* pp. 1168-1173.

47. See Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* III, 165-167 on the orthodox mystics and pp. 161-165 on the heterodox mystics.

48. On that discontinuity see Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne,* particularly chap. IX on the persecution of the Erasmianists. A change reflected in the correspondence of Luis Vives and Rodrigo Manrique, the son of the Inquisitor, was part of a general European change in the religious political climate. Vives writes to his friend Erasmus in 1534: "We pass through difficult times in which one cannot speak nor be silent without danger. In Spain Vergara and his brother Tovar have been arrested, not to mention other very learned men. In England, the bishops of Rochester and London, and Thomas More. I pray heaven to give you an easy old age." Rodrigo Manrique writes from Paris to Luis Vives on the occasion of Vergara's imprisonment: "You are right, our country is a land of pride and envy; you may add: of barbarism. For now it is clear that down there one cannot possess any culture without being suspect of heresy, error, and Judaism. Thus silence has been imposed on the learned. As for those who take refuge in erudition, they have been filled, as you say, with great terror . . . At Alcalá they are trying to uproot the study of Greek completely."

    For an interesting example of a critical reaction to the change and a plea for a more tolerant policy see José Antonio Maravall, "La oposición político-religiosa del siglo XVI. El erasmismo tardío de Felipe de la Torre," *Homenaje a Xavier Zubiri* (Madrid: Editorial Moneda y Crédito, 1970), II, 297-320.

49. An archbishop of Toledo, Carranza, was subjected to persecution, as were Priuli, Flaminio, Pole, and Morone in Italy.

50. See Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne,* p. 826. The expurgated text was in the Second Part, chap. 36: "The works of charity that are made lukewarmly and slackly have no merit and are not worth anything" (Index of 1632). See Américo Castro, "Cervantes y la Inquisicion," *Modern Philology,* 27 (1930), 427-433.

51. Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* III, 333.

52. Gerhard Moldenhauer, "Spanische Zensur und Schelmenroman," *Estudios eruditos in memoriam de Adolfo Bonilla y San Martin,* 1 (Madrid, 1927), 223-239, quoted by Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* III, 460.

53. On the role of inquisitor see Julio Caro Baroja, "El señor inquisidor," in *El señor inquisidor y otras vidas por oficio* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1968), pp. 15-63, who stresses the consequences of the legal, rather than theological, training preferred for the "career" and of the dependence of the judges in the more important "intellectual" cases on the opinions of experts.

54. Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne,* pp. 395-466. See also José Antonio Maravall, *Carlos V y el pensamiento político del renacimiento* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1960), pp. 206-224.

55. The position of Erasmus when faced with the conflicting demands of Catholics, Protestants, and even Charles V is paradigmatic. See Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne.*

56. See Angel Losada, *Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda a través de su Epistolario y nuevos documentos* (Madrid: Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, CSIC, 1959).

57. Weber, *Economy and Society,* II, 513-514.

58. See Pierre Mesnard, *L'essor de la philosophie politique au XVIe siècle* (Paris:

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Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1969), with chapters on Francisco de Vitoria, Juan de Mariana, and Francisco Suárez.

59. Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung de Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1949), chap. II.

60. The literature is so extensive that a special bibliography has been published: Lewis Hanke and Manuel Giménez Fernández, *Bartolomé de las Casas, 1474-1566. Bibliografía crítica y cuerpo de materiales para el estudio de su vida, escritos, actuación y polémicas que suscitaron durante cuatro siglos* (Santiago, 1954). Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959) provides an excellent account of the historical context and the controversies of the time. His *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959) focuses more specifically on the intellectual battles and debates. Marcel Bataillon has collected his papers in *Etudes sur Bartolomé de las Casas* (Paris: Centre de Recherches de L'Institut d'Etudes Hispaniques, 1965), which includes a chapter on "Charles-Quint, Las Casas et Vitoria," a subject also treated by Ramón Menéndez Pidal, "Vitoria y Las Casas," in *El P. Las Casas y Vitoria con otros temas de los siglos XVI y XVII* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, Col. Austral, 1958), pp. 9-48. See also Menéndez Pidal, *El Padre Las Casas, su doble personalidad* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1963).

61. Weber, *Economy and Society,* II, 439-451.

62. Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, *Obras completas,* vol. I, *Obras en prosa* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1966), with an introduction and notes by Felicidad Buendía. For a biography see Luis Astrana Marín, *La vida turbulenta de Quevedo* (Madrid: Editorial "Gran Capitán," 1945).

63. On the Spanish contributions to economic theory, see Vilar, "Los primitivos españoles del pensamiento económico," pp. 175-207.

64. *Memorial de la política necesaria y útil restauración de la República de España* (Valladolid, 1600).

65. *Conservación de Monarquías y discursos políticos sobre la gran consulta que el Consejo hizo al señor rey Don Felipe Tercero* (1626).

66. See Vilar, "El tiempo del Quijote," p. 443.

67. Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* IV, 250.

68. See *ibid.,* pp. 6-9, on Saavedra Fajardo.

69. Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice,* leads to some of the relevant literature.

70. *Ibid.,* pp. 12-13.

71. Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians.*

72. *Ibid.,* chaps. 5 and 6.

73. Menéndez Pidal, *El Padre Las Casas,* pp. 358-380.

74. See note 60.

75. Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice,* pp. 162-172.

76. Menéndez Pidal, *El Padre Las Casas,* chap. VIII, esp. pp. 324-335 on his prophetism.

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77. Weber, *Economy and Society,* II, 439-451.

78. Bataillon, *Etudes sur Bartolomé de las Casas,* pp. xvi-xvii. See also Lewis Hanke, "More Heat and Some Light on the Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America," *Hispanic American Historical Review,* 8 (1964), 313.

79. Menéndez Pidal, *El Padre Las Casas,* p. 347.

80. Francisco de Quevedo Villegas, *Política de Dios y Govierno de Christo,* ed. James O. Crosby (Madrid: Castalia, jointly with the University of Illinois Press, 1966); an excellent critical edition of the text.

81. Juan Marichal, "Quevedo: El escritor como 'espejo' de su tiempo," *La voluntad de estilo* (Barcelona: Seix y Barral, 1957), pp. 149-162.

82. Quoted *ibid.,* p. 158.

83. Quevedo, *Obras completas,* p. 947.

84. Quoted by Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* IV, 6.

85. Quoted by Palacio Atard, *Derrota, agotamiento, decadencia en la España del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Rialp, 1956), p. 156.

86. Palacio Atard refers to these authors and quotes them. Vilar, "El tiempo del Quijote," p. 443, refers to this generational shift in the response to the state of the nation. Another important source on the ideas of the period is José María Jover, *1635: Historia de una polémica y semblanza de una generación* (Madrid, 1949).

87. Green, *Spain and the Western Tradition,* III, 49-51.

88. *Ibid.,* p. 50.

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FRANÇOIS BOURRICAUD

The Adventures of Ariel

Ariel is not only the biblical name for certain human-headed lions, or the sylphlike character of *The Tempest* created by Shakespeare as the wise Prospero's companion. It is also the title of an excellent book, published in 1901 by the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó, which gives a highly idealized description of the intellectual and his mission in Latin American societies. I shall place the following observations under the invocation of Ariel in order to emphasize the continuity of this mission, or of a pretension to such; yet I am well aware that the symbol so expressed has undergone quite evident transformations.

We must first ask whether it makes sense to consider the role of the Latin American intellectual *in general.* I shall not hide my skepticism as to the stereotypes concerning "Latin America." In fact, the geographical area thus designated manifests an extraordinary heterogeneity when social and economic factors are taken into account. The differences between such obviously underdeveloped countries as Bolivia or Paraguay, and Argentina, southern Brazil, or even Chile are striking, whether one considers individual productivity, rate of urbanization, or education. In addition, there is little exchange within the countries of that particular zone, and I refer not only to the flow of goods, services, or capital, but also to the exchange of ideas and intellectual contacts.

During the nineteenth century, intellectual life in the new Latin American republics was characterized by two features: compartmentalization of small national (one is tempted to say provincial) intellectual markets and dependence on the international centers of diffusion, situated in Europe and the United States. Today, intellectual life in Latin America tends to be organized around Latin American themes; dependence on themes imported from the center seems, at least at first sight, to have diminished. Just how seriously should one consider these apparently important transformations?

I am not unaware of the arbitrary nature of dividing history into periods. Yet I feel that it is far more justifiable to attribute the awakening of

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consciousness to the 1920's than to the time of Independence, which constituted a false start for almost all of the new states, followed by a long period of disillusionment, characterized by the setting aside of the very ideals in whose name the *Libertadores* had fought and by a pronounced degradation of the most elementary conditions of civility.[1] The period that followed saw an increased exposure of ever-greater sectors of the society to the impact of modern ideas and modern techniques of production. There was a growth in foreign investment, an activation of foreign exchanges, and finally the substitution of American imperialism for British imperialism. The crisis expressed itself culturally in the rise of indigenous art, the formulation of the Indian-American theme, and the affirmation of populism. These are characteristic expressions of a search for identity, a trait common to societies struggling with major transformations.

So, for example, positivism, of the French or Spencerian version, had repercussions first in Mexico, and, with some delays, almost everywhere on the Latin American continent. What is significant is that there was no exchange or interaction between the European positivists and their Latin American disciples; the ideas circulated only one way. The Latin American contribution to the decisive points of the positivist conception of intellectual life (the relation between science and its technical, moral, or political applications; the autonomy of knowledge with regard to religion, culture, and values) added no original element later adopted by either France or England. During the entire nineteenth century, and probably until World War I, Latin American culture remained provincial, in that the learned culture had been drawn either from the hispanic background or from French and Anglo-Saxon sources, while the popular culture survived on a latent basis, forced into a sort of limbo by the censorship of a Westernized elite.

With the advent of the Mexican revolution, this period, which some, such as José Carlos Mariategui or Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, called "neocolonial," gave way to an intellectual, political, and university movement which spread from Córdoba during the 1920's. This was the trying experience of discovering a Latin American identity. Although observations that attempt to treat the entire American subcontinent as a meaningful unit are questionable, a more or less analogous combination of circumstances did take place throughout Latin American history, occurring in the various areas with no more than thirty years difference in time. Thus between 1850 and 1880, most countries put into effect policies of modernization founded on the free entry of foreign capital. In like manner, between 1930 and 1960, these development policies *hacia afuera* were abandoned in favor of industrialization based on the substitution of imports, protectionism, and the creation of a more or less extensive State sector.

The 1920's mark a delimitation in intellectual and ideological activity; it seems reasonable to speak of a "Latin American conjuncture" from 1920

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on, in which the problems of dependence and identity were dominant. In the main, these two concerns were expressed through the *indigenismo* movement, which was of interest first to those countries in which a strong native minority subsisted, then through the intellectual movements, which after Córdoba affected all the universities of the continent in varying degrees.

Interest in "indigenous" life is now fully accepted, but the history of this interest illustrates the difficulties with which several generations of intellectuals had to struggle in their effort to grasp the originality of the Latin American situation. From 1860 on, in Mexico and Peru, the question of what should be done about the Indians preoccupied not only philanthropists and other "do-gooders," but also those concerned with the material development of their country. One may even ask whether, from the very beginning, sensitivity to the indigenous was not—in addition to radical criticism of a society guilty of tolerating such injustices—a sort of reactionary love of the past,[2] a more or less avowed longing for the colonial period, when the Indians were "protected" by the church and the Spanish monarchy from the abuses of land grabbers, who, after independence, were given by liberal legislation the means to enrich themselves at the expense of the indigenous communities and the church. However that may be, the radical indigenous cause underwent serious transformations; having at first demanded a policy of promotion (education) and protection (concerning land), the movement eventually turned the Indian into the symbol of national identity (and in the final analysis, continental identity).

The *indigenista* claims were not set forth by the natives themselves, who during this entire period could neither express themselves nor be heard, except through outbursts of "decentralized violence,"[3] but by the enlightened elements of a mainly provincial middle class. In Peru during the 1920's, for example, a tight network of channels connecting Lima and the capitals of the provinces (especially Le Cuzco) was established through the *Asociacion Pro Indigena* and the subscribers to several magazines such as *Amauta* and *La Sierra*. This system brought the intellectuals of the capital—those who had a concern for the indigenous problem and who had access to the power groups in Lima—into touch with others of similar sympathies in the provinces. Having access to the ministries, they could at one and the same time assume the role of protector of a community suffering the abuses of some *gamonal* and press for progressive legislation. Communications existed, but there was always the threat of misunderstanding and distrust between those who had already "arrived," and were near the seats of power, and those who, bitter or resigned, remained isolated in the provinces.

The *indigenista* protest offered the intellectuals a rallying point. It gave them a mission, and, indeed, painters, folklorists, and *indigenista* "instructors" contributed much toward giving the natives, particularly the brighter among them, a vital sense of their own dignity.[4] For this reason, it is im-

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possible to dismiss the indigenous movement as simply folkloric, as was the case with certain similar movements in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. This is not to say, however, that the *indigena* culture did not have serious shortcomings. Two were particularly obvious.[5] First, it lacked sufficient conceptual and analytical tools, not only in the technical or scientific realms, but also in the areas of cosmology and philosophy. No fully developed intellectual tradition comparable to Confucianism or Buddhism existed any longer in Latin America—assuming that any such tradition had existed, even before the conquest. Second, the indigenous culture, even if still remarkably alive within the confines of village life, did not provide a convincing model of political and social organization for countries asserting their participation in the race for modernization. For this reason, more lucid persons involved in discussions of "Inca socialism" in Peru generally concluded that pre-Colombian "socialism" had little to do with that modern socialism defined by Lenin as "democracy plus electricity."

The combination of a certain number of indigenous and local elements —what Robert Redfield would call "folk culture"[6]—with modern elements, ideas emanating from Paris, London, or New York, inevitably rendered the *indigenista* ideology highly unstable. The Latin American intellectuals of the 1920's vigorously affirmed the need for an original synthesis. This synthesis, however, already precarious, was threatened even more by certain characteristics of the hispanic tradition, which, in spite of the *indigenista* group's railings against Spanish colonial rule, continued to serve as the medium making possible a familiarity with European and North American ideas.

It is difficult to appreciate the contribution of the Spanish cultural tradition to the intellectual life of Latin America. Distrust of Spain, denunciation of the colonial administration's crimes, and condemnation of clerical obscurantism are themes that recur frequently in *indigenista,* Mexican or Peruvian, literature. Except during the Second Spanish Republic, *los hispanizantes,* those who claimed as a point of reference the traditional hispanic culture, generally identified themselves as conservatives. However, the vehicle of traditional Spanish culture was more important than the symbolism of ideological affiliations. During the whole of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, Spain had no great philosophical systems, no original social or political doctrines, and no important technological or scientific innovations to export. This did not mean that intellectual life in Spain was dead. Its development, however, proceeded along the lines of the polemic and the essay (perhaps even in the academic storing of knowledge), but not by research procedures and theoretical analysis.

Frenchmen writing about politics, in particular the French of the eighteenth century, are considered to be very prone to generalization; Tocqueville pointed out the consequences of this tendency toward abstraction

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and deduction on the part of the French intellectual. The Spanish of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cultivated the essay; Unamuno and Ortega excelled in the use of this form. What the essay has in common with the French "politics of literature" is a basic lack of concern for facts and experience. The difference, however, is that while the French claim to deduce and prove, the Spanish writers willingly assume the role of visionary or magician, multiplying mirror tricks and spotlight effects endlessly, resorting to all the artifices of a baroque affectedness.

One should add to the preceding observations the fundamentally *innerweltlich* orientation of the Latin American intellectual. He is generally uninterested in pure learning or theoretical knowledge. This is demonstrable in many ways. Thus, for example, a comparison of the Latin American crisis of the 1920's, which centered on the search for identity, and the ways in which Europe came to modernity in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries will show the difference. All the questions so passionately examined by Erasmus as well as Voltaire—the relations between positive thought, tradition, and faith; the capacity of Reason to organize human society according to its own criteria; the limits imposed on Reason by tradition and the past—were barely considered by Latin American intellectuals, and if considered, only in the most conventional manner. Their interest focused almost exclusively on problems such as dependence and national identity, leading them to question the social mission of the intellectual, rather than the critical function of intelligence.

It is interesting to compare this pragmatic orientation with the constant weakness of the mystical element in Latin American Catholicism. The secular or regular church has remained strictly ritualistic until recent times. Today, however, it seems that the church is abandoning its traditionalism to launch itself into revolutionary activism. The transition to modernity, for clergy as well as laymen, seems to have been accomplished less through the development of critical thought than through an intense feeling of the urgency of an inevitable *compromiso* (commitment).

The possibilities of realizing this *compromiso* depend on the relation between the Latin American intellectual and the various institutions in which he participates. It is for this reason that an analysis of the Latin American student movement is so essential. Generally speaking, the intellectual associates with (1) learned societies or academies; (2) institutions of teaching and research (universities, for example); (3) public and private organizations in which he has a professional role; (4) political organizations, political parties, political movements. The effectiveness of the intellectual's participation in such groups depends on the nature of his attachment to them, and the help such organizations give him in realizing his objectives. For example, the role of the intellectual will differ greatly according to whether he can maintain active communication and systematic discussions with his colleagues or whether he is condemned to solitude by

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the narrowness, hostility, or inconsistency of his social environment. As a last resort, the intellectual may feel impelled to search outside of—perhaps even in opposition to—his own social group for people with whom he may converse, persons who were not formed in the same disciplines as he was, but whose energies he will seek to capture to accomplish his mission. He will turn to the youth, workers, peasants.

I

The most positive feature of empirical sociology is its ability to rid us of preconceived ideas. There are two particularly strongly-held stereotypes of the Latin American intellectual. On the one hand, he is represented as a guerrilla-obsessed, revolution-loving romantic; on the other, he is described as a lover of the past, forever hostile to technical progress and the modern organization of industrial societies. As with all stereotypes, these do hold an element of truth. Indeed, if one questions Latin American students, particularly those in sociology, one finds that they locate themselves on a scale of radicalism as "very much to the left." However, if one takes the trouble, as Glaucio Soares did, for instance, to separate the social science students from others—medical students, law students, students of agronomy—one finds that these last groups situate themselves at lower levels of radicalism. If one seeks to further the analysis by studying the motivations of social science students, one discovers that although 30 per cent of the students of the University of Colombia's sociology department chose this discipline out of a desire to change society, 50 per cent of the students chose sociology in preparation for a professional career—which may be unrealistic, but it does not imply an exclusively or even primarily ideological motivation, at least at first sight.

In that respect, Gloria Cucullu's research on the values held by intellectuals is quite revealing. Her study, conducted in Argentina, consists of two samples, the first randomly selected among people in the literary field, the second composed of those individuals selected by the first sample as the most distinguished literary personalities.[7] Three open-ended questions were asked of this intellectual elite. The first concerned the connotations associated with the following terms: industrialization, mechanization, and technology. The second solicited the respondent's opinion on the increasing interest among students in technical and scientific careers. The third evoked the effects of accelerated industrialization on the future of the writer and his public. The answers of both sample populations to each of the above questions were favorable to the stereotypes of industrial society. In the first sample, favorable associations outweighed unfavorable ones by 47 per cent, in the second by 55 per cent; negative associations occurred among 24 per cent in the first sample and 20 per cent in the second. For example, 29 per cent and 34 per cent (first and second samples, respectively) con-

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sidered industrialization as "progress"; only 10 per cent and 3 per cent spoke of "standardization," "massification," or "mechanization." Gloria Cucullu left an option open to those who would rather hold a middle-of-the-road position, such as the following: industrialization is like Aesop's tongue, the very best or worst of things. Only 16 per cent of the respondents chose this cautious answer. The sum of favorable responses to the second question was even greater than for the first. Sixty-one and 62 per cent of those questioned approved the technological and scientific orientation of studies. The development of scientific and technical studies is of course a prerequisite to a more general development. Yet the difference between the two samples is particularly marked in reference to this point; 37 per cent of the literary personalities held this opinion, as against only 25 per cent of the first sample. On the last question, concerning the future of literature in an industrial society, the great majority of literary notables were optimistic (58 per cent). This optimism was somewhat less evident in the first sample (44 per cent), yet pessimistic reactions were only 15 per cent and 12 per cent respectively.

One must not attempt to draw more conclusions from these data than warranted. The answers given do not guarantee that the subjects' conceptions of industrial society are realistic. In addition, the second question is quite surprising: It would seem, at first sight, that it is not the growth of technological and scientific establishments which is problematic in Argentina, but rather the rapid increase in the number of literary persons. The worth of Gloria Cucullu's study lies in its suggestion that we not content ourselves with the stereotypes of the Latin American intellectual's persistent past-loving and humanist orientations.

The work of Frank Bonilla reveals the special difficulties of the intellectual's situation, especially a remarkable article in which he demonstrated that intellectuals could not be clearly distinguished from professionals (or more generally, from the urban upper-middle class), whether one considered social origin, career profile, possibilities of promotion and mobility, or opinions and attitudes.[8] Bonilla encountered a major methodological problem in the rigorous identification of intellectuals. Does this qualification apply indiscriminately to all persons having either undertaken or completed certain studies? Or should it be reserved for those who so identify themselves? Finally, assuming that it is possible to delimit a group whose existence is affirmed by both its members and outside observers—by combining purely objective facts, such as level of studies and length of training, and subjective data, such as attitudes and opinions—the coherence of this group and the power it can dispose of in relation to other groups must yet be determined.

Using data from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil, Bonilla shows the extent to which the intellectual (self-identified or objectively recognized) resembles the other professional group closest to him on the scale of social

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stratification. Bonilla took care to assess his comparisons at all levels of the social scale. He thus extends the range of his observations (which include the relatively low categories of intermediate technicians) and also avoids conferring elite status on all intellectuals merely on principle. His conclusions are thereby far more pertinent, as they apply to all categories of intellectuals, regardless of hierarchical position, and because of the rigorous correspondence established between the intellectuals and their professional homologues: same origin (rising urban middle class), little difference in years of schooling and revenue, same class identification. The score does not differ greatly for a doctor or a laboratory researcher, a student leader or an intermediate executive in a firm. In any case, the difference in score is less between intellectual and professional of the same level than between intellectual and intellectual, professional and professional of different levels. What is even more remarkable is that both intellectual and professional express the same attitude toward commonly-held values (the degree of legitimate competition in a good society, the degree of confidence in industrial society, the degree of adherence to one's nationality).

I shall not undertake a thorough examination of the relationship between intellectuals and professionals, even though this relationship constitutes one of the most important elements in studying not only industrialized countries, but also developing countries. The professionalization process combines in a very complex way a certain number of partial trends: a high level of qualifications (consequently a considerable initial investment), continual adaptation, retraining of the professional in an increasingly demanding organizational framework, frequent loyalty conflicts between the organization's hierarchy and the authorities in the profession. The result of this process is a certain reconciliation of intellectuals and professionals, and at the same time a specialization of each group according to different functions, even if this means that the relations and contacts are tighter and more continuous. It is thus not very surprising that Bonilla should find marked similarities among researchers, industrial executives, and university professors, since all in all these categories belong to the same body, or to the same population, if only because of common education and the increasing importance given to intellectual training for professionals.

What is more surprising, however, is the conformity Bonilla notices among intellectuals. "The intellectuals I have studied reveal, behind a façade of radicalism and nonparticipation, a profound adherence to middle-class values, and seem to have been conditioned by bourgeois sentimentality as to appropriate behavior and the worth of a good reputation." Bonilla thus not only shows the relationships between professionals and intellectuals, but also maintains that both are "petit bourgeois."

I would agree, but with certain reservations. The so-called "bourgeois" values do not constitute a coherent and complete ethical system, such as that of the Puritans, or even that of the French petit bourgeois at the end

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of the nineteenth century. Bonilla gives three indicators of conservatism which describe the "attitudes of several Latin American professionals." The first concerns adherence to Catholicism, which is very strong, since 70 per cent of the medical students, 75 per cent of the students in economics, and 42 per cent of those in the sciences[9] claim to be practicing Catholics. The second indicator concerns the subject's optimism and satisfaction, both of which are also high (and without the variations found in relation to religious practice, conspicuous among students in the sciences). The third indicator measures the degree of satisfaction attained through the subjects' participation in their everyday activities. The smallest percentages of satisfaction are revealed by the medical students; this would seem to be in accord with the marked reticence of this group concerning the conditions of competition.

Can conservatism be presumed on the basis of the practice of Catholicism, the subject's optimism as to his private life and future, and his satisfaction with his chosen career and profession? Bonilla does not speak of "conservatism," but rather of adherence to "petit bourgeois" values. These values do not apply merely to professional life; they also refer to the subject's attitude toward his home life, his obligations toward his wife and children, his concept of what is desirable in this area. Obviously, similar expectations bring the intellectual and professional closer together.

Is conservatism, or even cultural authoritarianism (in other words, a more or less implicit adherence to common values, in the most rigid and constrained way), associated with political conservatism? Cultural conservatism, or even authoritarianism, is quite evident in Bonilla's data, especially in certain political answers. Of the Mexican intellectuals questioned, 64 per cent stated that the popular majority cannot influence the course of the country's affairs. (Only 15 per cent of the members of parliament replied similarly.) The interpretation of this answer is ambiguous, however, so long as one cannot determine whether the respondent considers such a situation "normal" or "scandalous." When asked which obstacles seem to prevent national unity, between 82 and 88 per cent of the subjects cited the "absence of civic culture among the masses." This absence, considered a "cause of underdevelopment," is mentioned by all categories questioned and is placed before "the pressure of foreign governments," which comes immediately after "the operations of international monopolies," and "the egoism of national land-owners and businessmen." According to available data, the extent of national identification or nationalism is remarkably strong; if one adds this element to the above observations, the over-all picture becomes quite clear: distrust of those who govern, contemptuous condescension toward the "uncultured masses," a distinct though somewhat weaker tendency to project the blame for underdevelopment on foreign capitalism and local interest.

But these "petit bourgeois" are also political radicals; they favor vast

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property transfers, extension of state control over the economy, nationalization, and state planning; they express their distrust of imperialism and the ruling classes. It seems, then, that there is in fact consensus regarding the different points enumerated above, and moreover, that it exists more intensely among intellectuals *stricto sensu*, particularly among students, than among professionals. The coherence of this consensus, however, is another matter, and we shall later explain why, lacking strictly logical coherence, it tends to be formulated in paroxysmic terms, at the end of a radicalizing process.

Suffice it to say for the moment that though these petit bourgeois intellectuals give all the appearances of being political radicals, they are cultural conservatives (anti-imperialists and at the same time authoritarian and elitist). Two facts explain this disjunction. First, it must be remembered that radical criticism in the realm of ethics, religion, and morals was probably not as pervasive in Latin American societies as it was in France and the United States. I find the absence of such a radical tradition indicated in the missionary style of political preaching in Latin America, the insistence on the *compromiso*, the suffocating moralism of the most radical movements—as in the Cuban example—and the failure, at least until now, of hippie-type movements. The astonishingly large proportion of students, professionals, or intellectual radicals who declare themselves practicing Catholics and, in general, the adherence to middle-class values by people *de avazanda* themselves underscore the persistence of conventional morality.

Second, it must be understood that there is no true conservative tradition in South America. Of course, vested interests ardently defend themselves, but they have never succeeded, or even tried to succeed, in legitimizing their action or presence. It is true that toward the end of the nineteenth century, civilian governments (called *civilistas* in Peru until President Leguia's second term) established almost everywhere a sort of democratic legitimacy, which although limited and very constrained, assured the reign of vested interests, and also the presence of well-bred people in parliament, the ministries, and even the presidency. But that which Jorge Basadre calls the *Republica aristocratia* belongs to the past. Except for that period, Latin American conservatism has assumed essentially two political forms, one which we shall call, as does the Venezuelan Valenilla Lanz, "democratic Caesarism"; the other I propose to call "cynical economicizing" (not intended pejoratively). According to democratic Caesarism, one's only resort in societies constantly threatened by dissolution is to call on a strong leader. Caesar, whether he be called Porfirio Diaz or Juan Vicente Gomez, plays the part of a democrat, and in general does not respect the traditions entrusted him. In addition, to the extent that the conservative leaders are generally cultivated and cosmopolitan, they can hardly be pleased by the governments which shut down newspapers and behave badly toward foreigners, who usually end up in exile. Unlike liberal poli-

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ticians whose weakness engenders disorder, Caesar asserts his ability to assure, first, personal security, then the safety of goods, then common prosperity. He encourages the initiatives of both foreigners and national capitalists.

The cynical type also emphasizes the need to produce wealth, but he distrusts Caesar as he would any formidable demagogue. His aim is the preservation of the economic sphere from the improvisations of politicians, the whims of the "man on horseback," and the pressures of the "blind masses." The clever maneuvers of the cynic are rarely very effective today. As to the "man on horseback," he no longer wishes to serve as the "oligarchy's watchdog," an expression well known among the Peruvian military.[10]

We are thus confronted with two facts: the weakness of conservatism as a political ideology and the strength of conservative attitudes and culture. We must therefore resolve the paradox arising from a juxtaposition of an authoritarian cultural background with a political orientation that is far more radical than conservative, and at the limit is frankly activist.

First, let us recall that only a minority of Latin American intellectuals (or intellectuals of other nationalities) are political activists. This point is particularly well established with regard to students. Only a minority of them participate in political organizations, be it as sympathizers, members, or leaders. Similar results show up when the observer examines student participation in the administration of jointly governed universities. Everyone knows that the level of electoral participation is quite low, varying between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of those registered.[11] Although, to my knowledge, there is little data available on the political commitment of professionals, I would tend to believe that the two propositions confirmed in the case of students—low partisan participation and low corporate participation—would be equally true. In considering whether these two types of participation are linked, we find that students who are politically motivated and active are also those who participate as candidates or delegates in the Department or University Councils. Finally, it would be interesting to determine if (as I believe, even in the absence of evidence) the most politically engaged professionals are to be found among those who qualify themselves as intellectuals.

To understand the nature of activism, it is essential to differentiate between activism and extremism. All those who are "engaged" are not necessarily rabid; all politically active Latin American intellectuals are not communists, Trotskyites, Castroists, or Maoists. The term "extremist" includes a series of attitudes of which at least two must be specified here. On the one hand there is an extremism of nihilistic inspiration, which wantonly exaggerates the severity of its choices; on the other hand, there is an extremism which feels compelled willy nilly to "go to the limit" without experiencing the exquisite sensation which envelops the nihilist facing

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the desired end—annihilation of the other and of self. A "reformer" may be induced to advocate extremely drastic policies he had not initially planned to support, or that he would even have disapproved of or condemned. The radical intellectual can be led into a situation in which he loses control of an action undertaken without having properly estimated his own capacities and with little knowledge of the world in which he attempts to function. Thus, if certain "committed" become "rabid," it could be more the result of repeated failures than a deliberate choice. In the end, we can say that one *suffers extremism* as a fatality, rather than *choosing it* as a destiny.

This kind of proposition is obviously very difficult to prove. We could attempt to do so only if a great deal of autobiographical material were available. Personal information on guerrilla fighters would be most valuable for this task. But when we look at the material actually available—the research on students—we realize the scarcity and poverty of our information. Yet, these studies do reveal the Latin American intellectual's extreme ambivalence in relation to his society.

Students who are politically engaged are almost all progressive; what is striking is the diversity, the rivalry among the parties or factions which they support. Many could not possibly be labeled extremist. In the Peruvian university elections, until the military coup d'etat of 1968, the *aprista* federation of students sometimes won, and even when beaten by a coalition formed of all its opponents, it constituted an important minority, along with the communist groups of various doctrines, the Christian-Democrats, and the "independents." The Christian-Democratic groups are well entrenched in the Chilean and Venezuelan universities. However, it is important to realize that this partisan pluralism coexists with an ideological consensus, which is readily conducive to situations of unanimity (for instance, against the "imperialist threat"), particularly if the explosive potential is exploited by clever manipulators.

We have already noted that Latin American professionals agree on the causes of the underdevelopment of their country. A study comparing answers given by a sample of Chilean students[12] belonging to two different groups, Christian-Democrats and the Popular Front (FRAP), discloses a similarly remarkable convergence on interpretations of the Chilean situation, its causes and its remedies. Referring to a list of the most important issues relevant to Chile today, 20 per cent of the Christian-Democratic students and 20 per cent of the FRAP students cite "inequality of opportunity"; 23 per cent of FRAP students and 37 per cent of the Christian-Democratic students point out the "monopoly of the upper classes." The most significant difference is revealed in two responses: (1) "imperialism's" baneful role is mentioned by only 2 per cent of the Christian-Democrats, whereas 29 per cent of the *frapistas* assert this; (2) the "necessity of a social revolution" is acknowledged by 11 per cent of the *frapistas* and by only 4 per

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cent of the Christian-Democrats. Let us add, though, that on the question concerning the veto which could nullify a party's victory at the polls (Must the party which has won the elections, regardless of which party it is, be allowed to assume power?), both *frapistas* and Christian-Democrats agree to accept the majority's decision. Furthermore, the Christian-Democrats are more numerous in recognizing this rule of the democratic game: 73 per cent as against 63 per cent of the *frapistas*.

It is unwise to generalize from this Chilean data without due precaution. For instance, respect of the majority is much less prevalent in a country like Peru, where the military has more than once annulled electoral results it disliked, with little resistance or opposition from civilians in general, or from the intellectuals among them. However, from the data collected by Myron Glazer, it is possible to distinguish among Latin American intellectuals the grounds for consensus as well as the outlines of several important cleavages. They more or less agree on the necessity of development, "structural" reforms, the egoism of the privileged, the masses' passivity and lack of culture, and the perversity of foreign interests. Cleavage revolves around two issues: the resources and the identity of the group—party or institution—on which devolves the historical responsibility of accomplishing change.

For example, among the Chilean students studied by Glazer, *frapistas* and Christian-Democrats seem divided on the desirable extent of reforms: Should they be "moderate," "considerable," or "structural"? The *frapistas* are more structuralist than the Christian-Democrats. In all probability, the problem of the extent of reform is linked to that of its implementation. Those who believe in "revolution in liberty," to use Eduard Frei's expression, do indeed intend to "change the structures," but they believe that this change should come about according to a rate and procedure fixed by law, that is to say, under circumstances whose legitimacy cannot be challenged by those who stand to lose because of the change. On the second divisive issue—which party leader, which group appears best qualified to advance "structural reforms" or to "make the revolution"—this question, which implies partisan sympathies and loyalties, evidently varies in form according to the time and place. But one may wonder—though this hypothesis is by no means proved—if this search for those most capable of "making the revolution" does not become progressively more radical as the deceptions and errors accumulate and intensify.

The Latin American intellectual's "extremism" should be examined from this angle. If we are to assess the problem correctly, we must take into account the existence of two kinds of consensus: one cultural—in the sense of fundamental common values—characterized by a high degree of conservatism if not authoritarianism; the other political, concerning those problems which Latin American societies in their present state of development must deal with, and find solutions for, if they are to be brought out

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of their present crisis. Conservatism or cultural authoritarianism, radicalism or political progressivism—these theoretically define independent attitudes; yet, they seem to be associated, with at least moderate intensity, by most subjects, though often in an unstable and ambiguous way.

II

I suggest that we call "activism" that very unstable combination which is first perceived as a most ambitious project, "integral" as the Latin Americans say, and yet at the same time incapable of assuring its full realization. In the following pages, I shall attempt to connect the successive forms of activism to the evolution of the relation between professional and intellectual, and consider the extent to which the intellectual has entered the administrative and political systems.

The most obvious and naïve form of intellectual activism is what one could call the Latin American variety of "pulpit idealism,"[13] or, to use a more current expression, "arielism." The following remarks are borrowed from Rodó,[14] though I do not propose to describe fully the Uruguayan *Pensador*. I consider him a model, a type. The idea of his work that one may infer from the following may seem to some more of a caricature than a portrait. We know that Rodó contrasts the utilitarianism he attributes to the North Americans—whose technical mastery he admires, but whose "spirit of possession and acquisition" he condemns—with devotion to the values of Beauty and Truth. The manner in which he opposes "Society" and "City" is as follows: "The society organized once and for all, which limits its project of civilization to elements of material prosperity, and its idea of justice to equitable redistribution between partners, will not manage to make the cities it inhabits anything other than beehives or anthills. But the *City* is great in the sense that its days are more than the invariable repetition of a same echo . . . that in it something exists which rises up over the crowd, when among the lights burning in its night, there is also the lamp which comforts the solitude of him who watches, kept alert by his thoughts, and in whose spirit begins the formation of the IDEA which shall burst forth under tomorrow's sun, transformed into a cry which summons and a force which guides souls."

Rodó's vocabulary—the light, the lamp, the sun, tomorrow, the cry, the force, the anxiety—is obsolescent. But regardless of how ridiculous the *Pensador* may seem in our day and age, even to many Latin American intellectuals, his message deserves attention, not only because of his influence on generations formed at the time of the Córdoba Manifesto, and during the crisis that followed, but also because of the permanence of certain arielist themes which even today have not lost all their vigor. Is the opposition between city and society a replica of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* opposition? In any case, this opposition includes a condemnation of industrial

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society, especially the Anglo-Saxon variety, echoes of which one could easily find today among revolutionaries as well as among "humanists" of Christian inspiration. We must however add that Ariel's idealism, the indifference or contempt for technical matters and industry, has been vigorously attacked by professors and other writers, who also bear the title "intellectual."

Rodó sees the *Pensador*'s role as a mission of censorship and denunciation; he is awarded the vocation of being the archetype. The function of censor proceeds in the name of values that have been slighted; it is less a social criticism than a moral protest. The *Pensador* thus comes to conceive of his action on society not as a series of piecemeal interventions, but as an "integral" reform, a total change, which has all the traits of a philosophical conversion. The methods of this action are essentially pedagogic, if we assume this term to mean that the master presents himself as the model and that his sole presence on the ramparts is like a flame whose light will suffice to keep alert the spirit of the citizens.

The insistence on the Socratic relationship between "master and disciple" is clearly linked to the aristocratic aura of *arielismo:* "As the multitude passes by, I observe that though it does not look up at the sky, the sky watches it. Something from on high descends upon the masses, indifferent and obscure as the furrowed earth. The fluttering of the stars resembles somehow the motion of the sower's hand." According to the arielist conception, political action consists essentially of preaching. And it so happens that the supreme preacher is the university professor. This coincidence, this convergence of two otherwise independent elements in the same role deserves attention. Rodó's *Pensador* borrows much from the Germanic *Denker:* the same concern with vast panoramas, what today we would call "totalizations," the same combination of idealism and aristocratic tendencies, more or less reconciled within the educational mission. In Germany, however, where the thinker is also a professor, the pulpit is more than just a tribune. The professor is specialized in a given field, and the thinkers' aristocratic tendency to separate themselves from that which is common is reinforced by the esoteric style of the "Seminar," in which the disciples gather around the master, who reserves for them alone the rare elixir of his science. No such thing existed in the Latin American universities at the end of the last century, since intellectual specialization was minimal. The professors' essential activity was to give a veneer of general culture to future professionals in law and medicine. The "Thinker" was a sort of specialist in generalities, who, in an effort to consolidate his prestige, willingly resorted to all the seductive potential of "inspired" style.

Anxiety and curiosity found their expression in the rhetorical and brilliant evocation of ideas rather than in empirical research or through methodical discourse with experts of a life specialty. It is possible, however, that in the Latin American societies of the late 1900's, the university, because

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it still had an almost religious prestige—well indicated by the Spanish word *claustro*—was the only refuge where a certain kind of abstraction (the "generalities" of the French) could be discussed. The fusion within the *Pensador*'s role of a "generalizing" orientation (the *Pensador* is able to recognize Good, Beauty, and Ugliness, condemn or exalt civilizations) and of an aristocratic orientation (the *Pensador* is the only one capable of fulfilling this sovereign office and is responsible for his message only before History) would thus be explained.

The dark legend woven around the pre-Córdoba universities does not allow us to discern the ideological ferment which probably made many of them far more animated than is generally admitted today. The students there were not the only source of anxiety; the tremor perceptible at the beginning of the twentieth century was not the only omen heralding the confrontations and troubles that were to come. Almost everywhere around 1910, professors—some of whom were truly remarkable[15]—came into the universities with "new ideas." Most were influenced by arielist thought, some by pragmatism of the Anglo-Saxon variety.

Let us not disparage too quickly the Latin American version of pulpit idealism. Rather, let us attempt to understand how the concept of the *Pensador* as *vates* led to a new definition of the relation between the intellectual and politics. I shall not attempt to describe the movement which, while originating in Córdoba, had its most remarkable consequences outside the Argentine, and attained cultural significance for the whole of Latin America. The arielist hue is apparent in the Córdoban Students' Manifesto: "Youth lives in constant search of heroism. It is disinterested, it is pure. It has not yet had the time to become corrupt. It never errs in the choice of its own masters." Youth is now identified with those values whose defense Rodó had entrusted to the *Pensador*. Youth is elevated to the dignity of Ariel; it becomes a collective *Pensador*.

We should dwell a moment upon this metamorphosis, for which a precedent can be found in the romantic exaltation of the student during the nineteenth century. The lectures given by Jules Michelet at the Collége de France[16] between December 1847 and April 1848 evoked some of the essential themes of the Argentine Students' Manifesto of 1918: There was an important difference; Michelet was not a youth, but a visionary addressing young people. He said, "You are, as it were, at the center of the times . . . You relate more easily to the various classes, through sympathy, or at least benevolence. You are at the center of everything, at the hub of things. You have, in more than one way, the custody of unity, and with this custody, the duty to fortify, extend, and establish this unity which has as yet but little progressed."[17] According to Michelet, the student was a link between the past and the present, a mediator between the different social classes. In the role Michelet assigned youth, as in the role the Córdoban youth assigned itself, the common element was a value-carrying role as

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harbinger of modernity as well as the mediator between the future and the past, between the still "barbaric" masses (to use Michelet's term) and the socially and culturally well-endowed elites. The romantic idealization of the European student of 1848 and the Latin American student of the 1920's has a great many causes, only some of which are identical.

In both cases, the phenomenon occurs at a time when the social actors, if not the most active and the most immediately affected by the process, are at least those most able to reflect upon it, give a meaning to it, and in general foresee some of its consequences; in short, those individuals most preoccupied with the aftermath of industrialization and urbanization, with the resulting changes in work and life styles, are recruited from school youth, because on the one hand, their "capacities"[18] supposedly enable them to assume the greatest responsibilities, and on the other, as a result of their youth, they are not guilty of the errors and egoisms of the past, are unsoiled by compromises with those in power, and are open to all alliances with the "vital forces" pushed aside for so long by the oligarchies.

The ethereal branch of Ariel is embodied in the student. This embodiment of spirit in a social movement, although inconclusive, can perhaps best be studied in Peru between 1919 and 1931, because during the 1920's university life and the beginnings of mass-party organization met and intersected, though the modern forms of mass politics did not break through. I shall mention only three of the most characteristic aspects of the Peruvian process, which I analyze further in a study of the formative years of Apra[19]; relevance goes far beyond the Peruvian case. The first problem encountered by the movement during its formation concerned its capacity to reform the university and to become the driving force of the reformed university. This attempt failed quite rapidly, not only because of resistance on the part of the old university oligarchies and the distrust of the political authorities, but also because of difficulties inherent in the "reformist" project. The reformers tried to make of the university a center of ferment and discussion, a center of popular education open to all without restrictions or qualifications, a research center of the highest quality—in short, a combination of Spanish Ateneo, Socratic-Platonic academy, German seminar, and, of course, a revolutionary thought and action group. The movement, totally incapable of reforming the university from within, tried from without to create a counteruniversity, called a "popular university," which lasted only a few years.

The movement continued to claim "revolutionary capacity," but this had to be proved. This is the most serious problem that Haya de la Torre and then Mariategui had to deal with. Both of them, although by different methods, sought to establish a working solidarity between intellectuals and workers. Since the school youth organized itself as the "vanguard of the masses," it could not just speak for the masses, it also had to communicate with them, or at least have some contact with them. This was particularly

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difficult in countries such as Peru, composed of a great majority of Indian peasants and a very small urban proletariat. The *indigenista* movement then seems to have been an attempt by intellectuals to assert their own identity through rediscovery of the historical continuity and geographical extension of the popular tradition. The famous *pueblo continente* or Indo-America myth is an illustration of this pathetic effort to find oneself by meeting others. If one wishes to follow the Peruvian movement's course to the end, one must find out how, after the university reform adventure, the attempt to establish an alliance with the manual worker and the Indians eventually resulted in the constitution of a populist party that, despite many setbacks, still exists today.

Regardless of the ambiguity that might result from applying the same term to the Mexican regime, the Peruvian *aprista* party, as well as the Perónist movements, I believe it is possible to speak of "populist" movements, if the term is taken to mean the combination of a certain number of original orientations: (1) a dose of "anti-imperialism," especially in relation to the United States; (2) a concept of autonomous development, *hacia adentro;* (3) a demand for the "integral" participation of those social forces which the traditional oligarchic governments had held back; (4) a preference for coalitions or "fronts" rather than for "class" action in the Marxist-Leninist sense. These items form but an outline, and the "extended participation" as understood by Haya in 1930 differs from the conception held by Perón in 1943; the *hacia adentro* development generally indicates a policy of import substitution, but the expression may also be applied to more or less successful, and more or less methodical, attempts at autarchic planning. Whatever the diversity of the positions covered by each item mentioned, whatever the problems involved in harmonizing these different orientations at the operational level of concrete policies, they are organized around the rejection of "oligarchic power" and "dependence on imperialism"; they affirm and claim an autonomous capacity of development.

The intellectuals' situation during the period of predominantly populist orientations was not always easy. One need only mention the brutal interventions of Perónist authorities in the press and in university life. The intellectual atmosphere was extremely strained in Peru between 1945 and 1948, when an uninterrupted succession of skirmishes and confrontations occurred, during which time the *apristas* intellectuals were constantly opposed to all other sectors of the intellectual community who were leagued against Haya de la Torre's party. If one attempts to sift from the mass of arguments and accusations the reasons for the hostility between the populist intellectuals and all other groups of the intelligentsia, one retains several indefinitely repeated themes which criticize populism both as a method of action and as a style of thought.

The first criticism I shall consider later. The second refers to a certain rhetorical redundancy, a certain idealistic verbosity, which seems even more

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vulnerable given the intellectual intentions and claims of the populist movement. When Colonel Perón disguised himself as the *Pensador,* his chances of being taken seriously were slim. But Haya de la Torre—great orator and well-known essayist—was not much more convincing when, imagining himself following in Einstein's footsteps, he commented on *el espacio-tiempo historico.* Haya and the intellectuals of his generation were extremely critical of Rodó, arguing against his unrealistic intellectualism. Yet they were also fond of generalities; they were thoroughly satisfied with an "integral" vision, and despite their declarations on the need for the elaboration of scientific politics, their frames of reference remained essentially literary.

Meanwhile, Ariel pursued his metamorphoses. He had yet to add to all his ambitions that of vying with Prometheus. Even if until about 1950 the *tecnificación* theme of government by experts and scientific policies was composed mainly of rhetorical developments—with the notable exception of the Mexican *cientificos*—it soon became far more important, particularly given the initial disdain of pulpit idealism for technical matters. The North American—who, according to Rodó, was technical civilization's most finished product—lived for the immediate reality, for the present, and subordinated all his activity to the egoism of personal and collective welfare. However, this condemnation was in truth already weakened, with the realization that technology—in the area of production as well as that of organization and control of social relations—was a condition of progress. Would it not suffice to subordinate technology to an ideal, for it to acquire a value (derived evidently, but still valid)? This issue had been raised by the Mexican positivists of the 1880's, when they asked whether it was not best for them, given their ideal, to support an authoritarian government—that of don Porfirio—which, they argued, was the only one capable of undertaking the accelerated modernization of their country.

They were mockingly called *cientificos* and the name stuck. It illustrates well the conviction that the alliance of power and science is the basis for political legitimacy—a theme recurring frequently among Latin American intellectuals and one substantially distinct from the concept which founds democratic legitimacy on civility. In order to fully comprehend the *cientificos* position, one must first determine with which science they were in fact affiliated. During the 1880's, economics and sociology were not, as they are today, applied sciences. The *cientificos* were schooled either in law or technical engineering, and in both cases steeped in a philosophy more or less derived from the French positivist conceptions of societal development. It is difficult to assess the role assumed by the *cientificos* in the development of Mexico because it evolved mainly during the government of don Porfirio and because the *cientificos* claims as against their real achievements, and the "dark legend" spread by their opponents, render a balanced appraisal of their role impossible. We can say that they were advisers, *asesores,* who tried more or less efficiently to promote a certain number of

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progressive reforms in the areas of education, judicial and administrative organization, and public works.

However, it must be pointed out that most were not true civil servants, but "part-time advisers," who, while keeping their private concerns in their *bufetes,* dedicated a part of their time to advising the administration. They were involved in the technical preparation of laws and in the elaboration of major developmental projects, as well as the structural organization of roads, railroads, agricultural production, and mining. They probably acted as intermediaries and "promoters" in these different roles. In the first place, they helped spread a certain number of new ideas and techniques on organization and production that they had learned abroad. Second, they helped establish the dialogue between the federal government and foreign interests, probably the most criticized aspect of their activity. Their influence on don Porfirio and the increasingly small circle of his intimate associates should, however, not be exaggerated: the "Porfiriato" was never, even in its best moments, the *cientificos* government. In addition, it is doubtful whether they formed a homogeneous group, trying to impose themselves on other groups who shared in the management of affairs.

The *tecnificación* process, which was inevitably stopped during the period of violence and instability that marked the first twenty years of the revolutionary era in Mexico, progressed more vigorously than ever after 1945 through almost the whole of Latin America. With respect to Mexico, Raymond Vernon[20] suggests an image of the post-revolution *tecnico* that provides an important comparison with the *cientifico.* The *tecnicos* are mainly economists working for the federal government. Their situation differs from that of the *cientificos* in that they are obliged to live and work in the context of a bureaucratic organization. They are not independent professionals lending their services to the administration in an accessory and irregular fashion. Whatever their exact judicial status, it is related to that of civil servants. In addition, because of the peculiarities of the Mexican regime, they are the agents of an executive who is not only powerful but also stable, whose operation is continuous, and who is consequently able to decide and control the execution of that which has been decided. Thus, Vernon states, the *tecnicos* are not, and cannot claim to be, policy-makers, even if they are closely associated with the decisions made by politicians. While they may claim that their strength lies in their ability to prescribe a political line, in fact it lies in their ability to elaborate the technical alternatives which are submitted for decision to the political leaders.

They possess a certain fiscal or budgetary know-how which allows them to participate in the definition of major national alternatives on the level of governmental programs; they also have a more or less well-defined conception of the government's task, of the goals it proposes, and of their urgency and priority. Strictly speaking, as technicians they are more or less

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specialized and more or less competent. But the very nature of their work leads them out of the narrow field of their own technical capacity and into the consideration of the major options of national politics. They are even more so inclined if apart from their particular competence they are influenced by a certain number of generalities or ideological trends. Vernon gives a rich and detailed description of their ideology: "They are far from agreeing on all economic problems. They are separated by several doctrinal differences. A small minority is committed to the Marxist dogma . . . the others favor a mixed economy, but one in which the public sector would increase. And even among this last group, large differences subsist as to policies of intervention. And yet, they do have a common ideology."[21]

This ideology is evidently related to the populist trend. Industrialization, agrarian reform, lessening of dependence on imperialism—this is a language which can be understood by an *aprista* of the 1930's, a Mexican *cientifico* of the 1950's, or any of General Velasco's *asesores* in 1971. But as these themes move progressively away from their populist origin, they undergo a sort of split into two parts, through a technocratic transposition. On the one hand, they become commonplace, and, indeed, in the early 1970's, the major populist themes are indiscriminately accepted by almost all sections of opinion. The experts become aware of the fact that there is not just one possible industrialization policy, but several, and that the lessening of dependence on the foreigner may be realized in quite different ways.

This consensus is given a certain efficiency, a certain regulatory capacity, precisely because the government for which the *tecnicos* work is relatively aware of its goals and methods. They have a double advantage in that their responsibilities are carried out in an administrative framework and under the control of political leaders. First, since the administrative machinery is discriminating and efficient, their action has predictable and attributable consequences. A certain apprenticeship thus becomes possible, which allows the accumulation, at the organizational level, of knowledge, experience, and a tradition; this assures the formation of a highly qualified team of leaders and civil servants. Second, the role of the intellectual undergoes decisive revision; the efficiency of intervention in the political order no longer seems exclusively dependent on ideological preaching or partisan commitment, but rather on the ability to cooperate in the prosaic setting of an organization where the intellectual contributes less by his inspiration and charisma than by his competence, information, and judgment. But this hypothesis is advanced with considerable hesitation. Even if this transformation in the intellectual's role is confirmed, it is to be expected—though the signs are still rare and ambiguous—that it will in all probability be the beginning of a new crisis, one more mishap in the story of Ariel.

For the *tecnificación* process is not, as suggested by the Mexican example analyzed by Vernon, limited to the advent of a responsible and qualified economic administration. In fact, the Mexican example notwithstand-

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ing, this process can lead to far greater difficulties with regard to control over a society whose development the intellectual is conceived to promote. It may be relevant to mention briefly another group of *tecnicos*, who might be called the "developmental technicians." I have had ample opportunity to observe them in Peru during the last ten years. In the intellectual area, their rise is explained by the rise of the social sciences; in the administrative domain, by the multiplication and growth of organizations charged with the realization of a certain number of developmental programs: an agrarian reform institute, *cooperación popular*, regional management, planning, and so forth.

The training received by members of these organizations is a function of the prodigious expansion of university enrollment, particularly in social science departments, from the end of the 1950's on. Theoretical and methodological tools imported from the United States and Europe were superimposed on "progressive" ideological orientations. Although this combination was quite unstable, it had the great merit of giving applied sociology and anthropology certain techniques of observation and intervention, along with vague principles justifying their use. It seems that the developmental technicians in Peru have generally been able to find their niche within the political system, which in the end was almost as dependent on them as they were on it.

Recent Peruvian administrations, lacking tradition, and having expanded greatly since the beginning of Belaunde's presidency, recruited a highly heterogeneous group. Among them were a certain number of Belaunde's followers; personal loyalty to the president and membership in his party, or in a given faction of his party, or in one of the splinter groups more or less connected with his party, constituted the principal if not unique title of recommendation. In these developmental agencies, there were also technicians from the various ministries: Health, Agriculture, Education, Public Works. The students fresh from the university—in particular from the anthropology and sociology departments—were conspicuous in these organizations. Though they were restricted to contractual status, without guaranteed employment, they generally received higher wages than the permanent employees of the classic administrations and were often given extensive responsibilities dealing with coordination and administration, either in Lima or in the field. It is not surprising that such tasks, assumed by the "generalists," often youthful, who had full liberty in the way they executed their responsibilities, yielded all sorts of resentment from the "classic" bureaucrats.

The heterogeneity of recruitment and training which seems characteristic of the group of "developers" explains in part, but only in part, its fragility and its vulnerability to ideological "commitment." It is not very difficult to explain why the theme of *compromiso*, whose major interpreter is Orlando Fals Borda,[22] has once again become fashionable. After a long

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period of acceptance on the part of the social science specialists, the objectivity and neutrality extolled by empirical methodology—the precept of "axiological neutrality"—becomes almost unbearable in countries where the intellectual's mission appears less one of understanding the world than of changing it. The consequences of the exaltation of the *compromiso* for the definition of the intellectual's role must yet be examined.

It is no longer a matter of writing, or speaking from the heights of a pulpit, or even of participating in the organization—by education or indoctrination—of the popular masses. There is only one duty left: to make the revolution! I am well aware that in Spanish the word *revolución* is extremely ambiguous, since it equally designates the most commonplace military coup d'etat and the most decisive social transformation. It seems to me, though, that three attitudes which prevail through the recent analyses of Fals Borda can be discerned within the new *compromiso*, and that these are held by the most radical, the most revolutionary of Peruvian intellectuals.

First, I would underline their pessimism, or even nihilism. In truth, one is hardly surprised, this attitude colors so naturally the way in which the intellectuals judge their own societies—often called neocolonial—and imperialism, which they blame for the state of underdevelopment. The intensity of the pessimism seems to vary a good deal. Though it was checked by an almost fanatical confidence in the final success of the "cause," it was very pronounced, for example, in the 1930's among Peruvian intellectuals committed to the *aprista* party, which was persecuted at the time; it was probably less intense during the postwar years. Even if the democratic interlude in Peru lasted only from 1945 to 1948, even if the *aprista* party was again obliged to descend into the catacombs of clandestinity, hope still existed for the possibility of development, or at least of change. And this hope was strengthened greatly at the beginning of the 1960's by the Alliance for Progress. Although American imperialism was still perceived and denounced as inherently perverse, the Alliance, through various programs, provided assistance in the areas of education, health, housing, and regional planning, which benefited directly (through jobs), and indirectly (through foreign posts, periods of instruction, retraining) the early developmental technicians. The outlook was not completely bleak: One felt something could be done.

This relative euphoria died down noticeably from about 1965 on, for multiple and even contradictory reasons, both local and international. The failure of the Alliance for Progress was not the only factor involved; the failure of Castroism also added to the depressive effect. Increasingly pronounced and widespread skepticism toward the possibilities of industrialization and the modernizing capacities of the "national bourgeoisie" was one of the manifestations of this pessimism. In the populist ideologies, condemnation of capitalism and imperialism accompanied exaltation of the "national bourgeoisie," which would be given the means of expansion

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and consolidation by the popular state, what Haya de la Torre[23] calls the anti-imperialist state. Now, though, this confidence in the "national bourgeoisie" is gradually disappearing,[24] while at the same time confidence in reformism and the worth of formal democracy declines. The Latin American economists, on their side, grow increasingly more skeptical of the merits of the substitution-of-imports policy. The sociologists and political scientists insist on the *total* dependence of the local elites on the major national interests. During the 1950's, it was fashionable to expect a great deal of the "national bourgeoisie." The fashion today is to deny that it ever existed. Most of the committed intellectuals consider the ruling classes of their own countries to be only the puppets of major foreign interests. Meanwhile, the revolutionary potential of the masses seems increasingly doubtful, particularly since the decline of Castroist influence. The only organized movements seem willing to participate in the game of reformist demands or action, and the belligerency of unorganized marginal groups is quite restricted.

Disappointed by the national bourgeoisie, but also by the masses, certain revolutionary intellectuals may come to believe that the system excludes any serious possibility for change, and that it is necessary to "break the system" in order to make change possible. This conviction takes several different forms, but all have a common latent dimension, which I shall call "volitionalism." The goal of breaking the system can be expressed in the humanist rhetoric of the Christian-Democrats as "structural conditions" or "revolution in liberty." It can also be attained by what Fals Borda calls *subversion*—that is, by overthrowing the established order, through violent action, even if sporadic, and protest by the masses, even if these are incompletely mobilized. However, if breaking the system becomes the primary goal, all methods are good, guerrilla tactics as well as the "call upon the soldier."

I call "voluntaristic" the attitude underlying these different positions as they are held by the intellectuals. I consider this term to mean, as does Karl Deutsch,[25] the claim of an individual or a group to impose its own preferences, without taking into account—unless in a purely tactical way—the preferences of other groups, or the "resistance of the environment." Volitional politics combine, in varying proportions, elitism (or counter-elitism) and progressivism. If their will is that of the State, a considerable—and eventually excessive—portion of the collective resources may be put at the disposal of the bureaucratic apparatus so that the "plan" may be accomplished. The will of a "counterelite" tends first to organize into sects or small groups, hoping later to eliminate all opposition and eventually become the only party. In both cases, the collective resources are ultimately concentrated relentlessly, and controlled by a minority, self-defined as avant-garde or a "universal class," which legitimizes its action by invoking the interest of the "people" or of the "working class."

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The voluntaristic inflexibility expresses both the urgency of the *compromiso* and the impossibility of its realization through other than exceptional and drastic measures. It is unstable and fragile because of its paroxysmic character. It can take either the constraining form of hierarchical control, or the exalting form of appeal to spontaneity. The spell cast by Castro on many intellectuals is due to the combination, in both his regime and personality, of these two aspects. He is at once the orator whose breath pulverizes "imperialism" and the organizer "planning" the development of his country. The charm, though obviously weaker, exerted by the present military junta on certain Peruvian intellectuals,[26] results from the convergence of a task—a duty—and an instrument of power, which providentially occurs in order that what has long been but a dream may be realized.

An impression of increasing anomie among the intellectual group emerges from this description, progressing as the urgent need for the *compromiso* is perceived as more intense and as the choice of strategies becomes more confused. Two evidences of this anomie may be cited; first, the growing fascination with violence, exemplified by intellectuals and students not only at the university, but also in clandestine action, guerrilla warfare, and urban terrorism—the various modes of action which receive if not the blessing, at least increasingly evident toleration from the Catholic Church. There is also an extreme instability in alliances among those intellectuals involved in political life. I refer particularly to certain Peruvian intellectuals whose intricate maneuvers between an allegiance to the revolutionary movements and their actual allegiance to the military regime are so baffling. They justify their support of the junta by saying that a great number of the military became aware of the army's special responsibilities in respect to developmental policies. The concept of development set forth by the military was indeed close to that of the intellectuals because the former borrowed it from the latter, or rather because both evolved it from common sources. And yet the style, the manifestly authoritarian concept of power which the Army Command shows no signs of abandoning, does not appear to have repulsed those intellectuals who feel most attracted to the junta. They simply proclaim even more vigorously their unwavering commitment to the principles of the left.

This analysis is incomplete for obvious reasons. We are, in truth, unable to distinguish those among the developers who would qualify as the most radical, or to identify the characteristics of this group and give its numerical importance. In fact, we know neither how many are the revolutionaries—the active few—nor exactly who they are. If we take the group as a whole, however, we can determine the shift of the developers toward radical themes, which we have tried to describe and attempted to relate to the developers' experiences in the organizations where they work. In this way, our hypothesis about the importance of the formation of the intellectuals'

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ideology, their roles, and, particularly, the professional roles they perform in their society might be verified.

Does my description exaggerate the importance of the *compromiso* in Latin American intellectual life? I have shown Ariel in his pulpit, trying to organize the masses, fascinated by revolutionary violence, making his way through the labyrinth of modern bureaucracies, simultaneously client and adviser to the Prince. But I did not give him the opportunity to speak of his artistic or literary dreams. I have shown him more as lusting for power than tortured by conscience. Is he beginning to deliver himself from his didactic and moralistic bonds, as Octavio Paz suggests, to enjoy his own solitude, to perceive it not as the result of his powerlessness, but as the symbol of his destiny? I feel that this conversion may be accomplished only if certain conditions, some concerning Ariel, others concerning his society, are realized. First, the intellectual's way of relating to politics exclusively through the compulsive *compromiso* must be exorcised. Second, the values of popular culture can no longer be ignored and disdained, or experienced with remorse and obsession, as they were for a long time by the *indigenista* intellectuals. Can they not be grasped in all their richness, thereby liberating those who delve into them, bringing them fullness and development?

In setting forth this problem, I return to the issue raised in the first few pages of this essay: the cultural dualism that has characterized the Latin American intellectual's situation since Independence. The first manifestation of this dualism was the opposition between popular culture and learned culture in the nineteenth century. Even if, from World War I on, popular culture was acclaimed and glorified by the *indigenista* movement, even if the elimination of internal and external dependence was extolled by the various populisms as the paramount task, the gap subsisting between the project and its realization is still so great that the *compromiso* takes on an increasingly intense volitionalist hue. The distance between the intellectual and his society used to carry with it the shameful acceptance of those differences separating the small enlightened minority from the rest of the population. Today, this distance tends rather to lead the intellectual to proclaim the project of "suppression of dualism," yet it continues to be experienced as the impossibility of accomplishing such.

Perhaps Ariel has yet to explore the possibility of aesthetic conversion? But can he, who is so infatuated with power, become an artist; in other words, can he become reconciled with the world and with himself, trying less to transform the world than to transfigure it through the mediation of images with which he can identify? In the aesthetic realm, will we not once again come across the problems of Latin American dualism, if until now, as I suspect, aesthetic creativity has been confined entirely within the popular culture, which Ariel continues to exalt, but to which he is probably more and more a stranger?

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References

1. This interpretation has little relevance to Chile, Argentina, or Uruguay. However, it is applicable to Mexico, the Andean countries, and, with many reservations, to Brazil, of which case no mention will be made in this essay.
2. For example, in Victor Andres Belaunde's answer (*La Realidad Nacional* [Paris: Editorial "Le Livre libre," 1931]) to Mariategui's thesis in *Siete ensayos sobre la realidad peruana* (Lima: Amauta, 1928).
3. To use Albert O. Hirschman's expression in *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1963).
4. See Ciró Alegría, *El mundo es ancho y ajeno* (Mexico: Ciana, 1953), chap. 20.
5. I feel that these observations apply equally to the Mexican case.
6. For example, in *Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
7. "El stereotipo del intelectual latino-american: su relación con los cambios económicos y sociales," in Juan F. Marsal, *El intelectual lat* (Buenos Aires: Solar, 1968), pp. 73-101.
8. Frank Bonilla, "Intelectuales y liderazgo," *Aportes*, 5 (July 1967), 123-147.
9. This concerns Argentine students in the first and last years of the disciplines considered.
10. See my book *Pouvoir et société dans le Pérou contemporain* (Paris: A. Colin, 1967), part II, chap. 2.
11. Aldo Solari, *Estudiantes y politica en América Latina* (Caracas: Monte Avila, 1968), pp. 18-24.
12. M. Glazer, "Estudiantes y politica," *Aportes*, 5 (July 1967), 42-80.
13. The term "idealism" should not be understood here in the technical sense of the word, which reduces the being to a mere phenomenon and emphasizes the activity of the mind in the knowing process. I consider this term to designate the attitude, very like that developed during the same era by a French philosopher, forgotten today, Alfred Fouillée, under the name *Idées-Forces*, which credits "ideas" with the ability to assure *an sich für sich* their own realization. This attitude is compatible with historicism, since the realization of ideas is not immediate, and history acquires its meaning from such.
14. Kalman Silvert devoted chap. 7 of his *Sociedad problema* (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1962) to Rodó. The texts cited are from this chapter.
15. For Peru, one would have to mention Villaran and Deustua, who engaged in a most interesting argument on the social functions of education.
16. Jules Michelet, "L'Etudiant," *Le Seuil* (Paris, 1970).
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.
18. This is the expression used in France at the end of the July Monarchy to designate the members of liberal professions whose training should have qualified them to dispose of the franchise but whose insufficient income prevented their political participation.

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19. In a forthcoming work on the formative years of the Apra party.

20. Raymond Vernon, *The Dilemma of Mexico's Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), esp. chap. 5.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

22. See *La subversión en Colombia* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 1967) by Fals Borda, and the discussions which took place around this work, in particular the debate between Fals Borda and Solari (in *Aportes*).

23. Haya de la Torre, *El anti-imperialismo y el Apra* (Santiago: Ediciones Ercilla, 1936).

24. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrolla en América Latina* (Santiago: Ilpes, 1967).

25. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York and London: The Free Press, 1963), esp. pp. 105-111.

26. See my article in *Aportes* (April 1970), "Militares porque y para que?" and in *Mundo Nuevo* (December 1970), "Los militares peruanos mano a la obra."

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SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND RICHARD B. DOBSON

The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union

MODERN SOCIETIES—both Communist and non-Communist—face a growing dilemma posed by the fact that key institutions and their elites are increasingly dependent upon intellectuals, particularly those in universities, research institutes, and the cultural apparatus generally. Yet, the leaders in these same social units are among the major critics of the way in which the society operates, sometimes calling into question the legitimacy of the social order and its political structure. A ruling elite, even one that is conservative and anti-intellectual, cannot respond to such challenges by crushing the intellectuals, unless it is willing to incur the punitive costs which such suppression entails. As the Polish "revisionist" philosopher Leszek Kołakowski wrote while still a member of the Communist party, "the spiritual domination of any ruling class over the people . . . depends on its bonds with the intelligentsia . . . ; for the less one is capable of ruling by intellectual means, the more one must resort to the instruments of force."[1] Decades earlier, the liberal economist and sociologist Joseph Schumpeter argued that under capitalism the dominant economic class must protect the intellectuals, "however strongly disapproving" they are of them, because they cannot repress intellectual criticism without initiating a process of repression which will undermine their own freedom.[2]

The word "intellectual" is fraught with ambiguities. The meanings attached to it are diverse. In the loosest sense in which the word is used in common parlance today, intellectuals may be said to be all of those who are considered proficient in and are actively engaged in the creation, distribution, and application of culture. This conception, however, is too diffuse for analytic purposes; it is desirable to distinguish between several types. We prefer to emphasize the much smaller category of "creative intellectuals," whose principal focus is on innovation, the elaboration of knowledge, art, and symbolic formulations generally. Included in this group are scholars, scientists, philosophers, artists, authors, some editors, and some journalists, as distinguished from the more marginally intellectual groups

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who distribute culture, such as most teachers, clerics, journalists, and performers in the arts, as well as those who apply knowledge in the course of their work, such as practicing physicians, lawyers, and engineers. The creative intellectuals are the most dynamic group within the broad intellectual stratum: because they are innovative, they are at the forefront in the development of culture, and the other marginal groups are dependent upon them for the ideational resources they use in their work.

A qualitatively more exclusive group is the "critical intelligentsia" whose members are recruited from the ranks of creative intellectuals. The critical intelligentsia is composed of those who not only have the ability to manipulate symbols with expertise, but who have also gained a reputation for commitment to general values and who have a broad evaluative outlook derived from such commitment. The characteristic orientation of these "generalizing intellectuals" is a critically evaluative one, a tendency to appraise in terms of general conceptions of the desirable, ideal conceptions which are thought to be universally applicable. Such generalizing intellectuals have been described by Lewis Coser as follows:

> Intellectuals exhibit in their activities a pronounced concern with the core values of society. They are the men who seek to provide moral standards and to maintain meaningful general symbols . . . Intellectuals are men who never seem satisfied with things as they are, with appeals to custom and usage. They question the truth of the moment in terms of higher and wider truth; they counter appeals to factuality by invoking the "impractical ought." They consider themselves special custodians of abstract ideas like reason and justice and truth, jealous guardians of moral standards that are too often ignored in the market place and the houses of power.[3]

It appears that since his appearance as a recognizable social type, the creative intellectual has frequently assumed the role of generalizing intellectual, often acting as a severe critic of the society in which he lives and engaging in political activism in order to transform it. What explains this phenomenon? In this essay, by examining the Soviet and American cases, we seek to demonstrate how certain features inherent in the role and social organization of intellectual life give rise to critical activity, promote the formation of a critical intelligentsia, and help produce what Lionel Trilling has perceptively called the "adversary culture" of the intellectuals.[4] Moreover, the rising prestige of the institutions of knowledge production and creative intellectuals, along with the interdependence between these social units and other key institutional structures, leads to the rapid diffusion of critical ideas and values, thereby amplifying the impact of such activity.

The United States

The opposition or adversary role of American intellectuals is, of course, not new. Many[5] have called attention to this phenomenon, seeing it as a

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continuing one in American history. Richard Hofstadter described their stance of alienation as "historical and traditional," and pointed out that "even the genteel, established intellectuals of the mid-nineteenth century were in effect patrician rebels against the increasing industrialization and the philistinism of the country. So that it has been the tradition of American intellectuals of all kinds and stamps to find themselves at odds with American society: this, I think, to a degree that is unusual elsewhere." A century ago, Whitelaw Reid, the editor of the *New York Tribune,* pointed to the role of the American "Scholar in Politics" as a foe of the "established," and a leader of the "radicals."[6]

Policy-makers have expressed concern over this phenomenon since the beginning of the Republic in spite of the fact that the first generation of American political leaders have justly been described as intellectuals. Thus, in 1798, President John Adams argued against admitting foreign scientists or philosophers, saying: "I really begin to think, or rather to suspect, that learned academies, not under the immediate inspection and control of government, have disorganized the world, and are incompatible with social order." And in a less directly political context, Thomas Jefferson wrote even earlier, in 1787: "State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules."[7] In a preinaugural memorandum to President Nixon advising him what to expect, Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggested the tension began somewhat later, stating that since "about 1840, the cultural elite have pretty generally rejected the values and activities of the larger society. It has been said of America that the culture [the intellectual elite] will not approve that which the polity strives to provide."[8] An earlier Republican president, Herbert Hoover, writing of the situation in the late 1920's, discussed "the growing left-wing movement embracing many of the 'intelligentsia.' "[9]

Lest it be thought that the intellectuals' opposition to the "polity" has been limited in modern times to periods when Republicans have been in office, or when there were very exceptional circumstances, as, for example, under Lyndon Johnson, it should be noted that in October 1961 James Reston felt moved to write a column discussing the discontent of the intellectuals with John F. Kennedy.[10] He noted that after nine months the new regime was being described as "the third Eisenhower administration." Reston reported that the intellectuals were "disenchanted by the absence of new policies, the preoccupation with political results, the compromises over education and the techniques of appointing conservatives to put over liberal policies and liberals to carry out conservative policies." Reston reminded his readers that an earlier liberal Democratic president who had sought to appeal to the intellectuals, Woodrow Wilson, had had comparable difficulties with them. Wilson had pointed to an inherent "perennial misunderstanding" between "the men who act . . . [and] the men who write."

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Long before he took office as Richard Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger reiterated Woodrow Wilson's complaint and analysis: "[For] intellectuals outside the administrative machines . . . protest has too often become an end in itself. Whether they have withdrawn by choice or because of the nature of their society, many intellectuals have confused the issues by simplifying them too greatly."[11] More recently, America's leading novelist, Saul Bellow, has acknowledged the validity of the complaint of the political leaders. "American intellectuals don't enter government service very willingly, and they look upon government as a cold-blooded monster. They're separatist and radical by education, and they feel they're serving higher ideals—to resist, to stand aside. States are distrusted, establishments attacked."[12]

Although scattered groups of right-wing intellectuals have emerged at times, the record seems to validate Richard Hofstadter's generalization that for almost all of this century the political weight of American intellectuals has been on the progressive, liberal, and leftist side.[13] Quantitative data derived from attitude surveys, the earliest dating back to before World War I, plus assorted other reports of the political orientations of the American professoriate, strongly indicate that American intellectuals have consistently leaned to the left.[14] This bias, to a considerable extent, reflects the absence or weakness of a legitimate national conservative tradition in America. National identity and national ideology are linked to a value system, stemming from an elaboration of those principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, that emphasizes egalitarianism and populism. Thus, when American intellectuals point up the gap between the real and the ideal, whether represented by what was (in a bygone Jeffersonian laissez-faire utopia of equal yeoman farmers) or what should be (a classless participatory future), they challenge the system for not fulfilling the ideals implicit in the American Creed.[15]

It may be argued, of course, that the "leftist" orientation of American intellectuals is in fact largely liberal rather than radical. If so, then it is in harmony with the preponderant national tradition. While there can be little doubt that a majority of those involved in intellectually-linked occupations have been liberals or progressives rather than supporters of the extreme left, it is also true that no other stratum in America has even approached intellectuals in their support of leftist, third party, socialist, and Communist activities, broadly defined. The record suggests also that the more involved individuals have been in genuinely creative intellectual activities, the more they have tended to support the left. One would hardly anticipate that in a country where leftist movements have never secured more than a fraction of the national vote that many intellectuals would stand on the political extreme. Yet, their obvious preference for opposing the existing authorities, whether economic or political, is clearly

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reflected in all the information that exists on the comparative strength of radicals among different strata of the society.

Academics were involved in antiwar agitation during the Spanish-American War, and they agitated for Filipino independence during the Filipino insurrection. While the war was still on, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., commented to a friend: "I confess to pleasure in hearing some rattling jingo talk after the self-righteous and preaching discourse which has prevailed to some extent at Harvard College & elsewhere."[16] An article in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1902 reported that college professors had acquired a reputation for taking obstructionist political positions. "Within a twelvemonth college teachers have been openly denounced as 'traitors' for advocating self-government for Filipinos. In many a pulpit and newspaper office, last September, it was declared that the utterances of college professors were largely responsible for the assassination of President McKinley."[17] Whitelaw Reid, who in 1873 had praised the antiestablishment role of American scholars, complained in a speech at Stanford in 1901 that it is a misfortune for the country that its college "instructors are out of sympathy with its history, with its development, and with the men who made the one and are guiding the other."[18] In the next decade, observers, both foreign and domestic, commented on the strength of socialism among the faculty of leading American universities.[19] The most influential young socialist intellectual of pre-World War I days, Randolph Bourne, while still an undergraduate at Columbia in 1912, explained the spread of socialism in the colleges as reflecting the fact that for a typical undergraduate, "his education, if it has been in one of the advanced universities, will only have tended to confirm his radicalism."[20] John Reed, active in the Harvard Socialist Club, reported that it was supported by many professors.[21] Although we have no quantitative measures to validate these impressions, a highly sophisticated survey of the religious opinion of American academics in 1913-1914, a period in which most adult Americans belonged to churches, indicated that the large majority did not believe in God or immortality. And reinforcing the generalizations that faculty radicalism was strongest in the leading schools, this survey found that the more distinguished faculty were much more irreligious than their less eminent colleagues.[22]

Large numbers of socialist and progressive intellectuals were swept away by the Wilsonian crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Yet by "1918-20 the doubts of many intellectuals about both the war and Wilsonian idealism turned to violent and bitter revulsion."[23] Considerable enthusiasm was expressed in many intellectual circles for the Bolsheviks and the Russian Revolution. The growing discontent on the campuses led many in business and politics, including the then vice-president-elect, Calvin Coolidge, to denounce the radicalism of college faculties.[24] Granville Hicks, perhaps the foremost Communist literary intellectual of the 1930's,

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saw the twenties as preparing the way for the Communist gains in the next decade.

> There was in that decade [the twenties] a loose kind of united front against the *status quo*. The intellectuals were almost unanimous in their distaste for a business civilization and in their willingness to accept as allies all enemies of the existing order. Russia, with all its faults, was regarded as being on "our" side because it represented something new in the world and because it was hated and feared by the proponents and beneficiaries of the *status quo*.[25]

Although much of the renewed "alienation" of intellectuals in the period took on a nonpolitical, strongly antimaterialistic, and antibourgeois orientation, the protests against the conviction of Sacco and Vanzetti for murder which grew gradually through the decade and reached a crescendo in 1927, the year of their execution, eventually mobilized and radicalized a substantial number of intellectuals both on and off the campuses.[26] As David Felix put it: "The Sacco-Vanzetti case belonged to the intellectuals."[27] The large-scale protest movement only magnified the conflict between the intellectuals and the powers.

> Thus when writers and professors began to voice . . . doubts, it seemed to many conservatives only another proof of dangerous radicalism among the intellectuals. And the writers and the professors, bringing out fact after fact which showed the prejudice and perjury involved in the conviction, came increasingly to feel that the leaders of business and government were not interested in evidence but only in teaching the radicals the brutal lesson that there was no room for dissent in America.[28]

The explicit involvement of large numbers of prominent intellectuals in various forms of left-wing politics, particularly in Communist and Communist-front groups, during the 1930's resulted in extravagant evaluations of the strength of Communism among intellectuals.[29] In 1932 a significant number of the more prominent intellectuals of the country endorsed the Communist presidential ticket.[30] However one estimates the actual proportion of intellectuals who went so far as to back the party, no one seriously doubts that the party's most obvious success during the 1930's was among the intellectuals and their "apprentices," the college students. As Daniel Bell has written:

> Except for its success in attracting an important section of the intellectual fringe and the student youth, the Communist party never achieved a wide mass following in America during the depression years . . . It did have for many years a disproportionate influence in the cultural field. At one time, from 1936 to 1939, through the fellow travelers in the publishing houses, radio, Hollywood, the magazines, and other mass media, it exercized influence on public opinion far beyond the mere number of party members.[31]

The one serious attempt at a quantitative evaluation of the backgrounds of members of the Communist party agrees with these impressions. Ernst and Loth report that "the proportion of Party members who have been to

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college is very high. Even more striking is the great number of college degrees among them . . . In fact, the Communist party in America seems to be such a highly educated, non-manual laboring group that at times there would seem to be more rejoicing in its headquarters over the recruiting of one common laborer than over ten Ph.D.'s."[32] Given the paucity of data, it is difficult to form any conclusive statistical judgment about the distribution of opinion among intellectuals in this period. It is possible, of course, that although the Communist party and other radical groups drew the bulk of their support from intellectuals, as well as from their fellow-travelers among the well-educated, that most intellectuals were in fact unaffected, as the limited membership of such groups suggests. Certain data imply the contrary. A repeat in 1933 of the 1913 survey of academics on religion, to which samples of writers and business and professional people listed in *Who's Who* were added, indicated that irreligion had grown among the professors during the twenty-year interval. The more distinguished academics were again shown to have a greater propensity to be irreligious than their less eminent peers. Writers were also heavily atheistic (62 per cent), while substantial majorities among the business and professional communities—of those sampled—were shown to be believers. Although attitudes to religion are not flawless indicators of political preferences, many studies indicate high correlations between being irreligious and having left views, at least in the United States. A Chicago survey in 1937 found academics to be much more liberal or radical on various socio-economic issues than those in other occupational groups, even manual workers. A study of party registrations in suburban San Francisco found one quarter of the writers registered as members of minority political parties, mainly Communist or Socialist.[33] The one national survey of college student opinion in the 1930's, conducted by the Roper Poll, saw 24 per cent express sympathy for "socialism," 6 per cent for "communism," 45 per cent for "liberalism," 15 per cent for "conservatism," and 2 per cent for "fascism."[34]

A contemporary (1938) effort to account for the leftist views of the more intellectually oriented undergraduates of the 1930's by two psychologists, Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert, suggested that to be "bookish" meant to be exposed to radical thought.

> To be bookish in this era has meant to steep oneself in the disillusioned gropings of postwar thinkers, most of whom, from philosophers to lyricists, are clearly "radical" . . . The literary groups to which these men belong, the day-by-day conversations in which they train one another to think and to feel, are full of the modern doubt and disquietude, and even more frequently, of the modern challenge and rebellion. To be bookish today is to be radical.[35]

The support given by intellectuals to organized leftist groups, particularly the Communists, was highly unstable. The various dramatic shifts in the party line along with events in the Soviet Union—from the famines

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imposed by enforced collectivization to the purges of the Soviet leadership and the Moscow trials of 1936 and 1938—leading finally to the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, which enabled the Germans to go to war, served to alienate almost all the intellectuals from the party. (Ironically, just before the Hitler-Stalin pact was signed, over four hundred intellectuals signed a manifesto published in the *Nation* on August 19, 1939, testifying to their faith in the *bona fides* of the Soviet Union.) Except during the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact (1939-1941), the Communist party from 1936 on had strongly urged all leftists to adopt a "defensist" posture, to support the United States and the other Western democracies. The Communists, joined by many socialists and liberals, argued that fascist totalitarianism was so dangerous that intellectuals and other critics of Western democratic systems had an obligation to restrain themselves and to defend their very imperfect societies against an attack from a much worse system. The Popular Front tactic, uniting all antifascist forces, pushed intellectuals to become supporters of the domestic status quo.

The end of the antifascist war was followed, ironically, by a renewed concern for Western democracy, again under totalitarian attack. This time the threat was thought to come from an aggressive expansionist Stalinist totalitarianism. Open anti-Semitism in Russia, the Czech coup, the Berlin blockade of 1948—these and other developments served to undermine any lingering faith in a Communist utopia. Many intellectuals, including most avowed socialists among them, were led to continue or to revive the policy previously urged on them by the Communists—to defend the existing society against an external threat. Philip Rahv, who had been an editor of *Partisan Review*, the principal radical literary-political magazine of the 1930's (pro-Communist in the beginning, later sympathetic to Trotskyism), pointed to these shifts in orientation in 1952.

> Among the factors entering into the change, the principal one, to my mind, is the exposure of the Soviet myth and the consequent resolve (shared by nearly all but the few remaining fellow travelers) to be done with utopian illusions and heady expectations. In their chastened mood American democracy looks like the real thing to the intellectuals . . . Whether capitalist or not, it has so far sustained that freedom of expression and experiment without which the survival of the intelligence is inconceivable in a modern society . . . In the palmy days when it was possible to take democracy for granted—that is, before the rise to global power of Hitlerism and then of Stalinism—the intellectuals were hardly aware of the very tangible benefits they derived from it. Now, however, only the most doctrinaire types would be disposed to trade in those benefits for some imaginary perfection of good in the remote future.[36]

Throughout the West, not only in the United States where Senator Joseph McCarthy pressed his advantage against the intellectuals, the same pattern of response developed. As Lipset noted at the end of the 1950's:

> The political issue of the 1950's has become freedom versus Communism, and in that struggle many socialist and liberal intellectuals find themselves

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identifying with established institutions. This identification comes hard to intellectuals who feel called upon to reject conventional stupidities, and results in a feeling of malaise which takes the form of complaining that everyone, including the intellectuals, is too conformist . . . Their solution to this dilemma is to continue to feel allied with the left, but to vote Democratic; to think of themselves as liberals—and often even as socialists—but to withdraw from active involvement or interest in politics and to concentrate on their work, whether it be writing poetry or scholarly articles.

. . . In spite of the powerful conservatizing forces, the inherent tendency to oppose the *status quo* will still remain . . . Any *status quo* embodies rigidities and dogmatisms which it is the inalienable right of intellectuals to attack, whether from the standpoint of moving back to traditional values or forward toward the achievement of the equalitarian dream.[37]

This period came to an end with the breakdown of one of the principal ideological justifications for the cold war—the threat of a monolithic Communist movement. Destalinization in the Soviet Union set a dynamic process in motion within the Communist world which made internal conflict within various countries and among the bloc nations very visible. Protest was more common; the Sino-Soviet split gave the final lie to the idea of Communist unity. As monolithic totalitarianism broke down, the image of Stalinist society—expansionist and oppressive—was weakened. Many of the pressures that had prevented intellectuals in the West from attacking their own societies ceased to exist. As ideological anti-Communism lost its strength, many older once-leftist intellectuals turned back in some measure to their earlier beliefs. More significant, perhaps, was the emergence among younger intellectuals and students of widespread social criticism. This began in the civil rights area, expanded substantially because of the Vietnam war, and ultimately came to touch a host of issues that affected almost all major American institutions. The new generations who knew neither Hitler nor Stalin, and had no first-hand experience of the 1948 Czech coup or the Hungarian revolution, found no reason to hold back in their criticisms.

The movement of the late 1960's differed substantially from that of the 1930's. Its most striking feature, perhaps, was an absence—there was no single radical group or combination of groups at the center; there was no equivalent to the Communist party of the 1930's. Many hundreds of thousands of persons—possibly millions—identified with the various militant radical protests. A sense of alienation was widely diffused; there seemed to be a rejection of authority; many spoke of the need for a new noncapitalist social order. Yet, with the exception of the short-lived conglomerative antiwar organizations, no group recruited more than a few thousand members. No new radical political party of any substance emerged. At the heart of the movement perhaps were the many hundreds of New Left or "underground" papers, of which the most influential was the "aboveground" *New York Review of Books.*

In spite of its loose level of organization, the different elements of the

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movement succeeded in challenging the system in a variety of ways and on a number of issues. Universities became staging areas; liberal and left faculty, followed by student activists, looked for a mass response. There were *over 600,000 professors and 8,000,000 students in the colleges and universities* of the country; ideas originating in these places circulated quickly. New forms of student activism and confrontation became common. As John Kenneth Galbraith noted:

> It was the universities—not the trade unions, nor the free-lance intellectuals, nor the press, nor the businessmen . . .—which led the opposition to the Vietnam war, which forced the retirement of President Johnson, which are forcing the pace of our present withdrawal from Vietnam, which are leading the battle against the great corporations on the issue of pollution, and which at the last Congressional elections retired a score or more of the more egregious time-servers, military sycophants and hawks.[38]

The evidence that the critical, often radical, role of the universities has stemmed from its most creative segment—those most successfully involved in research and publication and located at the most distinguished universities—has been reported in a variety of independent surveys of faculty opinion. All these confirm the early findings in the Leuba studies of religious belief. Those scholars who are at the most eminent schools (as judged by rankings of faculty, by the test scores of their students, and by funds available for research and library facilities), who have published the most (studies indicate a relationship between quantity and quality; those who publish more, on the average, also publish more highly regarded work), who have secured research funds, are generally in their political views much to the left of their less productive and less successful colleagues. Although younger faculty are generally to the left of those who are older, the age gap is lowest in the most prestigious universities. Conversely, those faculty who are most involved in and concerned with teaching, which might be thought to be a less intellectual (creative) role, are among the most conservative members. A national survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center in 1966 found the most successful academics already opposed to the Vietnam war. A more comprehensive study conducted for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in 1969 reiterated this finding. Surveys of persons who signed advertisements protesting the Vietnam war suggested that a disproportionate number were located at the better schools.[39]

In spite of Galbraith's emphasis on the influence of the universities, attention needs also to be paid to the literary intellectuals. They, too, have played a critical role in fostering the antiestablishment mood. Lionel Trilling, writing in 1965, emphasized their "adversary" role:

> Any historian of the literature of the modern age will take virtually for granted the adversary intention, the actual subversive intention, that characterizes modern writing—he will perceive its clear purpose of detaching the

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reader from the habits of thought and feeling that the larger culture imposes, of giving him a ground and a vantage point from which to judge and condemn, and perhaps revise, the culture that has produced him.[40]

While no opinion data exist for this group as a whole at all comparable to the surveys of faculty, their "house organ" in the 1960's, the *New York Review of Books,* has been as systematically radical and supportive of movement causes both at home and abroad as any other journal in the country. A 1970 survey of 147 "leading intellectuals" indicated that they were far more likely to mention the *New York Review of Books* as influential than any other single magazine. Half the respondents mentioned the biweekly as the one they and their friends discussed most frequently; its closest rival received only 20 per cent of the choices. Not surprisingly, given its role as an organ of literary as well as political criticism, the New *York Review* was considerably more influential among English professors and "nonacademics" than among social scientists or other academics.[41]

Quantitative data support the general impression that the intellectual elites are considerably to the left of all other strata in the American population. Various national surveys of the general public taken in 1969-1970 indicate that when asked to identify themselves by degrees of "liberalism," "conservatism," or "middle-of-the-road" status, only 20 to 30 per cent describe themselves as liberal or very liberal, between 40 and 50 per cent see themselves as conservatives. Among those in intellectually-linked occupations who were polled, the proportion who see themselves as liberal or left is 75 per cent for the leading scholars in the humanities or social sciences in elite schools (but 45 per cent for the professoriate as a whole), 86 per cent among a select group of 110 major intellectuals both within and outside of the university, 78 per cent among a sample of influential "culture critics" employed by major media outlets (as contrasted to 57 per cent of the group nationally), and 63 per cent among the editors of important publications and broadcast stations (as compared to 40 per cent generally). Although close to half the adult population choose to describe themselves as "conservatives," less than 15 per cent in any of the groups of leading intellectuals, professors, critics, or editors do so.[42] Over four fifths (80 per cent) of the high achieving scholars supported the terms for ending the Vietnam war proposed by Hanoi and the FLN.

The "critical" role of the American intellectuals is obviously significant. Unlike other groups who have challenged the system at various times, their antagonism does not appear to be reduced by success and the rewards it brings. If "adversary" tendencies flow in part from the fact that intellectuality tends to emphasize creativity, originality, and rejection of the traditional and the accepted, it follows that the cast of mind necessary for intellectual creativity will remain associated with support for social change and a rejection of the status quo. Such is what men as diverse as Thorstein Veblen, F. A. Hayek, and C. P. Snow have long argued.

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The Soviet Union

The 1960's have, of course, also witnessed the widespread diffusion of opposition tendencies among Soviet intellectuals. Given the absence of quantitative materials on the attitudes and behavior of Soviet intellectuals, and the limited knowledge among the public concerning the adversary culture in the USSR, we devote more attention to describing its actual content there than we did for the more familiar American story. The very notion that intellectuals are inherently at odds with the political system has apparently become so common within the country that it was the subject of open discussion at the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Soviet Communist party in April 1971. Aleksandr Chakovsky asserted the obligation of intellectuals to support the system and urged them not be be influenced by the idea fashionable in the West that "every sincere artist must be inevitably in opposition to the state in which he lives." "We can understand the opposition of an honest artist to a bourgeois society and state based on violence, oppression and lies, but we cannot tolerate the attempts of anti-Communists to spread this fraudulent view equally to the opposing system, on the basis of which social justice exists."[43]

Russian intellectual dissidence, too, has a long history. The very word "intelligentsia," which first gained currency in the 1860's and 1870's in Russia, denoted those who represented "consciousness" or "enlightenment." As such, the conception was linked with criticism and dissent.[44] In its early meaning, the word came to be closely associated with the names of Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, Tkachev, and the "nihilists" and Populists—all of whom were opposed to the existing order. Yet, by the end of the nineteenth century, as the educated group grew in size and its work became more differentiated, a new definition based on objective criteria—skilled nonmanual work or possession of higher education—came to vie with and even supplant the conception of the intelligentsia as, in effect, "the conscience of the nation," bound together by common ideals and sentiments.[45]

The victory of the Bolshevik revolution and subsequent rise of Stalinism had a profound impact on creative intellectuals. Ideological uniformity was established over intellectual life, if necessary through the liquidation of those of heretical views. In the years following the revolution, though, many intellectuals joined forces with the Communists, seeking thereby to implement their values and create a new social order and culture. For many, there was the strong conviction that an unprecedented era had dawned. In her memoirs, Nadezhda Mandelstam (wife of the outstanding poet Osip Mandelstam, who died in a Stalinist labor camp) castigates these intellectuals for their "capitulation":

> The intellectuals, meanwhile, set about a leisurely "revaluation of all values." This was the period of mass surrender when they all took the path marked out by the pre-revolutionary extremists and their post-revolutionary successors of

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the Averbakh type—though, needless to say, they tried to avoid the fanaticism and crudity of the vanguard. The capitulationists were led by men of about thirty who had been through the war, and the younger people followed them . . . The basic premise behind the surrender was that the "old" had given way to the "new," and anybody clinging to the former would go to the wall. This view was rooted in the whole theory of progress and the determinism of the new religion. The proponents of surrender attacked all the old concepts just because they were old and had outlived their usefulness. For most of the neophytes, all values, truths and laws had been done away with—except for those which were needed at the moment and could conveniently be given a "class" label.[46]

By supporting the Communists in this great "social experiment," these intellectuals at the same time undermined the basis for the existence of an independent critical intelligentsia. In Nadezhda Mandelstam's estimation, "it was the twenties in which all the foundations were laid for our future: the casuistical dialectic, the dismissal of older values, the longing for unanimity and self-abasement. It is true that those who shouted loudest were then the first to lose their lives—but not before they had prepared the ground for the future."[47]

But the tradition of the Russian intelligentsia as an independent social force has lived on, as has the haunting memory of the "surrender" of the intellectuals. The latter theme is embodied in the novel *Doctor Zhivago*, which caused such an uproar in the late fifties, leading to Pasternak's expulsion from the Writers' Union in 1958. As the editors of *Novy Mir* wrote, explaining their reasons for refusing to allow publication of the novel two years earlier,

> You are no stranger to symbolism, and the death, or rather passing of Doctor Zhivago in the late 1920's is for you, we feel, a symbol of the death of the Russian intelligentsia, destroyed by the revolution. Yes, it must be admitted that for the Doctor Zhivago you depicted in the novel the climate of the revolution is deadly. And our disagreement with you is not over this but, as we have already mentioned, over something quite different.
>
> To you, Doctor Zhivago is the peak of the spirit of the Russian intelligentsia.
>
> To us, he is its swamp.
>
> To you, the members of the Russian intelligentsia who took a different path from the one Doctor Zhivago took and who chose the course of serving the people betrayed their true calling, committed suicide and created nothing of value.
>
> To us, they found their true calling on precisely that path and continued to serve the people and to do for the people precisely the things that had been done for them—in laying the groundwork for the revolution—by the best segment of the Russian intelligentsia, which was then, and is today, infinitely remote from that conscious break with the people and ideological renegacy of which your Doctor Zhivago is the bearer.[48]

Against this background, the "rebirth" of the critical intelligentsia which has gradually taken place during the past two decades should be viewed.

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As Andrei Amalrik observes in his essay *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* several stages in this process may be discerned. A cultural opposition began to manifest itself slowly in the years following the death of Stalin. Writers and artists who had obediently followed party directives or who had withdrawn from public life began to express themselves more freely and to create works that did not conform to the party's prescriptions. Novels such as Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* (1954) and Dudintsev's *Not By Bread Alone* (1956) helped set a new, more critical and searching tone for published works and elicited heated debate. Independent artists like Anatoly Zverev and Oskar Rabin began to exhibit abstract art; young poets attracted large crowds at public readings. Singers like Okudzhava, Galich, and Vysotsky expressed in their songs the skepticism and suffering of those who had endured the Stalinist labor camps. During these years, unpublished works such as Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* and the typewritten literary magazine *Syntax*, edited by Alexander Ginzburg, began to circulate in manuscript form. Despite the government's attempt to suppress such challenges to the party's dictatorial role in cultural affairs, the opposition assumed a broader and more critical form in the years that followed.[49] As Andrei Amalrik notes, the increasingly widespread circulation of "underground" manuscripts with a more pronounced social and political content marked a qualitatively different stage in the growth of the oppositionist movement in the late fifties and early sixties.[50] The word *samizdat* (self-publication) came to describe this development.

While the trial of Siniavsky and Daniel in 1966 made clear the government's intention of eliminating the dissident writers, it also galvanized the intellectual community, producing an unprecedented number of protest demonstrations and petitions.[51] In the course of this continuing struggle between the dissident intellectuals and the government, numerous critics have been arrested and sentenced; countless others have been subjected to informal administrative measures (for example, firing from work, expulsion from the Writers' Union, denial of permission to travel abroad, loss of scholarship funds). Among those who have suffered most conspicuously are Viacheslav Chornovil, sentenced in 1967 for compiling an account of political trials in the Ukraine; Yuri Galanskov, condemned in 1968 for editing the anthology *Phoenix;* Alexander Ginzburg, prosecuted for gathering and editing documents on the trial of Siniavsky and Daniel; and Anatoly Marchenko, prosecuted for writing memoirs of life in prison camps in the post-Stalin period.[52]

The struggle has given rise to what has come to be called the Democratic movement. As Amalrik points out, though the movement lacks a formal organization and embraces very different ideological orientations, it is united by a common devotion to the establishment of the rule of law and basic civil rights. Within this rather diffuse movement, Amalrik identifies three distinct, though frequently intermingling, ideological currents—gen-

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uine Marxist-Leninist, Christian, and liberal.[53] Identified as representatives of the genuine Marxist-Leninist approach are Alexei Kosterin, Peter Grigorenko, and Ivan Yakhimovich, all of whom avowedly seek to return to the true principles of the party's revolutionary doctrine.[54] Supporters of Christian ideology, such as I. Ogurtsov, leader of the All-Russian Christian Union, maintain that society must return to Christian moral principles, which are sometimes interpreted in a Slovophile spirit, to stress the noble spiritual qualities of the Russian people.[55] Proponents of liberal ideology include Pavel Litvinov, grandson of Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Sakharov, the noted physicist, who are said to seek the establishment of a democratic republic, while accepting public ownership of the means of production.[56] While these may be the dominant currents, there are also numerous groups seeking more particularistic objectives—Ukrainians wishing to strengthen their cultural heritage, Jews wanting to emigrate to Israel, Crimean Tatars seeking to return to their homeland, and so on. Realizing the importance of the rule of law for them to be able to achieve their ends, these groups, too, enter into the broad Democratic movement.

The principal *samizdat* organ for the Democratic movement as a whole appears to be the *Khronika tekhushchikh sobytii* (The chronicle of current events).[57] The fact that the *Chronicle* has appeared on a bimonthly basis since 1968 testifies to the considerable continuity in the movement in spite of government repression. The establishment of the Committee for Human Rights by Andrei Sakharov, Andrei Tverdokhlebov, and Valery Chalidze, three physicists, in November 1970 may provide a nucleus for the coordination of the diffuse movement's activities. The Committee is devoted to strengthening the rule of law and ensuring civil rights, in accordance with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights adopted by the United Nations, by cooperating with the government in the establishment of legal guarantees and by engaging in criticism of the legal system. Hoping to create an organization which would retain its autonomy and would be able to speak for general principles rather than the interests of specific groups, the founders exclude from membership "members of political parties or other organizations laying claim to participation in the government, or of organizations whose principles permit participation in orthodox or oppositional political activities."[58] The main consequence of this clause, obviously, is the exclusion of members of the CPSU. Soon after its founding, the poet and singer Alexander Galich and the novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn were elected as "corresponding members," while the physicist Boris Tsukerman and the historian Alexander Yesenin-Volpin were elected as "experts."[59]

In effect, the guiding role of the Communist party of the Soviet Union is being challenged by a new intelligentsia—not the stratum of white-collar workers hailed by Stalin in the thirties as the creation and servant of the party—but by a conscious, amorphously organized group of intellectuals

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who dare to speak their minds and engage in independent activity in support of their ideals. The sources of contemporary protest are clearly reflected in Andrei Amalrik's analysis of the occupational distribution of those who signed letters of protest against the trial of Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky, and Lashkova in early 1968. Though the documents may not be entirely representative, their findings highlight a general phenomenon: those in the academic professions in particular—teachers and researchers—and those in intellectually-oriented occupations in general constitute the major source of support for the Democratic movement. Of the 738 persons signing these documents, the occupations of 700 are known. The percentage breakdown by occupational field is as follows: academics, 45 per cent; persons engaged in the arts, 22 per cent; engineers and technical specialists, 13 per cent; publishing house employees, teachers, doctors, and lawyers, 9 per cent; workers, 6 per cent; and students, 5 per cent.[60]

Accompanying the growth of dissent has been the resurgence of the idea of the intelligentsia as an autonomous critical force, serving as the "conscience of the nation." Such conceptions depart from the standard Soviet formulation, which defines the intelligentsia in terms of education and type of work (that is, qualified mental labor).[61] The sociologist, S. A. Kugel', for example, expresses doubts about the standard Soviet definition of the intelligentsia: "Is possession of a diploma of higher education sufficient for automatic inclusion in the composition of the intelligentsia? . . . It is well known, for example, that far from all specialists with higher and secondary education possess the capacity for independent thought and sufficiently creative social activity, corresponding to their cultural upbringing."[62] Others define the intelligentsia in terms of "intellectuality"—a high development of the intellect, wide mental horizons, and an elevated level of culture. For Iu. A. Kurnosov, the intelligentsia is above all "those people of high culture and morals" who actively participate in social life.[63]

In an insightful essay devoted principally to the American intelligentsia, the Soviet sociologist Igor Kon grapples with the problem of defining the intelligentsia. He argues that the growth of the educated group, the expansion of its functions and its accompanying internal differentiation, but also the interdependence between intellectual workers and their employers, all bring into question the conception of the intelligentsia as a lofty elite somehow standing above the basic social classes.

> Intellectual activity lost its former aura of exclusiveness: it was transformed from a calling into a mere occupation. Separate groups within the intelligentsia began to live in accordance with their own particular interests, which are sometimes very far from and even opposed to the interests of the remaining society . . . The model of the intellectual-ideologue, the social critic, can no longer claim universality.
>
> However, the need for such people exists, and is quite vital. Not fortuitously, in most recent American works, the intellectual is defined specifically as

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a thinker and critic of society (as distinguished from the technical specialist or the expert).[64]

Kon's conclusion—that there is a vital need for a critical intelligentsia—is particularly interesting because of the many similarities between his description of the problems of American intellectuals and those of Soviet intellectuals (for example, the restraints upon intellectuals in bureaucracies, the dogmatism and philistinism of political authorities, political repression during the McCarthy period resembling in milder form that of the Stalin period, the effect of censorship in politicizing and radicalizing writers, and so on). The article, appearing in the liberal journal *Novy Mir*, while ostensibly about the United States, was doubtlessly interpreted by some readers as an appeal for the self-assertion of a critical intelligentsia within the Soviet Union.

Clearly, the view of the intelligentsia as an autonomous critical force is one shared by members of the Soviet intelligentsia among themselves, even if it is not explicitly represented in the pages of the controlled press. *Message from Moscow*, a revealing anonymous account of Soviet society purportedly written by a foreign student who has been studying in Russia, claims that critically-minded, educated Russians speak of themselves as "the one per cent," thereby expressing their sense of eliteness, alienation, and isolation within Soviet society. The author writes: "Russian intellectuals themselves speak of the 'Soviet intelligentsia' as distinct from intelligentsia in the traditional sense: they mean engineers, even doctors and lawyers, who have acquired the technical skills of their professions but not the instincts of cultural and political enlightenment—people with a literate veneer over their essentially peasant cast of mind."[65] The intelligentsia, "the one per cent," though filled with pessimism regarding their ability to affect political decisions or realize structural change in society, think of themselves as the principal force of enlightenment.

Similarly, prominent members of the scientific community refer to the crucial role of a critical intelligentsia as a humanizing force in Soviet society. The renowned physicist Andrei Sakharov takes this position in his manifesto *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, which circulated originally in manuscript form in the USSR and was published in 1968 in the West. Sakharov addresses himself to what he sees to be the burning issues of the day—the threat of universal nuclear war, famine, militaristic police states, "bureaucratized dogmatism," and stupifaction induced by "mass culture." In view of these dangers, he asserts, "Only universal cooperation under conditions of intellectual freedom and the lofty moral ideals of socialism and labor, accompanied by the elimination of dogmatism and pressures of the concealed interests of ruling classes, will preserve civilization."[66] These beliefs, he tells us, "were formed in the milieu of the scientific and scientific-technological intelligentsia, which manifests much anxiety over

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the principles and specific aspects of foreign and domestic policy and over the future of mankind."[67]

Sakharov clearly regards the intelligentsia as a social group crosscutting occupational and class divisions in society that ought rightfully to play an active role in influencing policy. In his judgment, "the most progressive, internationalist, and dedicated element of the intelligentsia is, in essence, part of the working class, and the most advanced, educated, internationalist, and broadminded part of the working class is part of the intelligentsia." For this reason, it is senseless for the party to demand that the intelligentsia subordinate itself to the will and interests of the working class. "What these demands really mean," Sakharov asserts, "is subordination to the will of the party or, even more specifically, to the party's central apparatus and its officials." In the absence of a critical, committed intelligentsia, he asks, who will guarantee that the party officials are responsible to the working class and serve the genuine interests of progress rather than their own narrow interests?[68]

Although Sakharov stresses here the coincidence of interests of the intelligentsia and the working class, other scientists seemingly take a more elitist view of the intelligentsia and its social role. One such exponent is Zhores A. Medvedev, a prominent biologist who in recent years has become an outspoken critic of Communist policy, particularly with respect to scientific and cultural affairs. In his recent essay "Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World," Medvedev says:

> There is only one social group of people in the world which, not only on account of its position in society but simply on account of the humane qualities inevitably inherent in it, on account of its selection of people for these qualities and on account of the character of its daily activity, is connected in a world-wide mutually dependent, mutually advantageous, mutually respecting system in friendship independent of national frontiers, constantly sharing among itself all possible help and *interested to the utmost in the progress of mankind, of which it is the standard-bearer and motive force*. This group consists of the scholars, the scientists, the *intelligentsia, in the sense of the scientific, technical and culturally creative intelligentsia*, and not simply that class of people who have had a secondary or higher education.[69]

Medvedev emphasizes the international cooperation carried out by specialists from many nations and notes that "inter-state and international relations among scientists and those who are culturally active are the wisest and most trustworthy." Referring to the intelligentsia's progressive role, he points out that "if we take the American corporate scientific body as a whole, it constitutes the principal opponent to the war in Vietnam, while the universities and colleges are centres of the movement of the intelligentsia for peace." The cause of progress and peace can be best served by strengthening such international cooperation among members of the intelligentsia, thereby fostering "a truly intellectual and moral society" in

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which "any aspect of public activity is considered on the principle of the maximum benefit for the whole of humanity and the whole world."[70]

It is impossible to estimate with any precision the number of intellectuals who are dissidents and who engage in cultural or political activity with the intention of changing their society. Documents which have reached the West may indicate simply the tip of the iceberg of widespread opposition. According to three leading figures in the democratic movement (A. D. Sakharov, V. F. Turchin, R. A. Medvedev), "the overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia and youth understands the need for democratization" and, though also acknowledging the need for the gradual implementation of reforms, "cannot understand or condone actions which are clearly anti-democratic in character," such as the imprisonment of critics and the persecution of independent minded writers.[71] Somewhat more conservatively, Jonathan Harris estimates that throughout the Soviet Union, "there are probably hundreds, if not thousands, of groups [of intellectuals aspiring to "independent thinking"] who gather to discuss the nature of their own social and political system."[72] In view of the available evidence, it would appear that the conception of the critical intelligentsia as "the one per cent" of the Soviet population is not far from the mark. Yet, the evidence clearly suggests that a considerably higher proportion of those persons engaging in intellectual work, especially the more creative members of the scientific and scholarly community, are dissidents who identify themselves with the critical intelligentsia. Statistically, the incidence of conscious radical dissent in the Soviet Union may not be very different from that in the United States. It should be borne in mind that only one per cent or less of the American adult population have identified themselves as "radical" in public opinion polls in recent years, but that the proportion of intellectuals and students who have done so is invariably much higher. In the United States, where open dissent is more readily accepted, critical radical intellectuals are much more conspicuous.

To understand why a growing intellectual opposition emerged in the late 1950's, and why it grew to significant proportions in the 1960's, it is necessary to reflect on the consequences of destalinization. As has already been noted, in undermining the image of a single monolithic Communist power, destalinization weakened the ideological constraints on intellectual opposition in the United States and other Western countries. This development had even greater importance in the Communist world itself.

Just as the Russian intelligentsia emerged in the nineteenth century as a distinct social group during a period of uncertainty, sweeping reform, and enlivened public debate, so in a similar way, destalinization—the most momentous reform in the history of the Soviet Communist party and, indeed, of the World Communist movement—has been a crucial catalytic process for the reemergence of a critical intelligentsia in the Soviet Union today. The process began with Stalin's death; the demise of the infallible

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leader who had ruled his country with an iron hand for decades provoked widespread uncertainty about future policies. At that time, as the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko recalls, "the whole of Russia was one immense sea of doubt stretching all the thousands of miles between the Baltic and the Pacific . . . Something, I knew, was breaking down . . . The Babylon that was falling to pieces on Russian soil was the guilded papier-maché city of lies built upon gullibility and the habit of blind obedience. It was as if a blind people were recovering its sight."[73]

As initial uncertainty gave way to an official policy of destalinization—most notably, of course, with Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956—new problems arose. By condemning Stalin and thereby broaching the issue of the legitimacy of Stalin's deeds, Khrushchev raised doubts about the complicity of Stalin's heirs and brought to light the equivocal position of the leaders with respect to the establishment of the rule of law. If Stalin was condemned, ought his living accomplices to be deemed blameless and go unpunished? More than that, how could recurrences of the abuse of power be prevented except through the institutionalization of legal norms protecting individual rights and constitutional constraints on party leaders? At the same time, Khrushchev's affirmation of collective leadership effectively shattered the monolithic façade that Stalin had imposed on political life. Collective leadership, even when consensual, could not be as unitary as a one-man dictatorship; cleavages were inevitable. Such leadership necessitated a constant search for new support. Alignments more frequently shifted. To maintain a ruling coalition, there was a need for the kind of bargaining that increased the possibilities of an incipient pluralism within the political structure.

The winds of reform were felt particularly strongly by certain social groups—the entrenched Stalinist bureaucrats who feared any manifestations of "liberalization," which appeared to endanger their power and privileges; the inmates of labor camps, the most obvious victims of political repression; and the creative intellectuals who had been decimated by Stalin's purges and subjected to the most stringent political and ideological constraints. For a variety of reasons, intellectuals achieved greater prominence during this period and came to play a more independent role in political affairs. This resulted in part from the fact that certain intellectuals—writers, artists, and historians—whose occupational task is the interpretation of experience, showed themselves especially sensitive to the normative ambiguity that accompanied the reforms. Others looked to them for a clarification of the meaning of the times; willingly or unwillingly, writers, artists, and others professionally concerned with the interpretation of experience found themselves in a position of social leadership.[74] Also, the conditions of collective leadership and the leaders' perpetual need of support enhanced the position of those intellectuals who provided vital services to the regime. To the extent that some gained greater autonomy

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in exchange for services they rendered, the give-and-take between the political authorities and the intellectuals contributed to the emergence of a critical intelligentsia. Their relative autonomy, in turn, facilitated the free expression of ideas. It may be argued, furthermore, that intellectuals are particularly sensitive to the need for the rule of law and for social predictability combined with personal freedom. Not only is the rule of law necessary for their work, but they require it to protect their relatively privileged position from arbitrary acts by those who have political power.[75] Thus, in many cases, the intellectuals have tried to strengthen the rule of law and to curtail the scope of the party leaders' prerogatives.

In the Soviet Union, as in the United States, the resurgence of dissent derives in some measure from the critical activity of the younger generation. For thousands of young Soviet citizens who had learned quite literally to worship Stalin, destalinization was a shattering experience, discrediting the Communist regime and calling into question the actions of their elders. Not having known the Stalinist terror at first hand, they were also less likely to be submissive.

As Nadezhda Mandelstam observes:

> Among the new intelligentsia now growing up in front of our eyes, nobody blithely repeats old sayings like "You can't swim against the tide" or "You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs." In other words, the values we thought had been abolished forever are being restored, and they must be taken account of, even by people who could quite well do without them. This has come as a surprise both to those who never gave up these values and to those who tried to bury them once and for all. Somehow or other they lived on underground, taking refuge in all those hushed homes with their dimmed lights. Now they are on the move and gathering force. The initiative in their destruction belonged to the intelligentsia of the twenties, which, as a result, ceased to be itself and turned into something different. At the present day we are witnessing the reverse process . . . the main thing is this: these young intellectuals have appeared and the process is now irreversible—it cannot be stopped even by the physical destruction which the representatives of the past would love to visit on them. Nowadays the persecution of one intellectual only creates dozens more. We saw this during the Brodski affair.[76]

Not surprisingly, the young intellectuals pose problems for the party and Komsomol organizations which are supposed to guide their behavior and attend to their proper indoctrination. For instance, in an article entitled "Party Concern for the Upbringing of the Scientific-Technical Intelligentsia," which appeared in the journal *Kommunist,* the author comments: "Party and Y.C.L. organizations should devote more profound study to the needs and attitudes of young scientists and should struggle more persistently against personality traits that are unsuitable for young builders of communism, such as aloofness, skepticism and apoliticalness, which are sometimes encountered in scientific collectives. One cannot fail to be disturbed that certain young scientists picture democracy, individual freedom and humanism as some sort of abstract, nonclass categories."[77]

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Like the Russian intelligentsia of the past century, the contemporary critical Soviet intelligentsia has emerged in the wake of a major reform, when the basic problems of social life have been brought into the foreground. The intellectuals, confronting these problems, have articulated those values they believe necessary to guide men's actions and shape the social order. Because the Stalinist tyranny stands for the more critical intellectuals as the virtual antithesis of everything they believe in, they define their position with reference to the Stalinist past and struggle against every manifestation of neo-Stalinism. As the outspoken critic Andrei Sakharov affirms: "Our country has started on the path of cleansing away the foulness of Stalinism. 'We are squeezing the slave out of ourselves drop by drop' (an expression of Anton Chekhov). We are learning to express our opinions, without taking the lead from the bosses and without fearing for our lives."[78]

Internationally, the impact of destalinization has been far-reaching and profound. The most immediate effects were felt within the Soviet bloc, where unity gave way to "polycentricism" and schism. Throughout the Communist world, the initiation of destalinization elicited a vocal response from the intellectuals, who emerged as prominent critics of the existing order. Reviewing the events in Eastern Europe, one commentator writes:

> [In Hungary and Poland following destalinization] the writers, supported by the professors, economists, artists, the majority of journalists, and the teachers, took the lead in the mass movements for democratization . . .
>
> In Czechoslovakia, as in other dictatorships of the left or right, the struggle for democratization began with the fight of the writers, the artists, the students against censorship, for free expression. In 1967, the "liberals" won a majority in the Writers' Union . . . In January 1968, the writers, journalists, economists, historians, artists, joined with a growing part of the intelligentsia to force through a transformation of the regime into a pluralistic socialism.[79]

At the same time that destalinization was underway in the Soviet Union, and dissent was becoming more manifest in the Communist countries to the west, the leaders of Communist China thought it expedient to loosen the ideological fetters on their own intellectuals. The official slogan of the campaign in 1956-1957—"Let the hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools contend"—was meant to suggest that intellectuals were to be allowed an undefined degree of freedom of expression. The outcome of the Hundred Flowers episode was revealing, though hardly what the leaders had anticipated. As Benjamin Schwartz has written:

> Not only were the literary and cultural policies of the regime attacked; not only did professionals challenge the authority of the Party within their areas of competence; but there were even those who raised the dread question of power itself. The very grounds on which the Communist Party claimed political infallibility were challenged. In raising the question of political power, the "civism" of the Chinese intelligentsia went beyond anything that has occurred in the Soviet Union [in the fifties] since the inauguration of the "Khrushchev era."[80]

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In the face of overt dissent on the part of the critical intelligentsia, the Chinese leaders decided to tighten the reins again. Their experience with their own intellectuals probably strengthened their conviction that Stalin deserved great credit for what he had done. This was one more factor helping to create a schism between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The United States and the Soviet Union: Academic Intellectuals

The sixties, quite obviously, were a time of intellectual ferment both in the West and in the East. The United States and the Soviet Union, which had long appeared to differ from the countries of the third world by their political quietism and the absence of major ideological debate, emerged again as arenas of dissident activity. In both countries, intellectuals—or at least the critical intelligentsia—appear to be ideologically inspired, actively committed to the implementation of certain values and the achievement of structural change. The differences between the intellectuals of the two countries in their traditions, social conditions, and objectives are fairly obvious. The Americans seek the end of American participation in the war in Vietnam, the expansion of egalitarian opportunity, and the reform of the political system, to make it more responsive to citizen participation; in the Soviet Union the main thrust of the intelligentsia is toward institutionalizing basic rights and establishing the rule of law.

What attributes of the social structure contribute to the formation of such a critical intelligentsia? How is one to explain why autonomous social movements derive such support from those engaged in the "cultural apparatus"? The relationship between the two is by no means self-evident. As organized culture creation has increased in size and in social impact, cultural work has become more differentiated. The intellectual stratum itself has become more heterogeneous, and the individual practitioners have become less autonomous. These conditions would seem to militate against the creation of a critical autonomous intelligentsia, proposing and seeking to implement values of universal scope. Yet, any such inference would be superficial and misleading. There are other important features which, individually or in combination with other variables, contribute to the creation of a critical intelligentsia. To account for the emergence of such an intelligentsia, we must first isolate factors that induce intellectuals to adopt a broader stance—that is, a larger world-view and a commitment to general values. We must then show how they are able to gain sufficient autonomy to maintain their commitments.

It appears that various elements in the institutionalized reward structure for scientific and scholarly pursuits contribute to the fostering of a critical intellectual class. Intellectual life tends to be highly competitive;

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there is, in both Communist and non-Communist countries, a marked emphasis on the few in every category or field who win recognition for significant achievement. It has been argued that the vast increase in numbers of those involved in intellectual activity, both inside and outside the university, has heightened the possibilities of frustration and consequent political alienation.[81] The academic community itself is stratified; highest status and eminence go to a few in major universities or academy institutes or to those who win special recognition for specific scholarly achievements. The majority of scholars probably feel a sense of relative deprivation or even failure in relation to these more distinguished academics. Even those who have secured good posts or attained eminence in the past often find themselves pressed by younger men who are better suited to doing the original work that is required in new circumstances. Because of competitive demands, the increase in the status of the academic profession as a whole, and the greater recognition accorded the successful, the sense of frustration by others is probably increased. Hence, the growth in numbers may give rise to a more influential, though more alienated, intellectual stratum.

To understand the political and social activity of intellectuals, those factors inherent in scientific and scholarly activity and intellectual creativity in general are certainly more important than those which affect the distribution of reward or status. Among these are the variety of normative patterns associated with science and scholarship or related to intellectual life more generally. As Robert Merton has noted in analyzing the role of the scientists, the normative pattern of "organized skepticism" demands a "suspension of judgment until 'the facts are at hand' and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria."[82] Merton stresses also the importance of "universalism"—"the canon that truth claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to *preestablished impersonal criteria:* consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge."[83] Adherence to such norms of scholarly work may engender a critical attitude toward judgments and beliefs outside of the particular field of inquiry—a doubting of the conventional verities and reigning myths.

Maintenance of the norms of scientific and scholarly inquiry requires a certain autonomy from outside interference. As the authors of a significant study conducted under the auspices of the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences stated: "Science calls for quite a different type of management, working regime, different standards and rules in society's everyday life, than those suited to industry, because it involves a much higher degree of inner subjectivity and responsibility, a greater measure of initiative and self-realization. There has to be much greater 'reliance on man,' on his creative abilities and powers. In contrast to the hierarchy of the industrial system, science reaches a state in its development where

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it demands a fuller implementation of democratic principles."[84] Though perhaps of limited scope, such autonomy constitutes a necessary condition for the emergence of informal structures, such as those of a critical intelligentsia.

The most creative intellectuals in various disciplines often feel impelled to keep abreast of current developments outside their individual fields. In doing so, they establish informal contacts with their peers in other disciplines and develop a more comprehensive view of their work and its significance. In the Soviet context, for instance, Academician Pyotr Kapitsa asserts that neither the scientific councils nor any other existing formal organization can replace the *kruzhok,* the informal social circle, as the appropriate setting for the free and spontaneous exchange of ideas.[85] To the extent that scientists and scholars feel themselves to be alienated—separated from the means of effectively realizing themselves through their activity—they may be inclined to develop a critical orientation to their activity and to generalize ideological propositions. Bureaucratic social arrangements may have dialectical potentialities—at once limiting the scholars' creativity while fostering in them a critical mentality.

The very expansion of knowledge creation has resulted in an increasing concentration of intellectuals within certain social and geographical settings. Such concentration facilitates the dissemination of unorthodox ideas and may serve to foster a sense of corporate identity, solidarity, and eliteness. Students of the American scene have pointed to such concentration as one of the conditions contributing to the spread of radicalism within the academic world.[86] In the Soviet Union, scientists and scholars are even more concentrated, the trend toward greater concentration being particularly evident in the establishment of "science towns" and scientific "satellite-towns" such as Dubna, Pushchino, Obninsk, Cernogolovka, Rukovo, and others on the outskirts of Moscow.[87] The largest of these science towns is the *Akademgorodok* at Novosibirsk—an urban area with a population of over 40,000, where more than twenty specialized institutes are located.

While such settlements may serve to isolate scientists and scholars from the rest of the population, they also seem to afford a fertile setting for the gestation of critical thought, and they clearly pose new obstacles to the party's persistent efforts to maintain ideological controls. For instance, as the First Secretary of the Sovetskii Borough Party Committee stated in August 1970: "Ideological work in Academy City has its special features, conditioned above all by the youth of the collective (the average age of scientific personnel here is 32), territorial isolation and the absence of direct, everyday ties with production. All this creates a particular social climate that leads a certain portion of the young scientists to hold an exaggerated conception of their role in society. In their opinion, the scientific and technological revolution is the work of a rather small 'intel-

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lectual elite' alone. This mistaken self-appraisal is explained in large measure by the fact that the life path of some young scientists has been: school, university, then work in an academic institute. And, since their social and life experience has been quite limited, sometimes distortions arise in their outlook."[88] In 1969 more than 3,000 foreign intellectuals visited the center. "Along with scientific literature," we are told, " 'information' designed to serve the purposes of psychological warfare sometimes reaches the intelligentsia."[89]

Attempts by political authorities to impose their will on scholars creates a conflict situation conducive to the generalization of specific values. In the United States, many academics are cushioned from direct manipulation by political authorities by the institutionalization of academic freedom; but in allocating research funds, for instance, political authorities obviously have an impact on the choice of problems by scientists and scholars.

The relation of scholars to the political authorities in the United States differs significantly from that of the Soviet Union. There, the Communist party, deriving its legitimacy from Marxist-Leninist ideology, seeks to incorporate scientific achievements and scholarly explanations within its world-view, while at the same time attempting to exert a guiding influence over the whole of social life, including academic work. In the eyes of the party, the scientist or scholar, like every Soviet citizen, is in the first instance a builder of Communism, an unflagging fighter for the Communist cause, rather than a disinterested seeker of truth. Science, scholarship, and education are regarded as political pursuits, contributing either to the advancement of socialism or the defense of the imperialist-capitalist system.

Time and again, the party has attempted to thwart the spread of new ideas and theories—Freudianism, mathematical modeling in economics, cybernetics, sociology, genetics.[90] Yet, the party's intrusion into science and scholarship clashes with the very norms that define the nature of the scholars' work and provide standards for the evaluation of their performance. Scientists and other scholars are loath to permit the party's persistent surveillance of their intellectual work and personal lives. They resent limitations on their right to engage freely in inquiry along lines suggested by their discipline or beyond it.

It would appear that certain academics are becoming increasingly aware of their common position vis-à-vis the party authorities and are developing a sense of solidarity that cuts across lines established by individual disciplines and specialties. Recognizing the importance of such values as freedom of discussion and inquiry, "universalism," and cognitive rationality for their common endeavor, they are gaining a keener understanding of the political implications of such values. In being arbitrarily constrained by political authorities and finding themselves in a situation of conflict, they tend to generalize the values inherent in their academic

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work and to establish ties with other intellectuals, including writers, who are similarly constrained.

The party representatives appointed to supervise intellectuals can become symbols of the cleavage between the party and themselves. Andrei Sakharov, for example, attacking party tutelage of science, singles out a prominent party appointment—the director of the Science Department of the Party's Central Committee, Sergei Trapeznikov, whose views "are basically Stalinist (from our point of view, they reflect the interests of the bureaucratic elite)" and "differ fundamentally from the dreams and aspirations of the majority and most active section of the intelligentsia, which, in our opinion, reflect the true interests of all our people and progressive mankind. The leadership of our country should understand that as long as such a man . . . exercises influence, it is impossible to hope for a strengthening of the party's position among scientific and artistic intellectuals. An indication of this was given at the last elections in the Academy of Sciences when S. P. Trapeznikov was rejected by a substantial majority of votes, but this hint was not 'understood' by the leadership."[91] Thus, ironically, the very attempt of the Communist party to control science and to prevent the formation of an intelligentsia—an autonomous group which articulates fundamental values—contributes to the emergence of such a group.

In the United States, during the McCarthy period (1950-1954) when various efforts were made to intimidate left-oriented intellectuals both on and off university campuses, political intrusion may have produced comparable results. A survey of the effect of McCarthyism on the beliefs and behavior of American social scientists concluded that they were relatively unintimidated; their heads were "bloody but unbowed." Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., suggest that it was more dangerous for the career of an academic to be a public supporter of McCarthy on a college campus than to be a bitter opponent.[92] Robert Nisbet has credited the McCarthy period with helping to legitimate and thereby stimulate campus political activism. The activism of the 1960's drew support from the politicized university faculties which had resisted McCarthyite pressure during the 1950's.

> No single figure, no single issue . . . had ever seized the minds of faculty members as did the person of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the cause he represented in the 1950's . . . For McCarthy's enemy, his declared enemy, was not labor, not labor unions, not the people—in the Populist sense—but almost strictly and exclusively the intellectuals in this country, academic intellectuals especially.
>
> Given his assaults in so many intellectual areas, his challenging of the loyalty of intellectuals, his threats to "get" Harvard and other universities, it would be extraordinary if the mind of the American faculty had *not* become visibly radicalized in the 1950's.[93]

The impulse to react critically to the larger society must not, however,

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be seen primarily as a function of deprivation or punitive experiences, though these may contribute to the *activization* of an opposition movement at a given time and place. Both logic and evidence suggest that the principal component of intellectual endeavor—its concern for creativity, for originality, and for rejecting the traditional and the established—presses those most favorably endowed to challenge what is received and accepted in the larger society. As noted earlier, all systematic quantitative efforts in the United States to relate intellectual achievement (as reflected in recognition by one's peers, record of relative accomplishment in publications, and position at the more prestigious universities as judged by rankings of faculty generally or by the test scores of students) agree that those who rank high on these indicators of academic status are among the most left-inclined professors. Those faculty who are primarily oriented to and concerned with teaching are more conservative than those more involved in the research culture.

Although no comparable published surveys exist for the Soviet Union or for any other Communist country, a variety of reports by foreign scholars who have spent time in Russia, impressionistic though they be, together with accounts of findings in still unpublished studies by Soviet scholars, indicate that a similar pattern exists there as well. It seems certain that scholars who are members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, whose institutes correspond to the more prestigious research-oriented graduate schools in the United States, are much more likely to exhibit antiestablishment thought and behavior than those who teach in the relatively low status, non-research-oriented Soviet universities and the specialized technical institutions of higher education. The Soviet authorities have had more difficulty with their best scholars and scientists, and with intellectuals generally, than with those who *distribute* intellectual products as teachers. Soviet science institutes and "science cities" tend to be centers of opposition; they are among the principal supporters of free intellectual life and the "underground press."

These reports do not, of course, demonstrate that activities associated with intellectual creativity press men to take a more critical political position. They are also congruent with the assumption that the kind of mind or background which impels men to question the society of which they are a part also makes for success in intellectual activities. An argument of this kind was made by Thorstein Veblen over a half century ago in his attempt to account for the "intellectual pre-eminence of Jews."

> The first requisite for constructive work in modern science, and indeed for any work of inquiry that shall bring enduring results, is a skeptical frame of mind. The enterprising skeptic alone can be counted on to further the increase of knowledge in any substantial fashion. This will be found true both in the modern sciences and in the field of scholarship at large . . . For [the intellectually gifted Jews] as for other men in the like case, the skepticism that goes

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to make him an effectual factor in the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men involved a loss of that peace of mind that is the birthright of the safe and sane quietist. He becomes a disturber of the intellectual peace.[94]

A comparable thesis was put forth fifteen years ago by Lazarsfeld and Thielens in their effort to explain why those faculty who were at high quality American schools had the most liberal and left views. Pointing out that such institutions "attract more distinguished social scientists," they said:

> The original and creative minority among them will often have analytical minds which do not automatically accept current beliefs, minds willing to entertain unorthodox ideas as to how a modern society can best function. Next to the creative leader comes the competent teacher and productive research scholar. Even if he might be by nature more amenable to the general currents of public opinion, he is more directly in communication with the leaders of his profession, and his thinking is shaped by the process of mutual interaction among primary groups [of other high quality scholars] . . . Thus he too will add to a permissive [liberal] climate when appointed to a distinguished institution.[95]

Radical and liberal social scientists in the West naturally find it ego-enhancing to discover and explain links between their leftist political views and intellectual creativity. Hence, the way in which the conservative economist F. A. Hayek accounts for the same phenomenon is of considerable interest. Writing in 1949 before most of the studies cited above were made, and without apparent awareness of the early ones completed by Leuba, Hayek stated: "on the whole the more active, intelligent, and original men among [American] intellectuals . . . most frequently incline toward socialism, while its opponents are often of an inferior caliber . . . Nobody, for instance, who is familiar with large numbers of university faculties . . . can remain oblivious to the fact that the most brilliant and successful teachers are today more likely than not to be socialists, while those who hold more conservative political views are as frequently mediocrities. This is of course by itself an important factor leading the younger generation into the socialist camp."[96]

In seeking to explain this phenomenon Hayek understandably rejected the hypothesis that more intelligent people tend to become socialists. Rather, he suggested that the more intelligent among those who were inclined to support the status quo sought out nonintellectual pursuits, while the "disaffected and dissatisfied" rejected occupations linked to the business system and were more inclined to find a career in intellectual activities. Hayek wrote: "It is therefore probably the fact, not that the more intelligent people are generally socialists, but that a much higher proportion of socialists among the best minds devote themselves to those intellectual pursuits which in modern society give them a decisive influence on public opinion."[97] Hayek, like Veblen, found a relationship be-

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tween the factors that lead Jews to intellectuality and to leftist political views.[98]

Such hypotheses, advanced to account for the association between intellectual achievement and propensity to "disturb the peace" of society, may be regarded as mutually reinforcing, rather than as contradictory explanations. They suggest that the attributes of mind which lead men to reject the established order are closely linked with those that foster scholarly or artistic creativity. Certain evidence from surveys of student attitudes and occupational preferences reinforces these generalizations. A number of American studies indicate that as the opinions or partisan identification of undergraduates move to the left, the more likely are they to exhibit qualities defined by researchers as "intellectuality" and to indicate a desire for an academic career. Those inclined to become intellectuals exhibit cultural tastes with regard to athletics, books, media habits, and politics distinctly different from other youth long before they have finished college.[99] It is highly doubtful that the relationship is solely a function of selection. As Lazarsfeld and Thielens have argued, absorption in the high level intellectual culture in the United States has, particularly for young people, inevitably meant association with the adversary culture orientation. Not only do the brighter among the more leftist-oriented tend to opt for intellectually related vocations, but the intellectually motivated who are initially nonleftist discover a link between their activities and a critical stance.

There are, of course, other sources of variation among scholarly intellectuals which affect their political orientations. Discipline or subject matter are particularly important. In the United States, a variety of surveys of academic opinion indicate that the social sciences and humanities are toward the left end of the spectrum, the natural sciences near the middle, and the more applied professions (education, business, engineering, and agriculture) farthest to the right. In general, these findings lend support to the hypothesis that those fields which are more "intellectual" rather than practical—that is, the liberal arts, as contrasted with the professional or applied disciplines—tend to foster a leftist or liberal political orientation. Within the natural science fields, the pure or theoretical approaches tend to be associated with a more liberal outlook, while among the social sciences and the humanities, the more politically relevant disciplines—political science and, above all, sociology—appear to be the most liberal according to a number of independent surveys of academics in different fields.[100]

As for differences among Soviet scholars, reports by foreign scholars and students, together with documents published in the West, lead one to believe that political dissidence and critical activity are more pronounced among students and faculty in the natural sciences than in the social sciences and the humanities.[101] Significantly, it is not scholars in the hu-

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manities and social sciences, but Andrei Sakharov, Andrei Tverdokhlebov, and Valery Chalidze, three prominent physicists, who founded the Committee for Human Rights, an organization devoted to the strengthening of legal norms and basic civil rights. The principal reason that natural scientists are relatively more critical and more politically active appears to be that the more politically relevant fields, such as the social sciences and the humanities, are particularly hampered by ideological controls. Philosophy, by and large, means Dialectical Materialism, which is endowed with the sanctity of revealed truth; social science tends to be "applied" and is generally subordinated to ideological tenets; fields in the humanities are tailored to serve the needs of "political upbringing." At a recent conference (December 21, 1971) of the heads of Social Science Departments of Higher Educational Institutions, M. A. Suslov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, reiterated the party's position on these matters. After pointing to the task of the social sciences to produce knowledge dealing with "the problem of management in the broadest sense, from the management of the individual enterprise to management on the enormous scale of the entire country," and contributing "to the more effective utilization of the latest machinery and of labor," Suslov described their ideological role:

> The most important conditions for the fruitful development and effective utilization of the social sciences in communist construction are the allegiance of these sciences to Marxist-Leninist methodology, a creative approach to the elaboration of urgent problems, and interaction with other spheres of scientific knowledge.
>
> The growing role of the social sciences makes higher demands on the level of the teaching of these sciences in the higher schools and calls for intensifying the Marxist-Leninist tempering of all Soviet students.
>
> If Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory is to be presented to students in all its vital force, teachers in the social sciences must be in the forefront of the ideological struggle and must be able to use the latest achievements of Marxist-Leninist thought. The central part of this task is the creative understanding and propaganda of the decisions of the 24th Party Congress.[102]

Being subject to such forms of ideological control, liberal arts fields that might otherwise be controversial and intellectually engaging are neither. Because of limitations on original and innovative work, the more creative or intelligent are often drawn to the sciences. In many cases, the student's or young scholar's search for promising areas of inquiry is simultaneously a flight from politics.[103]

While the natural sciences produce more critics than the social sciences—a situation that also existed in Czarist Russia through much of the nineteenth century—this may now be in the process of changing. Sociology, banned in all Communist countries during the Stalinist period as a "bourgeois" discipline, has become an important field of inquiry both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Having previously been regarded

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as somewhat heretical, it has become attractive to the more critically minded among students and younger researchers. In Eastern Europe, there is a general consensus that sociology students have been in the forefront of student protest. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, senior sociologists stood out among "revisionist" and "non-Marxist" elements. In the Soviet Union, where the party regards sociology as an instrument for rationalizing its rule, the theoretical conceptions and empirical findings nonetheless tend to undermine ideological dogma and officially sponsored images of society. Zev Katz observes that the party leaders "—and, indeed, the sociologists themselves—find themselves in a painful dilemma. For if sociology is to be a truly effective instrument for improving the Soviet system, it must be allowed to be somewhat independent and critical, to point out where the failings of the system lie . . . The party is as yet reluctant to do this, and it therefore continues to try to keep sociology within safe bounds."[104]

Writers and Artists as Critical Intellectuals

In concentrating on scientists and scholars, that is, on knowledge producers, there is no implication that writers and artists do not play a significant social role or form a vital constituent part of the critical intelligentsia. Of course, they differ from the former group both in their social organization and type of work. Writers and artists are much more likely to be freelance or unattached intellectuals who are not employed within an organization. Also, their creative work is typically more evaluative and expressive than scholarship or science, bound by norms of "objectivity," cognitive consistency, and empirical verification. But among these groups, too, the nature of their work and of their social relationships tend to foster a critical, skeptical outlook which has important political implications. Jean-Paul Sartre has argued that the creative writer is inherently engaged in an activity that undermines the stability of society by making it "self-conscious."

> If society sees itself and, in particular, sees itself as *seen,* there is, by virtue of this very fact, a contesting of the established values of the regime. The writer presents it with its image; he calls upon it to assume it or to change itself. At any rate, it changes; it practices dishonesty; thus, the writer gives society a *guilty conscience;* he is thereby in a state of perpetual antagonism toward the conservative forces which are maintaining the balance he tends to upset . . .
>
> Only the governing classes can allow themselves the luxury of remunerating so unproductive and dangerous activity . . . They want to retrieve themselves, and they charge the artist with presenting them with their image without realizing that he will then make them assume it . . . But, functionally, he moves in opposition to the interests of those who keep him alive. Such is the original conflict which defines his condition.[105]

One of the fundamental dilemmas for intellectuals generally has been

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to obtain the resources necessary to pursue creative activity without "selling out," without tailoring one's creative and intellectual work to the demands of director, patron, or consumer. In modern times in the West, the emphasis on originality and innovation and on following the logic of development in various creative fields—be it painting, music, literature, or drama—has been responsible for a recurrent conflict between intellectuals and their patrons, who pay for their works or exert control through the state, churches, businesses, or other institutions. Intellectuals have often felt themselves to be dependent on philistines, while wanting to do whatever they liked according to the logic of their field.[106]

Much of the discussion concerning the political propensities of unattached intellectuals has focused on the tensions created for the artist by his relation with those who determine his rewards. It has been asserted "that free-lance intellectuals are more receptive to political extremism than are other types of intellectuals . . . [since] the free-lance intellectual . . . has been dependent on an anonymous and unpredictable market . . . Rewards are much less certain to be forthcoming for the free-lance intellectual, the form of reward less predictable, and the permanence of the recognition more tenuous . . . [They] tend to be more dependent on their audience over which they have relatively little control, and to feel greater social distance from it."[107]

Out of this tension between the intellectual and the patron have come various political tendencies, both reactionary and radical. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the right-wing critique has depicted mass society or democracy as coercive and corrupting for intellectual activity. Such societies are said to pander to the masses who destroy genuine creativity. Tocqueville feared that a democratic society would produce mediocre intellectual elites precisely because these elites would be greatly influenced by the demands of the masses. Charles Eliot Norton was typical of many nineteenth-century American humanists who deplored "the loss of cultural standards in an era of democracy."[108] In their quest to realize their values, many American intellectuals expressed their rejection of the vulgar commercial civilization around them by glorifying the supposed virtues of the more cosmopolitan European cultures, and by attacking the "bourgeoisie." The dominant ideological trends among the most creative writers were "adversary," either disdainfully reactionary, or more commonly an elitist intellectual opposition to capitalist industrial society. Referring to the intellectual climate at the turn of the century, Joseph Gusfield observes that Henry Adams was a perfect representative of this view. "In his anti-democratic and anti-business attitudes he mirrored a persistent theme in American intellectual life."[109] Adams also illustrated a dominant theme among elitist intellectuals, that their main antagonism was directed against the bourgeoisie. Writing in the nineties, Adams voiced sentiments that were to lead some writers to back fascism or communism in the 1920's and 1930's:

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For my part, hating vindictively as I do our whole fabric and conception of society, against which my little-self squeaked protest from its birth, and will yet protest till its death, I shall be glad to see the whole thing utterly destroyed and wiped away. With communism I could exist tolerably well, for communism is favorable to social consideration apart from wealth; but in a society of brokers and Jews, a world made up of maniacs mad for gold, I have no place.[110]

Antibourgeois, elitist, or overtly antidemocratic sentiments led a small minority of leading American humanists and other intellectuals to find reason to praise Italian fascism. Some who wrote in extremely positive terms were avowedly on the left, and sometimes also pro-Soviet. The *New Republic*, for example, during the last years of the twenties urged a "sympathetic hearing" for the Italian system which promoted "national cohesion and national welfare." The "liberal" weekly even justified fascist violence as necessary to end internal strife and disunity and compared it to the use of force and bloodshed to save the Union during the American Civil War. Its editors at the time included Herbert Croly (who wrote the pro-fascist editorials), Bruce Bliven, Alvin Johnson, Robert Littell, Robert Morss Lovett, George Soule, and Stark Young. Among the prominent Americans who wrote favorably of fascism were writers such as Wallace Stevens and Henry Miller, a variety of humanistic scholars, including Irving Babbitt, Charles Beard, Shephard Clough, Carlton J. H. Hays, Horace Kallen, William Lyon Phelps, George Santayana, and Herbert Schneider, and former "muckrackers" S. S. McClure, Ida Tarbell, and Lincoln Steffens.[111]

Although, as noted earlier, the thirties pressed almost all politically involved American intellectuals to identify with the left, the rightist formulations of the antibourgeois critique had considerable strength among major literary figures in Europe. In Germany, one thinks of Stefan George, Ernst Junger, Friedrich Junger, Gottfried Benn, and Moeller van den Bruck as central figures, almost all of whom came close to identification with the Nazis. In France there were a variety of Catholic reactionaries such as Paul Claudel, Georges Bernanos, Gabriel Marcel, plus the philo-fascist right, Celine, Henri de Montherlant, and Drieu la Rochelle. In the English language world, there were W. B. Yeats, D. H. Lawrence, Wyndham Lewis, the American expatriates T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, all of whom held antidemocratic elitist points of view. Almost all of these figures, however, loathed the materialistic world of commerce and industry.

What has been termed the "aesthetic movement" in literature exhibited their thinking well. John Harrison observes:

> The aesthetic movement, ostensibly the least political of all literary "movements," nevertheless had a profound effect on the political beliefs of many writers and artists . . . Poets in the early nineteenth century tended to retire to a private world where they cultivated the belief in their superiority to practical life . . . Contempt for the taste and judgment of the public can easily become contempt for the public itself, particularly when that public is becoming more numerous and self-assertive.

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. . . The critics of democracy believed that the privileged aristocracies of old, despite their inequities, did preserve a taste for higher human quality and forms of refinement by their traditions. Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses* epitomizes the fear and hatred aroused by the developing mass society. This attitude was widespread among the literary intelligentsia who gave it its most articulate expression.[112]

On the other side, the leftist literary view predominant in the United States for much of the century suggests that conditions of the market place and the power of the privileged class and the state prevent the intellectual from being free; his creativity is thwarted. Writing about the constraints on intellectual creativity, both conservative and leftist intellectuals often cite the same examples, but locate the source of the problem differently. Both, for instance, attack movies, television, or the other mass media for catering to essentially low tastes and suppressing true creativity. Yet, while the conservatives blame the phenomenon on the vulgar values of the mass audience, the leftists attribute it to the bad taste and profit-making motives of the businessmen who own and control these forms of mass communication.

Some have recently argued that the power relationships have been reversed to a marked degree in the United States—that the artist is no longer dependent on a patron, that it is the other way around. James Ackerman says that wealthy consumers now agree to buy art that is judged as the most creative by the leading experimental artists. As a result, there is no longer an avant-garde in the old sense, since the most advanced and esoteric work is quickly bought at high prices by art patrons.[113] Daniel Bell, currently engaged in an in-depth study of the relationship between culture and social structure in the United States, also stresses the power of the creators: "The middle-class audience, or even the buyer alone, no longer controls art. In painting, in film (perhaps less so in advanced music), the artist, and usually the *avant-garde* artist, now dominates the cultural scene. It is he who swiftly shapes the audience and the market, rather than being shaped by them."[114]

The increased power, status, and income of the cultural elite has not appreciably tempered their opposition to the larger society. They still see themselves at war with a "repressive" society. The "adversary culture" is more widespread today than at any time in the past; it finds support among the educated wealthy, where it has taken the form of "radical-chic," an involvement usually on the fund-raising level, with participation in well-publicized social events for causes identified with the most exploited elements in society.[115] As Lionel Trilling notes, "the adversary culture of art and thought . . . has detached a considerable force from the main body of the enemy and has captivated its allegiance."[116]

The situation of writers and artists in the Soviet Union differs in many ways from that of their counterparts in the West. To begin with, they are

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corporately organized and are "officially" dedicated to art as a specific ideological form. To be recognized as a writer and to be published in the Soviet Union, for example, requires that one be a member of the Union of Soviet Writers. Under Stalin, the Writers' Union served as one of many organizational "transmission belts" for communicating decisions from above and mobilizing, in Zhdanov's memorable phrase, these "engineers of the soul."[117] Membership in the Union carried with it—as it does today—certain obligations. One of the articles of the Union's statute specifies "socialist realism" as the basic, obligatory approach of Soviet writers. As the party ideologues reiterate on numerous occasions, only when the writer is guided by party spirit (*partiinost'*) can he understand his place in the historical process and his role and responsibility in the struggles of his time. According to the political authorities, party control is not restricting; rather, it is the very condition of true creative freedom.[118] Literature is necessarily ideological and propagandistic; it must conform to a host of conditions in respect to plot structure and character portrayal, never straying from the party line of the moment. As Andrei Sinyavsky stresses in his essay "On Socialist Realism," Soviet literature and the whole official culture is teleological through and through: its purpose, its very raison d'être, is to speed the coming of Communism.[119]

Needless to say, many talented writers chafe under such limitations. The plethora of underground writings published in the West and the trials of dissident authors tell their own story. Indeed, the tension between writers and patrons common in the West is aggravated in the Soviet Union by the stringent censorship and by the long tradition that imposes a civic obligation on those who choose to write. Yevgeny Yevtushenko asserts: "Perhaps more than the poets of any other nation Russia's poets have been remarkable for their high civic spirit . . . It is no accident that Russia's tyrants regarded Russian poets as their most dangerous enemies . . . To a Russian the word 'poet' has overtones of the word 'fighter.' Russia's poets were always fighters for the future of their country and for justice."[120] The tradition of realistic, *engagé* literature and of the writer as a social critic lives on, shaping the writers' conception of their vocation and thereby contributing to the formation of a critical intelligentsia.

A milestone in the struggle for freedom of artistic expression was the letter submitted by Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers in May 1967, which called for the abolition of censorship.[121] No action was taken on Solzhenitsyn's proposal. Not allowed to publish any of his works in the USSR since the mid-sixties, Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Writers' Union in November 1969. Yet, the very limitations that censorship and political controls impose upon writers create a degree of solidarity and ideological consciousness among those who feel the restrictions. Not fortuitously, Andrei Sakharov applies an observation from Lewis Coser's *Men of Ideas* to the situation of the Soviet writer: "Many an author who

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was initially apolitical was drawn to the political left in the United States because the left was in the forefront of the battle against censorship. The close alliance of avant garde art with avant garde political and social radicalism can be accounted for, at least in part, by the fact that they came to be merged in the mind of many as a single battle for freedom against all repression."[122] Just as Coser believes that censorship contributed to the alienation of intellectuals in France and the United States, so Sakharov suggests that such is occurring in the USSR today. If this is so, then the very stringency of censorship and party control is partly responsible for the fostering of a politically conscious and critical intelligentsia.[123]

Several facts testify to the strong links between the critical intellectuals in the arts and those in the academic world. Several of the most widely publicized protests by academics centered around the trials of writers. As we have noted, the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966 marked a watershed in the development of the oppositionist movement. Because of the attention which their works may receive, writers in particular may become symbols of the struggle for creative freedom and civil rights in the Soviet Union. Such is the case most notably with Solzhenitsyn, whose "portrait hangs in prominent places in [intellectuals'] living rooms: it is a kind of membership of the 'opposition.' "[124]

Academic intellectuals also make up an important part of the public supporting experimental, original, and critical writing and art. Academicians such as Pyotr Kapitsa, Lev Landau, Igor Tamm, and Nikolai Semyonov publicly supported and defended abstract art, though it was denounced by Khrushchev himself.[125] Noting that young or prominent members of the scientific elite are among the most ardent patrons of abstract art, some have attributed this fact to the congruence between theoretical research and a more "intellectual," less representational form of art.[126] Likewise, scientists and other intellectuals tend to be conspicuous among those favoring more innovative forms of literature. The poet Andrei Voznesensky commented while traveling in France in 1962:

> In today's world, in which Sputniks and other extremely complex machines are constructed, there are a vast number of people interested in such things. The people who especially like modern poetry are the young physicists, the young scientists, men who, while they appear very uncomplicated and ordinary, do complex things and are complex people. Thus they don't want overly simple poetry, just as they are not interested in primitive tools.[127]

In short, the Soviet "adversary culture" gains strength from and unites intellectuals in the academic world and those in the arts.

The Power and Influence of Intellectuals

A number of the variables mentioned here as determinants of an intelligentsia have been specified by others as explanatory variables for the

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creation of class consciousness vis-à-vis the political authorities. It is obvious that certain segments of the intellectual stratum may have an international character and are bound to an international community that extends beyond the borders of any single nation. Although there are parallels between an intelligentsia deriving its principal support from the intellectually involved stratum and the fully conscious working class described by Marx, the differences are significant. Whereas the proletariat engages in material production, the intellectual is employed in the production of nonmaterial objects, in the creation and elaboration of ideas and symbolic forms. The industrial working class has been thought to have revolutionary potential because it is a large class whose members are exploited, share a common low status, and are deprived of effective political power. In contrast, though growing at a rapid rate, the intellectual stratum is much smaller and is relatively "well-to-do," if not privileged, with respect to income and prestige.

Yet, to the extent that intellectuals constitute a critical intelligentsia, they have great potential for inducing social, political, and cultural change. This point was emphatically argued by C. Wright Mills, among others. In "The Decline of the Left," written in 1959, Mills said:

> No other group of men is as free [as are intellectuals to make political decisions about their work]; no other group, just now, is as strategically placed for possible innovation as those whose work joins them to the cultural apparatus; to the means of information and knowledge; to the means by which realities are defined, by which programs and politics are elaborated and presented to publics . . .
>
> Intellectuals have created standards and pointed out goals. Then, always, they have looked around for other groups, other circles, other strata to realize them. It is time, now, for us in America to try to realize them ourselves—in our lives, in our own direct action, in the immediate context of our own work.
>
> . . . As intellectuals, we should conduct a continuing, uncompromising criticism of this established culture from the standpoint of—what so-called practical men of affairs call—utopian ideals . . . If we, as intellectuals, do not define and redefine reality, who will?[128]

In his article "The New Left" published the following year, Mills expressed even more forthrightly his conviction that intellectuals should be regarded as the revolutionary class, in effect, by the nascent left movement. Distinguishing himself from contemporary Marxists who regard the working class as the historic agency of radical change, Mills minced no words in pointing to "the really impressive historical evidence that now stands against this expectation" and characterized the belief as a "labor metaphysic," "a legacy from Victorian Marxism that is now quite unrealistic." He proposed that those on the left direct their attention to "the cultural apparatus, the intellectuals—as a possible, immediate, radical agency of change."[129]

To appreciate the intellectuals' potential for social change, it is necessary

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to consider their functions and their relationships to other social elites and to the body politic generally. A key function of intellectuals is to provide symbolic formulations for the cultural construction of reality. Hence, they have potential for the "restructuring" of man's conception of himself and his society. Beyond that, they may be able to apply sanctions to motivate others to act toward their favored ends. The sanctions which they possess are principally three: power derived from the threat of withholding needed services, influence derived from its possession of high prestige, and value commitments generated through the elaboration of ideology.

With respect to the first sanction, power, it is clear that intellectuals supply services vitally needed by various social collectivities and their elites. At the same time, they are dependent on others for resources, particularly financial support in the form of remuneration or grants. By virtue of this interdependence, they are, at least potentially, not without power. The extent to which they come to exercise power depends on the degree to which their services are needed, the degree to which they constitute a unified monopolistic supplier (that is, control the market), and the degree to which they themselves are dependent upon other services or resources which others supply. Although the state, in the United States and the Soviet Union, is dependent on intellectuals for skills and expertise in many areas, including military research and development, they are, for the most part, many separate suppliers rather than a single monopolistic force. For that reason, their power vis-à-vis the state has been obscured by the more manifest power of the political authorities over them. The relationship, however, is not a constant and may not always be so asymmetrical. Intellectuals, particularly when organized, may be able to exercise considerable leverage vis-à-vis other elite groups, including political leaders.

Contributing to the increased political importance of intellectuals has been the growing significance of science and other branches of knowledge, evidenced by the rapid expansion of those occupational groups that are engaged in knowledge production. These changes, as well as growing numbers in the "service" sector, have led some to posit the beginning of a new social era. Daniel Bell speaks of a "post-industrial" society in which theoretical knowledge becomes the principal source of social and economic change, the "matrix of innovation," and in which the scientific-technological intelligentsia gains great prominence, prestige, and power.[130] In a similar vein, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes of the onset of a "technetronic" age, in which technology and especially electronics increasingly become the principal determinants of social change, altering social structure, values, mores, and the global outlook of society.[131]

The impact of the "scientific-technological revolution" has been gaining greater attention recently by scholars in Communist countries, including the Soviet Union. The most comprehensive and significant of these studies, perhaps, is that conducted by Radovan Richta and his associates in the

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mid-sixties under the auspices of the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences. According to the authors, the work, entitled *Civilization at the Crossroads: Social and Human Implications of the Scientific and Technological Revolution,* was "conceived in an atmosphere of critical, radical searching and intensive discussion on the way forward for a society that has reached industrial maturity while passing through a phase of far-reaching socialist transformation."[132] The central thesis of the study is that "science is emerging as the leading variable in the national economy and [is] the *vital dimension* in the growth of civilization. There are signs of a *new* ("post-industrial") *type of growth,* with a new dynamic stemming from continual structural changes in the productive forces, with the amount of means of production and manpower becoming less important than their changing quality and degree of utilization. Herein lie the intensive elements of growth, the acceleration intimately linked with the onset of the scientific and technological revolution."[133] Amplifying this point, the authors write:

> Today it is a commonplace to see the upsurge of science as the feature of our age. Fifty years ago there was nothing in the world to compare with the research centers of today, the network of laboratories, the new towns catering for scientists and universities. Science has penetrated the foundations of contemporary society, infused the dynamics of historical movement so thoroughly that the whole pattern of change appears as a "research revolution" and the coming age as one of "scientific civilization" . . . We discover that the crux lies in the *new status of science.* This type of human activity, which has hitherto served primarily as a factor of *social consciousness,* is now fully and self-evidently proving its worth as a *productive force.*
>
> . . . *all* productive forces are being converted in one way or another into applications of science, which is emerging as the most revolutionary and widespread—and ultimately in effect universal—productive force in society. Therein lies the basis for the new status assumed by science in current civilization processes . . . Science does not operate solely as a factor in the production of things and as an instrument for satisfying wants; it serves equally as a source generating new types of human endeavour, as an initiator and producer of new wants. That is to say, it is a productive force that can create new demands, conflicts and outlooks.
>
> Science owes its new status primarily to its exceptional power of *generalization.* In contrast to other products, a scientific finding is not consumed by use, on the contrary it is improved on—and then "it costs nothing." Moreover, science possesses a peculiar *growth* potential. Every finding is both a result, and then a starting point for further research; the more we know, the more we can find out. This intrinsically exponential quality distinguishes science sharply from all traditional activities of the industrial type.[134]

Coinciding with the scientific-technological revolution are major changes in the occupational structure. Demonstrating the "disparity between the scientific and technological revolution and industrialization," the authors point out, is "the turn to a relative *decline* in the amount of labour absorbed by *industry* and associated activities" and the prospect that the tertiary sector will encompass 40 to 60 per cent of the national labor force in

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industrial countries in the coming decades, as is already the case in the United States. Particularly noteworthy is the trend of rapid expansion of the labor force engaged in science, research, and development: until recently a fraction of one per cent, these experts now constitute about two per cent in the technologically advanced countries; by the end of the century they may account for 10 per cent, and in the first half of the next century 20 per cent or more.[135]

"The fantastic forecast of a drastic, tenfold expansion in scientific activity made by Prof. Bernal in 1939—received with incredulity at the time—was soon outdone by reality," comment Richta and his associates. "In most industrial countries the work force in science, research and development is doubled within eight to twelve years, and in the USSR in seven years."[136] In the United States, the number of engineers rose from 217,000 in 1930 to nearly a million in 1964, whereas during the same period, the number of scientists increased from 46,000 to 475,000. Otherwise stated, whereas between 1930 and 1965 the general work force increased by about 50 per cent, the number of engineers increased by 370 per cent and that of scientists by 930 per cent.[137] In the Soviet Union the growth of the numbers of scientists and scholars (*nauchnye rabotniki*) has also been very rapid.[138] Numbering 96,000 in 1939, they increased to 162,500 in 1950, 354,200 in 1960, and 927,400 in 1970.[139] In the past decade, the growth rate has accelerated.[140]

Not only have the knowledge-producing occupations been increasing in number at a phenomenal rate, but such intellectuals have become more conscious of their social role and more widely valued by the general population. A signal event in the United States was the Soviet Union's successful launching of Sputnik in 1957. As Richard Hofstadter observed: "The Sputnik was more than a shock to American national vanity: it brought an immense amount of attention to bear on the consequences of anti-intellectualism in the school system and in American life at large . . . In 1952 [during the height of McCarthyism] only intellectuals seemed much disturbed by the specter of anti-intellectualism; by 1958 the idea that this might be an important and even a dangerous failing was persuasive to most thinking people."[141] In the Soviet Union, too, the success of Sputnik and subsequent achievements have heightened men's awareness of the importance—and "power"—of scientists.

In appraising the social significance of the expanding intellectual stratum, it is important to realize that though the scientist's or scholar's specialized knowledge may be comprehensible only to a relatively few, his personal prestige is widely appreciated. That prestige may provide the basis for the exercise of influence, in the sense specified by Talcott Parsons, or social leadership more generally. According to Parsons, when given information suggesting a course of action but not offering a clear inducement is transmitted by an actor, the receiver differentially appraises the

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information in terms of the actor's prestige. Prestige, as a code, changes not the content of information but the evaluation of it. If such information is transmitted by someone of higher status, action in accordance with it is more compelling than if it is transmitted by someone of lower status; that is, the message is more "persuasive."[142] Thus, people tend to "look up" to those whom they respect and to defer to their judgments on important matters. In this way, the prestige of knowledge producers contributes to the political and social importance of intellectuals and the critical intelligentsia, both in capitalist and Communist countries.

Significantly, Richta and his associates argue that under socialism it is even *more essential* for intellectuals to be accorded high prestige and allowed freedom of inquiry, since socialism seeks to limit material differences among occupational groups.[143] Yet, as we have noted, such conditions help promote a critical intelligentsia as an independent political force. The authors themselves seem to be aware of, but by no means disturbed by, that possibility. Before the Russian invasion in 1968, they applauded the idea that the expert might become a social critic under these conditions of intellectual freedom.

> The expert is of service to socialist society when he points emphatically to the opportunities for advance and to the barriers, when he is fully informed about science, technology and cultural developments in other countries, when he breaks new ground with full confidence that what furthers socialism will find the recognition due to it. The expert who carries out instructions to the letter has no opinions of his own, avoids taking risks, or is timid, absorbed in his own worries and incapable of criticising superiors and subordinates when things need to be pushed ahead, is of no value to socialism. Today all types of society are facing a test of their ability to create the climate needed for free development and universal application of science.[144]

Not without reason, the authors say that the Communist party "will be equal to the task [of political leadership during the scientific-technological revolution] only if it oversteps the narrow bounds of rule by power and the corresponding means of administration," completely reshapes its internal structure, and evolves a "whole range of new, unorthodox approaches and forms." In their view, power pressures and administrative management "served their purpose," but "are incapable of arousing economic activity, stimulating rapid technological advance, and still less of generating scientific discoveries—in fact, they offer the best way of killing such prospects."[145]

The greater impact of intellectuals and the university community on the body politic of many nations is not a function simply of increased numbers, of the vital services provided, or even of increased general social prestige. Serving both to certify other elites as technically competent through their control of formal education, and helping to produce the ideational and cultural resources that various collectivities need, the culture-producing

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centers and intellectuals have been gaining in their ability to exercise great influence over the other elites, whether in government, the churches, business establishments, or the mass media. They are able more readily to disseminate their values and ideas and assure their acceptance by others in elite positions. Since in the United States the most prestigious within the intellectual world tend to be disproportionately to the left, they are able to influence the beliefs of other less intellectually involved people, both within and outside the university. The most visible and distinguished scholars and scientists constitute important reference individuals for those who respect intellectual accomplishment.[146] This process is more evident in the United States than in the Soviet Union, though even there the political elite is hard pressed to maintain its political hegemony and "charisma" in relation to the expanding, vital, and prestigious stratum of intellectuals.

In the West, the influence of the universities and the intellectual community generally appears with respect to the churches as another chapter in the historic process of secularization. Both the Protestant and Catholic churches are currently under severe internal tensions as they seek to adjust their identity, theology, and ritual to contemporary conditions. Although the complex changes occurring in the churches have a variety of causes, one of the major sources of change stems from the fact that increasingly the leaders of the churches—those concerned, above all, with questions of theology and dogma—conceive of themselves as "intellectuals" and include the secular intellectuals in their reference group.[147] Increasingly, the leaders of the churches appear to seek the approbation of the intellectual community located principally around the universities. While the university is a secular and critical institution which is modern in the sense of constantly being in the forefront of the elaboration of new ideas, churches by their nature emphasize continuity, tradition, and the legitimacy of revelation. Numerous dilemmas confront those churches seeking to maintain belief in revelation and tradition, while also aligning themselves with the critical, innovative approach of the universities. In general, the modernization of many religious denominations reflects the extent to which theology has become a subbranch of the broader intellectual life. Surely the changes in the church have important consequences for the value system of the larger society. Organized religion, rather than being simply a conservative institution, increasingly emerges as an institution pressing for broad social reform, often of a radical nature.

A somewhat analogous problem arises in the Soviet Union where the Communist party seeks to maintain the purity of its Marxist-Leninist ideology, by which the party's "historic" role is justified. In contrast to religious dogma, Marxist-Leninist ideology is purported to be "scientific"—that is, based on empirically verified generalizations rather than revealed truth. According to the official party view, dialectical materialism is sensitive to and dependent on all the accumulated wisdom of science. It is supposed to

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provide the individual branches of science with a codified world-view and an integrated philosophy. But certain problems are inherent in this identification of ideology with science. As Alexander Vucinich, an American scholar, points out:

> It fails to perform the most important task of a philosophy preoccupied with the epistemological problems of science. "It is no accident," states Thomas S. Kuhn, "that the emergence of Newtonian physics in the seventeenth century and of relativity and quantum mechanics in the twentieth should have been both preceded and accompanied by fundamental philosophical analyses of the contemporary research tradition." In relation to science, dialectical materialism is essentially a conservative philosophy—a philosophy too much committed to the proposition of harmonious relations between established ideology and established science to search for and propose new avenues in the development of scientific theory. The primary task of dialectical materialism is to consolidate sacred and secular—ideological and scientific—thought, and to spell out, defend, and extol the superiority of science as a mode of inquiry and a world view. It overlooks the fact that science does not thrive on the dedication of uncritical worshippers but on the work of critical protagonists.[148]

This commitment of the party to the maintenance of ideology in all spheres of life lies at the heart of the troubled relationship between the party and the academics. A true dilemma confronts the party: on the one hand, in order to advance science it seeks to encourage initiative, criticism, and the free expression of original ideas; on the other hand, it attempts to obstruct the expression of ideas or theories which might challenge established ideology.[149] The creation of new knowledge and the construction of improved conceptual schemes carries the threat of "revisionism," whether through incremental emendations or the complete refutation of Marxist propositions. The official contention that Marxist ideology is "scientific" allows critics to challenge both the theory and the political policies on the grounds of science. For example, attacking the idea that it is an "ideological deviation" to express unorthodox ideas, Medvedev declares: "Scientifically speaking, it is senseless and absurd. If ideology is a science, if communism is a science, if Marxism-Leninism is a science, then any criticism of any proposition in these sciences is also a science and not a 'deviation.' In any science, if it is not a collection of empty dogmas, certain propositions are continually going out of date and need to be replaced, new ideas, new propositions are always appearing in connection with new circumstances, new conditions, new relationships."[150] In the long run, it appears likely that the continued cultivation of science in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries will lead to a gradual erosion of ideology, at least in its cruder dogmatic forms.

A second sphere of activity in which the elite shows strong signs of being affected by ties to the intellectual and university world is in the mass media. To an increasing degree in the United States and in other Western countries, the men and women who write for the major papers

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and journals and who are in charge of broadcasting have the same values and political orientations as the critical intellectuals. As noted earlier, a survey by the Harris Poll of mass media editors reports that 40 per cent describe themselves as "liberals," and only 13 per cent as "conservatives," a pattern which puts them far to the left of the public, but to the right of leading intellectuals. Harris reports, however, that 63 per cent of those in charge of major organs located in the major cities are liberal. It may be argued that those who have risen to prominent positions in the mass media wish to be accepted as intellectuals and, like many contemporary theologians, regard the critical intelligentsia as a key reference group. The change in the outlook of journalists, for instance, has recently been described by A. James Reichley:

> Since World War II the old reporters of the *Front Page* school, whose attitudes were at least as much anti-intellectual as anti-government, have gradually disappeared. The new journalists have tended to be better educated and more professional—and strongly influenced by prevailing currents of opinion in the academic community. The part played by the Ivy League in the intellectual establishment has no doubt been exaggerated, but it is worthy of note that almost one third of the nation's most influential journalists . . . turn out to be graduates of Ivy League schools. Even the top national journalists who are not college graduates . . . operate in a milieu in which liberal intellectual attitudes are pervasive. The suggestion of one critic that many national journalists now function as a kind of "lesser clergy" for the academic elite is not far from correct.[151]

Such men identify prestige with being at the summit of an intellectual institution, not with being successful in business. Since many who work in the mass media identify with the summits of the intellectual world, the "working press" is often composed of individuals sympathetic to social change. Consequently, though the most influential American mass media—the Columbia Broadcasting System, National Broadcasting Company, *Washington Post, New York Times,* and the like—are big business establishments, they increasingly present a sympathetic view of those who seek to change society from the left.

In the Soviet Union, the intellectual community does not exercise a comparable influence on the mass media managers and producers; the party continues to exercise control through agencies such as *Glavlit,* the system of *nomenklatura,* and the like. It would seem, in contrast to the American case, that not finding sympathetic supporters for their views, the Soviet intellectuals try to a considerable extent to circumvent the controlled media altogether. Unpublished Soviet sociological studies indicate that scientists in major research centers rely on foreign radio for reliable news and ignore the Soviet mass media.

A third elite group on which the intellectual community in the West exerts growing influence is the government bureaucracy. Commenting on the way in which the antibusiness values of the intellectuals were under-

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mining the legitimacy of capitalism, Joseph Schumpeter stressed the "direct relationship between the intellectual group and the bureaucracy . . . Except for inhibitions due to professional training and experience, they are therefore open to conversion by the modern intellectual with whom, through a similar education, they have much in common, while the tinge of gentility that in many cases used to raise a barrier [particularly in Europe] has been fading away from the modern civil servant during the last decades. Moreover, in time of rapid expansion of the sphere of public administration, much of the additional personnel required has to be taken directly from the university."[152] The government bureaucracy has become increasingly dependent on the expertise cultivated by the university, so that it is now staffed, particularly at its upper levels, by men with close ties to the university world. Since many of them seek the approbation of that community, they, too, appear responsive to the changing orientations and generally leftist dispositions of prominent figures in the academic world.

In the Soviet Union, intellectuals do not exercise a degree of influence on the political elite which is comparable to that of intellectuals in most Western countries. Party control of institutions of higher education, the Academy of Sciences, and the various professional unions, as well as of the mass media, greatly limits the ability of intellectuals to influence diverse social groups. At the same time, stress upon the preservation of ideological purity and political reliability in the promotion of individuals in the party and state bureaucracies obstructs the spread of values and ideas articulated by critical intellectuals. Yet, it is certain that the governing authorities are relying to an increasing degree upon the specialized competence of highly educated personnel and that the latter are forming a growing proportion of the party membership. The incidence of party membership correlates positively with level of education: the more one's education, the more likely one is to be a member of the CPSU, and the higher one's position within it will probably be.[153] Whereas in 1956 "specialists" (those with higher or specialized secondary education) made up 26 per cent of the party membership, by 1965 they had increased to more than 34 per cent. Graduates of institutions of higher education have come to be particularly highly represented in the party. In 1965, 39 per cent of the 4.6 million graduates were in the party, as compared with 35 per cent of the 2.3 million graduates in 1956.[154] More than 90 per cent of the full members of the Central Committee elected at the Twenty-Third Party Congress in 1966 had a complete higher education.[155] It remains to be seen whether this increasing reliance upon the expertise deriving from education and research in universities and institutes will lead to intellectuals' exerting greater influence on the political leadership. At a number of points we have commented on the dilemma posed for the leadership as it tries to foster intellectual creativity and "development" in the broadest sense, while simultaneously seeking to maintain ideological orthodoxy and discipline. In view of the evidence reviewed,

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there is every reason to expect that the tension and conflict between creative intellectuals and the party authorities in the Soviet Union will continue.

In the United States, the leadership group most resistant to this trend is business management. One would expect business executives to provide support for conservative values since they manage the dominant economic institutions of the society. Yet, even business and management are beginning to face problems deriving from the functions and prestige of the university. Particularly in capitalist society, as Schumpeter noted, and as was later reiterated by the radical sociologist J. P. Nettl, the business establishment finds it necessary to protect the right of intellectuals to undermine the system. They argued:

> In capitalist society . . . any attack on the intellectuals must run up against the private fortresses of bourgeois business which, or some of which, will shelter the quarry. Moreover such an attack must proceed according to bourgeois principles of legislative and administrative practice which no doubt may be stretched and bent but will checkmate prosecution beyond a certain point. Lawless violence the bourgeois stratum may accept or even applaud when thoroughly roused or frightened, but only temporarily . . . because the freedom it disapproves cannot be crushed without also crushing the freedom it approves . . .
>
> From this follows both the unwillingness and the inability of the capitalist order to control its intellectual sector effectively . . . the intellectual group cannot help nibbling . . . and criticism of persons and of current events will, in a situation in which nothing is sacrosanct, fatally issue in criticism of classes and institutions . . .
>
> In defending the intellectuals as a group—not of course every individual—the bourgeoisie defends itself and its scheme of life. Only a government of a non-bourgeois nature and non-bourgeois creed—under modern circumstances only a socialist or fascist one—is strong enough to discipline them.[156]

One cannot preclude the possibility of a fascist reaction to severe challenges from the intelligentsia, but in the United States at least, as David Riesman has suggested, it appears that the top business executives show increasing respect and concern for "intellectual values" as articulated by those in universities.[157] Being respectful of intellectuals and sharing at least certain of their values, the business elite is significantly affected by criticism emanating from the academy and the intellectual world. Preliminary results from the Columbia University study of the American elite, directed by Charles Kadushin and Alan Barton, strongly reinforce these assumptions.

In the Soviet Union, the influence of the academic world and the critical intelligentsia appears weaker in respect to the state economic managers. For one thing, the process of self-selection noted by Frederich Hayek in the United States is probably even more pronounced in the USSR. The more "intellectual" and critical men and women prefer to engage in research far removed from the exigencies of management. Also, political reliability continues to be a major criterion for promotion in the bureaucracy; consequently, those at the top show a strong commitment to the

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established ideology and its principal tenets. Although some are critical of certain aspects of the economic system, their criticism is often of a narrow and technical nature. However, such a "technocratic" critique has some points of congruence with the ideological propositions of various members of the scientific community.[158]

Conclusion

Intellectuals and their apprentices, university students, have never been as numerous as they are today. Given the increased requirement of post-industrial society for university-trained people and continuing high levels of innovative research, the university is needed more than ever before. While the society is becoming more dependent on intellectuals, it is also more influenced by them.

It may be argued that the growth of critical intelligentsia disposed to support the "adversary culture" and reject the worth of dominant political and economic institutions is undermining the capacity of governing systems in modern societies to maintain social equilibrium. Leadership itself, the primary function of authority, is under question by intellectuals everywhere. Castro, Mao, Tito, Franco, the Greek colonels, the leaders of Western Europe, no less than those who head the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, find themselves at odds with their intellectuals.

The critical intellectual denies the possibility of participating in government without betraying the ideals of the society. Faced with attacks on their legitimacy from intellectuals and students, many in the governing elites exhibit a failure of nerve. They find it difficult to ignore or suppress groups whose values of scientific and intellectual progress they are committed to. The basic tensions, the contradictions within the system, come increasingly from within the elite itself—from its own intellectual leaders supported by large segments of its student children. If in Hegelian terms the contradiction of capitalism was its dependence on an ever growing working class brought together in large factories, the contradiction of post-industrial society, whether Communist or non-Communist, may be its dependence on trained intelligence, on research and innovation, which requires it to bring together large numbers of intellectuals and students on great campuses and in a few intellectual communities located at the centers of communication and influence.

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23. May, *The Discontent of the Intellectuals,* p. 19.

24. For references, see Lipset, *Rebellion in the University,* p. 162.

25. Granville Hicks, *Where We Came Out* (New York: Viking, 1954), p. 165. For a more recent analysis by a Marxist on the revived radicalism of the intellectuals of the 1920's, see Martin J. Sklar, "On the Proletarian Revolution and the End of Political-Economic Society," *Radical America,* 3 (May-June 1969), 23-36.

26. See David Felix, *Protest: Sacco-Vanzetti and the Intellectuals* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965).

27. *Ibid.,* p. 16.

28. Ernest Earnest, *Academic Procession* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), p. 279.

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29. See especially Eugene Lyons, *The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941), p. 129.

30. Aaron, *Writers on the Left,* pp. 196-198.

31. Daniel Bell, "The Background and Development of Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Donald D. Egbert and Stow Persons, *Socialism and American Life,* I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 353-354; see also Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, "The Intellectuals Turn Left," *The American Communist Party: A Critical History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 273-318.

32. Morris L. Ernst and David Loth, *Report on the American Communist* (New York: Holt, 1952), pp. 3-4.

33. For these studies see Lipset, *Political Man,* pp. 314-318.

34. For a report on this study and other surveys conducted during the 1930's, see Lipset, *Rebellion in the University,* p. 184 and pp. 178-182.

35. Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert, *Public Opinion and the Individual* (New York: Harper, 1938), pp. 107-108.

36. Philip Rahv, "American Intellectuals in the Postwar Situation," reprinted in his *Literature and the Sixth Sense* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1969), pp. 176-177.

37. *Political Man,* pp. 341-343.

38. John Kenneth Galbraith, "An Adult's Guide to New York, Washington and Other Exotic Places," *New York,* 4 (November 15, 1971), 52.

39. These studies are reported and cited in Lipset, "Academia and Politics in America," pp. 211-289.

40. Trilling, *Beyond Culture,* pp. xii-xiii. For documentation from novels, see John Chamberlain, "The Businessman in Fiction," *Fortune,* 38 (November 1948), 134-148.

41. Charles Kadushin, Julie Hover, and Monique Tichy, "How and Where to Find Intellectual Elite in the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 35 (Spring 1971), 1-18.

42. The academic data are from the massive (60,000 sample) survey of American professors conducted by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education which is being analyzed by Everett Ladd and Lipset. References to various findings from that study are reported in Lipset, "Academia and Politics in America." The data on the major intellectuals are from the Kadushin study cited in the previous note. The information on the culture critics and editors is from a study conducted by the Harris Poll in 1969, as reported in a newspaper release issued by the United Church of Christ, March 16, 1970. The leading scholars from the Carnegie study are those who have published ten or more books or articles in the past two years and are located at "elite schools" as defined by their standards for admitting students and amount of research funds and revenue.

43. Bernard Gwertzman, "Brezhnev Is Given Ovation as Congress Votes Report," *New York Times,* April 6, 1971, p. 3.

44. On the early meaning of the word "intelligentsia" see Alan P. Pollard, "The Russian Intelligentsia: The Mind of Russia," *California Slavic Studies,* 3 (1964), 1-32. For further references see Michael Confino, "On Intellectuals and Intellec-

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tual Traditions in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Russia," *Dædalus* (Spring 1972), pp. 117-149.

45. Confino, "On Intellectuals and Intellectual Traditions," pp. 138 ff. Cf. George Fisher, "The Intelligentsia and Russia," in Cyril E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change Since 1861* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 262.

46. Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope: A Memoir,* trans. Max Hayward (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 165.

47. *Ibid.,* p. 168.

48. "'Doctor Zhivago': Letter to Boris Pasternak from the Editors of *Novyi Mir,*" in Richard Pipes, ed., *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 224.

49. On the literary ferment of the fifties, see Harold Swayze, *Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962) and Robert Conquest, *The Pasternak Affair* (New York: Lippincott, 1962). On the literary situation in the early sixties, see Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964,* with documents selected and edited by Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965); and Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, eds., *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) and *Halfway to the Moon: New Writing from Russia* (New York: Anchor Books, 1965).

50. Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* with an introduction by Leopold Labedz, letters, commentaries, and notes (New York: Perennial Library, 1971), pp. 8-9. The *samizdat* materials (typewritten manuscripts or photocopied material that are circulated through informal social networks) are diverse, ranging from verses by obscure poets and the unpublished works by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, to detailed accounts of recent political developments and of the trials of dissidents. See the following anthologies: Abram Brumberg, ed., *In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1970); *Samizdat I: La voix de l'opposition communiste en U.R.S.S.* (Paris: Combats, 1969); and Michel Slavinsky, ed., *La Presse clandestine en U.R.S.S., 1960-1970* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1970). The best available guide to published and unpublished *samizdat* materials in English and Russian appears to be *The Radio Liberty Register of Samizdat,* Reference Handbook No. 76, compiled by Albert Boiter and Peter Dornan, Research Department, Radio Liberty, February 1971.

51. Sinyavsky and Daniel were arrested in September 1965, and tried in February 1966, at which time they were sentenced to seven and five years respectively, in strict regime labor camps, for having published their books abroad. Documents on the trial are found in *On Trial: The Soviet State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak,"* translated and edited with an introduction by Max Hayward, revised, enlarged edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Works by Abram Tertz (Andrei Sinyavsky) include *Fantastic Stories* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963), *The Trial Begins and On Socialistic Realism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), and *The Makepeace Experiment* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). The story "This Is Moscow Speaking" by Nikolai Arzhak (Yuli Daniel) is found in Blake and Hayward, eds., *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature.*

52. Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* p. 9. See Viacheslav Chornovil,

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The Chornovil Papers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and Anatoly Marchenko, *My Testimony* (New York: Delta, 1971). Amalrik, too, was arrested, tried, and sentenced in 1970 for publishing "anti-Soviet" works—notably, his essay, cited above. His previous conviction and exile under the earlier "anti-parasite" laws are described in Andrei Amalrik, *Involuntary Journey to Siberia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1971). The trials themselves gave little evidence of the magnitude of the struggle being waged. On the widespread use of "administrative sanctions," see the recent account by An Observer, *Message From Moscow,* with a new Epilogue "Russian Intellectuals in the Leninist Year" (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), esp. pp. 44-90, 289ff; and the account of psychiatric detention for political reasons by Zhores A. and Roy A. Medvedev, *A Question of Madness* (New York: Knopf, 1971).

53. Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* pp. 10–13. Amalrik dates the Democratic movement from 1968, the time of the extensive public protests over the violations of legality in the trial of Galanskov, Ginzburg, and others. Some of the documents from this period are found in Brumberg, ed., *In Quest of Justice,* pp. 93-182.

54. For some materials by and about Kosterin, Grigorenko, and Yakhimovich, see Brumberg, ed., *In Quest of Justice.*

55. Relevant documents are found in Michael Bourdeaux, *Patriarch and Prophets* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

56. See Pavel Litvinov, *The Demonstration in Pushkin Square* (Boston: Gambit, 1969) and Karel van het Reve, *Dear Comrade: Pavel Litvinov and the Voices of Soviet Citizens in Dissent* (New York: Pitman, 1969). See also Andrei D. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,* with an introduction and notes by Harrison E. Salisbury (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968) and "Appeal of Soviet Scientists to the Party-Government Leaders of the USSR," an Open Letter from A. D. Sakharov, V. F. Turchin, R. A. Medvedev (dated March 19, 1970), *Survey,* 76 (Summer 1970), 160-170.

57. An English translation of *The Chronicle of Current Events* is published regularly by Amnesty International in London. A number of other serial *samizdat* "publications" have also appeared. Among these are *Iskhod* (Exodus), which is devoted to the struggle of Jews for their rights; *Politicheskoi devnik* (Political diary), which evidently circulates among those in political positions, perhaps within the party *apparat*; *Veche* (named after the ancient Russian popular assembly), which has a strongly Slavophilistic orientation; and *Obshchestvennye problemy* (Social problems), edited by Valery Chalidze, a founding member of the Committee for Human Rights, whose viewpoint and concerns it largely mirrors.

58. "The Committee for Human Rights in the USSR," *Chronicle of Current Events,* 17 (London, April 1971), 45-46.

59. *Ibid.,* p. 47, and Bernard Gwertzman, "Three in Russia Move to Defend Rights," *New York Times,* November 16, 1970, pp. 1, 8.

60. Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* pp. 14-15.

61. Among Soviet sociologists, the most widely accepted and authoritative view appears to be that formulated by M. N. Rutkevich: "By intelligentsia (in the narrow, direct sense) in a socialist society we understand the social group, [or] segment (*sloi*), consisting of individuals who are professionally employed in the performance

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of highly-qualified mental labor which requires specialized secondary or higher education." M. N. Rutkevich, "Intelligentsiia kak sotsial'naia gruppa i ee sblizhenie s rabochim klassom" (The intelligentsia as a social group and its rapprochement with the working class), in Ts. A. Stepanian and V. S. Semenov, eds., *Sotsial'nye klassy, sloi, i gruppy v SSSR* (Social classes, segments, and groups in the USSR) (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), pp. 136-137. Most Soviet sociologists characterize the intelligentsia as a "segment" (*sloi*), rather than a social class (*klass*), and regard the main components of Soviet society as two classes of manual workers—the working class and the collective farm peasantry—and a nonmanual "segment." Occasionally, some sociologists still include all nonmanual workers in the intelligentsia (that is, both specialists and less qualified white-collar workers), while others define it more narrowly than Rutkevich. As noted, however, the dominant tendency is to follow Rutkevich in distinguishing between the intelligentsia composed of specialists and the less qualified white-collar workers (*sluzhashchi*). According to the criteria of Rutkevich's definition, some fifteen million persons would be included in the Soviet "intelligentsia." For an overview and critique of various social scientists' conceptions of the intelligentsia, see Stepanian and Semenov, eds., *Sotsial'nye klassy, sloi, i gruppy v SSSR*, esp. pp. 136-143, and P. P. Amelin, *Intelligentsiia i sotsializm* (The intelligentsia and socialism) (Leningrad: Leningrad University Press, 1970), esp. pp. 40-44. A detailed discussion of these problems is found in Zev Katz, *The Soviet Sociologists' Debate on Social Structure in the U.S.S.R.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December 1971). Complementing this study is his forthcoming *Part II: Soviet Dissenters' Views on Social Structure in the U.S.S.R.* We are particularly indebted to Dr. Katz for sharing with us his insights on the Soviet Union and bringing to our attention relevant material.

62. S. A. Kugel', "Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva pod vozdeistviem nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii" (Change in the social structure of socialist society through the influence of the scientific-technological revolution), *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 3 (1969), 16.

63. Amelin, *Intelligentsiia i sotsializm*, pp. 41-44.

64. Igor Kon, "Razmyshleniia ob amerikanskoi intelligentsii" (Reflections on the American intelligentsia), *Novy Mir*, no. 1 (1968), 179.

65. An Observer, *Message From Moscow*, p. 199.

66. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, pp. 27-28.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

69. Zhores A. Medvedev, "Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World," in *The Medvedev Papers*, trans. Vera Rich, with a foreword by John Ziman, F.R.S. (London: Macmillan St. Martins Press, 1971), pp. 170-171. Emphasis added.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

71. "Appeal of Soviet Scientists to the Party-Government Leaders of the USSR," an Open Letter from Sakharov, Turchin, Medvedev, p. 165.

72. Jonathan Harris, "The Dilemma of Dissidence," *Survey*, 16 (Winter 1971), 107.

73. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, *A Precocious Autobiography*, trans. Andrew R. MacAndrew

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(New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964), pp. 91-92. Indeed, no one in Russia was unaffected by the death of the dictator. For instance, as a retired schoolteacher told Maurice Hindus in 1958: "In the time of Stalin, teaching history was a simple matter: all I had to do was to stick to Anna Pankratova's texts like a fly to paper and no one could make trouble for me. But soon after Stalin's death, academicians, historians, and ideologists began to denounce Pankratova's fables and to wrangle over how best to present our history to the younger generation. It was a trying time for history teachers." Because of the perplexities of the historians over a new history textbook, Hindus reports, there were no school examinations in the subject in the spring of 1953. Maurice Hindus, *House Without a Roof: Russia After Forty-Three Years of Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 325-326.

74. Furthermore, the task of rendering experience meaningful may easily merge with that of creating ideology, since such interpretations embody values, ideals which can be generalized. It is in terms of the generalization of values inherent in a creative work that one can understand the impact, for instance, of the short novel by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. The publication of his novel in the fall of 1962, during one of those ephemeral bloomings of "liberalization," was a literary event of the first magnitude. Solzhenitsyn's portrayal of the quiet dignity of a simple worker in one of the labor camps, based upon his personal experience, perhaps came closer to the life experiences of millions of Soviet citizens than any work which they had read. The condemnation of Stalinism contained in the work is implicit, but strong. In 1963, although he had reportedly given his personal approval for publication of the novel, Khrushchev stated with consternation that literary magazines had received about 10,000 novels, short stories, and memoirs on the theme of labor camps. Soon it was said, "Tell me your attitude about Ivan Denisovich, and I will tell you who you are." The last two points are reported in Mihajlo Mihajlov, *Moscow Summer*, introduction, notes, and biographical information by Andrew Field (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965), pp. 66, 128. Cf. Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope*, pp. 287-289, and see "How People Read *One Day*" (A Survey of Letters, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn), in Leopold Labedz, ed., *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record* (New York: Harper and Row), pp. 21-37.

75. Cf. Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* p. 17. Amalrik asserts that as a consequence of their need and respect for law, professionals in general constitute "the basic stratum of any society on which a democratic regime bases itself."

76. Mandelstam, *Hope Against Hope*, pp. 331-333.

77. N. Sviridov, "Party Concern for the Upbringing of the Scientific-Technical Intelligentsia," *Kommunist*, 18 (December 1968), as translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 21 (January 22, 1969), 5.

78. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*, pp. 54-55.

79. François Fejto, "Les intellectuels et la politique: pays de l'est: revendication du droit à la critique," *Le monde diplomatique*, 19 (October 1970), 11-12. For detailed analyses of the Czech events see Dušan Hamšik, *Writers Against Rulers* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971) and Vladimir V. Kusin, *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia, 1956-1967* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971). For a discussion of the relationship of Communism to intellectuals in many countries, including the West,

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Eastern Europe, and Communist China, see Jürgen Rühle, *Literature and Revolution* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969).

80. Benjamin Schwartz, "The Intelligentsia in Communist China: A Tentative Comparison," in Pipes, ed., *The Russian Intelligentsia,* p. 180.

81. Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1949), pp. 118-119.

82. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 560.

83. *Ibid.,* p. 553. Emphasis in text.

84. Radovan Richta and a research team, *Civilization at the Crossroads: Social and Human Implications of the Scientific and Technological Revolution,* English language ed., trans. Marian Šlingová, October 1968, printed in Czechoslovakia, distributed in the United States by International Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, N.Y., p. 228.

85. Kapitsa stated: "I have said many times that what we need is a scholars' clubhouse where we could gather and talk about the essential problems of our work in an atmosphere free of any coercive elements. When I worked in England, I observed that the most interesting discussions about the leading current scientific problems took place in colleges at meal times. There we discussed the questions that crossed the boundaries of many sciences. This helped us to widen our horizons and to comprehend the current significance of individual scientific orientations." Cited in Alexander Vucinich, "Science," in Allen Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 336.

86. For example, Anatol Rapoport, "Have the Intellectuals a Class Interest?" in H. P. Dreitzel, ed., *Recent Sociology No. 1* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 237; J. P. Nettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent," in Philip Rieff, ed., *On Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies, Case Studies* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), p. 125. For reports on various studies of student activism in the United States which indicate a relationship between size of academic institution and propensity for protest, see Lipset, *Rebellion in the University,* pp. 94-100.

87. Zhores Medvedev notes that partly because of the centralized communication system (that is, for distributing scientific information), Soviet scientists and scholars are much more concentrated geographically than those in the United States. In contrast to the data of the National Academy of Sciences which shows that American scientists are distributed throughout the country roughly in proportion to the area's population, he observes that 85 per cent of the Academicians and Corresponding Members of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union have Moscow addresses. Speaking with knowledge of his own field of research, he adds that not less than 70 per cent of all the scientifically significant laboratories and institutes in the field of biology, biochemistry, genetics, embryology, and biophysics are located in the Moscow area. Medvedev, *The Medvedev Papers,* pp. 126–127.

88. R. Yanovsky, "The Scientist's Ideological Convictions," *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* August 28, 1970, as translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* 22, no. 46 (December 15, 1970), 5.

89. *Ibid.*

90. The most notorious case of political interference is that of the suppression of the

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study of genetics and advancement of Lysenko to a position of supremacy in biology. See the recent work by the Soviet biologist Zhores A. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko,* trans. I. Michael Lerner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

91. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,* pp. 56-57.

92. P. F. Lazarsfeld and W. Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), pp. 95, 104.

93. Robert Nisbet, *The Degradation of the Academic Dogma* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 143.

94. Thorstein Veblen, "The Intellectual Pre-Eminence of Jews in Modern Europe," in his *Essays in Our Changing Order* (New York: Viking Press, 1934), pp. 226-227.

95. Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *The Academic Mind,* pp. 161-163.

96. Hayek, "The Intellectuals and Socialism," pp. 426-427.

97. *Ibid.,* p. 427.

98. *Ibid.,* note 3; see also for a general discussion of the sources of Jewish involvement in intellectual activities and their relationship to politics, S. M. Lipset and Everett Ladd, Jr., "Jewish Academics in the United States: Their Achievements, Culture and Politics," in *The American Jewish Year Book 1971,* 72 (New York: American Jewish Committee, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1971), 89-128.

99. These studies are discussed in Lipset, *Rebellion in the University,* pp. 80-123.

100. For an overview of the findings of these studies, see Lipset, "Academia and Politics in America," pp. 227ff. For more detailed discussions of specific disciplines see various articles reporting on the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education survey of 60,000 American academics by Everett Ladd and Lipset. Those most relevant to the discussion here are: "Politics and Polarities: And What Professors Think," *Psychology Today,* 4 (November 1970), 49-51; "American Social Scientists and the Growth of Campus Political Activism in the 1960's," *Social Science Information,* 10 (April 1971), 105-120; "The Politics of American Political Scientists," *PS,* 4 (Spring 1971), 135-144; "The Politics of American Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology,* 78 (July 1972); and "Politics of Academic Natural Scientists and Engineers," *Science* (forthcoming).

101. Albert Parry, *The New Class Divided: Science and Technology Versus Communism* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 280.

102. From "The Social Sciences Are a Combat Weapon of the Party," *Pravda,* December 22, 1971, p. 2, as translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* 23 (January 18, 1972), p. 10.

103. As one recent commentator points out, "Most intellectuals try to find work as far removed from politics as possible: editing a journal of ancient history, for example, is preferable to working on contemporary history because of the obligatory half-truths and evasions the latter entails. The natural sciences are preferred to the humanities and social sciences for the same reason: Marxism-Leninism makes no claim on the behaviour pattern of atoms. In writing, the pure adventure story is preferred to any story that involves a factory, sociology or politics in any way.

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In research, the obscure writer or thinker is preferred as a subject to the well-known one.

"In everything the light-weight peripheral project is preferred; it is less likely to attract attention, and hence there is a greater chance of honesty." An Observer, *Message From Moscow*, pp. 223-224.

104. Zev Katz, "Sociology in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism*, 20 (May-June 1971), 38-40. Katz notes, too, that "in contrast to the situation in the literary field, not a single piece of sociological writing suppressed in the USSR has been published abroad; there is not a single Soviet sociologist who is an expatriate in the West; nor do the signatures of Soviet sociologists usually appear on protest documents. This would seem to indicate that even the most critical members of the Soviet sociological community accept the basic principles of socialism as their point of departure, although many of them, one suspects, would like to see—and promote—an evolution of the system in the direction of the humanist ideals of Marxism and the Bolshevik Revolution. When they are critical, their criticism and their constructive proposals for change appear to be motivated by such a desire rather than by any thought of overthrowing the system altogether. Indeed, such an attitude may be an indispensible precondition for a major contribution by sociology to a positive transformation of Soviet society." (p. 28) It is possible that since many Soviet sociologists produce findings which often sharply challenge the official ideology in the course of their normal scientific work (for example, that school grades, dropping out, and university attendance correlate highly with parental socioeconomic status, that high school youth disdain manual and rural employment, and the like), they may feel it necessary to pretend to a greater formal ideological loyalty than do those whose work, as such, does not touch the party line. For a discussion of the factors which make sociology the most "adversary" discipline in western academe, see Lipset and Ladd, "The Politics of American Sociologists."

105. Jean-Paul Sartre, *What Is Literature?* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 81-82. Emphases in original.

106. Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (New York: Viking Press, 1961), pp. 201-204; see also pp. 197-226. For a general analysis, see Ferdinand Kolegar, "Literary Intellectuals and the Politics of Perfection," *Indian Sociological Bulletin*, 3 (October 1965), 79-90.

107. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 186-187.

108. William B. Hixson, Jr., *Moorfield Storey and the Abolitionist Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 36. See also Kermit Vanderbilt, *Charles Eliot Norton: Apostle of Culture in a Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 194-220.

109. Joseph Gusfield, "Intellectual Character and the American Universities," *The Journal of General Education*, 14 (January 1963), 234.

110. Quoted in Wilson Record, "The American Intellectual as Black Sheep and Red Rover," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, 40 (Winter 1954-1955), 538-539. In commenting on the French scene in 1896, Adams wrote: "No common interest can ever reunite rich and poor, clerical and atheist, bourgeois and artist." W. C. Ford, ed., *Letters of Henry Adams* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1938), p. 114.

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111. John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 209-260; see also Thomas Molnar, "The Intellectual as a Reactionary," in his *The Decline of the Intellectual* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1961), pp. 157-198.

112. J. R. Harrison, *The Reactionaries* (London: Gollancz, 1966), pp. 25-26.

113. James Ackerman, "The Demise of the *Avant Garde*: Notes on the Sociology of Recent American Art," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 11 (October 1969), 371-384.

114. Daniel Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," *The Public Interest,* no. 21 (Fall 1970), 21.

115. Tom Wolfe, *Radical Chic & Mau-mauing the flak catchers* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970).

116. Trilling, *Beyond Culture,* p. xv. For a description and analysis of the diverse forms of tension between the literary world and the "modern economic personality" from the early nineteenth century to the present see César Graña, "Social Optimism and Literary Depression," in his *Fact and Symbol* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 3-64.

117. On the political functions of the Writers' Union under Stalin, see Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "The 'Governing Organs' of the Union of Soviet Writers," *American Slavic and East European Review,* 15 (1956), 382-399.

118. For example, A. Rumiantsev, "The Party Spirit of the Creative Labor of the Soviet Intelligentsia," *Pravda,* September 9, 1965, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* 17, no. 36 (September 29, 1965), 3-6.

119. Abram Tertz (Andrei Sinyavsky), *The Trial Begins and On Socialist Realism,* pp. 150ff.

120. Yevtushenko, *A Precocious Autobiography,* pp. 88-89.

121. Document 49, in Brumberg, ed., *In Quest of Justice,* pp. 245-247. As Solzhenitsyn's letter states, in part, "Under the obfuscating label of *Glavlit,* this censorship—which is not provided for in the Constitution and is therefore illegal, and which is nowhere publicly labeled as such—imposes a yoke on our literature and gives people unversed in literature arbitrary control over writers . . . Literature cannot develop between the categories of 'permitted' and 'not permitted,' 'about this you may write' and 'about this you may not.' Literature that is not the breath of contemporary society, that dares not transmit the pains and fears of that society, that does not warn in time against threatening moral and social dangers—such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it is only a façade."

122. Sakharov, *Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,* p. 62. Sakharov derived the quotation from Kon, "Razmyshleniia ob amerikanskoi intelligentsii," 190-191.

123. Coser, *Men of Ideas,* pp. 95-97.

124. An Observer, *Message From Moscow,* p. 307.

125. Parry, *The New Class Divided,* pp. 263-264.

126. *Ibid.,* pp. 264-265.

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127. Cited *ibid.*, p. 265.

128. C. Wright Mills, *Power, Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills,* edited with an introduction by Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 231-233.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

130. Daniel Bell's views have been widely published. See, for instance, his recent articles, "Technocracy and Politics," *Survey,* 17 (Winter 1971), 1-24, and "The Post-Industrial Society: The Evolution of an Idea," *Survey,* 18 (Spring 1971), 102-168. For an alternative view, see Alain Touraine, *The Post Industrial Society* (New York: Random House, 1971).

131. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1971).

132. Richta and others, *Civilization at the Crossroads,* p. 21.

133. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

134. *Ibid.*, pp. 212, 213, 217. Emphasis in text.

135. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-124.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

137. Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Indicators of Social Change: Concepts and Measurements* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 201-202.

138. The Soviet category "scientific worker" *(nauchnyi rabotnik)* includes a wide variety of specialized workers. According to current usage by the Central Statistical Administration, the definition encompasses Academicians, full members and corresponding members of all academies, all persons with a higher degree of candidate or doctor of sciences or with the academic title of professor, associate professor *(dosent),* assistant professor, senior research worker *(nauchnyi sotrudnik),* junior research worker, irrespective of the place or nature of their work, and also persons conducting research work in research establishments or carrying out research and teaching in institutions of higher education, regardless of whether they have higher degrees or academic titles, as well as specialists without a higher degree who carry out research at enterprises and project organizations. E. Zaleski and others, *Science Policy in the USSR* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969), p. 543. On earlier definitions, see Alexander G. Korol, *Soviet Research and Development: Its Organization, Personnel, and Funds* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 76-78.

139. T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1967* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 442; Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 g.* (Moscow: Statistika, 1970), p. 694; Central Statistical Administration, *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1970 gody: kratkii statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow: Statistika, 1971), p. 191.

140. Thus, from the end of 1960 through 1966—that is, in the course of six years—the number of scientific workers doubled, whereas during the fifties, such doubling took ten years. On the average, according to S. A. Kugel', the number of scientific workers has been growing by more than 12 per cent annually, faster than any other social-occupational group. In comparison, the number of workers and em-

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ployees as a whole has been increasing by just 4.3 per cent a year, and industrial workers by 3.5 per cent. In some fields the growth rate has been even more intensive. During the early sixties, for instance, in the fastest growing fields—economics, technical science, and physics and mathematics—the number of scientists doubled in approximately four years. Kugel', "Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury," 18.

141. Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life,* pp. 4-5.

142. Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," in his *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 355-382.

143. "Many specialists will lack the incentives existing under capitalism—social distinctions cannot be unduly sharpened. The greater then the need for socialist countries to contrive and safeguard a suitable regime for creative work, leaving people as free as possible to do their special jobs; the more important it is to raise the prestige of work in science and technology and, most important, to give the socialist expert a wide field for freely creative self-assertion." Richta and others, *Civilization at the Crossroads,* p. 232.

144. *Ibid.,* p. 233.

145. *Ibid.,* pp. 253-254.

146. See Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *The Academic Mind,* p. 250, for a discussion of this process within academe as it affects younger faculty and graduate students.

147. This reference group phenomenon is reflected symbolically in the proximity of major seminaries in the United States to university centers. For instance, the Union Theological Seminary and the Jewish Theological Seminary are across the street from Columbia; the Pacific School of Religion is up the hill from the University of California; and the Episcopal Theological Seminary is next door to Harvard. Various Catholic seminaries, such as Woodstock, have moved to secular academic communities. Not fortuitously, seminaries such as these are among the most innovative.

148. Vucinich, "Science," in Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society,* pp. 345-346.

149. The party's dilemma was revealed, for instance, in an interview with V. P. Silin, Doctor of Physics and Mathematics and Secretary of the Party Committee of the Academy of Science's P. N. Lebedev Physics Institute in Moscow, which appeared in *Pravda* (December 2, 1970). In response to one question, Dr. Silin asserted that "conditions ensuring the broadest possible scope for initiative" are essential for the full development of the potentialities of young scientists. He made this point emphatically: "The scientist who asks, 'What should I do?' is a poor scientist. Maybe you're young, but you should have your own ideas. Our task—that of the Party organization and the entire collective—is to create an atmosphere in which you can boldly put forth your ideas and get an interested response, in which you can receive an opportunity to examine, investigate and experiment. This is the only way real scientists grow." V. P. Silin, "The Potential Is Practically Unlimited," interview by V. Kozhemyako, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* 22, no. 47 (December 22, 1970), 8.

150. Medvedev, *The Medvedev Papers,* p. 280. At the same time, the ideology can be used to challenge the legitimacy of official policies. Medvedev also states: "If a

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government which at a particular moment in time adopts a particular point of view uses illegal measures in its polemics against those who hold different views; encroaches upon the secrecy of correspondence, arbitrarily extends the legal functions of the censorship, dismisses people from work, prosecutes them, breaking the standards of legal procedures, commits slander, restricts civil rights, and so on, then this means of ideological warfare is an ideological deviation from the ideology of communism as a whole. The Marxist communist ideology is something international and universal, it extends in time into the past and future, it develops and becomes more complex with the inevitable increase of exchange of information. The chief aim of communism, as a political system, in the works *[sic]* of Karl Marx, consists of 'destroying all attitudes under which a man can be humiliated, oppressed or outcast.'" (p. 282)

151. A. James Reichley, "Our Critical Shortage of Leadership," *Fortune*, 84 (September 1971), 93. See also Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Presidency and the Press," *Commentary*, 51 (March 1971), 41-52; Edith Efron, *The News Twisters* (New York: Nash, 1971).

152. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, p. 155.

153. For 1959, it is estimated that the percentage of party members in the Soviet Union according to level of education was as follows: primary or less, 0.3; incomplete secondary, 9.5; secondary and incomplete higher, 14.0; higher, 27.0. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership*, p. 407.

154. Boris Meisser, "The Power Elite and the Intelligentsia in Soviet Society," in Kurt London, ed., *The Soviet Union: A Half-Century of Communism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 169-170.

155. Most of them (60 per cent) had specialized in the natural sciences, mathematics, or in applied technical fields. S. Voronitsyn, "The Present Composition of the Party Central Committee: A Brief Sociological Analysis," *Bulletin of the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR*, 16 (June 1969), 24-25.

156. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, pp. 150-151. Nettl comments on this statement that "this explains the social effectiveness of intellectuals in bourgeois society (as well as their effectiveness in transforming it radically)." J. P. Nettl, "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent," in Rieff, ed., *On Intellectuals*, p. 57.

157. See David Riesman, "The Spread of 'Collegiate' Values," in de Huszar, ed., *The Intellectuals*, pp. 506-507.

158. On the social characteristics, values, and political role of the managers, see Jeremy Azrael, *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

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COMMENTS ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET INTELLECTUALS

The Editors believed that there would be some interest in having others comment on the argument developed by Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard B. Dobson. Professor Jill Conway of the University of Toronto and Professor Martin Malia of the University of California, Berkeley, have acceded to our request to provide such comment.

JILL CONWAY

Intellectuals in America: Varieties of Accommodation and Conflict

SEYMOUR LIPSET'S and Richard Dobson's discussion of the intellectual as critic and rebel in the United States is an interesting attempt to illuminate and interpret radical social criticism in that post-industrial society which many sociologists until very recently characterized as having moved beyond ideology. They assert that American academic institutions are centers of cultural activity critical of and divorced from the essential values and attitudes of American popular culture, inhabited by scholars and students alienated from the structures of power in America. This picture of the American intellectual and his relationship to his society is not easily recognized by scholars working from a historical rather than a sociological perspective. The notion that American scholars as a group hold ideas more to the left than their fellow Americans serves not to clarify but to confuse the picture. Both conservative and progressive views have been associated with a wide range of intellectual positions which cannot be fitted into the conventional categories used in the analysis of European thought.

The late Richard Hofstadter pointed out in the introduction to his *Social Darwinism in American Thought* that "the roles of liberal and conservative have so often been intermingled and in some ways reversed that clear traditions have never taken form."[1] Hofstadter's generalization came from his detailed study of American intellectual life in the post-Civil War period. In the Gilded Age the robber barons, who were interested in preserving property and controlling egalitarianism, were not conservative in intellectual matters. Quite to the contrary, they were outstanding economic innovators who with unparalleled skill and inventiveness built up the cor-

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porate structure of American business and industry with little if any reference to the past. On the other hand, those who revered the ideas and beliefs of agrarian America might properly be called conservative, for they were, often as not, unquestioning adherents of the Jeffersonian tradition in American thought, as convinced as the sage of Monticello that the principles upon which the republic was founded have a universal applicability. It was this group, true believers in the Jeffersonian teaching, that favored government intervention in economic life, an attitude that Europeans would characterize as left and progressive. Thus for the intellectual historian, the views of those academics whom surveys reveal as being on the political left must be examined much more closely before they are accepted as genuine critics of the American way of life.

The distinctive American experience and the resulting ambiguity of the words "liberal," "conservative," "progressive," and "reactionary" must always be borne in mind in any analysis of American intellectual life. The American intellectual is not a single social type. He may emerge as the expert or technocrat whose mind is at the service of the existing economic and political structures. This is often the case today. He may be the romantic democrat whose opposition to power and authority comes from an idealized vision of Jeffersonian America. He may be something else again. He may reject America and its values entirely and follow the long line of American expatriates to Europe. Henry James was an expatriate for profound aesthetic reasons, as was Ezra Pound. T. S. Eliot left for philosophical as well as aesthetic reasons, later reinforced by religious convictions. Henry Adams is a striking example of an exile who stayed at home. At the same time there are the artists such as Herman Melville and Walt Whitman who believed that the American experience possessed a classic universality. They remained to celebrate a democratic society. They and their successors glorified the common man, be he worker, ethnic, black, or booster from Main Street.

These were and are the artists. Those who live and work with ideas, on the other hand, the academics, the intellectuals, whether expert or romantic democrat, have experienced no rebellion against American political and social institutions but have accepted their promise as the only blueprint for an ideal world order. What changed the quality of intellectual life in American centers of learning in the 1930's and the 1960's has been the emergence of competing models of the ideal world order. However, with rare and not very influential exceptions, it is questionable whether these alternatives have done much to undermine the inner conviction of the most radical contributor to the *New York Review of Books* that he or she inhabits the center of the world. The acrimony of American intellectual life comes not from a genuine adversary culture questioning the legitimacy of both cultural and political institutions. Instead the battle rages because one style or another of approach to the promise of American society is in vogue at the

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seats of political power or may have greater appeal for popular culture. Those deprived of influence for the time being advance their opposing views. But they are adversaries about means and ends in realizing the American dream, not about its ultimate desirability. Certainly in their quest for the rewards of intellectual réclame, their preoccupation (overt or covert) with "making it," they are not exempt from the national obsession with success.

This raises the basic question. Can an activist society whose intellectual tradition is pragmatic produce a genuine adversary culture? In fact, can it even conceive of one? It was certainly the intent of the founders of graduate education in the United States and of the benefactors who endowed the first secular institutions of higher learning in the late nineteenth century to achieve within a bustling commercial culture a true academic enclave where reflection and social criticism would be possible and where scholars could be exempt from the national drive for pecuniary success. However, there were forces at work in the professionalization of higher education which frustrated this intent. Nothing could illustrate their influence more clearly than the history of sociology during its development as a field of academic specialization. The sociological mind in America, which Lipset and Dobson regard as the most radical in the intellectual spectrum, has an instructive history which is exactly contemporaneous with the rise of graduate education and the professionalization of academic life.

The point in American history when the concept of society replaced that of politics and the state in the elucidation of historical change came in the late nineteenth century with the generation of William Graham Sumner and Lester Ward. Their task, as they saw it, was to fit the eighteenth-century idea of progress arising from political institutions into the framework of evolutionary social science. Both succeeded admirably in ways which exemplify the basic configuration of intellectual types in the native American tradition. Sumner's reworking of the evolutionary scheme produced a justification of the unrestrained competition of American economic life in the second half of the nineteenth century. Ward, in justifying the interventionist state, asserted that intellect and social policy should control the dynamic of progress. Both were synthetic thinkers who left no academic successors, though Sumner taught within the established setting of Yale.

The institutional setting which was central for the development of the second generation of sociologists was the newly founded University of Chicago, where the availability of endowment, the opportunity to build a scholarly department, and the social service orientation of William Rainey Harper's university all fostered rapid growth. At Chicago the social factor seemed preeminent to a group of midwesterners for whom the growth of the industrial city appeared to be transforming the rural America of their youth and carrying it upon a path of development not provided for in Amer-

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ican political or social thought. They believed it was the city rather than industrial capitalism which was undermining the basis of community and creating social conflict. Moreover, as citizens of a progressive republic they were not free to speculate about problems arising from the decline of religion, the anomie which comes from the absence or disintegration of norms. For them the problem of norms had to be dealt with under the study of the immigrant and his difficulties of assimilation and under the guise of speculation about "social control" in democratic societies. In focusing attention on the immigrant, none of the Chicago urban sociologists doubted that his assimilation was desirable to a way of life whose legitimacy and humane qualities they left unquestioned. Edward A. Ross, Robert Park, and William I. Thomas believed that the conflicts of assimilation came from the backward racial stock, religion, or culture of the immigrants. It did not occur to them that these conflicts might arise from the exploitive and alienating economic and political systems of the United States. It followed that their students engaged in the study of "human ecology" were obliged to undertake descriptive surveys because the major sources of social conflict could not be examined and the psychological dimensions of the disintegration of norms were blurred by the search for "democratic social control."

One might expect that a generation of describers and cataloguers would logically be followed by a new group of synthesizers in rebellion against the methods and interests of their predecessors. However, this did not happen during the era of Ernest W. Burgess and William F. Ogburn at Chicago and George Lundberg at the University of Washington. The work of these three men made Chicago and Washington the two centers of major development in sociology during the 1920's and 1930's. However, the aim and intention among members of this generation was to establish sociology as a science with the same precision in observation and measurement as a natural science. This ambition reflects a hierarchy of intellectual values which is characteristically American. It is at once a response to the pragmatic movement in philosophy and to the high value placed on science in intellectual endeavor. The result was a concentration on quantification and on the development of survey techniques which has been one of the characteristics of American sociology. Together with the passion for quantification came the development of academic specialization. This was the major institutional factor operating against any further concern with synthesis. Quantification and specialization meant that research projects in the 1920's and 1930's treated materials which were quantifiable and subjects which did not cross the boundaries of the conventional subspecialties which together made up the discipline of sociology. Industrial sociologists did not do research on social pathology, though they well might have in these years. Similarly, research on deviance separated the problem of prostitution from the study of the family and of property systems. As Robert

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Lynd pointed out in *Knowledge for What?*[22] the net result of this fragmentation was the prevention of radical root and branch assessments of American society. Major efforts at synthesis could not be undertaken by a generation pursuing precision in ever more restricted areas of academic competence.

There were other factors militating against synthesis and radical criticism during these decades. Of these the most important were the extent to which the profession became involved in government work during the First World War and later during the great depression. Ogburn's work for the national War Labor Board during the First World War was to be followed by his presidency from 1930 to 1933 of Herbert Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, a natural position for one of the leaders in a profession responding to the enhanced prestige of government service. During the Roosevelt era of the 1930's sociologists were to be deeply attracted by the lure of planning the democratically controlled society and ready to put their skills at the service of established authority. Burgess' faith in the ability of sociology to bring about utopia was expressed in his presidential address to the American Sociological Society in 1934. He declared that the mores of the American people could be manipulated in a planned progression of change which would permit the United States to become the model democracy of a new world order. Lundberg's awareness of the extent to which government involvement blunted scientific detachment made his one of the few voices of the era raised against the tendency to merge research projects with political goals. Given the enthusiasms of the New Deal and the Second World War it is understandable, if unfortunate, that his warnings were not well received by his contemporaries.

The climate of opinion which developed in the late 1930's and the 1940's did nothing to reverse the trend which linked research in sociology with established authority. Instead the rise of fascism and the outbreak of the Second World War created a situation in which the capacity for social research could have great patriotic significance. Coincidentally, Paul Lazarsfeld brought to the United States the new research techniques necessary for surveying opinion and testing attitudes, techniques which were necessary for mobilizing a national population. Lazarsfeld's interests in market research which he had developed in Europe were to find their full institutional expression at Columbia University and its related research institute. Here was developed the first large scale research center utilizing the new techniques. This kind of institution, created, staffed, and maintained for conducting surveys, was to be the prototype of sociological development in the postwar period, of value alike to business and government and far more dependent on their support than earlier research had been. From such centers teams go out to quantify the alienation of the appropriate sample of the work force on the requisite five point scale. The capacity to do so however produces only meliorist criticism of industrial organization because of the very nature of the research operation.

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Even so, the ability to scrutinize a national population and to describe not only the "human ecology" of a city or the deference system of a small town but states of mind as well did lead sociologists in the late forties and fifties to the spiritual malaise of the consumer society. It is debatable, however, whether the discovery of the anomie of the middle class has provoked a fundamental reassessment of American values among those who led the way in mapping the contours of the malaise. At the conclusion of *The Lonely Crowd* David Riesman professes a modified version of the American faith. "The idea," he says, "that men are created free and equal is both true and misleading: men are created different; they lose their social freedom and their individual autonomy in seeking to become like each other."[3] This statement implies a lost state of autonomy, like the independence of the Jeffersonian yeoman, to which all should desire to return.

In the fifties and sixties this sense of lost American innocence was to be still further intensified by renewed contact with European thought and the discovery of elites. The recognition of the existence of elites and the new concern with the nature of leadership came in a decade when the disasters of American foreign policy emphasized in the most unambiguous terms the dimensions of American economic imperialism. At the same time the cultural revolution in China proved infinitely attractive to American youth dissatisfied both with mass culture and the learning of cultural institutions where specialization and professionalism had constrained intellectual spontaneity and deadened both curiosity and ideological fervor. These external forces have contributed to the radicalization of a new generation in American sociology, so that in place of the once bland assumption of freedom from values, academic debate centers upon the political orientation of all research. Beneath the passionate search to unmask structures of power, lines of command, enclaves of privilege, and sexist domination—all seen as domestic dimensions of American imperialism—there lies an implicit assumption of subversion. Only treachery can explain why a once innocent republic should acquire such a massive drive for power and dominion. The theme of subversion is a recurrent one in the writing of American history, worked and reworked in moralistic terms in the nineteenth century, secularized in economic terms by the generation of Beard and Parrington, refined and restated by the new analysts of the cold war. Just as the conspiracies of the rich are necessary to explain America's decline from grace because the initial promise of the Revolution and the break from Europe cannot be questioned, so it is necessary for American intellectuals to establish the path to recovery, some liberation from the dream turned nightmare. The transformations of consciousness which will give us back the spontaneity of that once happy agrarian utopia will, we are told, come from technology, from the media, from the youthful counterculture, from "people's universities" and "free schools." The list is long. To

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it we must now add the "adversary culture" of the universities, which have suddenly become capable of generating fundamental criticisms of American society, criticisms directed at what Lipset and Dobson call structural change, though in fact the only changes they mention are expansion of economic opportunity and modifications of the political system. One final point must be made about Lipset's and Dobson's analysis of American intellectual life. They follow Schumpeter in assuming that a capitalist society is both unable and unwilling to control its intellectuals because of the reliance of bourgeois business upon free enterprise in goods and ideas.[4] What Schumpeter did not envision, steeped as he was in the values of European intellectual life, was the complexity and ambiguity of the intellectual's role in America. The truly alienated respond to the force of democratic sentiment by taking their explosive criticisms into exile. Those who remain are sufficiently steeped in the capitalist ethos to be controlled by the market for their ideas, strong enough believers in the American way to make them, as Santayana said, "clergymen without a church" who may dispute about dogma but who never question the revelation.[5]

References

1. Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Life* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944), p. 8. The introduction contains a brief essay on the role of the intellectual in America which is among the most enlightening on this complex subject.

2. Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge For What?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939).

3. David Riesman and others, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953), p. 349.

4. See Lipset's and Dobson's note 156.

5. George Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1934), p. 43.

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MARTIN E. MALIA

The Intellectuals: Adversaries or Clerisy?

SEYMOUR LIPSET and Richard Dobson, in analyzing the role of "critical intellectuals" in the United States and the Soviet Union, give a pessimistic version of the "convergence theory" of Western and Russian developments. Their thesis is that in an advanced technological, or "post-industrial," order the key institutions of society are increasingly dependent for their functioning on professionally trained intellectuals; yet these intellectuals, because of the critical faculties required by their work, also become the bearers of a strident "adversary culture" which questions the very legitimacy of the order they serve. Indeed, since "the critical intellectual denies the possibility of participating in government without betraying the ideals of the society," his attitude becomes the chief "contradiction" of the post-industrial order: modern society clearly cannot live without its intellectuals, but it may not be able to live with them, either.

There is certainly much evidence for the period since the end of the cold war—evidence which Professor Lipset and Mr. Dobson marshal most persuasively—to support such a thesis; and the 1960's in particular may well go down as a major cultural divide in modern history. Still, we should not forget that the "end of ideology" was once prematurely proclaimed, in the 1950's; and it may be equally premature now to proclaim the definitive return of ideology. Just as destalinization and the fading of the cold war permitted a revival of ideological criticism, so too new international events may provoke another ideological recession; and, indeed, since Nixon and Mao have appeared in the media smiling benignly at each other, the critical intelligentsia in all countries is already somewhat less sure of itself. In any event, it is worth attempting to point out certain historical and social factors which could limit or diminish the recent impact of critical intellectuals in both East and West.

Professor Lipset and Mr. Dobson find the propensity of intellectuals to assume an adversary stance to lie in a variety of causes: the irritations of censorship and repression, the pressures of historical circumstances, the value system of the national tradition. But they find the basic cause in the nature of intellectual activity itself, in "its concern for creativity, for origin-

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ality, and for rejecting the traditional and the established": skepticism and criticism of all received values, of all accepted norms, are intrinsic to intellectual creativity per se; and this characteristic is amplified many times over when intellectuals are mobilized massively in the "technostructure" and "culture apparatus" of advanced societies.

What is questionable in this view is the primacy as a causal factor accorded to the nature of intellectual activity per se; for, though all intellectuals live by exercising critical discernment, a *systematically* critical intelligentsia, directing its fire primarily at society, is a relatively rare—and recent—phenomenon, a special case in the long history of professional intellectuals. For such an intelligentsia to emerge a special concatenation of other factors—social, political, and historical—is required, so as to focus the critical temper of intellectuals with ideological obsessiveness on a limited range of sociopolitical issues. Indeed, Professor Lipset and Mr. Dobson recognize this multicausal pattern in their perceptive discussion of the fluctuating fortunes of the critical intelligentsia between the 1930's and the 1960's and of their dependence on the egalitarian and populistic value system of the United States, which obviously originated in a social and religious heritage quite independent of the intellectual class itself. Still, such factors deserve to be explored further, and in terms of other national examples, in an effort to assess more precisely the conditions under which the critical habits inherent in intellectual activity go the lengths of a full-blown "adversary" culture.

It should be noted, by way of introduction, that the existence of such a culture implies a number of attitudes, over and above a critical consciousness, on the part of intellectuals. It implies, first, self-consciousness as a group, defined by a sense of collective mission to society. By the same token, it implies a sense of opposition between the intellectuals and society, a sense of "we" and "they," of the enlightened and the benighted, the refined and the philistine, the progressive and the retrograde. It thus implies, also, a sense of historical movement, of progress founded on constant struggle between "right" and "left," an agonistic dynamic in which the intellectuals are the vanguard. It implies, finally, the belief in the following amalgam of values: that the life of the intellect yields not only scientific truth, but moral truth; that the moral truth is also inevitably social in nature; that there exists, therefore, a scientific or rational politics the aim of which is social justice, or equality; and that the men of intellect, by definition, are the chief bearers of this truth-which-is-justice. Intellectuals of this particular sort are best designated by the Russian term "intelligentsia," which, from the time of its emergence in the 1860's, has meant, basically, "critically thinking personalities" (in Pisarev's phrase) or "nihilists" (in Turgenev's term), in the sense of those who systematically question all traditional values in the name of reason, progress, and social justice.

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Why such a term and group first emerged in backward Russia will be touched on later. For the moment suffice it to note that a similar group self-consciousness was much slower to emerge in the more advanced West. Elements of the above mentioned syndrome of attitudes were clearly present among the French Encyclopedists, in Marx, and on the nineteenth-century European left generally; but the feeling that these attitudes belong, or ought to belong, to *all* intellectuals is a relatively recent phenomenon. To stick to terminology as a convenient measure of collective self-consciousness, we first hear of *la classe intellectuelle* in France at the time of the Dreyfus affair. In the English-speaking world the term "the intellectuals" (invariably in quotation marks) appears only in 1914, with Bertrand Russell in Britain or with Walter Lippmann (then on the left) in America. It seems, moreover, to have been imported from France, in particular from the circle of Romain Rolland and other "intellectuals" opposed to the war. It was only after the war and the Russian Revolution that the term lost its quotation marks and became a part of the standard vocabulary everywhere, replacing the older and less potent designation of "men of letters." At the same time the terms "right" and "left," hitherto used only on the Continent, entered the Anglo-Saxon political vocabulary, giving a heightened sense of historical movement and indicating to the newly self-conscious intellectuals which side they should be on.

Thus it was the trauma of world war together with the Russian Revolution, and the concomitant spread of Marxism-Leninism (an ideology of the Russian intelligentsia, after all), that for the first time generalized belief in the responsibilities of militant, missionary, or moral intellectuals. For modern war seemed to menace the very existence of civilization at the same time that revolutionary Communism offered the mirage of a new type of civilization. And ever since 1914 we have lived with the same cycle of political and social issues—the fear of *Gotterdämmerung* and the hope of the ultimate utopia—with the result that the new type of political-moral intellectual has been with us just as constantly, from the *New Masses*, to the *Partisan Review*, to the *New York Review of Books*, at times driven to retrench, as at the height of Stalinism, but always ready to return in force whenever the issues of war and revolution came again to the fore.

But in other political and cultural circumstances the intellectuals can behave very differently. Let us begin with a situation that presents the clearest antithesis to the modern one: the period—say until the seventeenth century—when Western society was dominated by a religious culture articulated through established churches. In this situation the intellectuals, who were often also clerics, could be critical of received truths only within narrow limits and in selective fashion, arguing for one variant of religious tradition against another, as for example in disputes between Puritans and Anglicans or between Jansenists and Jesuits. Or when the intellectuals were rationalists, as in the case of Baconians or Cartesians, they

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always took care to reconcile, in some manner, the dictates of reason with the heritage of faith. Thus systematic, across-the-board criticism was simply out of the question for intellectuals of whatever stripe. This was so not only because society would not tolerate total or "heretical" dissent, but also because the intellectuals themselves had accepted and internalized the notion that the basic principles by which man lives must be beyond human questioning.

The existence of critical intellectuals, then, presupposes a predominantly secular, pluralistic, and liberal culture, which makes a positive value of free expression and of intellectual competition in the "market place of ideas." And this in turn presupposes not only institutional arrangements guaranteeing civil liberties, but also the triumph of modern science, which conferred on human reason—the prime faculty of all intellectuals—an authority and apparent infallibility it had never before possessed. Still, these developments, for the first time approximated in the eighteenth century, constitute the necessary, but not the sufficient, conditions for the emergence of a critical intelligentsia. It is political and social conditions, as well as the national tradition, which play the decisive role in orienting the energies of the intellectuals. For example, in the eighteenth century a liberal culture and the new science were certainly more advanced in England than in France, yet it was France which produced those first critical intellectuals known as the philosophes.

In England the new rationalism of science led to the empiricism of Locke and the skepticism of Hume, which emphasized the limits of human understanding almost as much as its achievements, combatting all "enthusiasm" and warning against the vagaries of mere "opinion"; while what reforming zeal existed in society was left to the religious sects and dissenters of an "unenlightened" sort. This was so, in large part, because after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 the majority of intellectuals were satisfied with the existing oligarchic, liberal order and wished to protect it from the assault of religious zealots left over from the turmoil of the Great Rebellion. In France, on the other hand, the existence of absolute monarchy, a monolithic established church, and a legal class hierarchy furnished social issues to the intellectuals that made it possible for the Encyclopedists to transform Locke's prudent empiricism into an instrument of radical criticism, the weapon of a militant *parti de la saine philosophie* in its struggle with the "superstition" and "irrationality" of the establishment. And this tendency was reinforced by the absence in France of a tradition of religious dissent to serve as an alternative outlet for reforming energies. Then, after 1789, the Revolution served to fix the French national myth predominantly on the left, while the British, reacting to the rationalistic follies transpiring in France (for example, Burke) fixed their national myth ever more firmly in the mold of the moderate, "organic" overturn of 1688 and of the prudent empiricism that stemmed from it.

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Thus the same intellectual method, founded on critical adherence to the "facts" as established by modern science, led to very different intellectual traditions in the two countries, because of differing social, political, and national circumstances. And once these two traditions had become fixed, they largely defined the field of maneuver, and the range and tone of criticism, for all future generations of intellectuals. As a result, modern Britain, though it has had its Bertrand Russell, its Oxford Pledge, and the *New Statesman and Nation,* has never had an adversary intelligentsia on the scale of modern France, with large masses of intellectuals actually in "The Party" and others, such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, hovering anxiously on its fringes. This difference cannot be explained by the dynamic of intellectual creativity per se; it can only be accounted for by the total context in which the intellectuals exercise their creativity, and the targets for criticism offered by that context.

An even more telling example of this fact is furnished by modern Germany. Surely, no group of intellectuals in modern history has been more creative than that of Germany between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Indeed, most of the great intellectual "isms" of the modern world, from Kant, Hegel, and Marx, to Nietzsche, Freud, and Weber are of German origin; and it is no exaggeration to claim that, in the domain of general social philosophy, mankind continues to live off the accumulated intellectual capital of pre-Hitler Germany (by comparison nineteenth-century British utilitarianism and French positivism have been paltry influences). Yet this great German tradition has leaned much more to the right than to the left; and it has displayed consistent ambiguity toward the role and power of reason in human affairs. There is, to be sure, the towering exception of Marx; but Marx (and the other "left Hegelians") can be accounted for, in part, by the one period of acute conflict, in the 1830's and 1840's, between the German establishment and the intellectuals. Otherwise, the German intelligentsia has supported, and indeed justified, the established and the traditional with all the power of its creativity.

Why this should be so is a very complicated matter, but a few crucial factors may be singled out. First, the religious heritage of Lutheranism, which abandoned control of the church to the territorial prince, has meant that in much of German thought freedom came to be associated with voluntary submission to authority—as in Hegel's (and Marx's) equation of liberty with the conscious and rational acceptance of historical necessity. Second, when German national culture began to stake out its identity in the period of the *Sturm und Drang* it was obliged to do so by combatting the universalistic pretentions of dominant French rationalism, thereby producing an unusually precocious and fecund critique of all reason in the name of romantic, intuitionist, and subjectivist modes of thought. Third, throughout the nineteenth century German society was in large part modernized, whether with respect to industrialization or to education, by

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state action from above rather than by citizen initiative from below, thereby creating a bizarrely mixed order that was at the same time progressive and undemocratic, dynamic and unegalitarian, ultramodern and yet tenaciously old regime. Indeed, it was autocratic Imperial Germany which pioneered in linking the universities with the research laboratory, industry, and the state bureaucracy, thus adumbrating the present-day "technostructure."

In this confused situation the intelligentsia of Imperial Germany divided. Some, such as the future members of the Frankfurt School, chose critical opposition and entered the Marxist subculture, which entailed automatic exclusion from the universities and from a national forum. But the majority, including the most creative minds of the period, found that the system embodied enough of the values of "culture" to opt for integration and careers as "mandarins." As a result, the creativity of German intellectuals was turned less toward criticism of established institutions and values in Germany than toward the criticism of "Western" (Anglo-French) rationalism, of liberalism, positivism, and individualistic capitalism. Indeed, this criticism of critical intellect became the stock-in-trade of the German intellectuals after 1870—when they had become the admiration and envy of the world. Thus most of the "mandarins" were frankly conservative, extolling and rationalizing the "organic" German synthesis of the modern with the traditional, as did Tönnies and Sombart, the *Kathedersozialisten* and Thomas Mann, Meinecke and Heidegger; while such vulgar Nietzschean publicists as Scheler, Spengler, and Moeller van den Bruck stridently complained that the existing order was not conservative enough.

If the differences of national traditions and social and political patterns between England, France, and Germany have been great, the differences between the United States and Russia are even greater. And even though these differences are in a sense "fairly obvious," it is worth belaboring the obvious a bit here, for the present role and impact of the intellectuals of the two countries is largely governed by these institutional and historical dissimilarities.

Professor Lipset and Mr. Dobson have appropriately emphasized the lack of a legitimate conservative tradition and the predominance of an egalitarian ethos in the United States. It might be added that these characteristics of the national value system are due, among other things, to the Puritan settlement of the more important colonies and the persistence, in secularized form, of a liberal, evangelical spirit; to the quasi-revolutionary origins of the Republic; to the enduring lack of a rigidly stratified social structure; to the unparalleled opportunities for individual advancement and social mobility offered by an entire continent to be developed; to a sense of moral mission as a "new" society opposed to the "corruption" of old Europe, and so forth. Another unique feature of American society which

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deserves to be emphasized is the exceptional importance of the judiciary as the guardian of the higher national values, construed as much in ethical as in legal terms, a situation which exists in no other country, not even in the motherland of civil liberties and judge-made law, England. All of these circumstances together have given exceptional institutional leverage to left liberal intellectuals of the adversary culture, whether in promoting civil rights, influencing national policy on Vietnam, publishing the Pentagon papers, or fighting the regents of the University of California on behalf of Angela Davis. Visiting European leftists, such as Jean-François Revel and Edgar Morin, are constantly amazed by, and envious of, the variety and potency of the means of action to effect change open to American intellectuals. And these circumstances, in conjunction with real issues whose time had come, such as civil rights and the Vietnam war, account for much of the impact of the critical intellectuals in the 1960's.

Yet these same circumstances, especially once the burning issues have passed (as they inevitably do), can also serve to blunt the impact of the critical intellectuals. For the very flexibility of American institutions and the means of action they provide constantly lead dissenters, despite some talk about the hopelessness of the "system," back into the institutions of that same system: the courts, elections, the reform or "capture" of the Democratic party. Ideological issues, moreover, become particularized: elaborate dissertations by Noam Chomsky in the *New York Review of Books* about "imperialism" for most readers boil down to "the war" and to voting for McCarthy or McGovern; the issue of "capitalism" tends to dissolve into concern for ecology and the environment, or Ralph Nader's "consumerism"; allegations of structural "racism" come in fact to focus on concrete electoral and economic grievances of blacks or chicanos (for Max Rafferty, after all, can be defeated by Wilson Riles as California State Superintendent of Education).

Indeed, one of the standard complaints of the New Left is the "system's" ability to "co-opt" radical personnel and issues, to fuse them into a "wishy-washy" reformism. And this allegation is largely true. To be sure, with each crisis, from the New Deal to the 1960's, the system gives way somewhat and moves a bit to the left, a few authentic "reds" creep into the left wing of the Democratic fold and a number of Henry Wallace types come prominently to the fore, while the right develops a panicky suspicion of sell-out and treason. Still, in each of these crises the adversary culture gives way much more than does the system, and most of its spokesmen wind up, *à la Partisan Review*, basically supporting the new national "consensus," while somewhat later the right, *à la* Nixon, takes up many of the economic and foreign policies of a John Kenneth Galbraith. This view, to be sure, represents the optimistic, centrist opinion that America has usually had of itself. Nonetheless, it possesses a very real basis in historical fact; and institutionalized capacity to readjust the national consensus, surely, pro-

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vides the chief opportunity, and the principal limitation, for American intellectuals.

It should be needless to emphasize that no such flexibility and capacity for accommodation have characterized the Russian order, whether under the old regime or the new. And this circumstance has served to endow the Russian intellectual with a national heritage that combines the most exalted kind of critical ideals with a virtually complete lack of institutional means for implementing them—a situation, obviously, which is the exact antithesis of the American one.

Under the old regime the rigidity and the very real irreformability of the autocracy led to the emergence of a diamond-pure adversary intelligentsia of the sort that has already been defined. It was, moreover, the most extreme wing of this intelligentsia, the Bolsheviks, which gave to the new Soviet society its national myth and its norms of legitimacy. Thus the combined heritage of the old regime intelligentsia and of the October Revolution have given Soviet society the most left set of ideals of any modern nation—not only "rational" economic planning and material abundance, but the stateless and classless society—ideals so far left that no society could realize them. This circumstance, in conjunction with the Russian heritage of backwardness and Stalin's regimented modernization from above, have led to a uniquely wide gap between the ideal and the real in Soviet life.

In such a situation, the mass production of professionally trained intellectuals necessary for modernization would seem to favor the emergence of a thriving adversary culture. In reality, however, other circumstances have kept such a development to a minimum. And it should be emphasized that the number of active dissenters in the Soviet Union is extremely small. Although we obviously do not have the kind of survey data on Soviet intellectuals that we have for American intellectuals, it is clear from numerous reports of foreigners who have visited or resided in Russia that the dissident activities symbolized by such figures as Sakharov, Amalrik, Solzhenitsyn, or the brothers Medvedev are restricted to very limited circles in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Novosibirsk, and a few other centers, and that these activities are quite unknown to the overwhelming majority of the population.

This impotence is due, in the first instance, to the complete lack of institutional leverage afforded to critical intellectuals by the Soviet political structure—the obvious absence not only of an independent judiciary and political parties, but even of elementary freedom of expression. *Samizdat*, however remarkable in the post-Stalinist context, is still a primitive, and very limited, means of disseminating information, and one that probably reaches more people in the West than in Russia. As I. F. Stone aptly said in a recent number of the *New York Review of Books*, the problem of free expression as it is now posed in the Soviet Union takes us back more than

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two hundred years to the English revolution of 1688. Under such circumstances the only leverage that Soviet critical intellectuals possess is the combined appeal to the literal meaning of the Soviet Constitution (the tactic of Sakharov's "Committee for Human Rights") and to international public opinion so as to exert pressure on the Soviet government. This tactic has produced results on occasion, as in obtaining the release of Jaurès Medvedev, and, especially, in producing the pardon of the Leningrad Jews tried in early 1971—at the same moment Franco pardoned the accused in the Burgos trial. Still, this technique of moral pressure is as primitive as is *samizdat;* and for its few known successes there is a far larger, and unknown, number of failures.

Moreover, the limited scope both of *samizdat* and of the technique of moral pressure depend entirely on the persistence of division of opinion within the Soviet hierarchy as to how far to tolerate such dissident activity. Moderates apparently feel the dissidents are not dangerous enough to make it worth the scandal of repressing them. But old Stalinist and neo-Stalinist elements clearly disagree, and these groups have been gaining strength since Khrushchev's fall, in 1964, in the administrative bureaucracy, the military, and even in the technostructure; for the Soviet establishment possesses unusually effective means for the co-optation of like-minded successors. How long these divisions of tactical opinion will leave to Soviet critical intellectuals their present narrow margin of maneuver is impossible to tell. What is certain, however, is that in a "crunch" all the leverage is on the side of the establishment and that, outside of a handful of *exaltés*, no one would attempt a "talent strike" against the system.

The Czechoslovak case in 1968 is here the touchstone, for despite the *national* union of the intelligentsia for reform, and their commitment to the premises of Radovan Richta, quoted by Professor Lipset and Mr. Dobson, the entire movement collapsed once autocratic pressure was applied—and society continued to function, inefficiently of course, but not much more inefficiently than Communist societies normally function. And both the Soviet government and the Soviet critical intellectuals are quite aware of this precedent. In short, the opinion of Joseph Schumpeter, quoted by Professor Lipset and Mr. Dobson, that, in effect, intellectual repression and advance technology cannot mix, does not hold under certain political structures; and what Leszek Kołakowski deplored as the "resort to the instruments of force" can, if necessary, close the gap between the two—at a low level of efficiency to be sure, but then the aim of such regimes is not economic efficiency as such, but that minimum of crucial productivity necessary to support international political power.

Another set of inhibiting factors for Soviet critical intellectuals lies not in the system but in themselves. Soviet intellectuals as a group are characterized, first, by a very low level of critical sophistication. The flat quality of Soviet intellectual life in most areas outside the natural sciences, the dead

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weight of official ideology, and the relative lack of contact with the West for some fifty years have conspired to deprive Soviet intellectuals of adequate concepts and models in terms of which to criticize their society. Their protest, therefore, is almost always a moral one, expressed moreover in literary terms. The key critics are poets and novelists, such as Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn, and not social scientists as in the West. The criticism of Soviet intellectuals thus almost never assumes the form of an *analysis* of the system, directed to the great and obvious questions: what went wrong with the Revolution, and why Stalinism? Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge* is a reasonably well-documented study of Stalinist practices, but it is a complete failure as an effort to explain why such "aberrations" occurred. The only real attempt at an analysis of Soviet reality is Amalrik's *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* but this is only the timid beginning of an enormous task.

A second constraint on the Soviet critical intelligentsia lies in its unique relation to Marxism-Leninism. Elsewhere Marxism-Leninism, in one or another version, and usually in a loose construction, provides the chief critical theory of adversary intellectuals, since it offers a "scientific" explanation of the principal moral scandals to the left—inequality and exploitation—which it accounts for by "capitalism" at home and "imperialism" abroad. Yet this theory is unavailable as a critical weapon to the Soviet left, in part because it has been preempted by the state, and in part because its categories are completely unadapted to the analysis of Soviet society. To be sure, as Amalrik informs us, the Soviet opposition, in addition to Liberals and Christians, is composed of "Marxist-Leninists," such as Grigorenko. But this group, which wishes to return to a mythical "democratic Leninism," as a practical matter has the same constitutionalist program as the Liberals; thus they use Leninism as a moral mystique, not as a mode of analyzing Soviet society. And the unavailability of Marxism-Leninism as a critical doctrine, in combination with the failure to produce a new mode of social analysis, leaves the Soviet intelligentsia without any sweeping, universalistic ideology, and hence with a diminished critical bite.

The same inhibiting confusion applies to the Soviet intellectuals' relationship to socialism. In the West and in the third world the ultimate ideal of the left, and the final goal of history, is held to be "socialism," in the loose sense of a world beyond private property and the profit motive, a world of justice and equality through nationalization. But this ideal cannot serve as a critical foil to reality for Soviet intellectuals, since "socialism," at least in the sense of nationalization, already exists in Russia and they all accept it as a *fait accompli*. The problem, then, is only how to make it work "correctly," to purge it of abuses. But this is viewed as a limited, practical problem, not as a question of "revolution" or of transition to a new historical stage. Thus, once again, ideology is evacuated and critical punch is lost.

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Still other ideological avenues and critical utopias are closed to Soviet intellectuals. Among the principal utopias of the old regime intelligentsia was "the people," either the peasants, the workers, or both. But belief in the radical, redemptive power of the people is no longer possible in Russia, in part because the people have already had their metahistorical day, in 1917, and the results were disappointing, but even more because of the Stalinist formula of exploiting popular frustration, xenophobia, and obscurantism against the intelligentsia during the purges of the 1930's and the "anti-cosmopolitan" (that is, anti-Semitic) campaign after World War II. As a result of these experiences, the Soviet intelligentsia is, by and large, afraid of the masses as an unenlightened force and as an ally of the repressive state. And this is true despite a certain Slavophile populism in Solzhenitsyn's art and despite Sakharov's rhetorical assertion that the intelligentsia "properly understood" is a part of the people. As a practical matter, Soviet intellectuals know that they are alone in their struggle with the state, and virtually without allies or even understanding among the masses.

For similar reasons Soviet intellectuals harbor no romantic illusions about the might and purity of third world revolution, Ho Chi Minh, Cuba, and above all about China. Indeed, Sakharov finds China even more frightening than his own government, the ultimate expression of all the evils that Stalin visited upon Russia.

The critical horizon, then, of Soviet intellectuals is an extremely narrow one in every respect. Both the institutional and the cultural context in which they operate make their criticism far less sweeping and global than that of their more fortunate Western confreres. At the same time, these circumstances leave no room for the nihilistic vitriol which characterizes a part of the Western counterculture. Instead, the Soviet critical intelligentsia concentrates pragmatically on the "small deeds" of old-fashioned civil liberties and liberal constitutionalism. In theory, this is a crippling "contradiction" for the Soviet order. It could become such in reality, however, only if the people became responsive to the intellectuals' criticisms, and for the moment there is no sign that this is occurring.

Thus, for very different reasons, there is probably at least as much stability in the Soviet as in the American order, despite the rapid growth of the technostructure in both countries; and the critical potential of the intellectuals in the two societies will no doubt continue to be filtered fairly routinely through the peculiar national traditions and institutional patterns of each nation for a long time to come.

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(New York, 1968), *The Politics of Unreason* (New York, 1970, with Earl Raab), and *Rebellion in the University* (Boston, 1972). Mr. Lipset is the recipient of the Gunnar Myrdal Award (1970). He is currently on a Guggenheim fellowship for the study of intellectuals, of which this article is a preliminary part.

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